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 Introduction
This book is about the human spirit and the kind of people Robert F. Kennedy 
may have had in mind when he spoke in South Africa in 1966 during the 
harsh days of apartheid, two years after Nelson Mandela was imprisoned.
Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, 
or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and 
crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring, 
those ripples build a current which can sweep down the mightiest walls 
of oppression and resistance.1
Mothers, students, teachers, lawyers, clergy, and many others featured in 
this book, from uneducated market women to professors, stepped out of 
the shadows and relative safety of anonymity into the often dangerous 
spotlight of repressive regimes. Mostly without violence, they stood up for 
democratic freedoms and human rights, for dignity and a better life. Their 
nonviolence does not mean they did nothing: they engaged in nonviolent 
strategies, and they took action.
Few studies have focused on the importance of such nonviolent resist-
ance in Africa in challenging repressive regimes. But this study also offers 
insights into civil resistance anywhere. Unlike some of the more recent 
struggles in the Arab world, including North Africa, most of the struggles 
highlighted in this book occurred before the use of Facebook and Twitter; 
activists stayed in touch through informal channels. Their struggles were 
not immediately successful, but eventually they were. Not all the activists 
stayed true to their stated goals once change had come, but many did. In 
most cases the peaceful resistance alone was not responsible for forcing the 
regimes out of power: international pressures, sometimes military interven-
tion played an important part. But without the domestic pressure against 
the regimes it is unlikely that change would have come as soon as it did.
This is a timeless book and a global story: the kinds of struggles portrayed 
continue today in many parts of the world, often in the form of mass protests 
that offer some sense of support in terms of numbers. But around the world 
there are many other people who challenge repressive regimes in small 
1 Robert F. Kennedy, “A Tiny Ripple of Hope” (Day of Aff irmation address at Cape Town Uni-
versity, Cape Town, South Africa, June 6, 1966), American Rhetoric. http://www.americanrhetoric.
com/ speeches/rfkcapetown.com/. 
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groups or even as individuals. This book is about some of those people in 
three sub-Saharan African countries and how they challenged regimes that 
used detention, torture, even murder to try to keep them quiet. They insisted 
on a halt to political detentions, state murders, torture, and the lack of the 
rule of law. In most cases, they had never been asked in detail about their 
nonviolent activism; most seemed eager to tell their story, stories seldom 
heard in the West.
Shortly after Nelson Mandela’s death in late 2013, one newspaper published 
the names of some of the political activists in prison in ten countries includ-
ing Russia, China, Ethiopia, and Vietnam (where Vietnamese Catholic priest 
and pro-democracy dissident Father Thadeus Nguyen Van was completing 
his twentieth year in prison since the 1970s for advocating for freedom and 
democracy).2 In Bogota, Columbia, David Ravelo was serving an eighteen-
year sentence for aggravated homicide; international human rights groups 
called the charge bogus and said he was imprisoned for speaking out on 
human rights violations in his country. Others were being held in Indonesia, 
Uzbekistan, and Tibet, where popular singer Lolo was sentenced to six years 
in prison in 2013 for writing and performing songs that advocated independ-
ence from China. In Bahrain, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, the father of Bahrain’s 
human rights movement, was serving a life sentence following his arrest 
after a series of pro-democracy demonstrations in 2011. And in Rwanda, two 
women journalists – editor Agnes Uwimana Nkusi and reporter Saidath 
Mukakibibi – were imprisoned for their independent reporting that was 
allegedly inciting civil disobedience.
This book tells the story of how people in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kenya 
stood up to repressive regimes and eventually helped force the abusive 
leaders out of power. It builds on existing theories of social movement but 
suggests revisions that help explain nonviolent social movements in repres-
sive settings. The model presented includes individual and organizational 
activism, as well as mass demonstrations. In all three countries, the nar-
rative traces the growth of what became a culture of resistance. This study 
differs from most studies of social movements in several ways. This study:
– focuses on activism by individuals and small groups, rather than the 
usual focus on large, often formal organizations (this approach reveals 
2 Dominque Mosbergen, “Nelson Mandela Was Released From Prison after 27 Years. These 
10 Political Prisoners Are Still Waiting,” The Huffington Post, December 7, 2013, accessed 
December 18, 2013, http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/2013/12/06/political-prisoners-nelson-
mandela_n_4401305.html#es_share_endedhese.
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a broader range of participants in nonviolent social movements than is 
normally recognized);
– shows that when it is too dangerous to pursue formal, organized chal-
lenges to a regime, individuals and small groups can sometimes manage 
to continue informal “resistance in abeyance” (at low levels), while 
waiting for safer times when they can emerge more fully and openly;
– traces how social movements actually start in poor, repressed countries;
– explains how nonviolent resistance movements can survive with mini-
mal material resources and little in the way of the external advantages 
that are usually associated with social movements’ progress, especially 
in the democratic West.
Here are three examples of the kind of nonviolent resistance this book is 
about.
In Sierra Leone, just days after a military coup, independent reporters 
were being arrested by the new regime. It fell to veteran journalist Olu 
Gordon, as secretary general of the national journalists association to deliver 
a protest letter to the junta headquarters. “I was petrified. At the time we 
just took chances – we did what had to be done.”3 Later some independent 
newspapers began operating from secret locations, distributing their 
copies hidden inside the pages of pro-government papers. (The story of 
the resistance by underground reporters and treatment of some who were 
caught is related in Chapter 4.)
Three Kenyan mothers, including Milcah Wanjiku, were convinced that 
the state was about to execute their imprisoned sons. They organized a 
nonviolent protest with a small group of other mothers of political prison-
ers, camping out in a park in downtown Nairobi. The government warned 
them not to do it but the women were undeterred. “What can I be afraid of 
when my son had been locked up? I felt my son would be hanged,” Wanjiku 
said. Unsure how to respond, especially against mothers, the government 
waited several days before sending in police armed with clubs and teargas 
to disperse them, as well as the growing number of volunteers protecting 
them. But the mothers reassembled at a nearby church and, with the help 
of domestic and international publicity and pressure, eventually won the 
release of all but one of the prisoners. Years later Milcah Wanjiku said she 
3 Olu Gordon, in an interview with the author, November 28, 2008, in his newspaper off ice 
in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Gordon, who died in 2011, was a longtime independent journalist 
and a former faculty member at Fourah Bay College.
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would protest again if her son was in danger.4 (The story of the mothers’ 
protest is detailed in Chapter 8.)
Liberian human rights attorney Tiawan Gongloe had been challenging 
authoritarian President Charles Taylor’s abuses of the rule of law despite 
the risks to him. Then he was detained and subjected to a long night 
of torture in a police station. Word of his plight quickly spread and a 
large crowd of his supporters quickly gathered spontaneously outside 
the station, following him the next morning when police took him to a 
local hospital. The crowds made him realize that “people did appreciate 
the things that we [he and other human rights attorneys] were doing 
for protecting the rights of the people. I think they [the regime] intensi-
f ied human rights advocacy by their repression because – the more they 
became repressive, the more people became resilient.”5 (His story is told 
in full in Chapter 6.)
Olu Gordon, Milcah Wanjiku, and Tiawan Gongloe were among the 
many ordinary people of their countries who became heroes in the eyes 
of their fellow citizens. They provided some of the “ripples of hope” that 
encouraged others to protest as part of nonviolent social movements that 
resisted repressive regimes. In most studies of social movements, this kind 
of individual or small-group contribution has often gone unnoticed.
Case Studies and Organization of the Book
The book is based on some 170 interviews by the author over a ten-year 
period in the three countries, mostly with former activists and others, plus 
extensive archival research and review of relevant literature. Interviews 
provide a window on resistance that archival studies and event counting do 
not, offering insights into the strategic choices participants take and revela-
tions regarding their motives. As one noted scholar of political contention/
social movements notes: “As we move from supposedly objective political 
opportunities to more subjective ones, perceptions become crucial, and the 
only way to get at perceptions is through interviews.”6 Chapter 1 offers theo-
retical perspectives on nonviolent social movements in repressive settings; 
4 Milcah Wanjiku, in an interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, October 12, 2002. Wanjiku 
is the mother of human rights attorney Rumba Kinuthia. Her daughter, Margaret Wangui 
Kinuthia, also took part in the protest and was injured.
5 Tiawan Gongloe, in an interview with the author, Monrovia, Liberia, June 19, 2006.
6 James M. Jasper, e-mail message to author, February 22, 2014.
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the conclusion presents implications of such resistance. The Appendix gives 
details on methodology, a list of interviewees, an historic comparison of 
repression levels in the three countries, country chronologies, and abbrevia-
tions. Each of the three case-study countries went through long periods of 
repressive rule during which people nonviolently challenged the regimes. 
In Sierra Leone and Liberia people suffered civil wars during the study 
period, but as in Kenya, the nonviolent resistance occurred mostly in their 
respective capitals except when the f ighting reached those cities. The book 
is organized as follows:
Part one: Sierra Leone
Chapter 2 focuses on a nationwide student uprising in 1977 that never fully 
developed into a social movement because of the repression and co-optation 
of the regime and for lack of planning and coordination with potential 
allies. But it helped launch a culture of resistance. Chapter 3 looks at how 
women, primarily, helped push a military junta out of power during a 
civil war and helped restore democracy through a widespread, open social 
movement. Chapter 4 examines how mass noncooperation against another, 
more violent military regime weakened it and set the stage for international 
military intervention that ousted the junta. During this time, a fragmented 
and often clandestine resistance in abeyance kept the culture of resistance 
alive under extremely dangerous conditions.
Part two: Liberia
Chapter 5 shows how a model for a social movement developed in Liberia 
in the 1970s. Then in the 1980s, nonviolent resistance was forced into 
abeyance because of the extreme violence of the Samuel Doe regime that 
overwhelmed brave efforts by individual attorneys, independent journal-
ists, students, and others. For several years after Doe was murdered, as a 
civil war continued from late 1989 to 1996, there was a period of democratic 
interim government when human rights organizations established roots. 
Chapter 6 analyzes how, after rebel leader Charles Taylor became president, 
these roots enabled a nonviolent social movement to courageously chal-
lenge Taylor despite his repressive efforts against activists. A second social 
movement, open and not directly threatening Taylor, involved campaigns 
by women for peace.
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Part three: Kenya
Chapter  7 examines the period of 1987 into 1991, when the regime of 
President Daniel arap Moi was torturing political dissidents, and before 
most organizations joined the resistance. Nevertheless, mostly individual 
human rights activists mounted a nonviolent social movement, staying in 
touch with each other through professional and personal ties. Chapter 8 
looks at the period 1991-2002 when individual activism gave way to a social 
movement of small group then large organizations that developed, as in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, into a culture of resistance that eventually helped 
bring a regime change.
1 Resisting Repression without Violence
New Theoretical Perspectives
Without heroes, we’re all plain people, and don’t know how far we can go.
Bernard Malamud, The Natural1
This study contributes to our understanding of nonviolent social movements 
in repressive settings in several ways. It shows how a broader concept of such 
movements and their participants reveals a wider range of activists than 
noted in most studies. This includes individual activists operating without 
the support of organizations but closely linked to the movements. The 
study also provides new evidence that in times of high levels of repression, 
a nonviolent social movement may operate “in abeyance,” which is to say 
at a lower level, until repression is reduced. During such periods resistance 
continues but less openly; indeed, sometimes clandestinely. At times it is 
fragmented, making it harder for a regime to clamp down on it.
The study adds important nuance to the theory of “opportunity.” Major 
social movement theorists have acknowledged that activists can proceed in 
the absence of opportunities and despite repression, but in the words of one 
of the theorists most closely associated with the opportunity theory, such 
instances are likely to be rare (McAdam 2004, 226). This research provides 
evidence that resistance in the absence of perceived opportunities may not 
be so rare. It happened repeatedly in all three countries examined, often 
in the face of severe repression. The scholarly spotlight on movements in 
repressive settings tends to focus on large, organized movements and mass 
demonstrations. This study, however, shows that paying closer attention 
to small, informal groups and networks provides a more complete under-
standing of how a nonviolent resistance operates in repressive settings. The 
concepts of minor actors and their often spontaneous role in a resistance 
movement helping major actors, as well as the unpredictability of a social 
movement are also introduced.
This study makes several major arguments:
1 Individual activism, a much understudied part of social movements, can 
play a significant part in nonviolent resistance. The literature on social 
movements is practically silent on the topic of individual activism. 
Individual activists are not members of a self-identif ied resistance 
1 Malamud (1952, p. 154).
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organization. They may contribute to the resistance, for example, as 
part of their professional duties, such as lawyers or journalists, when 
their professional organizations are either reluctant to be active or 
unable to provide support for their activism. They are linked to the 
movements by professional or personal ties. Sometimes they later join 
resistance organizations and even help lead them.
2 During periods of high repression, nonviolent social movements may 
lack a formal structure but continue in abeyance, informally, at a lower 
level of resistance, waiting for safer times to emerge more openly and 
formally. During such times, nonviolent activists may have informal 
organizational structures, as small groups and individual activists meet, 
sometimes clandestinely, to coordinate and plan their activism. They 
continue challenging authorities in a variety of ways that may include 
legal challenges, critical reporting, public speeches, and spontane-
ous demonstrations aimed at chipping away at a regime’s power and 
legitimacy. When repression lessens, formal organizations may appear 
or reappear, supported by mass demonstrations at times, until a new 
wave of repression curtails them. At such time, smaller-scale acts of 
resistance may resume.
3 Nonviolent resistance can take place even under severe repression without 
favorable conditions or “political opportunities” and with only limited 
material resources. In resisting repression, activists lacking structural 
opportunities or encouraging external conditions, are often motivated 
by a strong desire for dignity, freedom, and a chance to make a decent 
living, or in some cases by political ambition. They proceed despite 
repression, taking considerable risks to achieve their goals. In develop-
ing countries with only minimal material support, they are fueled in 
part by commitment and courage.
4 Nonviolent social movements in repressive settings involve a broader and 
more complex array of participants in more fluid actions than is gener-
ally recognized. The usual focus in social movement studies is on large 
organizations and mass demonstrations. But this misses a lot of what 
happens. Small groups and informal networks of activists, in addition to 
individual activists operating without organizational support, play an 
important role. Their involvement in the resistance is often more fluid 
than is generally recognized. Activists or “players” may shift in and out 
of various “arenas,” or centers of activity, making strategic choices as to 
when to move in or out of a resistance campaign, often more than once.2
2 The terms in quotes are used by Jasper (2012).
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5 From modest starting points, nonviolent activism can grow into a “cul-
ture of resistance” unless blocked by extreme repression. In this study, a 
culture of resistance is def ined as a process in which public challenges 
to the abuse of power by a regime become a norm for activists and a 
visible segment of the general public. Nonviolent resistance in repressive 
settings, once started, is akin to the downward flow of water; it moves 
around obstacles (repressive responses from a regime) and gathers force 
(supporters) unless blocked, at least temporarily (by severe repression 
by a regime).
6 There is a need for a universal model of social movements, one that can 
work in the democratic West as well as in repressive settings. Typically 
social movements in peaceful settings are aimed at regime reform, but 
in repressive settings the aim is often regime change. This study sug-
gests a new model for social movements to help bridge this gap, defining 
a social movement as a process of challenges to targeted authorities that 
may involve individual as well as organizational activism, and at times 
mass public support, and is aimed at either regime reform or regime 
change. The model or def inition does not insist on the usual charac-
teristics cited in the literature that a social movement be “sustained, 
organized and public” (Tilly 2004, 3).
Individual Activism
Nonviolent social movements in repressive settings are likely to include 
individual activists who are not supported by any organization. Many key 
participants in the movements studied were professionals, drawn into 
the resistance not as members of a resistance organization but out of a 
commitment to the principles of their profession. They were linked by 
professional ties or personal friendships to others in the resistance and were 
thus part of an overall movement.3 But they acted as individuals when their 
3 Noted social movement scholar Doug McAdam, in an e-mail message to the author, March 6, 
2013, said that in protest event counts, “individual acts in the name of a movement are routinely 
counted as part of the struggle.” Counting individual acts, however, is not the same as noting 
nonviolent resistance by individuals acting on their own and not as part of an organization. 
The individual activism shown in the current study as part of nonviolent social movements is 
generally overlooked in the literature. Tilly (2008, 210) ended his last book with this note: “Most 
of all, the book argues that students of contentious politics should move away from classif ied 
event counts and single-episode narratives toward procedures that trace interactions among 
participants in multiple episodes.” 
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professional organization was not part of the resistance or in some cases 
opposed political activism. Their actions soon marked them as opponents 
of the regime. Their activism is part of the broader array of social movement 
participants that many studies miss.
Examples of this category of professionals acting as individuals, without 
the support of any organization, include the lawyers in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Kenya who defended political detainees. They often did so 
as individuals when their bar association was not willing to challenge 
the regime and they were not members of a resistance organization. 
The same was true for independent journalists who continued to write 
critical articles despite regime threats. They were not part of any formal 
resistance organization and acted essentially as individuals when their 
newspapers consisted of little more than a couple of small rooms with 
some old typewriters and offered little protection or support. At times their 
press union did speak out for journalists’ rights, though that offered them 
little tangible protection. Some journalists were detained and tortured; 
a few were killed.
Some individual activists later join formal organizations that are part of 
a resistance. Their contribution to change, either as individuals or later as 
organizational activists, is recognized in the nonviolent resistance literature 
of Gene Sharp (2005, 419, 458) who emphasizes the importance of weaken-
ing the authority and legitimacy of the targeted regime. By challenging 
regimes on rule of law, defending activists, or exposing abuses through 
the media, individual (and organizational) activists in all three countries 
studied helped weaken the legitimacy of the regimes both at home and 
abroad and signaled to others that resistance was possible, though often 
at a cost.
James Scott, in Weapons of the Weak (1985, 297), makes a strong argu-
ment for paying close attention to “both individual and collective acts of 
resistance” and resistance that is not part of a formal organization. “If we 
were to conf ine our search for peasant resistance to formally organized 
activity, we would search largely in vain, for in Malaysia as in many 
other Third World countries, such organizations are either absent or 
the creations of off icials and rural elites. We would simply miss much 
of what is happening.” He adds, “The inclination to dismiss ‘individual’ 
acts of resistance as insignif icant and to reserve the term ‘resistance’ 
for collective or organized action is as misguided as the emphasis on 
‘principled’ action.” Scott criticizes the “privileged status accorded organ-
ized movements.”
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Resistance in Abeyance: Organization without Organizations
There tend to be two general, and not so surprising, relationships between 
repression and resistance: the level and type. (1) When repression is at a very 
high level, resistance is likely to decline into abeyance, possibly even going 
underground then resurfacing when it is safer. This pattern may repeat itself 
depending on levels or cycles of repression in the future. (2) During periods 
of high repression, the types of resistance are also likely to change. When 
repression makes formal organizations too dangerous, activists are likely 
to resort to a less formal approach, resulting in fragmented resistance by 
individual activists or members of small groups. Some of the mechanisms of 
this kind of low-level resistance are (a) individual activism without support 
of an organization; (b) small, informal group activism; and (c) clandestine 
meetings to plan further resistance.
Lack of formal organizations during a period of abeyance does not 
mean resistance is totally unorganized or even chaotic. In most instances, 
except for spontaneous demonstrations, there was organization without 
organizations. Some of the social movement literature argues that this 
kind of high-risk activism is supported by “[s]trong, pre-existing friendship 
ties” (Gamson 1990, 61). In the current study, activists were connected by 
professional or personal ties. In all three countries, they operated in the 
relatively small world of their national capitals, where most of the resist-
ance took place. It was an even smaller world when one considers that, for 
the most part, the key activists typically were among the educated elites 
of the country. They had frequent contact with each other as longtime 
professional colleagues and friends. In all three countries these kinds of 
activists gathered informally to discuss their resistance and sometimes to 
coordinate it.
The study also notes the relationships between the theories of abey-
ance and cycles of protest (e.g., Tarrow 1998, 128-30, 141-60). A resistance 
in abeyance refers in this study to a resistance that is limited in scope 
because of the repression. When it is too dangerous to have a central or 
formal organization or organizations, a practice of resistance in abey-
ance nevertheless continues to challenge the regime. Some portion of 
the challenge may be clandestine; it may be intentionally fragmented for 
survival purposes. Tarrow argued that during periods of decline or inactiv-
ity by a formal resistance organization or organizations, smaller, more 
informal organizations sometimes continue their activism. Groups such 
as churches, cooperatives, or trade unions provide “abeyance structures” 
which keep resistance alive on a lower scale until the opportunity for 
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larger activism is present again.4 Tarrow also argued that there was a 
cyclical rise and decline of movements for various reasons. In the three 
countries examined there were numerous ebbs and f lows of resistance, 
depending on the intensity of repression, but also on the issues. For ex-
ample, in Kenya, participation in the resistance peaked during election 
periods but was lower and more fragmented between elections and during 
periods of intense repression.
In her study of women’s social movements in the 1900s, Taylor (1989, 
761) def ines abeyance as “a holding process by which movements sustain 
themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity 
from one stage of mobilization to another.” Taylor also adds: “My approach 
relies heavily on the central premises of resource mobilization theory: 
political opportunities and an indigenous organizational base are major 
factors in the rise and decline of movements.” The current study f inds the 
contrary to be the case: the resistance in abeyance often took place with 
few, if any, political opportunities evident to the participants and often it 
took place with minimal material resources. Material resources in all three 
countries, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, poorer countries, were 
very limited. Activists at least partially made up for this in terms of the 
“resource” of motivating ideas, including a commitment to human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.
From Abeyance to Formally Organized Resistance
When repression subsides in an authoritarian state, there is likely to be a 
reemergence of a more formally organized social/resistance movement (the 
terms are used interchangeably in this study). The transition is gradual: 
it takes a while before activists and their supporters are convinced that 
things have really gotten better, safer. Some regimes gyrate between periods 
of concessions and repression, undermining a transition. There is never 
a guarantee that the worst is over. When a transition from abeyance to 
formal organizations occurs, it emerges from the fragmented centers of 
resistance that have been operating quietly, waiting for better times. The 
4 Tarrow notes (1998, 129-30) that theorizing on this concept of “decentralization” traces 
back at least to the 1960s in the United States and Europe; for Gerlach and Hine (1970) it meant 
lack of a single leadership and the absence of card-carrying membership. Taylor adds that 
decentralization was part of the model of the civil rights movement in the US South and later 
promoted by activist Saul Alinsky (1971) for use in US cities. 
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mechanisms of transition may include a growing willingness on the part 
of the general public to show up at public demonstrations once police have 
stopped arresting or even shooting at participants in such events. Lawyers 
associations may become politically active after a dormant period when 
the chairs of such groups no longer shy away from direct challenges to 
the regime. Independent newspapers forced to shut down or go under-
ground may resume publishing openly. Women’s organizations that have 
met behind closed doors may begin holding open meetings and staging 
marches. Human rights organizations that were in touch informally may 
begin meeting in open coalitions and issuing public statements in the name 
of the organized groups.
While the theory of abeyance is a useful theory that describes what 
happens when the repression gets too intense for a traditional social 
movement – a nonviolent resistance movement – to continue openly, a 
weakness in the theory is that it assumes that at some point when the 
repression lessens, the movement can resume a more open stance. There 
are two problems with this: (1) The concept of a “movement” is vague: is 
it one big organization with members who come out of hiding and take 
public stances? Is it a coalition of organizations? Is it the same people who 
reemerge, or a new cast of players? Could it be a combination of small 
groups and individuals acting outside of organizational support, as this 
book suggests? (2) The theory also seems to imply that when things get 
safer, a central organization emerges (or reemerges) to lead a resistance. 
In Sierra Leone, in a period of reduced repression in the mid-1990s, many 
women’s organizations successfully formed a centrally organized coalition 
to push the ruling military junta out of power and restore democracy. But 
in fact when things get safer, instead of a central organization, there may 
be a proliferation of organizations engaged in a resistance campaign or 
campaigns (as happened in Kenya in the 1990s), despite occasional violent 
outbursts by police against a strengthening political opposition. No main 
organization emerged to lead the continuing resistance. In one sense this 
was a positive reflection of the growing advocacy for change; in another 
sense it signaled growing competition among organizations for interna-
tional funding, publicity, and membership.
Resistance without “Opportunity”
Several recent studies have shown the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance 
(Bartkowski 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Ackerman and Karatnycky 
28 RiPPles of HoPe
2005; Ackerman and Duvall 2000).5 Others have provided convincing 
evidence that favorable structural conditions – often known as political 
“opportunities” – even when present, are not necessary conditions for resist-
ance (Goodwin and Jasper 2012). Opportunities are generally considered to 
be conditions in the economic or political circumstances in a society that 
encourage activists to proceed. These are exogenous circumstances, ones 
beyond the control of those engaged in the resistance.
In the current study of three sub-Saharan African countries with repres-
sive regimes, the resistance took place with little in the way of perceived 
opportunities. Instead, there was repression; still, there often was non-
violent resistance in the face of this repression. When the repression was 
overwhelming, some resistance continued in a less organized and open 
way, resuming in a more formal approach when the repression lessened. 
This reduced repression could be described as an “opportunity,” but not in 
the usual way the term has been used in social movement studies. Whether 
using McAdam’s 1996 illustrative set of opportunities, or his initial macro 
set from 1982, there were few if any political “openings” that made resist-
ance easier or safer. In his earlier work, McAdam (1982, 176) lists factors 
likely to produce “shifts in the structure of political opportunities … wars, 
industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unem-
ployment, and widespread demographic changes.” In his later list (1996, 27), 
synthesized from various scholars, McAdam includes as potential political 
opportunities: “1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system; 2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite align-
ments that typically undergird a polity; 3. The presence or absence of elite 
allies; 4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.”
McAdam is usually identif ied in the literature with his emphasis on 
“opportunity” as key to social movements. Tilly (2008), Meyer (2002), Tarrow 
(1998), and numerous other key movement scholars have also identif ied the 
importance of political “opportunity.” In their collaborative work, McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) sought to move beyond a static identif ication of 
opportunity and emphasize the dynamics of interactions between those 
making claims and those upon whom the claims were made. McAdam 
had earlier argued (1982, 48, 50): “While, important, expanding political 
5 Ackerman and Karatnycky (8) found that there was “more than a three to one chance” of 
a country achieving transition to political freedom where the civic opposition is nonviolent or 
mostly nonviolent. Chenoweth and Stephan found (215) that the probability of a country remain-
ing a democracy f ive years after a nonviolent resistance campaign was 57 percent compared to 
6 percent for successful violent campaigns.
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opportunities and indigenous organizations do not, in any simple sense, 
produce a social movement … Expanding political opportunities combine 
with the indigenous organizations of the minority community to afford 
insurgents the ‘structural potential’ for successful action … All three 
factors, then, are regarded as necessary, but insuff icient, causes of social 
insurgency.”
In 2004 McAdam complained of the “wooden manner in which it [the 
concept of opportunity] has been applied by movement scholars” (205). He 
called for greater attention to “culturalist and rationalist tenets” (230). More 
recently, McAdam argued that scholars have made the political process 
model he developed “overly structural” and not paid enough attention to the 
importance of people acting on structural conditions.6 McAdam has also 
acknowledged that people can mount resistance in “unpromising structural 
circumstances,” though arguing that such cases “are bound to be rare” 
(226). The current study of three countries suggests that such cases may 
not be as rare as one might think. Structural conditions are analyzed in 
the country chapters, but the study provides evidence from those countries 
that signif icant nonviolent resistance took place in the absence of clear and 
perceived political opportunities and in the face of considerable repression. 
But repression can stimulate resistance, as Goldstone and Tilly (2001) have 
shown, citing various other studies.
Broader, More Fluid Participation in Resistance
In addition to the less-studied phenomenon of individual activism, small 
group resistance receives far less attention than do large organizations and 
mass movements. Most studies of social movements in repressive settings 
tend to concentrate on large movements and mass public demonstrations, 
as in Eastern Europe (e.g., Karklins and Petersen 1993; Kuran 1991; Lohmann 
1994); in the Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002); in Latin America (e.g., Eckstein 
2001); or in Iran (Kurzman 2004). Even the relatively few studies of social 
6 In an e-mail message to the author, March 6, 2013, McAdam wrote: “It is certainly true 
that in the way that it developed, the political process model was overly structural. That was 
not, however, true of my original formulation of the model. For me two factors – the political 
opportunities and existing organizations/networks available to would be activists – def ined 
the structural potential of a movement. But whether that potential would be realized, was 
entirely dependent on processes of social construction and collective interpretation among 
the aggrieved population. Bottom line: at root the theory was exactly the blend of culture and 
theory, and top down facilitation and bottom up agency you are calling for.”
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movements in sub-Saharan Africa, while providing excellent insights into 
nonviolent resistance, focus mostly on large movements (e.g., Zunes, Kurtz, 
and Asher 1999; Tripp, et al. 2009; Ellis and Kessel 2009).7
The current study examines some large organizations and mass demon-
strations. But often the nonviolent resistance profiled herein was carried 
out by small groups, informal networks, and individuals. In Sierra Leone 
it was a small group of students that initiated a demonstration in 1977 
that developed into a nationwide boycott by university and secondary 
school students. A small group of mothers used a dramatic protest in Kenya 
to challenge authorities to release political prisoners. To overlook such 
contributions to the social movements/nonviolent resistance movements 
that developed in all three countries studied would be to miss important 
parts of the story.
As noted above, activists or “players” move between “arenas” (Jasper 
2012). For example, as shown in this study of three sub-Saharan countries 
that suffered under repressive regimes, professional people may move into 
the arena of activism and f ile legal challenges against a repressive regime or 
write critical articles and editorials, then slip back into their normal roles 
as attorneys or journalists, occupied with the more mundane features of 
their jobs. It is this fluidity that is missing in many social movement studies. 
Instead of being a “member” of a “social movement,” these professionals, 
and others – mothers, students, market women, clergy – were part of a more 
fluid, less formal, but active and important resistance that ebbs and flows 
depending on the needs and challenges of the moment. Contrary to the 
more traditional and structural concepts of political “opportunity,” these 
part-time activists were not necessarily cowed into submission by repressive 
acts of the regime. On the contrary, it is often those very acts that spurred 
them into action as players in various arenas of political contention. “A 
social movement is never a unif ied player, but a shifting coalition of players 
(groups and individuals) who come together for occasional events based on 
perceived overlapping goals” (Jasper 2012, 21-2). In this study of nonviolent 
resistance in sub-Saharan Africa, the players acted at times as members 
of organizations, and at other times with little or no formal organizational 
support, functioning on their own, though usually in touch with other 
individual or organizational activists.
7 Stammers (2009, 39) argues that the link between human rights and social movements has 
received inadequate scholarly attention.
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Scott’s arguments on resistance (1985, 290) have relevance for the study of 
non-organizational, nonviolent resistance by individuals, small groups, and 
informal networks against repressive rulers. The focus of the current study on 
challenges to regimes takes a more political edge than Scott, however. Scott 
was studying small-scale farmers in Malaysia. The resistance by the farmers, 
Scott noted, was primarily to “mitigate or deny claims (for example rents, taxes, 
prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, 
large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example work, land, 
charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate classes.” In the current study, 
the resistance focused on demands on the state to allow such basic human 
rights as freedom of speech and assembly. When those in the resistance 
concluded that the state would not grant these rights adequately, their focus 
switched from regime reform to regime change. This resistance took many 
forms, including using the courtroom to challenge regime abuses; investigative 
media and think tank exposure of regime weaknesses and abuses; and secret 
planning sessions to coordinate small-scale acts of resistance. These and other 
small types of nonviolent resistance often are missed in an overly narrow focus 
on large resistance organizations and large-scale actions.
Establishing a Culture of Resistance
A social movement is a composite of many small steps, decisions and actions 
by individuals, sometimes acting on their own, sometimes in organizations, 
angered by a sense of injustice, inspired by the hope of justice, hungry for 
dignity and freedom, or in some cases seeking personal gain. For many, hu-
man rights and democracy are gateways to a better life and worth a struggle, 
worth the risk. The real heart of a social movement is the living, pulsating, 
emotional, day-to-day efforts of activists. There comes a moment when 
participants in a social movement/resistance movement do something to 
put their hopes and words into action. At that moment they cross a line. In a 
repressive setting, they leave the relative safety of anonymity, of compliance, 
and join others as marked opponents of repression.
This growing resistance, if not overwhelmingly repressed, can develop 
into a “culture of resistance,” def ined in this study, as noted above, as a 
process in which public challenges to the abuse of power by a regime be-
come a norm for activists and a visible segment of the general public. Early 
activists and activism encourage additional resistance. Through planned or 
spontaneous demonstrations led by activists, public resistance can become 
more common even in the face of continuing repression. More people attend 
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political rallies, even when those are banned; the media becomes bolder 
in its criticism; people talk more openly against the regime. In all three 
countries, the resistance exposed the abuses of the regimes, weakened 
their legitimacy and encouraged more resistance. The resistance in all 
three countries that are the focus of this study eventually led to a culture of 
resistance that helped set the stage for the regime changes that occurred.8
There are three major elements to the establishment of a culture of 
resistance; they are likely to overlap each other and their sequence is not 
always the same.
1 Individual activism. The concept of individual activism, a topic gener-
ally not analyzed in social movement studies, involves resistance not 
supported in any signif icant way by an organization. For example, 
an attorney may decide to legally challenge the treatment of political 
detainees by the state; yet the attorney’s professional law organization 
may be unwilling to offer any support of this challenge, preferring to 
shy away from political actions. The attorney’s own law firm may be too 
small and f inancially weak to provide much support. This happened in 
Kenya, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
To overlook such challenges in the analysis of regime change and nonviolent 
resistance would be to miss important elements of the pressures that can 
build up against a repressive regime. The usual focus in social movement 
studies on organizational activism is thus limited. Regime leaders are aware 
of any kind of challenges: individual, organizational, or mass. Why shouldn’t 
political analysts also take notice of individual activism when it occurs? One 
reason individual activism is almost always overlooked, and rarely analyzed, 
may be that it isn’t easy to track. It requires locating activists or former activ-
ists and interviewing them (or in historical cases, documenting their actions 
via archival records) instead of tracking the easier-to-detect actions of 
organizations. The order of these elements is not always the same. In Kenya, 
there was an important period of mostly individual activism/resistance 
by independent journalists, attorneys, in the late 1980s and into 1990-91. 
Organizational activism became dominant in Kenya after the adoptions of 
multiparty elections. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, there were examples of 
individual activism at various times, especially by attorneys and journalists, 
depending on the level of repression of the regimes: sometimes individual 
and organizational activism overlapped.
8 Mass violence and deaths after the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya was a major 
setback for Kenyans. 
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2 Organizational activism. This is the more traditional focus of social 
movement studies, yet even here the focus tends to be on large, well-
established organizations. Tracking informal organizations, as some 
studies do, is also important, especially in a repressive setting where 
overt, open, and centralized organizations make easy targets for a 
regime. In this study, organizational resistance – by opposition political 
parties, women’s groups, students, unions, and others – played a key 
role in turning a society away from silent enduring to open resistance. 
Individuals can help break the wall of silence, but they are limited in 
what they can accomplish. Organizations are usually better equipped to 
conduct the more routine and day-to-day activities that keep pressure 
on a regime.
3 Mass resistance. This is an important element of a nonviolent resistance 
movement. It is one thing to have a few brave individuals challenging 
a regime; organizational resistance can keep the pressure on and even 
increase it. But without some indications of mass public support, a 
regime may be encouraged to continue repression, confident of survival 
in the absence of overt, widespread opposition. In Kenya, two major 
but illegal (at least in the eyes of the incumbent regime) rallies, offered 
clear evidence to the regime that the resistance by individual activists 
had much more public support than was evident. That mass resistance 
resurfaced again before the 1997 elections and in the years leading 
up to the election in 2002 which f inally saw a change of regime. In 
Sierra Leone, when a military coup took place in 1997, it was met with 
some individual and organizational opposition. But it was the mass 
nonviolent response (in terms of strikes, staying home, and closing 
businesses, for example) that gave a clear signal to the regime and the 
diplomatic world that the junta lacked credibility in the eyes of the 
people. In Liberia, mass marches by women demanding an end to the 
war in 2003 kept pressure on the regime.
It is important to add that this study does not argue that the establishment 
of the three elements of a culture of resistance always leads to a regime 
change, or that the existence of a culture of resistance is necessary to effect 
regime change. Nor is the establishment of a culture of resistance part of 
a deterministic model: the appearance of one element in the resistance 
culture does not lead automatically to the others. In addition, this study 
notes that there is always uncertainty involved. The resistance can be 
blocked by mass repression, but it can be helped by unpredictable events 
and the actions of sympathizers. As noted later, minor actors sometimes 
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spontaneously play a role in the survival of key activists. This study does 
argue that in all three countries, change would not have come when it did 
without the nonviolent resistance.
New Universal Model for Social Movements
In general, the focus in social movement studies on organizations – often 
large organizations – and mass demonstrations, has proven highly useful. 
But where repression has limited formal, open activism, there is a need 
to look closer at both individual and small, informal group activism. As 
noted, nonviolent resistance in repressive settings can occur not just under 
dangerous conditions but without much in the way of material resources or 
structural opportunities normally associated with movements in the demo-
cratic West. This raises an important question: is there room for a universal 
model of social movements, one that f its movements in the democratic 
West as well as repressive settings anywhere? Under repressive conditions, 
social movements may not exhibit the typical hallmarks of resistance in 
peaceful settings as noted above: “sustained, organized and public” (Tilly 
2004, 3). Goodwin and Jasper (2004, 3) use a similar def inition but add that 
the “collective, organized, sustained” challenges may also target “cultural 
beliefs and practices.” David S. Meyer in his study of social movements 
in America offers this def inition: “collective and sustained efforts that 
challenge existing or potential laws, politics, norms, or authorities, making 
use of extra-institutional political tactics” (Meyer 2007, 10).
Social movements operating in the face of repression can ill afford this 
kind of openness and organization; the repression can interrupt activ-
ism. Typically social movements in peaceful settings are aimed at regime 
reform, but in repressive settings the aim often is regime change. This can 
make activists, whether operating individually or collectively, a target of a 
repressive regime. Using the def inition cited above (see argument No. 6), 
this study suggests a new model, one that recognizes individual as well as 
organizational activism and sometimes mass public support, embracing 
regime change as a goal as well as regime reform, but without the expecta-
tions cited from the literature. The model recognizes the importance of 
strategic choices by participants in a resistance (e.g., when to join, what to 
do, when to do it). “In strategic rather than structural models, individual 
actions can make a difference” (Jasper 2012, 33). Future research using this 
new model in other repressive settings may help identify a broader range 
of activists than without it.
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Theoretical Implications
Structure and Resistance
This study argues that structure in the sense of political “opportunity” is 
not necessary for the kind of nonviolent resistance that took place in these 
three countries. But neither was activism alone the only factor in the changes 
that occurred. International donors used their leverage at times to pressure 
the regimes for change, most notably in aid freezes in Kenya. International 
human rights organizations often were effective in winning quick release of 
well-known activists from detention through negative publicity and direct 
contact with regime officials on behalf of the detainees. The poor economy 
in the 1980s across much of Africa and the upsurge in Western international 
support for human rights after the end of the Cold War were all part of the 
backdrop against which the activists operated. Further, it was military inter-
vention, not simply nonviolent resistance, that brought an end to a military 
regime in Sierra Leone. In Liberia, President Charles Taylor resigned under 
international indictment and with a rival rebel force approaching the capital.
Each of the regime changes in these three countries came only after 
mounting domestic nonviolent resistance. That resistance documented 
human rights and other abuses by the regimes, shredded claims of regime 
legitimacy and rule of law, and exposed corruption. It set the stage in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone for military interventions. By contrast, widespread civilian 
welcoming of the previous military junta in Sierra Leone offered the inter-
national community little incentive to oppose it until domestic resistance 
against it grew several years later. In sum, the nonviolent resistance alone 
did not cause the regime changes to democratic rule that eventually took 
place in all three countries; this study argues, without such resistance 
change would not likely have come when it did.
From the close-up vantage point of 170 in-depth interviews by the author, 
with past activists among others, this study offers a broader, more nuanced 
view of social movements than many studies. Unlike archival research from 
afar, it reveals the day-to-day fears, hopes, courage, tactics, and strategic 
choices of those who stood up for human rights, democratic rule, dignity, and a 
better life. The theoretical arguments developed from this qualitative research 
are grounded in actual events and they are “faithful to the evidence” (Neu-
man 2004, 30). But theoretical arguments alone do not reveal the emotions, 
the life of a social movement and its participants. Studies that argue social 
movements are more than calculated, mechanical responses to structural 
conditions in society are correct. The problem is that even in such works, 
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the analyses tend to leave out the story of the ordinary people who challenge 
authority, especially in repressive settings. The current study presents the 
voices of the challengers as well as a theoretical analysis of the evidence.
Emotions like courage, a need for respect and dignity, a gut feeling that things 
could and should be better, and a determination to do something – even some 
small thing – to make life better, played an important role in the nonviolent 
resistance that took place in all three countries. Structural explanations work 
to a certain extent in describing the conditions against which resistance takes 
place, and against which emotions play a part in resistance. If these background 
issues were highly favorable to daily life there would have been much less reason 
for a resistance. But structural explanations by themselves cannot explain 
why someone decides to challenge a repressive regime. Neither can emotions.
Jasper (2003) argues for the importance of emotions in social movements. 
Goodwin and Jasper (2004, 79) ask, “when does an increase in repression, 
or the use of certain types of repression, lead to greater mobilization, and 
when to less.” The way they phrase the question is important: they not only 
recognize that repression may actually increase resistance, they assume 
that beyond a certain point repression leads to less resistance.
Pearlman (2013, 392) argues that emotions such as a sense of “dignity … 
anger, joy, pride, and shame have emboldening effects.” They make people more 
likely to join a “political resistance,” despite the dangers. But emotions of “fear, 
sadness, and shame give rise to dispiriting effects. They increase individuals’ 
tendencies to make pessimistic assessments, discount prospects of change, 
privilege information about danger, have a low sense of control, and avert 
risk.” She applies this argument to the Arab uprisings of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Algeria. Pearlman concludes that the massive retaliation by the Algerian 
regime and remembrance of the past war there against France provoked fear 
on the part of the resistance which helped block a revolution there. She further 
argues that positive emotions helped spur the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. 
But it may be even more complicated than that division: some protestors facing 
repressive regimes may simply feel they have nothing left to lose. For example, 
in 1977, the Abuelas (grandmothers) of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina managed 
to turn their despair over the loss of their children (and in many cases, their 
grandchildren) into nonviolent resistance with a long series of demonstrations 
against the brutal regime, demanding to know what happened to them.
This study considers the relationship of resistance and repression by 
examining activism that involved courage, principle, or ambition – or some 
combination of the three. It is beyond the scope of this study to try to ana-
lyze the individual motives of activists interviewed, but the words of many 
interviewed are compelling in the context of highly repressive settings. This 
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study suggests that a synthesis explanation, considering rational choice, 
social movement explanations, including the often overlooked concept of 
emotions and from psychology the concept of moral rationality and altruism 
as part of what motivates people to resist repression.
In their works on why people joined the mass demonstrations against 
the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989 (the year the Berlin 
Wall fell), Karklins and Petersen (1993), Lohmann (1994), and Kuran (1991) 
offer differing rational choice explanations of why people engage in resist-
ance. Karklins and Petersen argue that protestors calculated their safety 
based on the size of the demonstration and the regime’s response: larger 
demonstrations assured people there was less risk to protest. But there is 
a tautological aspect to this: more people join the protest when crowds 
are larger; when crowds are larger more people join the protest (612). Their 
rational choice argument with calculations on both sides gives much 
credence to the ability of demonstrators and the regime to plan things 
out logically. But in countries with repressive regimes, demonstrators may 
be motivated more by emotion than calculation; the country’s strongman 
may be subject to emotional reactions themselves, as well to challenges 
to the regime’s power.
The current study also addresses a gap between the literature on nonviolent 
resistance and the social movement literature. Social movement literature 
focuses mostly on the dynamics of a movement, whereas the nonviolence 
literature concentrates more on tactics. But the division is not analytically 
useful. This study helps bridge this gap, combining elements of both to 
explain the resistance that took place by examining both dynamics and 
tactics. How social movements actually start has also received scant atten-
tion. Most studies examine growth and operation of movements but seldom 
does one trace back to the initial steps as this study does.
Related to this, the study helps us look closer at resistance not just from 
the point of view of activists but shows how authoritarian leaders see resist-
ance. Authoritarian regimes do not neatly focus only on large organizations 
opposing them, they are also very much aware of the smaller groups and 
individuals in a resistance. In the current study, authoritarian regime lead-
ers in all three countries strove to present themselves as legitimate rulers 
who upheld the rule of law. But they bent the law, warped its application, 
and used the law as a tool of repression. Still they struggled to convince 
donors and diplomats that the opposition was the force that was violating 
the laws. In such cases, an independent newspaper can rip the veil off such 
pretense and draw international attention to a regime’s sham claims of 
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legitimacy, sometimes opening the way for new international pressures or 
even military intervention, as happened in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
For Africa, where “the struggle to cross the frontier from personal rule to 
rule-based governance is still far from over” (Diamond and Plattner 2010, xii) 
recognition of a broader array of participants in nonviolent social movements 
offers new appreciation for the capacity of ordinary people to challenge even 
the most entrenched of repressive rulers. This recognition is clearer when 
Western-based social movement models are replaced by a more flexible, univer-
sal one that embraces responses to conditions in repressive settings as well. This 
broader recognition in turn may lead some donors and diplomats to reconsider 
their ways of encouraging greater respect for human rights and democracy by 
providing aid and training to a wider range of civil society activists working 
toward these goals. As one longtime scholar of African politics notes in response 
to the arguments of this study, “The missed realities of social movements that 
you talk about are actually intrinsically important to the political and social 
fabric of developing countries, as a necessary intermediate step in building a 
more truly ‘universal’ theory of social movements that builds on the experience 
of all world regions.”9 Harbeson also asks whether social movements were actu-
ally stronger than most observers recognized during the repressive Moi years, 
for example. The answer this study arrived at is yes. The chapters on Kenya show 
how domestic resistance, contrary to most assessments, was more effective in 
bringing about multiparty elections than international donor pressures.
Motives of Activists
In his study of resistance by Malaysian farmers to oppressive working 
conditions, Scott (1985, 291) makes an interesting observation with regard 
to how much of the resistance was principled actions against conditions 
and how much of it was self-interest. “The English poacher in the eighteenth 
century may have been resisting gentry’s claim to property in wild game, 
but he was just as surely interested in rabbit stew.” Like Scott’s study, this 
one does not try to separate out those activists who were acting for a greater 
good from those who saw potential personal gain in the resistance. Clearly 
some activists in the three countries in this study who took part in the 
resistance had hopes of personal gain, either in terms of political power or 
simply for an economy that would provide more jobs. Some former activists 
took positions in the new governments, sometimes disappointing fellow 
9 John Harbeson, e-mail message to the author, February 25, 2013. Among his numerous books 
on Africa is: Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2009.
Resisting RePRession witHout Violence 39
former activists and others with their performance; sometimes not. It is 
also beyond the scope of this study to examine the degree of democracy 
that emerged after the regime changes noted in each of the three countries.10
A few activists openly acknowledged they had used the push for human 
rights as way to weaken a regime and replace it with one more amenable to 
their profession. Certainly if the repression stopped or was at least reduced, 
they hoped their chances would improve to work more freely as lawyers, 
journalists, or students, for example. But to consider that a lawyer risked 
his or her life to gain a few more clients makes little sense. The costs too far 
outweighed the benefits. The regimes at various times practiced detention, 
torture, and murder to defeat those in the nonviolent resistance. Whatever 
their motives, activists took similar risks in resisting repressive regimes in 
Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. The regimes weren’t looking at motives 
but at their actions. And as noted, the regimes didn’t care if someone was 
in an organization or acting on their own as part of an informally linked 
resistance movement. Resistance marked them as enemies of the state.
The author agrees with Scott that trying to distinguish how much of 
the resistance was self-interest and how much was not is a debate that 
yields little additional light in a study of social movement activism under 
repressive conditions. The interviews fairly consistently yielded an overall 
impression that most participants were genuinely upset at the lack of human 
rights and democracy in their countries, resentful at the abuses, and willing 
to takes risks to be part of an effort to make things better for everyone.
Finally, in the best sense of scholarly research, this study builds on the 
pioneering work of social movement theorists in the spirit of Charles 
Tilly’s challenge to scholars. In his many works on social movements, Tilly 
never stopped looking for new ways to explore what he called “contentious 
performances” of people organizing to make claims. In his last book (2008), 
Tilly challenged scholars “to bring their own evidence and procedures to 
bear” on the topic.11 The current study is presented in the spirit of respect 
for previous works and a willingness to further understand the amazing 
determination of people to resist repression nonviolently.
10 The author analyzed some of the changes in Kenya 2002-12 in an article in the Journal of 
Human Rights (Press 2012).
11 The author met Tilly in October, 2007, in his off ice at the University of Columbia just a few 
months before his death. His off ice was stacked high with books, on desks and bookshelves. 
Referring to books in general, he said: “I like to read them and write them,” signing and handing 
the author a copy of his 2004 work, Social Movements, 1768-2004. When I explained the concepts 
presented in this current study, he called them “very interesting.”

Part one
Sierra Leone
Figure 2  A street scene in central Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2008
Photo by Betty Press
2 Students Shake the Pillars of Power
Sierra Leone, January 1977. Here in this coastal West African nation that 
is linked to the popular hymn “Amazing Grace,”1 was home of the captive 
who led the successful rebellion on the ship Amistad, and is the country 
whose civil war was portrayed in the f ilm Blood Diamonds, restless students 
at Fourah Bay College readied themselves to carry on a long tradition of 
resistance to repressive rule.
Meanwhile, Siaka Stevens – a president feared for his harsh way of dealing 
with detractors, including political executions and torture – prepared for his 
convocation speech as college chancellor. But during his address, students 
took him by surprise. Waving banners and placards, booing, and shouting 
“No more one-party,” “Free and fair elections,” and “Accountability – this is 
what we want,” they launched a protest that built on a history of resistance 
in Sierra Leone. It never quite developed into a full social movement forging 
connections with other constituencies in the country, but it contributed 
signif icantly to the creation of a culture of resistance in Sierra Leone that 
would fully blossom in the 1990s against two military regimes. This in turn 
laid a foundation for the social movements that emerged in the 1990s. And 
for a brief period, the 1977 demonstrations (which went nationwide among 
students) shook the pillars of power of the Stevens regime. The resistance 
momentum continued later that year in a different form: an opposition 
newspaper, The Tablet, involving some Fourah Bay College faculty and activ-
ist students. It extended further with more student protests in the 1980s, 
though on a smaller scale. In the mid to late 1980s, some student activists 
and others chose an alternate route for resistance by taking training in 
Libya on how to launch a revolution.
Founded during British colonial rule in 1827, Fourah Bay College, part of 
the University of Sierra Leone, was once called the “Athens of West Africa” 
for its proud tradition of learning. It sits atop Mount Aureol, looking out 
1 Former slave trader John Newton wrote the poem in 1772 that later became the hymn “Amaz-
ing Grace.” At one point as a young man he was held practically as a slave himself on a Sierra 
Leone coastal island by a slave trader he had angered, fed during his captivity by the owner’s 
slaves. Years later as a minister, he “used his pulpit in London as one means of raising British 
consciousness of the immorality of the slave trade. Newton was one of the leading abolitionist 
thinkers and activists to support the founders of the Sierra Leone Company, Granville Sharp, 
Thomas Clarkson, John Clarkson and Henry Thornton, who sought to establish a free settlement 
for ex-slaves in Sierra Leone” (Sapoznik 2012, 5, 11).
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like a sentinel over Freetown, the capital city with its maze of narrow 
streets overf lowing with people. In many ways the city hasn’t changed 
much from that pivotal moment in 1977. Looking down today from the 
campus where the president and his entourage took their seats in the 
small, open-air convocation site, the eye is drawn to a sea of rusted, cor-
rugated iron-roofed homes stretching upward one, two, four, f ive stories 
like trees competing for sunlight, of which there is plenty. At street level, 
between modern, taller off ice buildings, history continues unruff led by 
time: barbers ply their trade in tiny kiosks while teenage girls, balancing 
stacks of charcoal-f illed baskets on their heads, seek customers; two-story 
wooden homes hark back in style to the early days when freed slaves 
rescued by the British (after the British ended their slave trade) gathered 
upon their arrival beneath the giant cotton tree in the center of town. 
The tree lives on today, home to bevies of bats that f ly off at dusk and 
return by dawn.
Despite the bustle and the energy of the people in 1977, all was not 
well. “The worsening economic situation in the country due to high 
level corruption, nepotism, over-centralization of the state machinery, 
clientelism and patronage, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and others, had 
adversely affected all sections of society” (Alie 2006, 85). Many people 
were struggling to make a living, hoping and praying for children who 
didn’t die at birth, and facing an ever-weakening economy under the 
leadership of a president who used a combination of cunning and repres-
sion to silence critics. Most people lived in the crowded slums of the 
capital and in the few major outlying cities. Rural villagers shared the 
deprivations.
The previous colonial power had gradually spread its control outside of 
Freetown, forming a protectorate of the rest of the area that is Sierra Leone 
today. The British wanted to keep the French colonizers at a distance and 
not end up with an English city-colony surrounded by French-speaking 
Africans. The British used “indirect” rule, getting locals to do the admin-
istrative work for their colony. But that meant they had to start creating 
schools. They gradually started some, in Freetown and later up-country, 
but with limited curriculum – just enough learning to do the clerical and 
other administrative tasks. Fourah Bay College was an exception, but bright 
young students, including college graduates, had only limited prospects 
with the British in control. Gradually, with much help from missionaries 
establishing schools throughout the country, and with formation of some 
colleges, this began to change.
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Roots of Resistance
President Stevens probably should not have been so surprised at what 
happened at Fourah Bay College in 1977. The history of resistance in Sierra 
Leone is a long one. In 1839, for example, when f ifty-three Africans from 
Sierra Leone were abducted by Portuguese slave traders, sold to Spanish 
planters, and chained on board the Cuban schooner, Amistad bound for 
Cuba, they rebelled.
They had no way of knowing that their freedom would be successfully 
defended in the US Supreme Court in 1841 by former President John Quincy 
Adams. The court ruled in their favor and they returned to Sierra Leone. 
By all accounts the man who led the slave rebellion on the Amistad was 
Sengbe Pieh, whose name was incorrectly written by the Spanish as Cinque. 
In court, after the Amistad had been seized by the US Navy, he described 
himself as the son of a chief. He was an imposing f igure.2 Virtually every-
one who met him agreed he carried himself like a natural leader, with a 
charismatic magnetism, a forceful intensity. Somehow, even in chains in 
an American prison, he managed to hold center stage and to f ix himself in 
the American imagination at the time.
When the British f inally declared their claim in 1896 over all of Sierra 
Leone, establishing a “protectorate” for the area outside of Freetown, 
they followed up in 1898 with a tax on every home. Resistance quickly 
spilled over into what became known as the Hut Tax War of 1898. Though 
the resistance was widespread, the British focused on apprehending 
Bai Bureh in the Port Loko district.3 The British were unable to ap-
prehend him but punished other dissidents “mercilessly”; some chiefs 
were imprisoned, “huts and farms of defaulters set on f ire, and payment 
exacted at gunpoint. The terror of the colonial state was unleashed with a 
vengeance” (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 42-3). Soon the Mende 
in the south joined their northern Temne counterparts. Later, after Bai 
2 A sketch of Cinquez (an alternative spelling), was probably done by James (or Isaac) Sheff ield 
around 1839 while he awaited trial in New Haven, Connecticut. The original is now in the US 
Library of Congress and available online at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003690782/. 
(This is listed in the References section under the name Sheff ield.)
3 “Bai Bureh was, the resilient general and military strategist who led the Temne in the war 
against the British in 1898 … Intimations that Bai Bureh was responsible for the Hut Tax War 
of 1898, which grew out of his resistance to British aggression, are un-founded,” according to 
historian Arthur Abraham (1974, 9, 106). Abraham cites Bai Bureh’s account that he was drawn 
into the conflict in response to the killing of some people by the British.
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Bureh surrendered in late 1898 he was f irst imprisoned then sent into 
exile, returning in 1905.
The Hut Tax War may have marked the end of that kind of armed 
resistance (until the civil war began in 1991), but the Creoles4 and others 
continued to press for political rights, including through newspapers 
critical of the British administration. Labor organizations were also es-
pecially active. Examples of this twentieth-century resistance included: 
strikes by railway and other skilled workers between 1906 and 1914 
to win higher wages; riots in 1919 over depression conditions and late 
payment of WW I war bonuses; and a strike in 1926 by railway workers 
over “deplorable work conditions,” supported by strikes by the Krio elite. 
When colonial off icials offered a series of constitutional proposals in 1947, 
the Krio elite (now “replete in lawyers”) mounted a campaign to reject 
them (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 46-7; 60). In this way Sierra 
Leoneans provided models of resistance for what occurred in the early 
years of independence. But under the regime of Siaka Stevens and his All 
People’s Congress, the resistance was nearly silenced by a combination 
of force and co-optation. “Stevens systematically destroyed all forms of 
political and civil opposition” (Alie 2006, 97). Stevens and his party man-
aged to capture most of the energy of civil society that might otherwise 
have developed into social movements (Rashid 2013). The resistance was 
evident again from time to time in specif ic protests, including the 1977 
student demonstrations; it began to emerge more fully in the 1980s after 
Stevens stepped down, coming to full fruition in the 1990s. “The case of 
Sierra Leone demonstrates at least that the root cause of the problem lay 
in the systematic ruin of state institutions by a succession of corrupt and 
inept dictatorships, indulged by external donors and a network of pirate 
businessmen. As economic and institutional decay set in, the regimes lost 
all legitimacy in the eyes of the people they claimed to govern” (Chege 
2002, 159).
4 Creole (often called Krio, though originally Krio applied only to their language) are a mix 
of people of various origins including: former slaves recruited by the British from Nova Scotia 
and Jamaica, liberated slaves recaptured by the British from slavers off the coast of West Africa 
and released in Sierra Leone, and some freed slaves from the UK. “By the 1860s, wealth and some 
education had produced in the ranks of the recaptives and settlers the beginnings of a Krio elite, 
owners of property and aspirants to a lifestyle that was the envy of their poorer kinsmen … If 
the Krio were themselves divided along class and cultural lines, the alienation of some of their 
dominant families from the indigenous populate was even more pronounced” (Conteh-Morgan 
and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 26-7, 32-3).
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Rebirth of Resistance
Most social movement literature describes what induces a person to join 
a movement, how a movement does or does not advance, and sometimes 
what makes a movement decline. Seldom is there an explanation of how a 
movement actually starts or is attempted. It is not an easy research question 
to examine, but one can get a reasonable idea by locating past participants 
and leaders and interviewing them. In 1977, students at Fourah Bay College 
were about to attempt to start a social/resistance movement, though it 
was unlikely they were actually conscious that they were doing so or had 
thought out the full consequences. At that time, Stevens, a former labor 
leader and suspicious politician, was in control with a regime based on 
nepotism, paternalism, and fear. He had survived coups and assassination 
attempts, and he had learned to manipulate, co-opt, threaten, and punish 
those who might pose a challenge. But the economy was slipping, and 
radicalism was growing among college students. In addition, Stevens had 
made a relatively minor mistake with the Fourah Bay College students, and 
it was about to trigger a protest that would shake the regime. The question 
in 1977 became whether he would survive what began as an unprecedented 
act of resistance to him at the convocation and grew into a nationwide 
resistance.
“Opportunity?”
Social movement theories as applied in the democratic West by McAdam 
and other scholars typically emphasize the importance of political “oppor-
tunities” that help a movement to advance. Generally these are considered 
to be something in the structure of the society, something beyond the 
control of the activists. Lack of opportunity is also considered critical: the 
greater the repression, the less chance for a social movement to advance. In 
Sierra Leone, there was little in the way of apparent opportunity for restless 
students in 1977. Instead they faced a repressive regime that would resort 
to force when it felt force was necessary. They also faced a regime skilled 
in the use of co-optation to limit the scope of any emerging challenge. 
Referring to McAdam’s updated and synthesized, “highly consensual” list 
of opportunities (1996, 27): the political system was closed and stable; there 
were no obvious f issures among political elites or elite allies of the students 
(something that soon would become even clearer). Using McAdam’s earlier 
suggested list of “opportunities” (McAdam 1982, 176), the country was not at 
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war; Sierra Leone was not industrializing; the Cold War was underway but 
with no realignments affecting Sierra Leone at the time; and there were no 
widespread demographic changes, a vague concept given the diff iculty of 
determining when such changes might provide an opportune moment for 
action. Political freedom was limited. There was chronic unemployment, 
however, and the economy appeared to be worsening.
Beresford Davies was a new student at Fourah Bay College in 1977. Life had 
been “much better” in the early 1970s, though “not for everybody in Sierra 
Leone,” he recalled. “People were having a good time. Nobody was rushing to 
go out of the country.” For relatively little money, he would go to the market 
and f ill up a small basket. “I’d buy milk, I’d buy tea, I’d buy sugar, coffee, 
salami sausage, butter – any kind of thing I would require.” But by 1977, the 
economy was in decline. That potential “opportunity” for action was easily 
offset by the repressive nature of the Stevens regime. Stevens’ nepotism and 
paternalistic style of government showed no signs of changing. “Stevens 
would say the elections are ‘free and fair.’ Students would say they are ‘free 
and fear,’” Davies recalled, laughing. To help keep order, Stevens used the 
SSD (Special Security Division) an agency opponents referred to as Siaka 
Stevens’ Dogs. “Torture was an instrument [of the state …]. By ’77, you know 
people had gotten to the point where they are giving up to an extent … 
Because they [opponents, including students who had demonstrated unsuc-
cessfully in 1968] tried all that they could to change [the policies] of the 
central government, but Siaka Stevens had sewn up the system … Nobody 
was ready to challenge him because challenging him would be trouble: 
you’d either get killed or you’d be forced to run away …”5
Phase I: Student Resistance
Sierra Leonean historian and Fourah Bay faculty member Joe A.D. Alie 
noted (2006, 85) that students were particularly hard-hit by the combination 
of bad politics and bad economy at the time. “Poor educational facilities, 
inadequate and inappropriate curricula, programmes, and lack of employ-
ment opportunities for young people over the years contributed to their 
marginalization and turned them into a rebellious group. The students, 
5 Davies, in an interview with the author, December 3, 2009, on the campus of Milton Margi 
College of Education and Technology, near Freetown, Sierra Leone. At the time of the interview, 
Davies, a former Fulbright Fellow with a PhD in social science from Clements University in the 
US, was a faculty member at Milton Margi College.
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particularly those in the University, became very radical and anti-system.” 
Against this backdrop, facing a repressive regime and with little in the way 
of a clear “opportunity” on their side, students at Fourah Bay College were 
about to shake things up in 1977, creating their own opportunity.
Students were already focused on the growing opposition to apartheid 
in South Africa and had in their midst some students from southern Africa, 
including Zimbabwe and Namibia. When Kenneth Kaunda, president of a 
“frontline” state of Zambia, was scheduled to visit Sierra Leone that year 
for the f irst time, students planned to welcome him. They had received 
permission from the college off icials and were on their way to the ferry that 
would bring Kaunda across the bay from the international airport when 
the government intervened. It was Jan. 20, 1977, the day Jimmy Carter was 
being inaugurated president of the United States. The students suddenly 
heard an announcement that the Sierra Leone government had called off the 
student welcome of Kaunda, apparently fearing it might be misinterpreted 
as an anti-American gesture on the US inauguration day. But the students 
rejected this reasoning and greeted Kaunda anyway. On their return, they 
took a break at Victoria Park in downtown Freetown. Police dispersed them 
with teargas. After dinner that night at their campus some of the students 
in the “Gardeners,” one of the student social/political groups, gathered 
behind a hostel for a secret discussion. One of the students was Hindolo 
Trye, president of the Student Union at Fourah Bay, and president of the 
Gardeners.
So it was at that gathering we started to think: let’s begin to look at the 
whole country. If these people [the government] can think about America 
– the effect of our demonstration on America – let them begin to look 
at the effect of a demonstration in Sierra Leone pertaining to what was 
happening. Because at that time we had a de facto one-party system of 
government. And there was a lot of corruption. Things were not right.6
President Stevens was scheduled to address the annual convocation on 
campus January 29, just a few days later. “We said that will be the best 
time for us to organize such a demonstration so we can outline some of 
our own shortfalls to our own leaders. So we started planning from the 
20th.”7 Pulling off a surprise protest against the president would not be 
6 Hindolo Trye in an interview with the author, December 12, 2008, in his off ice as minister 
of tourism, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
7 Trye interview.
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easy, especially in a repressive state. Elected student leaders often had wide 
popular support, but they had to proceed with cunning to avoid detection 
by pro-government students who would tip off the police. So elected leaders 
tried to keep planned demonstrations secret until the last minute then 
suddenly take a vote. Whoever voted against the plan would be identif ied 
as pro-government. In their preparations to challenge the president, student 
leaders contacted someone off campus to write up instructions for the 
protest so that the handwriting could not be traced to any student. The 
Gardeners would lead the demonstration and begin at a signal from Trye.
I would give a sign. I would pretend as if I’m fixing my gown. I would stand 
up and sit down f ixing my gown. And that’s the time everybody would 
come out with their placards. And then they’ll be singing: “This is what we 
want.” So it was shocking to everybody because nobody expected that.8
At Trye’s signal, the twenty or so students who had been invited into the 
reserved seating section of the convocation and some among the hundreds 
of students standing around the edges pulled out their signs hidden in their 
clothing and began booing and calling out. “He [the president] was flab-
bergasted. I don’t think he had ever experienced anything like it before.”9 
Davies, one of the students, recalled:
He was in the middle of delivery of his address to the convocation when 
the students unfolded banners condemning the government. Right there, 
there was complete uproar. They [Stevens and his entourage] were not 
able to continue with that convocation, they had to move to town, for 
safety.10
The Power of Small Groups
It was a nonviolent protest. There would soon be violence by students in 
response to attacks by government thugs and the SSD, and as the protests 
spread, there were student attacks on some government property. But for 
now they were exercising what today is known as nonviolent resistance or 
nonviolent “conflict.” Either term signals a deliberate response to repression, 
8 Trye interview.
9 Gordon interview. Gordon, who died in 2011, was a longtime independent journalist and a 
former faculty member at Fourah Bay College.
10 Davies interview.
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either through acts of commission or omission, doing something or refusing 
to do something. One of the prominent proponents of nonviolent resistance, 
Gene Sharp, notes (2005, 36): “[P]eople have immense power potential. It 
is ultimately their attitudes, behavior, cooperation, and obedience that 
supply the sources of power to all rulers and hierarchical systems, even op-
pressors and tyrants.” Sharp also stresses that victory is not easily won and 
requires the activists to consolidate their gains and be ready to respond to 
countermoves by the opposing power. Would the students of Sierra Leone be 
able to build on their momentary success and help bring a shift of political 
power in their country? (Twenty years later, Sierra Leoneans would refuse 
to cooperate with a military junta, depriving it of the legitimacy and power 
it so desperately sought and helping attract international intervention that 
brought the regime down.)
For the moment, students had more power than the president. Looking 
back years later, some Sierra Leone professionals argued that the dem-
onstrations were a movement and that it had the potential to topple the 
government had labor joined forces with the students. Others disagree. “We 
could have brought the government down if we had had the experience; 
I certainly think so. There was a window of opportunity. It [the resistance] 
was a very fierce period of uprising … against a one-party system.11 The 
resistance was “very, very close” to ending the Stevens regime, said another 
observer. “The Labour Congress could have tilted the balance if they had 
sided [with the students]. They may have been able to tilt the balance in 
favor of true democracy.12 Gberie (2005, 44) doubts this claim. He writes: 
“The student-inspired protests … were a failure … [and] led to the consolida-
tion of Stevens’ hold on power … But they also exposed the weaknesses of 
the state and the potential for small groups of dissidents to shake it to its 
foundations” [emphasis added].
For the moment, students were refusing to be obedient to an oppressive 
president. What might have been just a one-time protest, not a “movement,” 
quickly shifted from a Fourah Bay campus protest to a national campaign 
to bring about real political change. Many students were still celebrating 
the audacious challenge at Fourah Bay to the president when supporters 
of the government countered with violence that triggered what became 
a countrywide protest. It is not clear that the campus protest would have 
spread nationally without the response from the regime.
11 Gordon interview; emphasis in original.
12 Davies interview. 
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Regime Repression Stimulates more Resistance
Early prominent social movement studies such as McAdam’s (1982) argued 
that without opportunities there was not much chance for a movement to 
progress. Some later studies recognized that the counter-resistance to a 
movement, including repression, could actually stimulate more resistance 
(e.g., Goldstone and Tilly 2001). Beyond an undefined point, however, repres-
sion is likely to stop a nonviolent resistance movement, as it did in Syria 
where a peaceful movement starting in 2011 was soon almost entirely shut 
down by the government’s massive use of force against civilians. In Sierra 
Leone, the f irst countermeasures to the students’ peaceful protest came 
the Monday after the weekend demonstration on campus. Members of the 
youth wing of the president’s party, All People’s Congress (APC), commonly 
considered by students to be thugs, attacked the campus with support 
from members of the Internal Security Unit. They destroyed property and 
assaulted some students and members of the staff.13 This repressive response 
to a peaceful protest added to the frustration and determination of students, 
both in the college and in secondary schools.
Student leaders at Fourah Bay had been in contact with student leaders 
in Freetown’s secondary schools, including some who would later surface 
as activists in the 1980s (Rashid 2004, 77). Although no advance plans had 
been made for them to join or support the Fourah Bay demonstration, 
secondary students soon became involved due to an unforeseen chain of 
events. Amidst word that the government was planning to close Fourah 
Bay College after the demonstration, secondary school students vowed to 
boycott their own classes. The protest message was then quickly “framed,” 
as the social movement literature describes a rallying focus, as “No College: 
No School.” This slogan helped spread the resistance nationally from Fourah 
Bay to across the nation as secondary students, who saw their future linked 
to the University, joined in (Rashid 2013). Fourah Bay student president 
Hindolo Trye was taken into police custody.14 In an interview, Trye recalled 
what happened next amidst word that the government would close Fourah 
Bay College:
13 Trye interview; Alie (2006, 86). Rashid (2004, 75) notes: “Students were brutalized and 
extensive damage wrought on campus property. Armed units of the Cuban-trained paramilitary 
Internal Security Units … personally controlled by Stevens, followed on the train of the thugs, 
allegedly to control the situation. They joined in the operation and arrested a number of lecturers 
and student leaders.”
14 In the interview with the author, Trye said he turned himself in because the police were 
looking for him.
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I remember the Inspector General of police … His son was also a member 
of the Gardeners and a student at Fourah Bay College at the time. So we 
were used to him; he was used to us because we used to go for weekends 
in the house with his son and so on and so forth … He said a lot of your 
friends want to come and see you: what should I do? I said “allow them to 
come and see me three by three.” That was a mistake they made. So when 
they came in it was “Plan Two:” Bring in the school children. The IG came 
to see me at about 11 or 12; by 2 or 3, the whole streets of Freetown were 
littered with protesting students; these students and college [students] 
combined [shouting] “No College, No School” from the east, the west, 
the north, and the south of Freetown. So after that from Freetown it [the 
demonstration] extended to the provinces. By then we had incorporated 
all the other colleges: Njala [University], Makeni Teachers College; Free-
town; Bo Teachers College; Bo Normal Teachers College – all of them 
[supported] “No College, No School” So there was massive protest in Bo, 
Kenema, Kono; everywhere in the country.15
“Plan Two,” involving secondary school children, had not been prepared in 
advance, even by Trye’s acknowledgement. Rather, it was a quick response to 
circumstances, a choice of tactics in the resistance. It was a major strategic 
initiative that transformed the resistance from a one-time campus event 
into a national protest. (It is worth noting here that this book argues for 
updated and broader conceptualizations of what social movements are, 
especially in repressive settings; one that includes individual and small 
group resistance with less automatic focus on “opportunities” and more 
appreciation for the initiatives of activists.)
Abdul Dimoh Kposowa, a high school student at the time who partici-
pated in the demonstrations in Freetown, recalled the sequence of events. 
University students would come down from their campus late at night and 
talk to secondary school student leaders. When the clashes broke out after 
the Fourah Bay demonstration, “police used live bullets.” In response, some 
government property was destroyed by students as they went on strike 
around the country, according to various accounts. Students threw petrol 
bombs at government vehicles, buses, and police. “When police blocked [us] 
… we started pelting stones at them and ‘missiles’ (Molotov cocktails). They 
burned down a dozen or six police vehicles.”16 Olu Gordon, who graduated 
15 Trye interview.
16 Abdul Dimoh Kposowa, interview with the author, Freetown, Sierra Leone, December 1, 
2008.
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from Fourah Bay in 1979 and lectured there in the 1980s, saw a girl killed near 
a police station and said two other children might have been shot by police 
as students rampaged through the streets of Freetown. According to Gordon, 
the spread of the resistance nationally came about in part when students 
from the then-closed Fourah Bay College returned to their homes in various 
parts of the country and “agitated” secondary school students into joining 
the protests. Interestingly, he noted, students were particularly active even 
in the city of Makeni, part of the APC’s northern power base of the president: 
“There was a lot of discontent, even in the north.”17 Gibril Foday-Musa was 
a secondary school student at the time in the southern city of Bo, Sierra 
Leone’s second main city after Freetown. “We led a demonstration against 
APC …We wanted an end to [single party] rule.”18
Resistance Impact
In the wake of the nationwide student protests, the government took a 
two-pronged approach to regaining control. “All educational institutions in 
the country were closed for several weeks and the Stevens administration, 
through the use of brute force, restored law and order” countrywide (Alie 
2006, 86). At the same time, Stevens personally began to negotiate with 
student leaders over their main demand to have a multiparty election. 
President Stevens had temporarily locked up the Fourah Bay College student 
president Hindolo Trye in a waterfront cell at Government Wharf. Beads of 
water drifted into the cell from the splashing waves, Trye recalled.19 When 
released, he and other student leaders further “framed” the continuing 
protest as a national movement by calling for a meeting of the student 
presidents of other colleges and universities in Sierra Leone. Together they 
drafted a set of resolutions which they released February 8, 1977, at which 
point the resistance “became a more coherent political challenge” (Rashid 
2004, 76). “Every day, for hours. [Stevens] was chairing all these meetings. 
It was Stevens, some members of his government, and the students.” The 
daily student leaders’ negotiations with the president and members of his 
cabinet brought crowds of students and others around State House. When 
the student leaders emerged after a day’s session, they would walk to nearby 
17 Gordon interview.
18 Gibril Foday-Musa, in an interview with the author, January 31, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
19 Trye interview.
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Victoria Park, surrounded by supporters and there announce the results of 
the day’s negotiations.20
In the end, Stevens agreed to student demands for “free and fair” multi-
party parliamentary elections and an end to the one-party system, “clearly a 
concession made to the students’ leadership” (Gberie 2005, 44). But Stevens 
had no intention of seeing his ruling party, the APC, lose the May 6, 1977 
elections. “Amid widespread violence, harassment, killing, and destruction 
of rural settlements [by government forces], only a mere 15 opposition SLPP 
[Sierra Leone People’s Party] candidates squeaked through to Parliament” 
(Rashid 2004, 76). But even that was too much for Stevens. On May 22, 1978, 
his party introduced a bill which passed and converted the country back to 
a one-party system, defended by Stevens as a necessary measure to avoid 
the country splitting into “tribal factions” (Alie 2006, 87). Part of the new 
law required SLPP members of Parliament to switch to the APC or lose 
their seat. All but one of the f ifteen, Mana Kpaka of Pujehun, switched. For 
former student leaders such as Trye, the election they had worked so hard to 
achieve was a major disappointment. What really hurt was that some of the 
Fourah Bay College lecturers that Stevens suspected of having supported 
the students’ protest accepted uncontested seats from the ruling APC. Trye 
said in the interview that he was “extremely disappointed” in the way the 
election was manipulated after “all the sacrif ices; all the school children 
that were killed in protesting.” Trye extrapolated:
Some [SLPP winners who agreed to switch parties instead of resigning] 
were made Ministers and given an off icial vehicle. Those who were not 
made Ministers were given an off icial vehicle … All three students who 
went in under SLPP were made Junior cabinet Ministers. [Emmanuel] 
Grant was made Minister of something. All of our friends who were 
making all that noise were then part and parcel of the system.21
Emmanuel Grant’s short-lived opposition victory and later political career is 
an example of the mercurial nature of Sierra Leone politics and an example 
of why the student-initiated protest of 1977 failed to bring lasting political 
change. Grant, a former student at Fourah Bay and a school teacher at the 
time of the 1977 demonstration, was one of the f ifteen who won a seat in 
Parliament on the SLPP ticket. He was a popular candidate among those 
tired of the Stevens regime. As part of the government’s intimidation of 
20 Trye interview; emphasis in original.
21 Trye interview.
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opposition candidates police f ired guns at the polling station and even tried 
to seize the ballot boxes. But Grant’s supporters “fought with the police, 
seized some guns from them. Somehow we were able to get those boxes 
into the counting station and were able to guard them. That’s why I say it 
[his election] was a miracle.” But the next year Grant agreed to switch to 
APC rather than resigning when the one-party law passed. He was rewarded 
with the post of deputy minister of f inance. (He ran again in 1982 and was 
reelected; Stevens appointed him minister of education from 1982-86.) Grant 
explained his decision to switch parties rather than resign:
The SLPP group was of the opinion that democracy will never return to 
this country again and they felt if we [SLPP-elected MPs] were there, we’d 
be able to secure their interests. Self ishness of human beings; that was 
the point. Nobody wants to lose. But I would have thought the best thing 
we could have done was to have quit Parliament and go into a private life. 
But that didn’t happen. They instructed us to stay. So all of us, including 
our leader, stayed.22
Civil Society Fails to Support Protesting Students
The student-led resistance of 1977 expanded more rapidly than its leaders 
had anticipated. The nationwide student uprising that spread from the 
Fourah Bay campus and the temporary detention of the student presi-
dent followed by his release to negotiate with the head of state alongside 
other student leaders was impressive. But there was no planning on how 
to consolidate those gains other than to leverage an election and hope 
for a credible opposition in Parliament. There were formidable obstacles 
to further success, not just the emasculation of opposition victories in 
Parliament despite popular support. “It was the students who made a name, 
but there were a lot of people underneath who supported the students, 
or else you wouldn’t have gotten anywhere. It was a mass movement.”23 
But participants in mass movements can grow weary or be drawn back to 
routines by their normal interests (Tarrow 1998, chap. 9).
Although the student protests went on around the country for several 
weeks, the promise of elections – and upcoming national student exams 
– took the steam out of the resistance. Unfortunately for the students, 
22 Emmanuel Grant, in an interview with the author, December 12, 2008, Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
23 Grant interview.
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their unorganized mass support had not been enough. Key civil society 
organizations that might have tilted the balance of power away from the 
government and offered strategic and political leverage and experience that 
might have led to a different outcome had stood on the sidelines. Labor was 
the main holdout. Accounts differ on the reasons, but the most widely cited 
explanation is that they had been co-opted by Stevens, an acknowledged 
master at the art. “Political activism by the labour movement was silenced 
through co-optation of labor leaders during the 1977 student crisis, and then 
crushed in the wake of the 1981 labor unrest” (Kandeh 2004b, 177). Stevens 
had come up through the labor ranks himself; he and his party had “deep 
networks in the labor movement.” Stevens also warned the professional class 
by radio that their businesses were likely targets if the protests “spiraled 
out of control” (Rashid 2013).
Tejan Kassim, a labor movement off icial then, confirmed that labor did 
not support the student uprising. But, he countered, this was due in part 
to lack of unity among the students. He cited support for the government 
among the Limba, an ethnic group Stevens used to help break a labor strike 
in 1981. Kassim added that when police started shooting at the students in 
1977, the Labour Congress issued a statement against that.24 Trye, looking 
back on his perspective as the Fourah Bay student president at the time of 
the demonstrations, argued that it was not just labor that failed to support 
the students. “The doctors, the professionals are not [consistent in resist-
ance efforts]. The labor union – they’ve always been bought over. Personal 
interests. You know Siaka knew them. Stevens played on the vulnerability 
of the human being. So they were vulnerable – to material things.”25
Women, who had been active politically in the 1940s and 1950s, retreated 
into social organizations in the 1970s due to the extreme violence against 
critics by the Stevens regime, according to Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, a prominent 
human rights attorney.26 (Women’s organizations would reemerge in the 1990s 
in a major push for peace and a civilian government to replace a military 
junta.) In 1981, when the labor movement finally did stage a strike in the face 
of worsening economic conditions, it was the students who failed to turn out 
to support them. Though labor leader Kassim noted that students stayed home 
24 Tejan Kassim,in an interview with the author, April 17, 2009, Freetown, Sierra Leone. Kassim 
was general secretary of the Artisans, Public Works, and Services Employees Union at the time 
of the interview, a post he had been elected to in 1972.
25 Trye interview. Gberie (2013) notes: “Trade unions, professional organizations, are not 
normally expected to follow students.”
26 Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, in an interview with the author, February 2, 2009. At the time, she was 
deputy chair of Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, a government agency.
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from classes, this was more likely because the teachers on strike were not in 
their classrooms. Some Sierra Leonean former activists speculated that either 
students were still resentful for lack of labor’s support for the 1977 student 
demonstrations, or they had lost some of their former steam for resistance. But 
by the mid-1980s, students at Fourah Bay College had reenergized under the 
leadership of their student president, Alie Kabba, whose story is related below.
As in Kenya and Liberia, the bar association often was not active as an 
organization to defend human rights, leaving human rights attorneys to 
act individually in defending political dissidents or making other legal 
challenges to the regime. This was another example of individual activism 
that becomes part of an attempted social movement as seen in the broader 
def inition of a movement used in this book. In the 1970s the Sierra Leone 
Bar was sidelined by co-optation by Stevens. “[It] had been in the forefront 
of leading demonstrations against Stevens. Lawyers are on record here of 
having downed their tools on a number of occasions and having led marches 
up to state house to meet Stevens and make demands … in the 70s.” But then 
the Bar was compromised by appointment of its president or other senior 
members to government posts, says attorney Abdul Tejan-Cole. “So as a 
result of that it ended up making the bar association a little more impotent. 
The bar ended up condoning what was going on [regarding repression of 
human rights].” When Tejan-Cole became president of the Bar Association, 
he issued an apology for the association’s failure to act as an organization. 
Some individual attorneys were active in defending human rights, but their 
impact was minimized by failure of the Bar Association to support them.27
Teachers also stayed on the sidelines in 1977. So did most leaders of the 
clergy, Christian and Moslem who “had always been on the conservative 
side, and allied to ruling governments”28. In Kenya, a handful of clergy 
spoke out boldly against the repression of President Daniel arap Moi in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Liberia, Catholic Archbishop Rev. Father 
Michael Kpakala Francis was one of the most courageous vocal critics of 
both Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor. In Sierra Leone, few clergy spoke out 
against Stevens; the rest were either afraid to do so or supported him.
At that point in time the whole country was an one-party state. If you 
said anything here, people were arrested for what they called “careless 
talk.” More often than not, they [clergy] would resort to Romans chapter 
27 Abdul Tejan-Cole, in an interview with the author, February 24, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
28 Ismail Rashid, in an email to the author, December 15, 2013.
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13 which speaks about … render to Caesar the things that are Caesar … 
But to come up at that particular point in time, as it were, to say: “Mr. 
President. We totally condemn what you are doing” – it did not happen 
in the strict sense of the word. 29
Phase II: Political Shape Shift: A “War” of Words
The narrow courtyard leading into Stop Press café is unremarkable and 
easy to overlook from the busy downtown street lined with angle-parked 
cars along a sidewalk overflowing with people, some of them working or 
studying at an adjacent university building. Young men hawking CDs or 
other items know the café well and approach clients seated in the small 
outdoor section in front of the indoor kitchen, sometimes venturing to the 
upstairs dining room, an unpretentious space with plain tables and a basic 
but tasty menu of rice, meats, and vegetables.
If you don’t know the faces, it looks like any other café, though the spirited 
talk hints at something more. Stop Press is more than it f irst appears: it is 
not just a place to eat; it is an unoff icial political gathering spot, mostly for 
supporters of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). The SLPP is a former 
archrival of Siaka Stevens’ All People’s Congress (APC), a rivalry that 
continues today with a new cast of politicians. At midday, history and the 
present mingle. Young attorneys in suits, other young professionals – men 
and women – and professors, settle in at tables in the cramped outdoor 
section. Look closer and on most days, if you know the faces, you can spot 
political activists, journalists, former student protest leaders and others 
from the turbulent Siaka Stevens era, survivors of those repressive years. 
One day, according to one of the regulars, President Ernest Bai Koroma 
of the APC party dropped in, perhaps for the food, but more likely as a 
friendly gesture to SLPP stalwarts. The café is run and owned by Pios Foray, 
who graduated in the turbulent year of 1977 from Fourah Bay College. He 
29 The Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper, Retired Bishop Emeritus of the United Methodist Church, 
of which Stevens was a member, in an interview with the author, April 20, 2009, in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone. Humper served as president of the Inter-Religious Council of Churches and as 
chairman of the post-civil war Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. In spite 
of the possible consequences, he added, “to some extent, the late S.M. Renner spoke out; the 
late Dr. M.N.C.O. Scott of the Anglican Church spoke out,” as well as Bishop Michael Kelly of 
Bo; and the late T.K. Davies of the Pentecostal church from 1971-78. He did not specify when 
they criticized the government. Some clergy were more direct in their criticism of the military 
junta that seized power in 1992, he added.
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and three other activists in December that year launched The Tablet, an 
opposition newspaper that became the extension of the resistance started 
with the student protests earlier in the year. 30
One might ask: how can a newspaper be the focus of a resistance? The 
usual, Western-based def initions of social movements are hard-pressed 
to answer the question. The typical focus is on organizations that as-
semble people for protests, though many social movement scholars do 
recognize the concept of process, not just organizations. The more flexible 
conceptualization of social movements offered in this book takes a less 
narcissistic or self-observing approach to movements than usual, focusing 
less on the mechanics of a movement and more on the purpose and the way 
the targeted authorities view the various kinds of resistance a movement 
can encompass. Under this approach it makes good sense to focus on The 
Tablet. It had the same purpose as the demonstrations – to bring about 
fundamental political change in Sierra Leone through public challenges 
to the authorities, in this case through risky institutional channels. The 
regime was not very friendly to critical journalism.31
The Tablet was inextricably linked to the student protests and resistance 
at Fourah Bay.
“Radical student leaders became radical journalists with the launching 
of the Tablet newspaper” (Rashid 2004, 77). The Tablet was tightly linked 
to Fourah Bay College and a clear extension of the social movement the 
students attempted to start. “For the population it [The Tablet] was a con-
tinuation of the student strike. They knew that.”32 Both Pios Foray and Frank 
Kposowa, two of the four founders of The Tablet, graduated from Fourah 
Bay in 1977, the year of the student-led national protest movement. Foray 
considered Fourah Bay faculty member Cleo Hanciles, a supporter of the 
student protests, as his mentor, along with a journalist from the 1960s, I.T.A. 
Wallace-Johnson.33 Hindolo Trye, student president in 1977, later wrote for 
30 The other three founders of The Tablet, according to Pios Foray and his brother John Foray 
were: Charlie Kallon, Lamine Warrity, and Frank Kposowa. Olu Gordon and I.B. Kargbo became 
key contributors. (Kposowa names Hindolo Trye, former Student Union president at Fourah Bay 
in 1977 as a founder.) 
31 Rashid (2013) notes that the APC’s own newspaper, We Yone, had been a powerful tool against 
SLPP in the 1960s and 1970s.
32 Trye interview.
33 It is interesting how each generation of activists took models from the previous one. Abdul 
Dimoh Kposowa, for example, who led a 1977 demonstration at his secondary school considered 
as his role models Pios Foray, Hindolo Trye, I.B. Kargbo, and his relative Frank Kposowa. “They 
were guys I admired. They were eloquent speakers.” In an interview with the author, December 1, 
2008 in Freetown, he recalled a phrase they often used: “The Struggle will continue.”
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the newspaper. So did Tablet contributor Olu Gordon who was expelled from 
Fourah Bay along with faculty colleagues Hanciles and Jimmy Kandeh in 
1985 along with forty-one students after another major student demonstra-
tion. “[A]ll three were deemed friendly with students” (Rashid 2004, 81). 
“With the start of The Tablet, “the student opposition just took another 
direction.”34 It was more than an opposition newspaper in an era when there 
was no opposition press. It was the voice of the resistance, of dissent at the 
time. Like the Nairobi Law Monthly in Kenya in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, The Tablet became a kind of rallying point for the intellectual class. 
Some of the professors, the lecturers at Fourah Bay College, contributed to 
the newspaper.’35 Their aim was the same: bring about a political opening 
of a fossilized, nepotistic system that was blocking economic progress and 
denying human rights. The Tablet lasted until 1981 when the government 
dynamited its press in downtown Freetown.
While one can still f ind copies of The Tablet in a monitored reading room 
in the library at Fourah Bay College, the best place to start tracking down 
its founders and key contributors is at Stop Press café. Most days founder 
Pios Foray is sitting, often with friends, at his usual table with his back to 
the kitchen, facing the rest of the patio from where he can keep an eye on 
business. My interview with him took place at this post. He continued to 
greet people as they arrived or left.
“We were radical, young idealists. We grew out of a liberal background. 
We thought we were the national conscience. I used the system to beat the 
system.”36 Foray said they found two printers, John Love and Ina McCarthy, 
who were willing to ignore government warnings against The Tablet. The 
paper tried to establish itself as a reasoned voice of the opposition, though 
from time to time their critical articles landed the staff in detention or 
forced them to hide. At one point he was ordered to appear at Parliament 
and faced charges of contempt for an article the newspaper had published 
which offended an appointed member of Parliament, Major-General Joseph 
Momoh, who was also the head of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military 
Forces and later to be named president by Stevens. “There was a huge state 
of tension in town. We had a large number of followers. We went with those 
34 Davies interview.
35 I.B. Kargbo, in an interview with the author, April 21, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. At 
the time of the interview, Kargbo, who wrote for The Tablet, was minister of information and 
communication in the APC government of President Ernest Bai Koroma.
36 Pios Foray, in an interview with the author, February 2, 2009, at Stop Press café in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone.
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to Parliament.”37 Foray successfully defended himself and was given “a 
hero’s applause” by supporters. He and Hindolo Trye later f led into exile in 
the United States “as a result of the APC’s repressive tactics” (Rashid 2004, 
p 88, n. 12).
Could they have been even a stronger voice for change? Independent 
journalist Paul Kamara, winner of the Train Foundation (New York) Civil 
Courage award for “steadfast resistance to evil at great personal risk,” thinks 
so. “The SLPP (the main opposition party to Stevens APC) decided to trans-
form themselves into the printing press of The Tablet newspaper.” Kamara 
contends The Tablet was co-opted to some extent by allowing a close and 
wealthy ally of President Stevens to furnish them with a printing press and 
vehicles, a “compromise of principles” of independent journalism. “Then 
when the newspaper opposed [the regime], the system came for them.” The 
press was blown up, no doubt at government orders, in 1981, according to 
Kamara.38 Foray acknowledged that things “went haywire” after the press 
was provided in 1979 by a backer of the president, Jamil Sahid Mohammed, 
who was also an entrepreneur. He did not explain further.
The Cost of Resisting Repression with Words
As a foreign correspondent in Africa, I encountered many courageous 
people who stood up for freedom in one way or another, often through 
their profession, especially lawyers and journalists. Their work was much 
more dangerous than mine. Periodically over a f ive-year period, I covered 
the civil wars in Somalia, Sudan, and part of Rwanda, among other stories. 
But we foreign journalists would fly back to our base in Nairobi, Kenya, 
leaving the danger behind. Once while in Khartoum, capital of Sudan, in the 
Arab-controlled north, a local paper published a recent story I had written 
based on my visit to a rebel-held town in the south of the country. I was not 
harassed by the government, though later I learned state security agents 
were questioning my activities. In one rebel-occupied town in southern 
Sudan I was briefly held under “arrest” by a local commander for having 
interviewed the unhappy local chief who resented the takeover of his area 
by southern rebels from a larger ethnic group. My wife, photographer Betty 
37 Kargbo interview.
38 Paul Kamara, in an interview with the author, April 17, 2009, on the f lat roof of his For Di 
People newspaper off ice in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Kamara established For di People as an 
independent newspaper in the early 1980s and maintained a strong critical approach toward 
all regimes for several decades. Kamara was still its editor when I interviewed him in 2009.
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Press, and I were arrested by the military at gunpoint and held (unharmed) 
for two days in Uganda for visiting a rebel-held area. Yet our escape routes 
from danger as journalists were usually as close as the nearest international 
airport. Local journalists in Africa, however, who persistently exposed 
wrong doing by repressive regimes, were never that safe. For them the exit 
door sometimes led to detention, or worse.
In Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Liberia, I met and interviewed numerous 
journalists who had been mistreated by their government or forced to 
f lee their homeland. In Sierra Leone, “[t]hroughout the 1970s the media 
was constantly harassed sometimes by over enthusiastic APC supporters. 
In addition, there were draconian press laws which hampered the work 
of journalists” (Alie 2006, 97). If President Siaka Steven could not co-opt 
someone he considered a risk to his power, he could be violent. By the 
time The Tablet was launched in late 1977, Stevens had already engineered 
the pseudo-legal executions of a number of his political foes. Interviewing 
surviving activists from that time it is easy to overlook what some of them 
risked to be a part of the nonviolent resistance to the Stevens regime. Two 
journalists for The Tablet illustrate the cost some activist journalists paid.
Refusing to Flee
Frank Kposowa, a co-founder and editor of The Tablet, met me in the mem-
bers lounge in Parliament, a place he once covered as a journalist some three 
decades before being elected as a member of Parliament. The building sits 
atop a small hill in the midst of sprawling off ice buildings in downtown 
Freetown. It was here that members had voted the will of Stevens, wiping 
out temporary opposition gains by the SLPP in the elections students had 
helped force with their demonstrations in 1977, returning the country to 
one-party rule. It was here that hand-picked leaders of various organizations 
were seated as members in Stevens’ efforts to co-opt any potential bases of 
power against him: the military, the bar association, labor. Bring them in; 
make them feel needed; give them prestige: take away their critical voices.
As we huddled together at a table on the side of the members lounge, 
Kposowa would suddenly stop talking when someone walked by in earshot, 
at one point for a long time. Was this a carryover from his heady days as 
an opposition journalist before he was elected to Parliament? He pointed 
to his still-visible facial scars that came from torture following one of his 
many arrests for his work with The Tablet. During those years under Stevens, 
“everybody was afraid. This was the time when you make your will before 
speaking” he says, laughing. “You could be in detention for one month, after 
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which you advise yourself not to talk again. Then he [Stevens] would give 
you a job,” a typical Stevens response to potential challengers to his power.
At that time we were really very radical. We had no respect for ethics. I’m 
being honest. We went raw. To make an impact on somebody’s life style, 
you have to speak in the language he understands. We didn’t have guns. 
We carried on the [struggle on the] front page of our paper: “The use of 
words is a choice of arms.”39
His arrest and torture came as a result of an article which apparently 
touched a nerve with Stevens. Kposowa criticized the president’s plans to 
host an annual summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
in 1980. The summit preparations would involve considerable expenses at 
a time when the country’s economy was already bad. On another occasion 
he was detained for an article he had written critical of the government as 
part of his “Ears to the Ground” column. “He was beaten up very seriously. 
He was admitted to hospital,” I.B. Kargbo, another writer for The Tablet at 
the time, recalled in a separate interview.
Why did Kposowa persist? “We were young and radical. Wherever we 
went we were hailed; people were giving us money. They called our name” 
he said. This seemed a rather vain reason for risking his life. But while 
acknowledging that the fame and money were certainly attractive, later 
in the interview he offered a deeper insight on his opposing repression. 
When a brutal rebel group naming itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) seized power in 1997, Kposowa was president of the Sierra 
Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ). The AFRC was practically at war 
with independent journalists. He considered fleeing the country. 
Sometimes I get very emotional. And it was the morality of it all. Here 
I was: elected by a professional association to provide leadership and 
I was afraid. Here were journalists, my own people, fanning flames of 
civil disobedience … to oust perpetrators of human misery. I had an op-
portunity to leave this country. I did take that decision one time. But half 
way, I burst into tears. I said: this could be interpreted as deep betrayal 
[of my profession]. And these boys are holding out … For me to turn 
my back on them – it was one of the few moments when I was actually 
emasculated. I said I cannot [leave]; I turned back: I must be with them. 
39 Frank Kposowa, in an interview with the author, April 15, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
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And because of that, once civilian rule was restored and my term had 
ended, they [fellow journalists] voted me [president of SLAJ] again.40
Independent Journalist Escapes Arrest by Jumping out a Window; 
Press Dynamited
I.B. Kargbo. In my interview with him, Minister Kargbo spoke distinctly 
and slowly as if carefully measuring his words, perhaps a habit developed 
as the off icial spokesman for the government, perhaps to recall with detail 
his political resistance some thirty years earlier. During the interview he 
put off numerous attempts by others to reach him by cell phone. It was 
something that happened often in such interviews. Former activists seemed 
very keen on telling their story. I often got the distinct impression that no 
one had previously asked them to recount it in any detail. In Kenya, for 
example, Paul Muite, a leading human rights attorney generously agreed 
to one, then a second lengthy interview, later saying it was the f irst time he 
had ever reflected on his activism in any great detail. He asked for a copy 
of the transcript which I provided.
At one point early in the interview Kargbo closed his eyes and recalled 
the “near absence of people to agitate for political and human rights” in 
the late 1970s and 1980s under Siaka Stevens. He analyzed both the 1977 
student demonstrations and the 1981 labor strike, calling both of them 
“unsustainable.” He argued that neither the students” nor the labor unions 
had a sustainable project. The old guard in the labor movement did not 
support the students in 1977, he said, because they still saw President Stevens 
as a “comrade.” Stevens had come up through the labor movement. Then 
students didn’t support labor’s strike in 1981 because the student union had 
“lost its teeth” and its Maoist and other radical “ideology” by then.
[The students] didn’t provide any positive results. So some people did not 
want to take the risk of associating themselves with a non-sustainable 
movement. The military was clearly against it – the student uprising. The 
military was f irmly behind Siaka Stevens. The police were f irmly behind 
Siaka Stevens. They [the students] did not have a structured system that 
can keep their programs and policies intact on a sustainable basis. And 
this is why you have these gaps there. And the workers, too; it’s the same 
40 Kposowa interview.
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thing. This was not helped either by the fact that later the government 
decided to recruit some of these people into government. 41
(Perhaps it should not be surprising, but it is interesting how numerous 
anti-regime activists in Kenya, Sierra Leone and Liberia, ended up in high 
government posts. In Sierra Leone when I interviewed her, Zainab Bangura, 
who helped lead a women’s movement for peace and democracy in the mid-
1990s, she was minister of foreign affairs. Trye was minister of tourism; and 
another former key Tablet contributor, Kargbo was minister of information 
and communication, both in an APC government, the same party they had 
opposed in their activist days.)
By 1979 The Tablet, Kargbo continued, “became a full blown organ for 
promoting human rights issues. People relied on it to come up with alterna-
tive views on state governance.” While off icially tolerated by the Stevens 
regime, sometimes just reading it could be a problem in some parts of the 
country. Marian Samu, for example, was arrested in Bo in 1981 because she 
had a copy of The Tablet. She was detained for two weeks for possession 
of “subversive” documents. Undeterred, the arrest spurred her interest in 
journalism – and politics. She began helping gather information for the 
newspaper. In 1991 she was vice president of the student union at Njala 
University and participated in a demonstration on the main road near 
Njala campus in 1991.42 When I told Kargbo I had read some copies of The 
Tablet and found them surprisingly unremarkable, uncritical, and rather 
bland, he responded:
The one-party state at the time did not provide much room for [an] effec-
tive opposition. And at the same time, we did not want to appear to be 
an anti-state instrument. So there was this neat balance that was most 
sincerely to insure that the people were informed properly and also insure 
that the government was put on its toes to promote at least some aspects 
of good governance; and the newspaper also exposed … any irregularities 
in the running of the state.
This attempt at a middle ground was precarious. While Kargbo said Presi-
dent Stevens at times called on The Tablet for advice, even soliciting names 
of people for a new government whom he then appointed, articles critical 
of the government got writers into trouble. At one point the newspaper 
41 Kargbo interview.
42 Marian Samu, in an interview with the author, January 23, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone
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published an article critical of the wife of a minister. The article was based 
on what the editors and a reporter thought was solid information, but it 
turned out to have been false. “Somebody set us up,” Kargbo said. On another 
occasion, the paper’s support of the 1981 labor strike was the breaking point 
in its tenuous relations with the government.
I wrote an article: “The Lessons of August 13 [1981]” on all the weaknesses 
of the government, the disappointments, the un-adherence to the promise 
made [to labor] by the President. And of course that also contributed to 
the intensif ication of the uprising. The workers became even bolder than 
before until Siaka Stevens declared a state of emergency. The same night, 
the police invaded my premises. I jumped out of the window. I could not 
[get] access to my car. I was lucky: I saw a very brave taxi driver, all by 
himself. Everybody else was at home. I f lagged him down and he gave 
me a lift to the center of town. I actually did go to the newspaper to see 
the level [to which] it had been vandalized.
Kargbo was found and arrested the next day. He was detained for forty days 
along with most of the key labor union leaders. Pios Foray and Trye fled 
into exile; Frank Kposowa stayed in Sierra Leone but fled to Makeni. That 
same week, The Tablet’s presses in downtown Freetown were blown up. It 
is widely assumed the government was responsible.
The second phase of the resistance started by students at Fourah Bay College 
had ended. A third phase had already begun. Students continued demonstra-
tions throughout the 1980s and to a lesser extent into the 1990s at which time 
two other social movements emerged to challenge two military juntas that 
deprived people of both their human rights and their longing for a democracy 
that might also improve economic conditions and provide a life for people.
Kargbo illustrates how some who engage in nonviolent resistance in one 
forum (as a student leader) can continue to resist in another (The Tablet 
newspaper); and, in this case, how some survive to later join governments 
after a repressive regime has been replaced.
Phase III: Radical Activism: From Seeking Regime Reform to 
Regime Change
The period of 1980-92 saw several major political changes with students 
continuing the resistance begun in 1977 through organized protests using 
a variety of tactics, both violent and nonviolent. Others turned to a more 
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radical option: taking training in Libya on how to start a revolution. In 
1980, Stevens generated more antagonism by hosting the expensive summit 
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at a time when the economy 
was deteriorating. “This activity was perhaps the most important single 
factor that precipitated the rapid collapse of the economy” (Alie 2006, 107). 
Students organized a campus strike in protest of the conference but it was 
ignored by the government.43 As noted previously, in 1981 labor organized 
a national strike; teachers also struck. The strike was quickly put down 
through a variety of tactics by Stevens, but it represented a growing public 
resentment to the way Stevens was governing the nation. It was also a 
sharp contrast to labor’s docile failure in 1977 to support the nationwide 
student strike. In the 1982 elections, an opponent of the government was 
killed in the Pujehun District near the Liberian border. In response, some 
residents organized a “campaign of defiance known as Ndogboyosoi (“bush 
devil”). The APC responded brutally, and thousands of peasant families 
were uprooted from their homes” (Keen 2005, 18).
Stevens, previously seen as the master of the game of control, appeared 
to be unable to prevent eruptions of resistance from various segments 
of society, especially from students. Unlike hierarchical organizations 
such as the Labour Congress or the Bar Association, or even the military, 
where he could wield his co-optation wand, awarding leaders with seats in 
Parliament, Stevens was unable to control students. Despite government 
supporters among the students, and despite the threats and use of violence 
to quell demonstrations, Stevens, and later President Momoh, never man-
aged to fully quell students’ social push for change. In 1984 there was a 
major student demonstration in Freetown in reaction to the ambiguity by 
Stevens about whether he would like to be a president for life. “Over 2,000 
college students and urban youth took to the streets carrying placards 
which condemned the president’s apparent plans for life presidency. The 
demonstrators stormed City Hall in Freetown and disrupted the ongoing 
APC summit” (Rashid 2004, 80). While some of the student organizers of 
demonstrations had larger goals than campus reform and wanted to see 
Stevens gone, they were not able to mount the kind of national protest that 
university and secondary school students had carried out in 1977. They 
made one last major attempt, under new student leadership and amidst 
a growing radicalization of students at Fourah Bay College. Olu Gordon, 
who graduated from Fourah Bay in the 1979 and was a lecturer there in the 
43 The Tablet, February 20, 1980, cited in Rashid (2004, 78).
students sHake tHe PillaRs of PoweR 69
1980s, compared the intellectual atmosphere among students in 1977 to 
that of the mid-1980s.
They were very radical [in the mid-1980s]. There was a high degree of 
socialist inf luence which was lacking in our time. We [in the 1970s] 
were familiar with Mao and Marx and what have you, but [there was] 
no considered ideological direction. But by ’85 that had changed [with] 
a lot of student groups – you had the socialists on campus; Green Book 
[of Libya’s Gaddafi]; you had the Pan-Africanist groups; you had [North 
Korea’s] Kim IL Sung study groups. You had a lot of ideological groups 
on campus.44
At a time when the regime appears to have been convinced that ethnic 
and political divisions among students at Fourah Bay College – no doubt 
encouraged by the regime – prevented student unity, students rendered the 
government a surprise. Alie Kabba was elected student president – unop-
posed – in 1985. Considered a radical, Kabba had already started taking 
training in Libya on how to start a revolution. His election was an indica-
tion of the united determination of the students to seek bold leadership to 
oppose a corrupt, failing regime. In an interview, Kabba reflected on his 
thinking at the time.
’85 was the crystallization of forces working for change. I felt anytime 
we could affect deep change. The one party dictatorship looked very 
vulnerable at the time. The economy was going downhill. We thought that 
was the time for us to go for it. I was pointing the f inger at the President. 
We needed an end [to Stevens]. We must organize to transform – basically 
regime change.45
The “frame” for his message was not regime reform but regime change. Kabba 
points out that where the 1977 demonstrations were initially planned, the 
spread to secondary schools was not, a point that even then-president of the 
student union Hindolo Trye makes. By contrast, according to Kabba, a lot of 
planning went into the 1985 demonstrations. Communications had previ-
ously been established with student leaders at other campuses around the 
country, in particular at Njala University near Bo, and at Kenema. Kabba and 
others then made contact with secondary school student leaders, building 
44 Gordon interview.
45 Alie Kabba, in a telephone interview from Chicago with the author, October 11, 2012. 
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on their involvement in 1977. Kabba’s team did not make contact with the 
labor unions; something he acknowledges was a mistake. “We planned mass 
civil disobedience: go straight to the State House and launch the f irst in a 
series of mass protests, not just in Freetown [but nationwide].”
But the nationwide demonstration never happened. Before it could occur, 
the Stevens regime responded to what they perceived as a growing militancy 
on campus and possible links to Libya under Kabba’s leadership. State 
Security Division personnel “raided the campus brutalizing and forcibly 
removing students staying on campus. The incident led to a citywide 
demonstration.” The University student leadership, including Kabba, was 
declared ineligible to re-register. After a subsequent protest demonstration 
on campus, which included burning a Mercedes Benz belonging to the 
vice-principal, Cyril Foray, protests continued in the city where students 
were joined by local youth (Rashid 2004, 81). “It became more than a student 
action [and] lasted about a week. Siaka Stevens flew to the military barracks 
from Freetown. Some thought the military would take advantage [of the 
unrest and stage a coup] … We had 1,000s [demonstrating]. We took over 
the city.”46
Gordon recalled the protest. “They [the protestors] shut down the town. 
The minute the students came downtown the police tried to stop them. 
There was tear gas all over the place. And if you are walking around you 
could get shot.”47 The University later expelled Kabba and three lectur-
ers: Gordon, Jimmy Kandeh, and Cleo Hanciles. Student demonstrations 
continued into the 1990s. In 1985, Stevens stepped down, orchestrating 
his replacement by his loyal head of the army Major-General Joseph Saidu 
Momoh. According to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion f inal report (2002):
Momoh, attempted to decelerate the economic and political decline 
through the promulgation of an economic state of emergency and a 
multiparty constitution. These measures were, however, managed in a 
dictatorial and abusive fashion, which rendered them “too little, too late” 
to salvage the situation. Against this backdrop, Sierra Leoneans became 
increasingly disgruntled and aggrieved with the malaise in governance 
and their inability to do anything to alleviate it. Many citizens, particu-
larly the poor, marginalised youths of the provinces, became open to 
46 Kabba interview.
47 Gordon interview.
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radical means of effecting change: they would readily answer the call to 
arms when the so-called revolution began to enter the country in 1991.
Students generally gave Momoh a two-year “honeymoon,” but by 1987 
resumed their protests and demands for multiparty government with a 
major demonstration. There was an effort to keep the protests nonviolent. 
“We had organized a ‘police’ force to keep it nonviolent.” But students re-
acted to violence against them from the government. “By the time Momoh 
came to power we knew how to make f irebombs. When police f ired tear 
gas, students threw teargas back.”48 In a meeting in 1990 with President 
Momoh, the Vice Chancellor of Fourah Bay College Cyril Foray, and oth-
ers, Abdulai Wai, student president at Njala University, delivered a letter 
from students calling for a constitutional change for multiparty elections. 
Momoh argued for continuing a one-party system. “He [Momoh] called us 
all kinds of names. He was furious. After his rage, Foray raised his hand and 
supported multiparty. The moment CP spoke, everything was calm. The 
following week, Momoh formed a national commission to study switching 
to a multiparty system of elections.”49 The following year, however, the APC 
Secretary General announced there would be a one-party election in 1991; 
that multiparty would be put off for f ive years.50 Students at Njala Univer-
sity staged a demonstration in favor of multiparty democracy. Students 
at Fourah Bay College held their own protest for multiparty elections, as 
Hindowa Momoh recalls:
We marched down the hill. But we could not even get there. The police 
arrived at the bridge [on the way downtown from Fourah Bay College]. 
We call that bridge “Solidarity Bridge.” We had stones; and they had guns. 
We had eight [white] students [from Kalamazoo, Michigan]. We used 
them as shields. [He said the American students had agreed to that.] We 
were tear-gassed; there were wounded students.51
48 Kalilu Totangi, in an interview with the author, February 11, 2009, at Stop Press café in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone. Totangi was President of the Student Union at Njala University, 1993-94.
49 Abdulai Wai, in an interview with the author, January 21, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
Rashid (2013) adds that this led to a “nationwide consultation process which led to the writing 
of the 1991 [multiparty] constitution. Ironically, the war started in the middle of this process.”
50 Wai interview.
51 Hindowa Momoh, in an interview with the author, January 23, 2009, in Freetown Sierra 
Leone. Momoh, a lecturer in public administration at the time of the interview, was president 
of the National Union of Sierra Leone Students, 1993-94.
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In 1991, shortly after the start of the civil war, Momoh f inally agreed to 
multiparty elections. By then, the “winds of change,” a popular phrase in 
many countries in the early 1990s, were blowing across sub-Saharan Africa 
in favor of democracy and human rights. A post-Cold War West was f inally 
showing genuine interest in both. In some African countries, especially 
Kenya, where Smith Hempstone was the US ambassador, the US was pushing 
for change. Some former student leaders in Sierra Leone credited student 
pressure plus domestic pressure for forcing Momoh’s hand. “In my opinion, 
domestic [pressure for multiparty] was more important [than international 
pressure]. Anarchy prevailed.”52
Training for Revolution
When a regime uses enough repression, it may be able to halt open non-
violent resistance, but it runs the risk of driving it underground. To some 
extent that is what happened in Sierra Leone. The failure of key segments 
of the still-weak civil society to support the student protest of 1977; the 
1981 dynamiting of The Tablet printing press and retaliation against its 
writers and editors; and the repressive crackdown on student activism at 
Fourah Bay in the mid-1980s, left student activists with a choice: keep trying 
various nonviolent resistance tactics, or turn to violent means of wresting 
change from an intransigent regime. Those opting for continuing nonviolent 
resistance, extending the 1977 resistance further, had engaged in a series 
of student-led demonstrations. But having seen the failure of the student 
movement to win lasting political change, some students and others began 
exploring alternatives, including revolutionary training in Libya and war. 
It is beyond the scope of this book to examine in any detail either of these 
paths. The war, especially, has been well-documented and analyzed by 
others (e.g., Richards 1996; Abdullah 2004; Kandeh 2004a, b; Gberie 2005; 
Keen 2005). Of note is the argument of Bolten (2009, 350) on the motives of 
student activists at this time.
I argue … that regime change was the goal only insofar as the regime 
in power attempted to limit, dictate, co-opt or crush the intelligentsia; 
and students with democratic political ideologies could not thrive under 
these circumstances. In essence, students acted because, in order to 
benefit from their education, they needed a government that valued the 
52 Momoh interview.
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intelligentsia, rather than one of rigid nepotistic structures to which an 
educated class served only as a threat.
Although this study does not include an analysis of the war, it does examine 
in subsequent chapters the nonviolent resistance by civilians, mostly in 
Freetown, to two military juntas that seized power during the war: one in 
1992, the second (which included a coalition with the rebels) in 1997. For the 
moment, because it shows the kind of fallout that may occur after a mostly 
nonviolent resistance fails to achieve its primary goals, it is worth looking 
briefly at the ventures of two Fourah Bay activist students’ involvement 
with the Libya training. Several other Sierra Leoneans, led by Foday Sankoh 
with encouragement and cooperation from Liberian rebel leader Charles 
Taylor, launched a civil war in 1991 which off icially ended in January 2002.
Gibril Foday-Musa. We sat on the balcony of a modern apartment that my 
wife and I had rented with a distant view of the ocean, in the Hill Station 
section of Freetown. It is a neighborhood of mostly colonial-era wooden 
homes on high posts built to catch the breeze and minimize attacks by 
mosquitoes in this rain-drenched coastal country. Gibril Foday-Musa, 
wearing a T-shirt, cutoff jeans, and a hat inscribed “Che Guevara,” seemed 
dressed to suit his accounts of how some students became radicals in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. But his hat offered no clue to his nickname: 
“Gaddafi.” In 1989, after revolutionary training in Libya, he had brazenly 
crossed back into Sierra Leone at an off icial border post wearing a track 
suit with thousands of dollars hidden in his clothing. He was on a daring 
mission: hire recruits to help start an armed overthrow of the government.
There was a direct link from the student demonstrations at Fourah 
Bay and the audacious plans of that young man. In 1977, when university 
students sparked the nationwide protests that challenged the one-party 
state, Gibril was in secondary school in Bo, where he joined in the protest 
which had spread there. Four years later he arrived as a student at Fourah 
Bay with his still-developing spirit of rebellion. With the limited student 
political gains of 1977 in mind, he began reading radical literature by 
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. 
Sankara’s charisma and revolutionary rhetoric inspired a generation or 
more of idealistic African youth.53 At Fourah Bay his yearning for freedom 
53 After only four years in power, Sankara was gunned down in 1987 by troops loyal to his 
supposed friend, Blaise Compaoré who succeeded him as president, bringing an end to Sankara’s 
revolutionary government.
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from the repressive Stevens rule was further kindled by faculty members 
such as Gordon, Hanciles, and Kandeh, who were eventually f ired for being 
independent thinkers at a time when the regime wouldn’t tolerate dissent.
In 1981 I came to the University and at the University we witnessed a whole 
lot of problems with the government of Siaka Stevens. We started advocating 
not only for freedom of the press, we started advocating for a regime change 
… That was also the period of the Cold War. The University was a fertile 
ground for the international community. The Americans were coming. The 
North Koreans were coming. The South Koreans were coming. The Libyans 
were also there. Even the Russians were there, recruiting sets of students.54
Gibril began studying The Green Book of Gaddaf i, a pursuit that earned 
him the nickname, “Gaddafi.” He accepted a Libyan offer to visit. On one 
of what would become numerous trips to Libya, he was part of a group of 
about thirty to thirty-five people, including perhaps ten university students. 
Gibril began regular travel to Libya. At one point he took military training 
in the Libyan desert. Commenting on this training, he expounded,
It was serious military training. Six months commando training … We 
wanted a revolution – we wanted to f ight. Because after the demonstra-
tion [in 1977 at Fourah Bay College] when they [the government] shattered 
us, we decided to say: “No: the next time we demonstrate we need to get 
our own guns.55
At that time, Libya was supporting revolutionary fever in various parts of the 
world, including Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The US considered 
Gaddafi a terrorist. When it came his turn to host the annual summit meet-
ing of the OAU in Tripoli, the US lobbied nations against attending. Stevens 
decided not to attend, “persuaded, no doubt by bribery rather than principle, 
to boycott the summit.” After that, Gaddafi “spared no opportunity to embar-
rass and undermine the Sierra Leone government” (Gberie 2005, 49). Gibril 
began recruiting for the future revolution, slipping back into Sierra Leone 
and meeting in small groups with people who had been spotted in other 
venues as being critical of the government. It was a courageous endeavor 
in the police state of the time. “Yes, it was dangerous, but exciting, too. It 
54 Gibril Foday-Musa, in an interview with the author, January 31, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
55 Foday-Musa interview.
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was really exciting,” he recalled. Among the would-be revolutionaries from 
Sierra Leone, some of whom had taken training in Libya, there was “a lot of 
in-fighting, a lot of suspicion” that spilled into the open in Ghana, a departure 
point for many of the trips to Libya. “People were developing bad blood 
because they thought Alie [Kabba] was becoming the darling of the Libyans. 
Alie was more charismatic than all of us. He was likeable, intelligent. I had 
trust in him.” The split was mostly between the ideological and the military 
wings of the group, which had not yet chosen a name.56
One of the people in the meetings in Ghana was Foday Sankoh, son of 
a peasant farmer, who had a primary school education. He was a former, 
low-ranking member of the Sierra Leone Army and had been imprisoned 
1971-78 on charges of involvement in an attempted military coup. “Sankoh 
had nothing to do with the Fourah Bay College student movement,” Gibril 
stressed. After most of the other radicals had given up on plans for an 
armed revolution, however, Sankoh forged ahead, launching a civil war 
in 1991. “We wanted an intellectual revolution. Foday Sankoh was not [an 
intellectual]. We had a problem with [that] – a serious problem. And the 
Libyans were really not happy with the situation because they wanted us 
to launch immediately. They wanted us to f ight immediately … We had a 
radical split with Sankoh himself over timing of the war.” Sankoh wanted 
to start the war sooner than the others.
In the end, Gibril and his colleagues, except the few who went with Sankoh 
to launch the war, dispersed. While in Ghana Gibril completed his journalism 
training and returned to Sierra Leone in 1990. When the military seized 
power in 1992, he saw a chance at last to share his revolutionary ideas. It 
seemed the right moment and he was hopeful as he presented a junta contact 
with a twenty-page paper and was told it would be given to junta leader 
Valentine Strasser. He later saw signs they had adopted some of his key ideas 
but without attribution. “Without credit, without credit.” He softly repeated 
the phrase a third time, “Without credit. I never would have wanted much 
– [very softly] credit.” At this moment, on the ground, two stories below the 
balcony, a chicken’s clucking was louder than his voice. After that, he added 
softly, his revolutionary spirit “went away.” Today he lives in Freetown.57
Gibril Foday-Musa illustrates that sometimes f ine line between nonvio-
lent resistance and violent resistance. In his case, he prepared for a violent 
response to the repression in his country, but ultimately he backed away 
from that and later became a part of civil society again.
56 Foday-Musa interview.
57 Foday-Musa interview.
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Alie Kabba. His name kept popping up in my interviews. Alie Kabba. Where 
was he, I asked, as I made my way around Freetown talking to men and 
women who had stood up to repressive regimes and lived to tell their story? 
Oh, he’s in the US, one person said. Maybe Chicago. His name was mentioned 
when there was talk of the aftermath of the 1977 demonstrations; he was 
part of the next wave of idealists/radicals. There was never an exact term for 
student leaders who simply wanted an end to a seemingly endless one-man, 
one-party rule based on corruption, intimidation, and cronyism that would 
almost certainly block their own future employment – unless they joined 
the sticky web of collusion with the regime that had co-opted so many 
before them. Some professors from the college and a number of students, 
including Kabba, who was elected student president at Fourah Bay in 1984, 
found in Gaddafi’s Green Book inspiration for the kind of change that was 
not taking place at home. Kabba explained the attraction.58
We weren’t interested in the loaves – we wanted to change the bakery; 
to get rid of Stevens. [Gaddaf i had a] very, very appealing message of 
power to the people: organizing people to be their own champion. It was 
everything contrary to the one-party dictatorship. We had no space for 
civil society [at home]. Getting this popular message of grassroots [poli-
tics] – was refreshing. “Power to the masses.” I was searching for ideas, not 
ideology. I was trying to come up with an idea that was Sierra Leonean. 
In the process I came up with “WeismGaddaf,” an attempt on my part to 
create a philosophy – interconnectedness among people – one that sought 
to basically assert that my interest is intimately connected, and together 
we could strive with something uplifting … African communalism.59
Kabba was exposed to revolutionary doctrines and training in Libya. As 
president of the student union at Fourah Bay College he attempted to 
implement some of the concepts from Gaddafi’s Green Book. This led to an 
armed and violent occupation of the campus by government’s State Security 
Division in 1985, which in turn prompted a citywide demonstration by 
students and others. He went underground for a few weeks after the police 
detained his fellow student leaders. After police began looking for them 
58 Kabba interview. 
59 This is very close to the widely-quoted African proverb: “I am because we are; we are 
because I am,” which is “attributed to South Africa. It speaks to the interconnectedness and 
responsibility that we have for each other. It embodies the concept of Ubuntu, the African idea 
of living harmoniously in community” (Betty Press 2011, 1). 
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and raided their homes, Kabba and several other student leaders, including 
Ismail Rashid boldly showed up at police headquarters. This took police 
by surprise. A deputy inspector arrived shortly with a detention order for 
Kabba signed by President Stevens in red ink.60
Kabba was held for several weeks then defended by a lawyer pro bono, 
the late Claude Campbell. At a time when the bar association was lying 
low, individual lawyers like Campbell and others stepped up to defend 
people the government wanted to silence. Upon his release he stayed in 
Freetown for a while but grew ever more suspicious of how far the govern-
ment would go to silence himself. When he and some of his friends were 
mysteriously “invited” to meet with President Stevens at a military barracks 
some distance from Freetown, Kabba opted out. He was wise to do so. 
Armed security forces stopped his friends’ vehicle on a lonely stretch of 
road and asked “Where is Alie Kabba.” Shortly thereafter, his lawyer told 
him: “These people really want to kill you.” He soon left the country out of 
concern for his personal safety.
After his trips to Ghana and Libya, however, Alie grew disillusioned with 
the idea of being able to organize a revolution in Sierra Leone. He and his 
co-conspirators had neither the forces, equipment, nor the funds to carry 
it out. He later thought of another option: “Build a broad-based coalition 
through civil protest – passive resistance, I still believe in it … tap into the 
energy of the masses … as a popular uprising.” But with this plan, too, he 
realized “we didn’t have the capacity … There was a danger of spontaneity 
that would not make systemic change.” After completing his education in 
Ghana and later in Nigeria, he immigrated to the US.
His f ire has not died out. “My past caught up with me. I thought I would 
not be interested in activism [anymore], but I started working for state of 
Illinois. That’s when I discovered nonviolence. I’m not a Marxist anymore; 
I never really was.” At the time of the interview Kabba was the executive 
director of the United African Organization, a Chicago-based coalition of 
African community-based organizations that promote social and economic 
justice, civic participation, and empowerment of African immigrants and 
refugees in Illinois. He is married and has two sons and two daughters.
Alie Kabba illustrates the dilemma a repressive ruler faces regarding 
popular nonviolent resistance: ignore it and it may undermine the regime’s 
power; repress its leaders and they may turn to violence and even attempt 
a revolution.
60 Kabba interview. The others who had gone to the station voluntarily were not in student 
government and were not detained (Rashid 2013).
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Implications of an Informal Resistance
In a repressive setting, open resistance led by small groups and individual 
activists is possible in the absence of more formally organized structures. 
During times when formal opposition organizations are considered too dan-
gerous, small groups and individuals, operating more fluidly and informally, 
can mount a resistance movement when participants are impassioned 
enough by their cause to risk violent reprisals by the state. Identifying 
such movements requires a more flexible concept of resistance than much 
of the social movement literature presents. This kind of resistance can 
take place without apparent structural opportunities and with minimal 
material resources. Demonstrations, however, even large ones, are unlikely 
to achieve lasting reforms without well-organized plans on how to keep the 
pressure on a regime after the main demonstrations end, or how to replace 
the regime. Without effective alliances with other key sectors of society, an 
uprising – even a major one that seems to threaten the pillars of power of 
a repressive regime – is likely to fail. One generation’s activism, however, 
can be a model for greater activism in the future, regardless of the success 
achieved, sometimes leading to a culture of resistance, as happened in 
Sierra Leone.
The resistance never fully developed into a social movement because 
of the repression and co-optation skills of the Stevens regime, and for lack 
of follow-through planning. But it had many of the hallmarks of a social 
movement, especially using the broader concept of a social movement 
developed in this book. In Sierra Leone, most of the political “opportuni-
ties” cited in much of the social movement literature were not present 
during the late 1970s and ’80s. There was widespread unemployment; and 
the economy was worsening by 1977 when students at Fourah Bay College 
staged a major demonstration against the regime of Siaka Stevens. But 
this potential advantage was more than offset by the regime’s record of 
repression. Instead, a small group of students created their own opportunity, 
seizing on a scheduled presidential visit to their campus to surprise him 
with placards and shouted demands for political reform. The protest quickly 
grew into a nationwide protest that spread to secondary schools and other 
colleges across the country.
Though it started peacefully, as police and government thugs attacked 
demonstrators, some students responded with Molotov cocktails and stones 
and damaged public property. The demonstrations temporarily crippled 
normal life in the country. The resistance took place before there was much 
in the way of an activist civil society. Repression and co-opting by the regime 
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had rendered key potential civil society players generally ineffective or 
unwilling to join the resistance. Students, one of the few organized bodies 
of potential activists, were somewhat divided along ethnic lines between 
supporters and opponents of the regime. Student organizers of the uprising 
had little time to forge a supporting alliance with labor, other professional 
groups, or women’s organizations, an alliance some observers said might 
have toppled the regime. President Stevens did agree to student demands 
for a multiparty election to Parliament, but a year after the election he 
reneged and won passage of a law to change back to a one-party system.
This up and down momentum echoes Tarrow’s theory of social move-
ment cycles (1998). He describes a rise and fall phenomenon; in Sierra Leone, 
there were several in this period. After the peak of activism during the 
student demonstrations, the level of resistance changed – along with its 
shape. The focus of a second stage begun in late 1977 was several individuals 
who formed a small, independent newspaper, The Tablet. The co-founders 
and key writers were mostly former student leaders and activist faculty 
members from Fourah Bay College. It became the voice of the movement 
until its presses were dynamited by the regime. The energy of the resist-
ance revived in the mid-1980s with more student-led demonstrations and 
a separate strike by the labor movement. Again, failure to forge effective 
alliances among key sectors of the emerging civil society weakened the 
collective clout of the movement. There appear to be several explanations 
for the failure of students in 1985 under radical student leadership to achieve 
a major nationwide impact: (1) failure of students to establish close relations 
with the labor movement, including teachers; (2) the continuing use by the 
state of repressive and preemptive violent tactics against student protesters; 
(3) a realization among student leaders that it was useless to try to wrest 
the concession of multiparty elections from Stevens, something students 
achieved temporarily in 1977, because he was just as likely to renege on the 
results as he had then; (4) a continuing deterioration of the economy which, 
instead of providing an “opportunity” for expanded resistance, created 
a feeling of helplessness that changes could come peacefully; (5) lack of 
other apparent exogenous “opportunities” of the kind generally regarded 
as helpful for a movement, such as splits in the ranks of the military.
But a culture of resistance was growing in the 1980s that came to fruition 
in the 1990s when civil society effectively opposed two military juntas. 
In terms of social movement activism, the students had left a mark. The 
repression by the regime had not stopped the resistance, including the 
government-backed attack by thugs on the Fourah Bay campus in 1977 and 
elsewhere around the country. Despite efforts to intimidate and brutalize 
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supporters of opposition candidates in the “multiparty” elections of 1977, 
many people had turned out to register their dissatisfaction at the polls. 
Students alone could not overcome a long record of co-optation of key 
elements of the emerging civil society organizations and some of its leaders. 
But the students had shown that even a repressive regime has weaknesses. 
As Gberie (2005, 44) noted above, students also showed “the potential for 
small groups of dissidents to shake [a repressive regime] to its foundations.” 
These lessons would be acted on in the 1990s. The activism in the 1970s and 
1980s left another important legacy, as one Sierra Leonean historian noted 
(Rashid 2004, 77):
The 1977 student intrusion into politics had limited gains. If anything, 
it served to revive a government under crisis but also opened up the pos-
sibility of sustained and organized opposition outside formal structures 
(emphasis added).
Figure 3  Secondary school students and instructor at a human rights workshop in 
Port Loko, Sierra Leone, 2009
Photo by Betty Press
3 Women Help Restore Democracy
A civilian social movement led mostly by women resisted military rule 
and helped push the junta out of power in Sierra Leone in 1996. The story 
of how the movement – strengthened by independent journalists and oth-
ers – managed to outmaneuver armed soldiers in a struggle for power is a 
tale of courage, wit, and use of nonviolent strategies. International pressures 
were also at work but by most accounts, including those from the US (which 
played a role), it was the ordinary people of Sierra Leone who deserve most 
of the credit. During 1994-96, women emerged from political obscurity 
in Sierra Leone for the f irst time in decades to lead the charge against 
the military junta of 1992-96 and demand a return to civilian rule. In the 
process of developing an effective nonviolent social movement, they defied 
the dangers of the military, organized broad alliances of organizations of 
women (mostly) and men, marched in the streets of Freetown, and rallied 
support across the country. Finally, at two national conferences, women 
leaders, including the head of an association for market women, helped 
sway the vote against the military staying in power. Democratic elections 
and a civilian president followed.
Other elements of an emerging civil society, including labor, journalists, 
teachers, and others, joined the campaign and helped deepen a “culture of 
resistance,” building on the resistance by university and secondary school 
students in 1977 against the Siaka Stevens regime and additional resist-
ance by university students in the mid-1980s. Most written accounts of 
this period focus on the devastating civil war and the later international 
intervention of West African and British troops that f inally ended it. The 
nonviolent resistance of Sierra Leoneans remains a largely untold story.1 
This chapter begins with a dramatic confrontation between the military 
and two journalists who played a key role in the development of the social 
movement of resistance to the junta. Next, the chapter focuses on how 
the women’s movement and other elements of civil society came together 
to oppose the military nonviolently with some international support for 
their cause. Finally, the two national conferences are examined where the 
direction of the nation was changed, including the dramatic moment at the 
second conference when a market woman confronted the military with a 
compelling statement. The chapter attempts to answer these questions: (1) 
1 Christopher Clapham (1997, 903-9), for example, provides a historical account of that period 
with detailed attention to the politics and military but does not mention a civilian resistance.
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how can a civilian, nonviolent resistance movement push a military regime 
out of power against their will; (2) how does such a movement actually 
start (the focus is on the women’s part of the movement, which was the 
new element in this period); (3) what role did the international community 
play in ousting the military; (4) what kind of tactics and strategies did the 
women and other groups use to overcome the military’s plans to prolong 
its stay in power?
A Modern David Uses Words, not Stones
A dramatic confrontation between the military and civilian activists came 
in late 1995. Top commanders of the civil war front were in the conference 
room at the Defense Ministry. They had summoned two key activists in 
the broad, open resistance against the military: independent journalist 
Paul Kamara, owner of For di People2 newspaper, and his associate, Sallieu 
Kamara (no relation). The military issued a blunt warning for them to stop 
publishing critical articles about the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC), which had seized power in April 1992. The critical reporting by the 
two, as well as some other journalists, was an example of how people can 
be drawn into a resistance movement through their profession rather than 
membership in an activist organization. Some attorneys were similarly 
drawn into the resistance movement this way, as well as some clergy and 
others. This broader base of resistance is one of the themes developed in 
this book. While traditional social movement theorists might argue that 
such professionals were not part of a social movement opposing the regime, 
the junta itself made no such neat distinctions. They knew who was against 
them. Paul Kamara was linked through professional or personal ties to 
other parts of the movement, including the resistance by women and other 
professional groups such as labor and teachers. They shared the same com-
mitment to peace, human rights, and democracy, as well as the same desire 
to see a working economy in which people could make a living. They faced 
the same dangers.
“The room was packed full of senior military off icers. We are the only 
people who are civilians in that place.”3 It was an uneven match, or so it 
2 Krio for “For the People.”
3 Sallieu Kamara, in an interview with the author, April 20, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
The emphasis was his during the interview.
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seemed: the country’s top military commanders in a military government 
in a showdown with the son of a poor farmer who struggled through his 
student years, often on one meal a day. But as a secondary-school student 
Paul Kamara joined the national student protest against the repressive Siaka 
Stevens regime in 1977. The year after his university graduation, Kamara 
launched For di People, a small, independent newspaper. This was under the 
Stevens’ regime, which had engineered the execution of some of his political 
rivals and did not hesitate to punish critics. Kamara’s goal even then was 
to support “humanity, freedom, and justice.” The NPRC leaders had already 
chastised him once for having the audacity to expose some of the early 
human rights abuses of the junta shortly after it seized power.4 Kamara, 
for example,pointed to “the rape of a senior hotel manageress, beatings of 
people who opposed the military’s will and the bloody executions of 26 
people who were accused of being involved in a coup plot, even though 
most of them were already in detention when this phantom coup was being 
plotted.”5 After those exposes (which were based on investigations by his 
newspaper), the NPRC refused to issue his paper a license in an effort to 
silence the criticism.
Tracking Resistance via Energy and Ideas, not just Social 
Movement Organizations
But Kamara would not be silenced. What he did next illustrates the fluid 
nature of a resistance movement under repressive conditions. Tracking 
such fluidity requires a focus not so much on the forms of the resistance 
but on its energy – the ideas and passion that drives some activists. When 
the military banned his newspaper, Kamara and some of his colleagues at 
the small paper simply transferred their energies to the National League 
for Human Rights and continued the same resistance against the NPRC’s 
abuses. This kind of shift is typical of what happened in all three countries 
studied, sometimes for tactical reasons, sometimes for survival, or both. 
Staying one step ahead of the police or military is a question of security as 
4 Paul Kamara, Sallieu Kamara, and Olu Gordon were among the f irst journalists to meet with 
the NPRC commanders on their f irst day in power and “looked up to them as revolutionaries 
and critics of the APC. But they became wary of them as they became critical of the regime’s 
excesses” (Rashid 2013). Rashid, a Sierra Leonean, is a professor of history at Vasser College and 
the author of several books and articles on Sierra Leone.
5 Paul Kamara in his acceptance speech for the Civil Courage Award by the Northcote 
Parkinson Fund, October 13, 2001, in Turin Italy.
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well as strategy. This f luidity is part of the loose webbing of a social move-
ment under repressive regimes that often goes undetected by a focus on the 
more traditional structures of dissent. It would be easy to not recognize a 
newspaper as part of a resistance movement. So the shift of energy from 
the newspaper to the human rights organization would be missed. Yet both 
organizations had the same purpose, and in this case, some of the same 
activists at the head; to count one and not the other is like counting some 
tentacles of an octopus but not all of them in trying to understand a whole 
social movement. Shifts like this are where the study of social movements 
can get very interesting – if one breaks out of the narrow def initional 
boundaries of what a movement is and instead of looking for organizations, 
looks for the process of resistance – a point that social movement theorist 
Joe Foweraker encouraged (1995, 23).6 A key point is to follow the energy, 
not just the form, of a resistance movement.
As shown in the previous chapter on Sierra Leone (in the section dealing 
with the independent newspaper The Tablet in the late 1970s and early ’80s), 
a newspaper can be part of a social movement. It is not what one ordinarily 
thinks of as being part of a “movement,” but as we’ve seen, The Tablet became 
the focus of the energy and the talents and some of the key people in the 
resistance movement against Siaka Stevens. Now, under the repressive rule 
of the NPRC, For di People and a handful of other independent newspapers 
became centers of energy, ripples of hope spreading the belief that it was 
possible to resist the military junta. At a time before formal resistance 
organizations had emerged that f it the usual Western model of a social 
movement, newspapers played a critical role in maintaining pressure on 
the government. They were linked through informal ties to other emerging 
elements of society that also energized the resistance. Sallieu Kamara, Paul 
Kamara’s deputy editor, was an eyewitness to a dialogue that occurred 
between the minister of defense and Paul Kamara in 1995:
Minister of Defense: Paul, you people are talking human rights; you always 
talk human rights; you always condemn us: all sorts of things in the name 
of human rights. I think we are very close to coming to the end of the 
road. Some of these things we will no longer take from you. And if you 
6 Foweraker distinguishes between the “social networks” (39) that may help form a social 
movement and the movement itself, a point well taken. But this study argues that when social 
networks are used to plan and produce acts of resistance, as they were in Sierra Leone, they 
move from pre-movement status to being an integral part of a social movement.
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continue, we’re going to kill you; and when we kill you we see if human 
rights will give you life again.
Paul Kamara: We are very much grateful for you inviting us here. But 
you have your own responsibilities as soldiers to protect the territorial 
integrity of this country. We have our own responsibilities as human 
rights activists and as journalists to do what we are doing. And as long as 
you continue to do your role in protecting this country, we’ll also continue 
to do our role as journalists and human rights [advocates]. So if you have 
to kill us, kill us now or else we’ll continue our work.
On the way out of the compound, the head of the army caught up with 
them and pleaded, “Paul, these guys are going to kill you. I want you people 
to leave everything.”7 The refusal to bow down to military demands dra-
matically illustrates the kind of courage that is the backbone of nonviolent 
resistance under repression. Shortly after their confrontation with the NPRC 
commanders, the two journalists were detained and their newspaper off ice 
was thoroughly searched. They were not killed, although the NPRC had 
summarily executed some other perceived or actual opponents. Apparently 
reason prevailed, or perhaps the military leadership, already splitting,8 felt 
too much under the gaze of the international spotlight to cause a major 
disturbance by dispatching one of the country’s champions of human 
rights. Others may have assured the military off icers that Paul Kamara 
had always been independent of regimes, that he wasn’t going to change 
in spite of threats. By Kamara’s count (in 2008), he had been arrested for 
his independent reporting by every government from the Stevens regime 
onward, even during democratic periods.
Paul Kamara faced more danger later. In January 1996, using the Stevens 
model of co-optation, the NPRC, looking for new legitimacy at a time when 
their ranks were split and they were stalling on elections, offered him 
the job of secretary of state, land, housing and the environment. After 
persuasion by fellow Sierra Leonean James Jonah, a retired United Nations 
under-secretary-general for political affairs, he accepted the post. However, 
Kamara instructed the NPRC leadership that his newspaper would continue 
its independent critical reporting under the editorship of Sallieu Kamara, 
which it did. On the night of February 26, 1996, Paul Kamara was gunned 
7 Sallieu Kamara interview.
8 The splits in the military provided a classical “opportunity” for resistance, but the repressive 
nature of the military made it very dangerous to take advantage of such an opening.
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down on a street in Freetown while driving with Sallieu, who recalled: 
“They f ired on him at close range. They left Paul for dead.” But Kamara 
survived and returned to his independent reporting in time to condemn 
a subsequent junta that seized power in 1997 from the government which 
had been democratically elected the year before. As a result, he was beaten 
by the rebels, who also ransacked his off ice.
Paul Kamara illustrates the courage and the cunning of an individual activ-
ist engaging in nonviolent resistance against a repressive regime. For the 
regime, such an activist presents a challenge they are not well-equipped to 
deal with: an activist who is not intimidated by the usual threats. Against 
such courage only force may halt the activist, but that risks condemnation 
at home and abroad – and further resistance.
Motives of Activists
In an interview on the flat roof of his For Di People newspaper, Paul Kamara 
explained his motives for persistently reporting abuses by every government 
since and including that of Siaka Stevens. “All those governments have 
jailed me and they say I have been a thorn in their f lesh. I wanted to make 
the world a better place.”9 In presenting him with the Civil Courage Award 
in 2001, John Train, founder of the New York-based Northcote Parkinson 
Fund, noted, “The courage of individuals, like Mr. Kamara, will help shape 
our future. We honor a citizen whose steadfast courage, over many years, 
in defense of freedom shines as a beacon to those who would follow the 
path of liberty.”
One day an off icial from the Central Intelligence Division of the govern-
ment asked Sallieu Kamara why he took such risks to report the news, 
especially since he had two daughters, implying that the risks were obvi-
ously not worth it, that it would be safer to live abroad. “I believed in what 
I was doing. And at that time I was enjoying it,” Kamara said. Recalling his 
response, he offered,
I said I have two daughters and they are far better off than many others. 
I can still afford to give them basic food daily. But they have millions of 
their colleagues who cannot even afford basic meals. Why not stay on 
and f ight for those children? Taking my two daughters out of the country 
9 Paul Kamara in an interview with the author, April 17, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
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will not solve the problem. Spend all the years abroad and you come 
back – the problem is there. So we have to stay.
Deepening a Culture of Resistance: Civil Society Re-emerges
Civil society, by most accounts of Sierra Leoneans interviewed, had been 
vibrant pre-independence, was later seen in professional groups (e.g., labor, 
teachers) during the Stevens years, but was still relatively weak in 1992 when 
the NPRC seized power. The year before, a rebel group calling themselves 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had launched a civil war.10 Led by 
a dismissed Sierra Leone Army corporal, Foday Sankoh, the RUF claimed 
it was f ighting against government corruption and poverty and sought to 
institute democracy. Their actions were quite to the contrary.
Throughout its nearly eleven-year campaign of largely terroristic vio-
lence, the RUF targeted mainly those very disposed people, killing and 
mutilating them [primarily by amputations] in an orgy of bewildering 
cruelty, while all the time looting the country’s rich diamond reserves 
and maintaining an extremely prof itable trade in them with outsiders, 
through Liberia’s Charles Taylor (Gberie 2005, 6).
The Sierra Leone Army was poorly equipped and poorly trained and the 
war was at a stalemate, amidst accounts of corruption and looting by army 
off icers. Momoh, who had f inally agreed to the idea of multiparty elections, 
did not resolve the issue. “This lack of professional training and equipment 
was a deliberate policy to make the army a non-f ighting force, so that it 
would not have the ability to challenge the APC [All People’s Congress] 
government [of Stevens and later Momoh]” (Alie 2006, 139). By the time 
a group of soldiers from the frontlines in the south staged a coup in April 
1992, the public was demoralized, frustrated at the lack of progress against 
the war, and tired of reports of army corruption. Arrival of the NPRC at f irst 
signaled for many a welcome break from the repression and failing economy 
of the past. It would become clearer later how ethnicity, regionalism, and 
political ambition played a part in the 1992 coup. But after more than two 
decades of repressive rule by essentially one man, Siaka Stevens, and seven 
years of rule by his handpicked successor, with an economy spiraling down, 
leaving millions in desperate conditions, and with a growing civil war 
10 It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the war itself.
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started in 1991, the NPRC coup was literally welcomed by many with danc-
ing in the streets of Freetown. This gave the new military rulers a certain 
legitimacy, not only in the eyes of the local population but in the eyes of 
the international community which “had no alternative but to go with the 
thinking of the civil society” in supporting them.11
Not everyone was so happy, however. Abdulai Wai, a student leader in 
the mid-1990s was one of the many who had campaigned for multiparty 
democracy and elections which were f inally being planned. “I felt shattered. 
I didn’t dance.’12 The joy faded for many others as NPRC abuses and desire 
to hold on to power became more obvious, and as the war dragged on. “Civil 
society became very active by questioning the activities of the NPRC.’13 
Various strands of civil society flexed their muscles against continued NPRC 
rule, challenging not only its tenure, but its very legitimacy. Sallieu Kamara 
describes how a “culture of resistance, a culture of advocacy,” evident in 
the student demonstrations of 1977 and the 1980s, expanded during the 
NPRC period:
You have women organizing themselves; you have political parties 
organizing themselves; you have the youth … organizing themselves; 
you have the Association of Independent Journalists. So all of us, we all 
[came] together … We [had] a very good network with all of these. If the 
women are organizing something, all of us would be there. Some men 
in the Association of Independent Journalists, [were] not journalists at 
all [but were part of the resistance]; and a few lawyers were with us. We 
were all part of the thing [the resistance].14
The Sierra Leonean social movement against the NPRC was comprised of 
networks of individuals, small informal groups and alliances of groups. 
Some professionals were drawn into the resistance through their work and 
support for democracy and human rights. Jusu-Sheriff and Isha Dyfan, for 
11 Abdulai Bayraytay, in an interview with the author, April 28, 2009, in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Freetown, Sierra Leone. At the time of the interview, Bayraytay was an off icial in the 
Ministry, working directly with the foreign minister, Zainab Bangura, a former leader in the 
women’s resistance movement against the NPRC in the mid-1990s. He contrasted civil society’s 
welcome of the NPRC with its widespread opposition to the arrival of another military junta in 
1996 which ousted a democratically elected government.
12 Abdulai Wai, in an interview with the author, January 21, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
13 Bayraytay interview.
14 Kamara interview; emphasis in original. In one sense, the NPRC coup was part of the culture 
of resistance, but its leaders later tried to repress it (Rashid 2013). 
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example, had been members of the Sierra Leone Human Rights Society 
and defended student activists/radicals in the mid-1980s. The networks 
included journalists who risked their own safety to report human rights 
and other abuses by the junta; some attorneys, some clergy, and most 
prominently, women’s groups – from the wealthy to poor and uneducated 
market women – a force felt as far back as the 1940s but which had been 
partially submerged in the 1970s under the harsh hand of former President 
Siaka Stevens.15 Traditional, Western-based definitions of social movements 
tend to miss key parts of this broad range of resistance; yet it was this varied 
resistance, informally linked, that proved to be an effective force in pushing 
the military junta out and bringing a democratic government in despite 
objections from the military hierarchy.
Military Abuses
Arrival of the NPRC in 1992 at f irst signaled for many a welcome break from 
the repression and failing economy of the past. But Max Conteh, a longtime 
off icial with the Sierra Leone Labour Congress recalls how the jubilant 
support for the NPRC by many began to change. “Soon, people started to 
observe that the NPRC started to derail the focus for which they came into 
power. And also they saw their … stay in power prolonged [the civil war]. 
People thought for democracy to come came back would be a better way 
to end the war.”16
The arrival of the NPRC represented a “rupture in the military and in 
national politics” (Rashid 2013) but in terms of regime repression, it was 
not such a sharp break from the past; it was simply a change of characters. 
Amnesty International reports soon began revealing a darker side of 
the NPRC leaders that portrayed them as abusers of human rights, not 
champions of prosperity and future democracy. As the NPRC made little 
progress toward ending the war, gradually Sierra Leoneans realized the 
junta was more eager to hold on to power and its trappings of privilege 
than ending the conflict. Some of the human rights abuses occurred in 
15 Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, in an interview with the author, February 2, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. At the time of the interview, she was deputy chair of the human rights commission of 
Sierra Leone, a government organization.
16 Max Conteh, in an interview with the author, February 6, 2009, at the Labour Congress 
off ice in Freetown, Sierra Leone. At the time of the interview, Conteh was director of education 
of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. He served as deputy director of education for the NPRC.
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Freetown; others happened in the war zones as NPRC soldiers fought and 
sometimes collaborated with the rebels, giving rise to the term “sobels.” 
Amnesty International reports included these examples:
December 1992. Twenty-six people were summarily executed by f iring 
squad in Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital, on December 29, 1992, some 
following secret and grossly unfair trials and others apparently after no 
trials at all. At least three others were extra judicially executed. Some 
were allegedly tortured before being killed. The defendants were held 
incommunicado, had no defense lawyers and were denied all rights 
of defense or judicial appeal. [Amnesty also reported that unoff icial 
sources] have alleged that there were no coup attempts [and that the 
so-called coups were excuses for getting rid of political enemies.]17
February 1995. It’s often impossible to tell whether it’s Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) rebels, deserters from the army, or government 
troops who are devastating towns and villages throughout the country, 
killing, raping and mutilating defenseless people … It appears that some 
disaffected soldiers have joined RUF forces, whereas others have formed 
separate armed groups. Both the RUF and disaffected soldiers are re-
sponsible for the torture, killing and abduction of civilians. Government 
troops are summarily executing captured rebels and others suspected 
of collaborating with rebel forces, with severed heads of their victims 
sometimes displayed on army vehicles.18
Birth of a Social Movement: Women Lead the Charge for Regime 
Change
While independent journalists provided one part of the social movement 
that grew to resist the NPRC for its human rights abuses, another key part 
of the resistance was led by women, despairing of the economy and disil-
lusioned by the junta’s failure to end the war. Peace was seen as the best 
way to improve the economy; and gradually women activists organized to 
resist the NPRC. A democratically elected government appeared to be the 
best option for both peace and an improved economy. Though the social 
movement literature is rich with theory on how social movements start, 
17 Amnesty International Newsletter, March 1993.
18 Amnesty International Newsletter, February 16, 1995.
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there is little in the way of documented evidence of how one actually begins. 
The attention is generally on how a movement grows and acts; the moments 
of birth are rarely included. Spotting those moments in history requires 
in-depth interviews with a wide range of people who were involved. The 
story of how the women of Sierra Leone became the lead force for peace is 
a story of alliances, determination, and at times, courage. At one point, at 
a national conference, with soldiers outside the venue beating would-be 
women observers, a market woman speaking inside directly challenged 
the power of the military to prolong their stay in off ice.
Women were politically active in the 1940s and ’50s and part of the 1960s. 
Constance Agatha Cummings-John, for example, “helped mobilize women 
into politics,” working closely with market women. In 1952 she organized 
the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement; in 1966 she served briefly as the f irst 
woman mayor of Freetown. But under the repressive hand of Siaka Stevens, 
women retreated mostly into social work, only to remerge against the NPRC 
in the mid- 1990s:19
In the struggle against the one-party state … politics was extremely 
violent and so the women withdrew and they went into all these different 
women’s groups: church groups, development groups, social groups of 
all different kinds. When the war came [1991], these groups came into 
their own because politics was now banned – but the women were there. 
They were now catalyzed and mobilized around the issue of restoration 
of peace.20
Women felt left out of the World Conference on women, held in Nairobi, 
Kenya, July 1985 because it was mostly government off icials who attended.21 
They began organizing for the Fourth World Conference on Women, to 
be held in Beijing, September 1995. The f irst step was to organize for the 
regional preparatory meeting to be held in Dakar, Senegal. In 1993, Amy 
Smythe, who was president of the Sierra Leone YWCA from 1993-96, formed 
a special group for peace which later developed into the Women’s Forum 
that became the central organization in a coalition of women’s groups and 
19 Jusu-Sheriff interview. Rashid (2013) adds that Stevens’ APC was able to “capture and co-opt 
some vocal factions of the women’s movement into its women’s league.” 
20 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
21 The off icial name was the “World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements 
of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace.”
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had a rotating chairmanship. At f irst the focus was on peace, not democracy. 
She said,
We had been saying that we want this conflict brought to an end but 
nobody has been listening to us. For us it was not about the authoritarian 
[rule in Sierra Leone]: women were suffering; women were affected by 
the conflict, and yet they did not have a voice … and the 1994 preparation 
[for the Dakar conference] gave them that opportunity.22
The Women’s Forum emerged in 1994 and included “all political, religious, 
ethnic, and other groups, such as the National Displaced Women’s Organiza-
tion, the National Organization for Women, the Women’s Association for 
National Development, the Young Women’s Christian Association, the 
women’s wing of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, as well as women trad-
ers associations and several Muslim and Christian women’s associations.” 
They prepared for the UN Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995 then 
“joined forces with the newly formed Sierra Leone Women’s Movement 
for Peace [SLWPM]” (Tripp, et al. 2009, 205). To go from planning for an 
international conference to planning how to help end a war devastating 
their country meant organizing alliances, coalitions, and informal linkages 
to other groups in a still-young civil society. Their tactics included “marches; 
seminars; we knocked on doors; we had one-on-one discussions with the 
international community; we issued press releases; we worked with the 
bar association – all kinds of things.”23 The Women’s Forum acted as a 
coordinating body but one intentionally designed not to replace or control 
other organizations. It had a rotating leadership that each month saw a new 
organization leading it, including small ones.24
So in 1994 … in our planning process, we were meeting together with 
women of all walks of life … sharing information, going back to our 
networks, collecting information – mobilizing our networks from the 
grass roots upward … planning and educating ourselves and learning to 
work together for peace. So that by the time we came back and formed 
the Women’s Movement for Peace, we constituted a force – a force that 
22 Amy Smythe, in an interview with the author, January 31, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
23 Smythe interview.
24 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
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not only analyzed [issues] for peace but called for peace, called for an 
end to the military regime and for a return to the democratic mode.25
Part of the focus of the groups in the Women’s Forum coalition was organ-
izing and educating; part of it was, at least for the senior women among 
them, using their respected position in society to gain the ear of the military 
junta leaders, including young Valentine Strasser, head of the NPRC. “These 
were young boys we had taught in school. [Strasser] was my pupil. He was 
quite honest … Because we were older women: they respected us; they 
listened to us.”26 Another woman who early helped organize the nonviolent 
resistance against the military was Dr. Nana Pratt. “There was fear in the 
way the military comported themselves … We preferred the worst civilian 
regime to a military one that is nondemocratic. We raised our voices.” 
Among other tactics employed, she and other women visited camps of the 
displaced from the on-going civil war, providing assistance – and talking 
politics, inviting them to Women’s Forum meetings across the country.27 
Women held meetings, directly lobbied NPRC senior officials, wrote articles, 
in their campaign for peace and democracy. Women organized a march.
The leadership of the SLWPM included a senior military off icer, Kestoria 
Kabia.28 Technically, her participation was not in opposition to the military’s 
stated goals of peace – and democratic government, in that order. As what 
had seemed a distant war now expanded, posing a threat even to Freetown, 
a number of groups were energized. A march in Freetown organized by 
SLWMP in 1995 was described as “20,000-strong” (Bradbury 1995, 49, cited 
in Keen 2005, 154). Tripp, et al. (2009, 205) adds these details:
[The march was a] “carnival-like event led by pediatrician Fatmatta Boi-
Kamar. It was the f irst public demonstration by women since the 1960’s. 
Professional women danced through downtown Freetown and linked 
arms with female soldiers, small-scale businesswomen, and nurses, sing-
ing “Try peace to end this senseless war.” Bystanders were captivated 
by the festivity and joined this parade of women. The demonstration 
25 Smythe interview.
26 Smythe interview.
27 Nana Pratt, in an interview with the author, February 6, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
Dr. Pratt was also active with a women-led peace initiative when a second military junta seized 
power in 1997.
28 Smythe cites three other women leaders in the Movement: Zainab Bangura, Yasmin Jusu-
Sheriff, and Isha Dyfan. 
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gave new legitimacy to existing peace groups that had previously been 
suspected of fronting for various political parties.
The various women’s organizations formed or strengthened in the mid-
1990s gradually narrowed their focus to not just peace, but elections for 
a democratic government before peace was achieved. This set them on a 
political collision course with the military which was intent on holding onto 
power until peace was achieved, a process that was not moving with much 
speed. At this point, Zainab Bangura, an insurance company employee, 
and attorney Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff teamed forces to try to give the general 
women’s peace movement a sharper, political edge. Bangura had contacts 
among the Temne ethnic group and was politically focused; Jusu-Sheriff had 
a political science background and, through her mother, Gladys Jusu-Sheriff, 
contacts among women nationally. Jusu-Sheriff’s husband was at the time 
minister of foreign affairs in the NPRC government. In 1995 she and Bangura 
formed the Women Organized for a More Enlightened Nation (WOMEN).29 
Jusu-Sheriff (2000) observed “the women’s intervention might also have 
made a negotiated settlement a more respectable option, minimizing loss of 
face for both government and rebels.”30 Now the goal of the movement was 
clearly not just peace but democracy: that meant regime change, she wrote:
We had to do more than just pray for peace and call on the military for 
peace and call on the rebels for peace. We’ve got to take the lead now. It 
is only a return to civilian government, democratic government that will 
put us in the position to be able to end this war. We cannot trust these 
soldiers to end the war.
The women approached Sierra Leonean and longtime United Nations official 
James Jonah, who was in the country to help with the eventual transition 
of the military to a democratic government. He was planning a national 
conference and they asked him for representation at it for women from 
around the country; they got his agreement for twelve. Other key coalitions 
in a now vibrant civil society were also opposing the military in one way or 
another and would be represented at the conferences – there would be two 
– that determined how long the military would rule. The US government 
facilitated some meetings of women’s organizations that were pushing for 
29 Jusu-Sheriff interview. “They reportedly threatened to expose corrupt politicians f inancial 
links with the military unless the politicians backed the elections” (Keen 2005, 156). 
30 Keen (2005, 156), paraphrasing Jusu-Sheriff ’s statements in Lord (2000, 46-9).
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democratic elections. Kiki Munchi of the US Information Agency (USIA), 
helped them develop civic education materials for the Teacher’s Union, for 
example. USIA also sponsored journalism training and other workshops in 
various parts of the country that were related to democratic issues. When 
the women said they wanted to take a stack of documents to take to the 
conference, USIA made photocopies for all the delegates.31
Growing Civil Society Opposition to Military Rule
Another coalition, the National Coordinating Committee for Peace (NCCP) 
brought together sixty professional, voluntary and religious organizations 
around the peace issue; and around this time the Sierra Leone diaspora 
became active on the same issue (Rashid 2013). Two other major coalitions 
came together at the conferences in 1995 and ’96: The Sierra Leone Associa-
tion of Nongovernment Organizations, and the Civil Society Movement of 
Sierra Leone. Festus Minah had a front row seat for the rise of civil society 
to oppose the NPRC and a second military Junta in 1997-98. He served as 
vice president of the national Teacher’s Union (1990-96) and as its president 
(1996-2005). He explains how two groups – market women and teachers 
– came to oppose the NPRC and shift their focus from regime reform to 
regime change.
Support for the NPRC was weakening. A growing segment of civil society 
was turning against what seemed to be an endless rule by a military now 
seen as unresponsive to citizens, unable to halt the war, but most willing 
to help themselves to the resources of the people and the country, either 
as “sobels,” or in outright misappropriation of state funds. Market women 
in various parts of the country being robbed of their wares were not the 
only groups feeling the impact of the civil war. Teachers in war zones 
were forced to flee their posts. But rather than compensate them during 
this period, the Ministry of Education, then headed by Christina Thorpe, 
refused to pay salaries for teachers not at their posts. This kind of policy 
may have seemed logical in peaceful areas, but in areas where even the 
Sierra Leonean military had abandoned, it made no sense to the teachers. 
The Teachers Union mobilized the displaced teachers for a meeting with 
NPRC ministers, including Thorpe. Reaching them was not diff icult; most 
were staying in camps for the displaced or on the grounds of schools in Bo, 
31 Kiki Skagen Harris (née Munchi), in an e-mail to the author, January 17, 2009. Such help 
continued under USIA’s Dudley O. Sims who helped foster democracy in both Togo and Liberia.
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the country’s second main city after Freetown and close to civil war zones. 
Meanwhile, information was coming out that the NPRC was draining the 
Ministry of Finance, supposedly to pay for the war but using it for their 
personal benefit. This misappropriation, which prolonged the war, added 
to the demands of teachers and others for constitutional government.32 
“Thousands” of teachers showed up for the meeting with Thorpe and at 
least six other cabinet ministers. By this time the demands had grown: the 
Union leaders asked for “salaries and constitutional government.” They got 
neither, though Minah notes that shortly after that Thorpe stepped down 
as minister of education.
Our next step was: get the information out that NPRC was not serious 
about pursuing the war. This time it was not just teachers; it was Labour 
Congress, teachers, working with professional bodies, working with other 
groups – human rights groups. And we had a battery of some NGOs that 
were within the system. And so we asked for the return [of democracy] 
which led to the f irst Bitumani [one of two national conferences on the 
future of Sierra Leone].33
With the collapse of the economy over the intervening years, teachers 
remained the most active part of the Labour Congress, widely represented 
nationwide. The declining economy and the war had weakened the mine-
workers and various unions tied to small-scale manufacturing, including 
dock workers.34 The Sierra Leone Labour Congress as a whole had lain 
low in 1977 during the student strike, had organized a short-lived strike in 
1981, and, according to Labour Congress off icial Conteh, did not organize 
a national strike against the NPRC.35 Some local member unions, however, 
did hold strikes during this period. Even this low level of labor resistance 
concerned the NPRC. “The NPRC thought that would destroy their national 
and international reputation if the strikes continued.” Labour and a wide 
range of civil society groups as well as traditional leaders, and the military 
would be represented at the two national conferences.
32 Festus Minah, in an interview with the author, January 21, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
33 Minah interview.
34 Ismail Rashid (2013).
35 Conteh interview
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National Conferences: “The Military Realized Late We Were 
Serious”
The NPRC under Strasser stated from the beginning their intention to hand 
over power to an elected civilian government. In 1994, the NPRC formed 
an Interim National Electoral Commission to oversee the election process. 
They chose Jonah to head it. In August, 1995, Jonah organized a national con-
ference known as Bitumani I at the Bitumani Hotel in Freetown, bringing 
together a wide range of delegates, including “political leaders, traditional 
chiefs, religious organizations, labour unions, women, and youth groups 
…The spirit of reconciliations, patriotism and seriousness of purpose that 
prevailed during the three day-meeting came as a welcome surprise to all. 
More remarkable was the decisive emergence of women as a political force 
to be reckoned with” (Alie 2006, 155). The popular call for elections “did not 
start with them [the women]. But, we were def initely the most organized 
at Bitumani I.’36
Leading up to the Bitumani I  conference, women had engaged in a 
nationwide campaign to educate other women about the need for peace 
and for elections of a democratic government. “The military realized late 
we were serious.”37 The women prepared for the conference. “We had to 
prepare for Bitumani. And we were pretty much the only people [prepared]. 
We organized ourselves. We prepared a women’s position paper.”38 At the 
conference, delegates reached a consensus that elections for president 
should be held in February.
On January 16, 1996, NPRC chairman captain Valentine Strasser was 
deposed by his deputy Julius Maada Bio in a bloodless coup. Strasser had 
angered some of the top commanders by sending them back to the barracks 
as he apparently planned to move toward elections. Bio and others had 
begun organizing a National Unity Party to contest the elections themselves. 
“Strasser, late in the day, said he was going to contest the elections. That 
was the main reason why they pushed him out.” But Bio was also ambitious; 
he would later run for president and lose in 2012. Bio made contact with 
rebel leader Foday Sankoh after the decision at Bitumani I to go ahead 
with elections. “Foday Sankoh was saying we don’t need elections now. 
It was after that that he [Bio] called Bitumani II … Basically I think the 
36 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
37 Smythe interview.
38 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
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intention was to prevent the elections from going ahead.’39 Bio initially had 
pledged to go ahead with the elections, but then raised doubts by calling 
for the new national conference to re-consider whether elections should go 
ahead or be postponed until later, presumably when peace was achieved. 
Opponents quickly saw this as a ploy to prolong the NPRC in power. “People 
said ‘absolutely not. No way.’ By then [women] are so radicalized. And then 
we have the march: the second women’s peace march.”40
The second Bitumani conference, therefore, set for February 12, 1996, 
was shaping up to be the litmus test for whether the NPRC would step 
down – or not. Bio had plans to persuade traditional chiefs and a range of 
others to go along with a continuation of military rule. But his plans were 
dashed by a decision by the Interim National Electoral Commission to host 
the conference on condition that “only those delegates who had attended 
the August 1995 conference would be invited.” (Alie 2006, 56). Still, the 
delegates’ vote would effectively determine if the military would stay or go. 
The traditional chiefs were “bought over by the NPRC government.”41 The 
army began announcing that it could not guarantee the safety of voters if the 
election was held before the war was brought to a close. Then just two days 
before the conference, the homes of INEC chairman Jonah and presidential 
candidate Tejan Kabbah were “attacked with grenades and gunfire. Soldiers 
were widely suspected of being behind the attacks” (Keen 2005, 156).
Market Women v. the Military: The story of two Maries
Across Africa and in many other countries, market women (and men) sit 
at small tables, often outdoors and often unprotected from the sun except 
perhaps by an umbrella or cloth. They sell grains, vegetables, clothing and 
almost anything else, sometimes from dawn to dusk. It is humble work, 
but it provides the money to pay for schools fees, feed a family, and buy the 
occasional extra. Sometimes, as with the “Nana Benzi,” market women of 
Togo and other West African coastal countries, their sales bring a lot of 
money. I once interviewed one of the “Nana Benzi” (so named because a 
number of them owned a Mercedes Benz). During the interview, she carried 
on a conversation on one of her two cell phones while calling out to her 
39 Julius Spencer, in an interview with the author, May 18, 2009, at Spencer’s media off ice in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone.
40 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
41 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
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house servant. In many countries in Africa, if the market women decide 
to go on strike for a political reason, much of the city or town feels the 
impact. When a small group of mothers in Kenya staged a strike, camping 
out in a city park to protest the political detention of their sons, it captured 
the attention of the regime and won wide public support. (That protest is 
described in this book in a chapter on Kenya.)
As the civil war that started in Sierra Leone in 1991 spread, so did attacks 
on civilians. One of the main targets of ambushes was women transporting 
farm and other goods to markets, especially in rural areas where the rebels 
were active. “Actually one could not decide whether it was NPRC or RUF 
because it came out from the warfront … We had ‘sobels,’ soldiers in uniform 
but behaving like the RUF.”42 The impact of these attacks on market women 
deprived them of income they needed to pay school fees; as a result, many 
children had to stay home. Among the market women, these economic 
grievances grew along with a realization that the war and their own family 
stability were linked. Gradually their focus shifted to a perceived need to 
get the NPRC out of power and bring in an elected government to restore 
peace and the economy. The military was now planning just the opposite: to 
stay in power until there was peace, but they showed no signs of achieving 
it. Two market women, both named Marie, played an important role in the 
second national conference (Bitumani II) in challenging the NPRC’s plans 
to prolong their stay in power. One of them, Marie Touray is a tall, confident 
woman, the kind of person people notice when she walks into a room. She 
had no formal education. The other, Marie Bob-Kandeh, is shorter, full of 
energy, and had only a few years of high school education.
Marie Bob-Kandeh. She was sitting at a desk in a crowded, plainly-furnished 
off ice in downtown Freetown where she does her paperwork as secretary 
general of the Market Women Association of Sierra Leone. When the coup 
took place in early 1996, it was the last straw for her and many other market 
women.
We have different categories of women in Sierra Leone. We have the 
elites; we have the grassroots people … We [market women] work on 
a commission basis; most of us are the breadwinners of the home. Our 
women were not earning enough money to look after the children. So 
when the coup took place, there are so many symptoms to tell us that 
these people are not willing to give [up] power and let the civilians take 
42 Minah interview.
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over. So we joined other women’s organizations [alliances] to organize 
Bitumani I and II.43
Zainab Bangura, who later became the country’s minister of foreign affairs 
under a civilian government, visited the women in some thirty-five markets 
in Freetown, talking to the chairlady of each market, explaining why Sierra 
Leone needed to move toward peace and democracy. She explained to 
them why the military had to leave. Bangura framed the message in terms 
of the economy, not just war and peace. There was a clear economic gap 
between the well-to-do Bangura and the market women. Some of the market 
women at f irst were skeptical of her. “They [elites] would only come to us 
when they need us. And after they succeeded, they would just abandon 
us.” Once convinced, the market women organizers from Freetown began 
spreading their message upcountry of “elections before peace.” Again the 
message was framed in both economic and political terms: elections to bring 
a government that would end the war and improve the economy.
We told them that all of us have eyes to see what is happening on the 
ground; that with these military people things are going from bad to 
worse every day. We used to sell to Lebanese people. Now most of them 
have run away because of the military [which] doesn’t have respect for 
elders [or] women. They aren’t ruling by the constitution; they’re ruling 
by decree … They can kill you at any time if you are walking and someone 
has made an allegation that you are committing a crime.44
Marie Touray. One of the market women upcountry was Marie Touray. 
Enough people I had interviewed in Freetown mentioned her to lead me 
to make an appointment. Though never having had formal education, she 
had become a leader among the local market women and active in politics. 
She in turn began advocating among local market women. “I told them we 
need a recognized government, a legitimate government that will bring 
development and [attract] the eyes of the international community to see 
us and to help us.”45 Now, at a critical point in the contemporary history 
of Sierra Leone, she had been called on by some of the Freetown women’s 
43 Marie Bob-Kandeh, in an interview with the author, February 2, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
44 Bob-Kandeh interview.
45 Marie Touray, in an interview with the author, March 26, 2009, in her hometown of Kenema, 
Sierra Leone.
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leaders to go to the Bitumani II conference and speak for market women 
in general. They invited her because of her local stature and credibility 
as a spokesperson for women. She was president of the Kenema market 
women’s association.
Marie Touray arrived at the conference in Freetown with a letter from the 
market women’s association. Upon her arrival, she spoke to the conference 
organizer and told him: “Jonah, we’re surprised you called another confer-
ence. Because we already agreed [at Bitumani I] that we want elections.” 
Outside the conference, things were getting nasty on the street. “There were 
soldiers, armed to the teeth. We were in there [the conference] hearing 
them beating people outside.46 Among the crowd outside trying to get in to 
observe (she was not a delegate) was the other Marie, Marie Bob-Kandeh. 
“We met at the Aberdeen Bridge [near the Bitumani Hotel] … but we had 
some resistance with the military. That is where we were f logged. I was 
flogged … it was painful; it hurt.”47
Inside the conference hall, the debate was underway at the podium 
and on the floor. A number of speakers had been urging postponement of 
elections until the war was over. Then it was Marie Touray’s turn to take 
the podium. Holding up the letter from her organization she said candidly 
that she couldn’t read, but she said she knew what was in it. She called out 
loud and clear: “We want no addition, no subtraction from the election date 
[chosen at the f irst conference]. Women delegates quickly echoed the call: 
“No addition; no subtraction.” Soon the hall was f illed with shouts for “No 
addition; no subtraction.” Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, one of the key organizers of 
the women’s efforts at the conference, recalled, “That just changed the tide; 
it just needed one person to have the courage to say [that].”48 Delegates 
voted “overwhelmingly” to keep the elections as planned.
The elections were held two weeks later on February 26-27, 1996, despite 
threats from the rebels and amidst some shooting. “A battery of interna-
tional and local observers monitored the elections, and their assessment 
was on the whole, positive” (Alie 2006, 156). In a peaceful runoff election 
March 15, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) candidate, Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah, won; NPRC Chairman Bio stepped down March 29, 1996.
46 Touray interview.
47 Bob-Kandeh interview.
48 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
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Implications of a Successful Nonviolent Resistance to a Military 
Junta
It is one thing for a nonviolent social movement to oppose a repressive 
civilian regime, especially if the resistance comes at a time in a country’s 
history when civil society is not very active or well developed. That was the 
case when a group comprising mostly students challenged the regime of 
Siaka Stevens and shook its pillars of power but was unable to topple him 
for lack of broader support. A nonviolent social movement challenging a 
military junta, however, faces even more danger. A military regime is not 
likely to make even the pretense of having legal safeguards against abuse of 
human rights. Challenging such a regime in the midst of a civil war is even 
more complicated, yet that is exactly what activists did in Sierra Leone in 
the mid-1990s. With women’s groups in the lead, civil society mounted an 
effective campaign to oblige the military to leave power sooner than its 
leader, Bio, intended. A combination of domestic pressure (expressed by 
mass demonstrations), lobbying of junta off icials, critical publications, and 
a very widespread public resentment at the continuing war, resulted in the 
military accepting calls for elections before peace was achieved instead of 
the other way around. It was a clear example of the ways in which a social 
movement seeking regime change under dangerous and unpredictable 
conditions can still have an impact.
Led by women organized in a social movement, including market women 
such as Marie Touray and Marie Bob-Kandeh, Sierra Leone’s civil society 
played a key role in edging out the junta peacefully, even as the junta had 
lost international credibility.49 “The NPRC in the final analysis realized there 
was a coalition between the international community [and] the civil society. 
They had [an election] commission that was actually bent on having an 
election; and the people supported the election: the country itself was ready 
for an election.”50 After the second national conference, Marie Bob-Kandeh 
returned to her market in Freetown; Marie Touray returned to Kenema. 
Years later, people were still talking about the role women had played in the 
reluctant departure of the military. Ultimately Bio and the NPRC military 
government had stepped down peacefully almost exactly four years after 
they seized power. Julius Spencer, who would go on to be named minister of 
49 Some Western governments (e.g., US, Canada, Netherlands, Germany, France, and the UK) 
provided NPRC leaders with an enticing additional reason to step down: scholarships to study 
abroad. 
50 Zainab Bangura, in an interview with the author, May 5, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
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information in the Kabbah government from 1998-2001, argues that in the 
end, Bio had little choice. Civil society had come together overwhelmingly 
against prolonging military rule. And the international community was 
watching very closely. “I think it had been made very, very clear to them 
[NPRC under Bio] that they had to respect the will of the people.”51
There is another view of why the military stepped down, one more 
focused on internal weakness of the NPRC itself. There had been some 
splits in the military over whether to proceed to elections or not. Though 
the civil society opposition to the NPRC probably preceded the splits, the 
splits provide a classical example of “opportunity” according to the social 
movement literature, though the record of violence by the NPRC was known. 
The relegating of certain senior off icers to the barracks by NPRC head 
Strasser in order to pave the way for a transition angered those sent back. 
Other NPRC internal problems were even more complicated. One senior 
NPRC off icial told human rights attorney Jusu-Sheriff, whose husband was 
minister of foreign affairs with the junta that the senior off icials could not 
trust their young subordinates who lied to them. The NPRC, she concluded 
“found themselves overwhelmed by the problems that they faced … They 
were out of their depth … they didn’t have good people. The whole thing 
[governance] is much more complex than they ever, ever imagined. And 
they just couldn’t cope.”52
At another level, the implications of what happened were an endorsement 
of nonviolent resistance and of the power of social/resistance movements 
under harsh conditions. It is important to recall that the NPRC had its dark 
side, with violence against civilians and perceived political opponents in 
Freetown. Upcountry some NPRC soldiers posed as rebels and stole and 
even cooperated with rebels, the “sobel” phenomenon referred to earlier. 
Nonviolent resistance against such a regime was dangerous. But as the 
unpopular civil war dragged on, there was growing opposition to prolonged 
military rule.
This is the background against which there was the re-emergence of a 
strong civil society for the f irst time in several decades. Not all segments 
of civil society joined the resistance, but enough people did, enough new 
organizations and revitalized old ones did, to make a difference. The tactics 
varied from institutional channels – writing letters and arranging personal 
meetings with NPRC officials – to non-institutional, such as public marches. 
Journalists such as Paul Kamara played a key role in the resistance, not only 
51 Spencer interview.
52 Jusu-Sheriff interview.
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publishing critical commentary on the NPRC that weakened its legitimacy 
in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans and the international community, but serving 
as a focus for the opposition. At one point key resistance leaders such as 
Bangura and others met at Kamara’s For di People off ice, despite police 
presence at the door, to strategize resistance against the regime.
The various segments of the resistance comprised a large social movement 
that linked a vast network of overlapping memberships, friendships, and 
professional ties. People kept in touch through personal communication in 
a pre-cell phone and essentially pre-computer era in Sierra Leone. Although 
there was a noticeable gearing down of energy in the resistance once the 
elections were held, women’s groups continued to push for peace. Various 
other groups in the resistance remained intact. Little did the activists know 
that all the energy and skills of civil society would soon be demanded again 
when yet another military coup took place. On May 25, 1997, the rebel 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) forced the elected Kabbah 
government to flee to Guinea. What the rebel leaders had not counted on, 
however, was the strength of an awakened civil society that would resist 
the new junta nonviolently, this time through a social movement using a 
very different tactic.
Figure 4  The author, political, police and military officials (from left to right) at a 
human rights workshop in Bo, Sierra Leone, 2009
Photo by Betty Press
4 Mass Noncooperation Helps Defeat a 
Violent Junta
I feel very proud of my country. It was one of the most heroic periods in our history. 
There were lots of individual acts of heroism by civilians.
Olu Gordon, independent journalist1
It wasn’t what a new group calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) was expecting when it seized power in Sierra Leone on 
May 25, 1997 from Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected just 15 
months earlier.2 A previous military coup launched in 1992 by the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC: 1992-96) had been welcomed with danc-
ing in the street in the capital of Freetown. This initial civilian welcome 
of the NPRC after years of repressive, one-party rule offered no reason for 
international intervention, though public, nonviolent resistance starting 
about two years later gradually turned the tide against them and helped 
push them from power.
This time the initial reaction to a military junta was different. Instead 
of jubilation, there was mass civil disobedience: banks and many shops 
closed; schools shutdown across the country; many people refused to go 
to work; civil servants did little work. The civil society that had flexed its 
muscles to help get rid of the previous military rulers now sent a clear 
message to the newcomers: you are not legitimate: step down now. The 
nonviolent resistance/social movement against the AFRC involved a variety 
of tactics, was carried out by individuals and organizations, was at times 
overt and at times clandestine, and had both an economic and political 
impact. It amounted to an “unprecedented civil disobedience as patriotic 
Sierra Leoneans refused to cooperate with the junta” (Alie 2006, 179).
The immediate mass rejection of the AFRC by the civilian population 
opened the door from the start for the military intervention by West African 
troops (mainly Nigerians). That intervention enabled the elected govern-
ment to return from exile in Guinea in March 1998, ten months after it had 
1 Gordon interview. During the period of the AFRC in Freetown, Gordon, who died in 2011, 
was an independent journalist targeted by the junta.
2 The AFRC junta controlled the capitol of Freetown from May 25, 1997 to early February 
1998.
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been deposed.3 During the time of the AFRC, “nonviolent demonstrations 
erupted spontaneously around the country and the continued strikes 
and boycotts made the country ungovernable” (Global Nonviolent Action 
Database, 2011). “The role of civil society in ending the NPRC dictatorship 
and resisting its AFRC sequel is unprecedented in the annals of military 
rule in independent Africa” (Kandeh 2004b, 179).
This chapter will examine the brutality of the regime; the nonviolent so-
cial movement that took place against the AFRC junta, and the tactics used 
by civilians against the regime – including noncooperation, a nonviolent 
“war” by independent journalists, and use of a propaganda/informational 
clandestine radio station: Radio Democracy. The chapter will also examine 
two courageous protest marches, one led by students, the other by women; 
the f inal brief orgy of violence of the rebels; international intervention that 
ultimately restored peace; and implications of the peaceful resistance to an 
extremely violent military junta.
Nonviolent Social Movement
The civilian response to the AFRC junta can be seen by some scholars as 
a poignant example of nonviolent resistance; it can be seen by others as 
a social movement. In fact, it was a combination of the two: a nonviolent 
social movement. As argued in the theory chapter, the divisions between 
these two theoretical viewpoints at times can be arbitrary and unnecessary. 
That is not to say that all social movements are nonviolent; some are violent. 
And some nonviolent resistance may not amount to a social movement. But 
in this case the nonviolent resistance did amount to a social movement, 
especially when using the more inclusive def inition of a social movement 
presented earlier: a process of challenges to targeted authorities that may 
involve individual as well as organizational activism, and at times mass public 
support, and is aimed at either regime reform or regime change.
A broad array of civilian society challenged the junta in many ways, 
both individually and through groups, using various tactics designed to 
undermine the credibility and strength of the regime. “The coalition of 
3 “The actions of the campaigners allowed the [West African] peacekeeping forces to restore 
the civilian government.” (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2011). Although the Kabbah 
government returned to Freetown in March 1998, f ighting continued in the countryside. Nigerian 
and later British troops eventually established peace and the war was off icially declared over 
in 2002.
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interests opposed to the regime included students, teachers, labour leaders 
and ordinary workers, market women, university lecturers, and even sec-
tors of the state’s coercive apparatus like judges, and the police” (Gordon 
2004, 191). From the start, the goal among the challengers was not regime 
reform but regime change. The high level of repression precluded most use 
of open resistance tactics, though there were some demonstrations, usually 
brutally suppressed. Instead, many Sierra Leoneans chose the option of 
noncooperation, refusing to do the normal kinds of work needed to keep a 
country operating smoothly.
Their resistance constituted a social movement as they turned to 
non-traditional channels of dissent, challenging authorities in terms of 
legitimacy. Though there was no central organization or central leader of 
the resistance, there was communication and for specif ic events such as 
the marches, coordination. For example, the march by students, violently 
broken up by security forces, was planned with the help of reporters and 
editors in the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, meeting clandestinely.
There was a higher degree of coordination than I’d ever seen between 
the various groups. It was mostly informal discussions. And all this was 
clandestine. You know, students coming around to my cousin’s house, or 
labor union meeting somewhere with labor union people. For example, 
when I wanted to get out [of Freetown], it was students who smuggled me 
into Hastings [a small town near Freetown where Nigerian ECOMOG4 
soldiers maintained a small base]. There were checkpoints all along the 
road.5
The civil disobedience was not simply a matter of choice: fear of being labeled 
collaborators later and fear of being on the streets were also motives for civil 
disobedience, according to numerous survivors from that period. While in 
power, the AFRC – a coalition of elements of the Sierra Leone Army and the 
rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) unpredictably responded to resistance 
with, cajoling, intimidation, threats – and outright brutality. They were danger-
ous, unpredictable, undisciplined, and ruthless. Journalists, a frequent target 
of AFRC wrath, and anyone else openly opposing the regime, took great risks.
4 Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) provided Nigerian-led combat troops to f ight the rebels in both Sierra 
Leone and Liberia.
5 Gordon interview.
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Democracy on Hold
There are contradictory assessments of President Kabbah’s progress in 
his brief nine months of democratic leadership leading up to the coup 
of May 25, 1997. Kabbah was “scoring some success in the peace process 
and in the economic front” (Alie 2006, 175). Kabbah “moved the economy 
from a negative growth rate of minus 6.4 per cent to a positive rate of 6 
percent in just one year” (Gberie 2005, 100). Donors were pledging funds 
for recovery and development. A peace accord was signed in Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, November 30, 1996. But Foday Sankoh continued his attacks by his 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). He was arrested in Nigeria in March 1997.
Gordon (2004, 185) argued, however, that the Kabbah government had 
done “more than just alienate the army, it systematically delegitimized itself 
by relying on the same patrimonial arrangements and repressive anti-people 
measures of proceeding regimes; making itself almost indistinguishable 
from those same regimes.” He notes that the month of the coup, the Kabbah 
government was “tear-gassing college students protesting against the SLPP 
[Kabbah’s Sierra Leone People’s Party] decision to award a pension to the 
discredited former president Joseph Saidu Momoh” and was pressing for 
controls on the independent press.
Whichever assessment one points to, there was widespread disapproval of 
a military coup replacing a democratically elected government. This is not 
to say the new junta did not have supporters; they clearly did. They provided 
their rationale for their coup. But who were these supporters? They included 
some professionals and politicians, as well as high school drop outs, illiterates, 
“some former bodyguards and errand boys of the NPRC leaders,” and some 
junior off icers of the Sierra Leone Army, including Sergeant Abu “Zagallo” 
Sankoh (Kandeh 2004b, 164). Zagallo,6 in a statement given to Sierra Leone 
police, offered this account of his involvement: “On the day before the coup 
[he] called up a total of 17 soldiers, including members of the army football 
team he was coaching, and told them he had a dream in which a man asked 
him why soldiers had allowed themselves to suffer such punishment in the 
army, adding that senior off icers were to blame” (Keen 2005, 208).7 Some 
soldiers had been imprisoned by the Kabbah government on charges of 
plotting a coup in December 1996, including Major Johnny Paul Koroma, soon 
to become head of state in the AFRC. A group of soldiers then proceeded to 
steal arms at a local barracks and continued to the Pademba Road prison in 
6 His name appears in different accounts as Zaglo and Zagllo.
7 Keen credits the account to documentation made available to him by Lansana Gberie. 
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Freetown where they used grenades to blast open the doors, releasing some 
600 inmates, including Koroma, arming many. They then took over the State 
House. Kabbah fled that afternoon to Guinea by ferry. Koroma immediately 
called upon the RUF, including its imprisoned leader Foday Sankoh being 
held in Nigeria, to join him in the government. The RUF quickly became the 
dominant force in the AFRC, including directing the junta’s security (Gberie 
2005, 101, 106). “Given the amalgam of unpatriotic elements (APC, NPRC, 
RUF) supporting the 1997 coup, it is not surprising why this coup was so 
unpopular” (Kandeh 2004a, 166).
The coup makers offered a variety of other reasons for their actions includ-
ing: dissatisfaction with the supplies the Sierra Leone Army was receiving, 
including reduced rice subsidies; rumors that the government was planning 
to dismiss many soldiers; a growing animosity between the army and the 
Kamajors, a civil defense force formed in the south to protect villagers and 
others from the RUF. The later reason “reflected perceptions that the govern-
ment was using the Kamajors as a counterweight to the army and, as such, 
was incapable of resolving the rift between the two armed factions.” The 
coup makers promised to bring peace to the country (Kandeh 2004a, 164-5).
To some the AFRC coup was both regional and ethnic. “Led by southern-
ers, the NPRC coup was anti-APC while the northern-led AFRC coup was 
anti-SLPP” (Kandeh 2004a, 178). Regionally, the NPRC coup of 1992, with 
strong southern support, ousted the APC whose base was in the north. The 
AFRC coup of 1992 with strong northern support ousted the southern-based 
SLPP government of Kabbah. Ethnically, some Sierra Leoneans refer to the 
1997 AFRC coup as “APC II” because it seemed to pull together supporters of 
the northern-based APC whose main strength was the Temne (and Limba) 
against the southern-based SLPP, whose main strength was among the 
Mende. A Lebanese businessman I interviewed (he did not want his name 
used) agrees with this analysis. He also argued that the AFRC coup involved 
some of the northern Limba sons of senior Limba off icers executed in the 
earlier NPRC coup of 1992, adding an aspect of revenge to the 1997 coup.8
While some political f igures in Sierra Leone fled the country when asked to 
serve, others accepted a position. I hadn’t realized that one of those who served 
in the AFRC/RUF cabinet was a colleague of mine in the political science 
8 Gberie (2005, 109-10 argues that it is a “myth” that the APC coup was a northern one because 
it attracted politicians from the north and south. 
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department at Fourah Bay College, in Freetown.9 Although I almost certainly 
had spoken to him about my research topic, it wasn’t until shortly before my 
departure, after nine months on faculty, that someone mentioned to me that 
Alimamy Pallo Bangura had served the junta as minister of foreign affairs for 
about two months in 1997.10 Bangura also ran for president on the RUF party 
ticket in 2002: he got just 2 percent of the vote (Alie 2006, 203). Bangura seemed 
a bit embarrassed at f irst when I came into his office and said I had learned 
about his association with the junta. But he agreed to an interview.11 “I was 
invited to help sue for peace. Johnny Paul Koroma [the AFRC leader] promised 
me to allow me to sue for peace.” Bangura said he ran for president on the 
RUF ticket to give disenchanted youth “hope” and steer them from violence. 
He charged that the election of Kabbah in 1996 was “stolen” due to fraud.12
A Brutal Regime: “The Whole Nation Was Crying”
All forces in the civil war (1991-2002) committed excesses of violence, but 
the most brutal was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), according to the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission.13 “The whole nation 
was in mourning. The whole nation was crying,” said the Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph 
C. Humper, who served as president of the commission.14 While most of 
the violations and abuses were attributed to the RUF, other signif icant 
perpetrators included the AFRC and the Civil Defence Force (CDF), usually 
formed around a core group of traditional hunters. The second highest 
institutional count was attributed to the AFRC, whose fighters most notably 
committed atrocities on a massive scale in the Northern region and in 
Kono District. The AFRC demonstrated a “specialisation” in the practice of 
amputations from 1998 to 1999. Of the various groups that comprised the 
9 I was a Fulbright Fellow doing research on this book and also teaching classes at Fourah 
Bay 2008-2009.
10 According to Gberie (2005, 110), Bangura had been dismissed by Kabbah as ambassador to 
the United Nations.
11 Alimamy Pallo Bangura, in an interview with the author, June 9, 2009, at Fourah Bay College, 
Freetown, Sierra Leone.
12 He provided no evidence of fraud in the election.
13 Final Report (2002).
14 The Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper, in an interview with the author, April 20, 2009, in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone. Humper, a retired bishop emeritus of the United Methodist Church 
had also served as president of the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone, president of the Inter-
Religious Council of Churches and from 2002-2004 as chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Sierra Leone. 
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CDF, the Kamajors received the most scrutiny, as they were responsible 
for almost all the CDF violations reported after 1996. Forced cannibalism 
is attributed only to the Kamajors. A def ining characteristic of the CDF 
became its ceremony of initiation, described to the commission by many 
witnesses as entailing physical and psychological torture as well as other 
gross abuses of human rights. Although the RUF was the f irst to abduct 
and forcibly enlist children as soldiers and porters, all the armed factions 
recruited children and deployed them to such end. The main armed groups 
accused of perpetrating sexual violence against women and girls during 
the conflict were the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the Westside 
Boys, and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).
Although this violence was widespread and left civilians at the mercy of 
one or more of these forces, until the AFRC coup of 1997, most residents of 
Freetown had not seen it face to face. That changed with the arrival of the 
undisciplined SLA and their dominant partners, the RUF in charge of daily 
life in Freetown. Suddenly the war was no longer a far off phenomenon. 
The occasional violence of the NPRC on the streets was nothing compared 
to the brutality that became common place in the capital. An incident 
reported by Amnesty International (1998) gives some idea of the nature of 
the violence under the AFRC.
On 14 January 1998 a trader, Sama Turay, was shot dead by soldiers on 
Wilkinson Road in Freetown after an argument. Local residents were 
forced to hand the body over to soldiers. Residents of the area staged a 
demonstration along Wilkinson Road the following day in protest against 
the killing. This demonstration coincided with a visit to Freetown of a 
delegation headed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Sierra 
Leone, at that time based in Conakry, for discussions with the AFRC 
on the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Conakry in 
October 1997. The demonstration on 15 January 1998 was brutally sup-
pressed; soldiers indiscriminately beat civilians and raided homes in the 
area around Wilkinson Road. They went from house to house accusing 
civilians of deliberately discrediting the AFRC during the visit of the 
delegation. One of the victims was a 25-year-old trader. When soldiers 
arrived at his stall he was hit in the face with butt of an AK47 gun and 
was also badly beaten on his back. He recognized the soldiers who beat 
him and described them as relatives of Major Johnny Paul Koroma [head 
of the AFRC]. Another of the victims was an 18-year-old girl, also living in 
the Wilkinson Road area, who had joined the demonstration. Three days 
112 RiPPles of HoPe
later six soldiers came to her home. She was raped by all six soldiers who 
then cut her hair and shaved her head with a broken bottle.
Jimmy Kandeh (2004a, 171-2), a Sierra Leonean professor of political science 
in the United States, offered this broader assessment of the human rights 
record of the AFRC:
Crimes against humanity committed by junta operatives included 
summary executions, mutilation and torture, arbitrary arrests incom-
municado detentions, sexual abuse and enslavement, abductions, forced 
recruitment, and the extensive use of child soldiers. All of these violations 
occurred on a massive scale and were in many instances videotaped by 
the perpetrators themselves.
A Critique of Theories of Nonviolence
Gene Sharp, one of the most prominent theorists of nonviolent resistance 
makes a distinction between “civil disobedience” and “noncooperation.” 
He defines civil disobedience, in part as: “A deliberate peaceful violation of 
particular laws, decrees, regulations, ordinances, military or police orders, 
and the like.” In part, he def ines noncooperation as “deliberate restriction, 
discontinuance, or withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation 
… with a disapproved person, activity, institution, or regime” [emphasis 
added]. Noncooperation can be social, economic (e.g., boycotts and labor 
strikes) and political (Sharp 2005, 544, 547). Of the two terms, civil disobedi-
ence and noncooperation, civil disobedience is the more popularly used, 
including in Sierra Leone, although the peaceful resistance was closer to 
noncooperation.
You had civil disobedience [emphasis added]. People didn’t go to work, 
even though the junta was really forcing people [to go to work] in order to 
have a semblance – that things were working. You had civil disobedience 
[she repeated]. It was pretty successful. It wasn’t like people came together 
and agreed – if they did, it was underground. But everybody just stopped 
going to work, refusing to cooperate. You had a few who cooperated; the 
majority refused to cooperate. And things weren’t working: banks were 
mass noncooPeRation HelPs defeat a Violent Junta 113
closed; schools were closed. There was no fuel; food shortages. It was a 
very bleak period.15
According to Sharp (548-9), nonviolent resistance is aimed at weakening 
what he describes as the “pillars of support” of the regime. “Examples are 
the police, prisons, and military forces supplying sanctions, moral and 
religious leaders supplying authority (legitimacy), labor groups and business 
and investment groups supplying economic resources.” Sharp argues that 
the key to power is obedience; if a regime cannot obtain the obedience of 
its people, it has no real power. “[T]he power of rulers and of hierarchical 
systems, no matter how dictatorial, depends directly on the obedience and 
cooperation of the population” (39).
Sharp (51-65) lists 198 methods of “nonviolent action” which he divides into 
three groups: (1) protest and persuasion: e.g., public statements, marches, 
protest meetings; (2) noncooperation: e.g., stay-at-home, boycotts, student 
or labor strikes, slowdown strikes, designed to produce the “disintegration” 
of a regime; and (3) nonviolent intervention which is harder for resisters and 
harder for regimes to withstand: e.g., fasting, sit-ins, occupations of work 
sites, alternative communication systems and markets.
Sharp’s theoretical arguments have been criticized on several points as 
Schock (2005, 44-6) notes: for not explaining how people are aroused to 
disobey a regime; not explaining how an alternative system is established; 
not examining possible regime support from other countries. Shock suggests 
combining political process theory (including how to frame or explain 
issues and how external “opportunities” encourage a social movement) 
with insights from nonviolence theory to provide a stronger theoretical 
analysis.16
In Sierra Leone, there was little need for opponents of the AFRC regime 
to “frame” or explain the junta’s seizure of power as illegitimate: that 
was quickly recognized by a broad range of the population. And there 
were few, if any, obvious external circumstances or “opportunities” which 
would encourage nonviolent resistance. Quite the opposite, the repres-
sion was so severe it strongly discouraged resistance. The country was 
almost universally condemned by other nations. International sanctions on 
15 Jamesina King, in an interview with the author, April 17, 2009, in the off ice of the Human 
Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, a government agency, Freetown, Sierra Leone. King, an 
attorney and former chair of the commission was a commissioner at the time of the interview.
16 David Snow and colleagues develop the concept of framing in various articles, including 
one in 1986 (“Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”).
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arms were imposed. As critics such as Schock point out, however, Sharp’s 
theories do not say much about how an alternative system is established 
through nonviolent resistance; the focus is on bringing down the targeted 
regime, not on establishing a new one. Here Shock’s approach of looking 
for strengths from more than one theoretical framework makes more sense 
than an overreliance on a single framework.
The current study of Sierra Leone, as well as Liberia and Kenya, suggests 
another critique of Sharp’s nonviolence theories which is similar to the 
general critique this study offers regarding social movements in repressive 
settings. Sharp suggests that the theories of nonviolence work best when 
there is a “wisely prepared grand strategy” (Sharp 2005, 48). That implies, 
as does much of the traditional social movement literature, that there is 
need for a relatively high degree of organized planning and coordination 
to succeed. There were informal networks, personal contacts, and at times 
coordination for a particular event, as will be shown. Radio Democracy 
played an effective propaganda and informative role and encouraged nonco-
operation with the regime – as well as warning civilians of the consequences 
of cooperation and being labeled a collaborator. In Sierra Leone (and the 
other two countries) there was a popular goal – regime change but there was 
no “grand strategy” such as Sharp argues is needed. The resistance against 
the brutal regime originated from different sectors of society in different 
places and at different times. It was both individual and organizational; it 
was not formally coordinated. Yet the nonviolent resistance helped lead to a 
regime change. But this very lack of central coordination and the individual 
nature of much of the mass noncooperation provided the regime with no 
easy targets to shut it down.
Social movement studies cited earlier have shown that repression does not 
always stop resistance and that to a certain point it may actually stimulate 
more resistance. It is generally accepted that repression does set, as James 
C. Scott noted (1985, 209), “parameters” on resistance. With this in mind, 
the case of Sierra Leone during the brief occupation of power by the AFRC 
offers some interesting insights and complexities with regard to nonviolent 
resistance. The violence by the AFRC was extreme by all accounts. It was 
also unpredictable, general in application, and thus terrifying to most resi-
dents. This raises the question of how much repression does it take to stop 
nonviolent resistance? It also raises questions of what kinds of resistance 
can take place under such circumstances and how does the resistance adapt 
to the repression. It raises another, perhaps more subtle question about 
the motives behind such resistance: how much of it amounts to deliberate 
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defiance of a repressive regime and how much involves actions taken simply 
to survive the extreme violence, a point discussed below.
[The regime] began to systematically and ruthlessly suppress political 
dissent and civil society and student militancy in the major towns and 
especially in Freetown. The regime indiscriminately arrested imprisoned 
and tortured journalists, demonstrators and anyone who was critical of 
the AFRC (Alie 2006, 179).
Violent Resistance
Beyond a certain point, repression may either stop most resistance or drive 
it underground with the potential to remerge in the form of insurrection, 
revolution, or some other form of armed resistance. Rejected by civil society 
and the international community, the AFRC embarked upon the systematic 
violence by the state under the slogan “If you don’t want us, you’ll die.” As a 
result, civil society responded not just with nonviolent resistance, but with 
people fleeing the country, and through force of arms (Kandeh 2004a, 167.) 
In Freetown, the capital, with few exceptions (notably a student protest 
march in Freetown that was violently put down), the resistance was not 
confrontational with the junta. It was largely nonviolent. But it took place 
during a civil war that at this period pitted the AFRC primarily against 
armed Civil Defense Forces, including the southern-based Kamajors among 
the Mende people, but also northern CDF’s and international troops.17 One 
Kamajor f ighter, Gibril Bassie of Bo, the country’s second major city, served 
in the national military (1992-97) and then joined the Kamajor (1998-2000) 
to f ight the RUF. He objected to the looting by the military, calling that 
activity “a business.” He added: “I stuck to the rules of engagement. I was so 
vocal. I feared no one.” But when the RUF rebels joined the AFRC govern-
ment “those were hard times.” According to Bassie, the junta attacked the 
Kamajors, burning people alive in some cases, using what is termed “neck 
lacing:” jamming a car tire around the neck of the victim and setting them 
on f ire.18
17 Internationally the civil war (1991-2002) involved at various times Gurkhas from Nepal, 
mostly West African troops led by Nigerians, government-hired mercenaries from South Africa, 
and f inally British troops.
18 Gibril Bassie, in an interview with the author, December 8, 2008, in Bo, Sierra Leone.
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Civil Society’s Nonviolent Resistance: Junta “Not Wanted”
It was against the backdrop of day-to-day violence that civilians in Freetown 
responded, some by fleeing the country, others by engaging in nonviolent 
resistance, as individuals or through organizations. In some cases the 
organizations, such as small independent newspapers, were so meagerly 
f inanced and few in staff that the journalists were acting more as indi-
viduals than as part of an organization structure that offered f inancial 
support, legal defense, and numerical strength for activists. An Amnesty 
International report (1997) noted:
Almost all sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including trade unions, 
religious groups, lawyers, women’s groups, teachers, students and journal-
ists, have opposed the military coup. Large numbers of civil servants, 
teachers and other public sector workers have refused to work in protest 
against the military coup, despite threats of dismissal by the AFRC.
By most accounts, the nonviolent resistance was nationwide,19 not just in 
Freetown. It took various forms: shops closing; banks shutting their doors; 
schools closing as teachers went on strike; laborers responding to the strike 
call of their unions; civil servants going to work only to collect checks and 
not be f ired but doing little or no work; people staying home from other jobs. 
Independent journalists at great risk continued investigations and critical 
reporting against the junta. Organized labor, including teachers, went on 
extended strike so schools shut down.
In summary, the resistance that was offered by the population is f irst in 
the history of this country … what you call civil disobedience at its highest 
level in my own estimation. Right from the word go the AFRC realized 
that they were not wanted. People didn’t go to work; most of the shops 
remained closed. Those who went to work, they sat down there, did noth-
ing. Group meetings were rare … There was a complete [international] 
blockade … A good number of people resigned [their work] and returned 
to their villages.20
19 The current study focuses mostly on what happened in Freetown, the nation’s capital.
20 Humper interview. The blockade was intended to stop arms shipments but it became a 
near-total blockade, including of food.
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Not everything shut down. Although many Lebanese shop keepers left 
the country or closed their shops, some stayed open, depending on the 
level of street violence day by day. Some taxies operated but at elevated 
prices because of the cost of black market fuel. As noted, civil servants 
went to work but mostly just to collect their paychecks, exercising a form 
of “go-slow” resistance. Some civilians and sympathetic members of the 
AFRC shared food with civilian acquaintances and sometimes would even 
eat together.21 Petty markets continued business. Rice, a popular staple, 
became scarce due to the blockades, so people turned more to local foods.
We have some crops that grow in the bush, we call them bush yams. A 
cassava plantation; potato plantation; yams. Those were the main source 
of livelihood – not only in the rural areas; they were brought here [to 
Freetown] because there was no importation of rice. Cassava became 
the main source of food in 1977. People survived on that.22
Not that people had much choice, but cassava became what James C. Scott 
(1985) might call a “weapon” of survival against the junta, as Rev. Humper 
described it. Humper argued that a deep-seated culture of respect for au-
thority left many Sierra Leoneans reluctant to protest outside of traditional 
channels. But he described a way small farmers respond when authorities 
are seen as illegitimate. If the illegitimate off icials are coming to their town 
to give orders, farmers “take their machetes or their cutlasses and go to their 
farms. When [the authorities] come to the town there is nobody there.”23
Individual Noncooperation
There were at least three reasons individuals resisted the junta through 
noncooperation: (1) as a protest in support of human rights and a return 
to democracy; this motive most clearly f its the brave, critical reporting by 
journalists, and the individual lawyers who defended people arrested by 
the junta; (2) out of fear of going to work and carrying on normal activities 
because it was too dangerous on the streets; (3) out of fear of being labeled a 
21 Charles Mambu, in an interview with the author, April 22, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
At the time of the interview, he was chair of the Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights 
Activists, Sierra Leone. Such sharing typically involved civilians and friends or relatives who 
were in the AFRC but not supportive of the regime.
22 Humper interview
23 Scott’s book is titled: Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.
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collaborator later when the legitimate government was reinstalled.24 Though 
the latter two reasons amount to resistance, they also are strategic choices 
for survival.
Fleeing a war-torn country is another form of noncooperation,25 but it is 
more likely that people fled the violence of the AFRC not as a form of protest 
but as a way to survive.26 Others fled their homes but remained in Sierra 
Leone. “By June 1995, WFP [World Food Program] staff put the number 
of internally displaced at 1.5 million (Keen 2005, 186). Hannah Foullah, a 
student at Fourah Bay College in Freetown at the time of the AFC takeover, 
recalled her decision to follow the Kabbah government into exile:27
It was a desperate time and because of what was happening you couldn’t 
be sure that you would be safe the next day. You are alive today; you 
don’t know if you are going to be alive tomorrow. You’d hear stories about 
people who had been raped, stories about people being attacked, you 
know. So then there was no rule of law because this was an illegitimate 
regime. So because they were illegitimate, would you complain to them, 
you know, about your rights being violated? No; so it became obvious that 
we could not continue living in Sierra Leone for the sake of our own lives 
because you wouldn’t have anyone to go to.
So we went, I remember, June 2 [1997, about a week after the coup]. It 
was my birthday; there was a big attack … There were explosions and 
everything, you know. And that was when we decided that we should 
leave. So we left the following week by road. My aunt had a … minibus, 
so we took that and that is how we went to Guinea.
24 This assessment is based on a wide range of interviews with people who were living in 
Freetown at the time the AFRC seized power in what became essentially an RUF-led regime.
25 One US-based organization noted: “The tactic of protest emigration [emphasis added] 
escalated, with an estimated 500,000 people – especially people with skills and professions – 
leaving the country” (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2011). An estimated 400,000 people 
f led to Guinea, Liberia or The Gambia, according to Gberie (1997, 150 cited in Keen 2005, 213).
26 Life in the refugee camps was not easy; it could also be boring. To help pass the time, a 
group of refugees pooled their musical talents and formed what became known as the Refugee 
All Star Band, whose sales eventually went international.
27 Hannah Foullah, in an interview with the author, December 10, 2008, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. At the time of the interview she was working in a bank. During the AFRC period she 
helped run Radio Democracy, set up by the government in exile to help undermine the AFRC.
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A Minor Theory: the Overlooked Role of Minor Actors in Helping 
Major Activists28
Sometimes minor actors step forward to help key activists then fade from 
historical memory. It is an aspect of resistance that is generally overlooked 
in studies. But without the intervention of minor actors, the key players 
might not have been able to carry on. In Kenya, for example, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, some activists narrowly escaped arrest due to tips 
from sympathetic supporters. In another circumstance, a prison guard 
helped a dissenter who was being tortured to get a message to an attorney, 
starting a chain of events that led to a reduction of torture in Kenya by the 
government. In Sierra Leone, two cabinet members of the ousted Kabbah 
government, both with a record of resistance to authoritarian regimes, were 
able to escape the country through the intervention of such minor actors.
In Freetown, the junta was scrambling to set up a government. While 
some APC politicians volunteered their services, some others who had been 
in the Kabbah government were offered jobs in the cabinet which would 
give the illegitimate junta an aspect of bipartisan support. Refusing an 
invitation put one in danger of being seen by the junta leaders as an enemy. 
Accepting such a post put the person in danger of being labeled later as a 
collaborator. One of those asked to take a post was Shirley Gbujama who 
had been Kabbah’s minister of foreign affairs. The AFRC leadership would 
have scored a victory had she agreed. But Gbujama, a Mende, with a master 
of education, had chaired the Bitumani conferences that had helped push 
the previous military regime from power and restore democracy. She was 
not about to turn around and help the ones who now had pushed aside the 
elected government. Through the help of others, she was able to escape. 
“They came to my house and took me to meet the junta. Someone whispered 
to me [about a forthcoming invitation] to be in the RUF government.” [She 
said:] “OK; thank you. As soon as I got home, I started packing. They didn’t 
know my plans. All the planes had left.” In the end, with the help of friends, 
she managed to get on a small f ishing trawler from Aberdeen and went to 
exile in Guinea.29
Emmanuel Grant, who was also asked to serve in the junta cabinet, almost 
didn’t make it to Guinea. The fact that he did escape underscores the role 
28 The theory is revisited in the f irst chapter in the section on Kenya.
29 Shirley Gbujama, in an interview with the author, February 9, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
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of minor actors who help activists as a form of resistance to a repressive 
regime. In Grant’s case, he had two narrow escapes by his own account with 
a minor actor saving him each time. Grant was minister of works when the 
AFRC seized power. He was arrested and taken in handcuffs to a military 
headquarters. After two days he and some other detainees were going to be 
moved to another location when two soldiers came to him. “One whispered 
to me: ‘don’t be afraid: We’ve come to save you. Our boss said we should 
not take you along with them [other detainees] – it could be dangerous for 
you.’” They dressed me in military attire, gave me a gun with my military 
cap and everything … They drove me off.30
He was taken to the home of a military off icer he knew. There he was 
told the junta wanted him to serve in their cabinet. But he refused. He was 
allowed to call a friend who came to collect him. With his friend he planned 
his escape on a boat to Guinea. Wearing a disguise which included a cap he 
managed to get onto the boat, but before it left, some rebels began searching 
the boat. Grant laughs as he recalled his second narrow escape to Guinea 
with the help of a second minor actor whose help amounted to resistance.
I was in a very small wardrobe in the Captain’s room. It was f inally 
opened, actually. One solider came and said: “Get out!” When I turned 
around, I noticed that he was alone. So I stood up and he said to me: “Mr. 
Grant I never realized it was you. If I had known I would not have let 
them come in. Just stay; we are going to tell them now there is nobody 
in the boat.31
Individual Resistance: Part of a Larger Social Movement
Scott (1985, 299) notes from his study of resistance by individual and organ-
ized small farmers in Malaysia: “Many of the forms of resistance I have 
been examining may be individual actions, but this is not to say that they 
are uncoordinated.” In Sierra Leone, while on the surface much of this 
individual resistance appeared to be spontaneous and ref lect personal 
decisions, a system of communication and networking developed, some of it 
overt, some of it clandestine. It amounted to a nonviolent social movement 
that responded to the repression of the regime. In Freetown, communities 
were divided into cells, typically only three or so people per cell. Messages 
30 Grant interview.
31 Grant interview.
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were passed between cells in code, Shellac Davies explained. For example: 
“That ink dress should be returned to me.” Because there were numerous 
spies working for the junta, “you were never sure of the messenger.”32 In 
these circumstances, codes and “silence became an instrument” of resist-
ance.33 Other communications were open. Radio Democracy, broadcasting 
from a then-clandestine location near Freetown, gave instructions on when 
people should stay home or go to work. Davies mentioned a three-month 
period when people generally did go to work but added that when Radio 
Democracy urged people to stay home from work, many complied. Ridicule 
is another form of protest. Many people, no doubt discreetly, except perhaps 
on Radio Democracy broadcasts, began referring to AFRC leader Johnny 
Paul Koroma not as head of state but “foot of state.”34 There was a large 
underground network of people from all walks of life providing information 
to Radio Democracy.35
Resisting and Surviving: “We All Thought We Were Going To Die”
For those who stayed in Freetown and other commercial cities of the 
country, the question for many was whether or not to continue going to 
their jobs as usual. If economic activity ground to a halt, opposition to the 
junta would be evident to all, including the international community. Civil 
servants worked for the government – now a military government – and 
were quickly warned by the junta to show up for work. According to many 
residents at the time who were interviewed for this study, civil servants 
generally showed up to work but did little other than collect pay checks 
when those were available. This kind of go-slow or work slow is a form 
of protest or resistance. “The job you’d normally take an hour to do, you 
would take a whole working day. Supervisors, too.”36 For other employees, 
not going to work was sometimes more a tactical survival strategy than a 
protest. “Initially we used to go to work, but then we stopped because of 
32 Shellac Davies, in an interview with the author, January 29, 2009. Davies, a former university 
student leader in the mid-1990s, was, at the time of the interview, chief f inancial off icer for the 
Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organizations.
33 Humper interview.
34 This example of derision was mentioned in several of my interviews and is also cited in 
Kandeh (2004a, 229, n. 111). 
35 Kelvin Lewis, in an interview with the author, February 13, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
At the time of the AFRC, Lewis was a contributor to the Voice of America.
36 Davies interview.
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lawlessness and growing insecurity. We all thought we were going to die … It 
was a horrible time. If it ever happens [again] I would be forced to just jump 
into the sea … There’s no way I would stay. It was really, really horrible.”37
Sally Kamara was a student at Fourah Bay College in guidance and 
counseling when the AFRC coup shook her life. Instead of going to classes 
and parties she was thrust into a strange new world of violence, fear, and 
uncertainty. About the only routine that continued was going to church. 
There were now new reasons to pray. Instead of searching for a job, she found 
herself like most residents of Freetown searching for food.
We walked long distances to look for food: we walked miles, miles. There 
are times when you are mid-way and you start hearing guns. Some homes 
were attacked. You don’t close your door at home because when you closed 
your doors, the junta boys would think you are concealing something. So 
we left our doors open. At night you don’t sleep … in your rooms because 
if we are caught they feel that you are harboring their enemy. We slept 
outside with burning tires along the street.38
On the surface, one might consider her as simply someone trying to survive, 
which is correct. But she was also a supporter of democratic government 
and had been part of the Women’s Forum that had helped push the previous 
military regime out of power. She took training as an election monitor for 
the 1996 elections. Kamara was in the crowds attacked by police outside 
the national conference (Bitumani II) in support of elections when the 
previous military junta was scheming to stay in power. After the Kabbah 
government returned from exile, she was at the back of the crowd that 
marched to the well-armed home of rebel leader Foday Sankoh (by then a 
part of the Kabbah government) to denounce rumors that he was planning 
a coup. A number of demonstrators were killed.
“Our brothers and our sisters were very strong” she said of her ordeal 
during the AFRC occupation. At one point AFRC rebels came to the home 
the family rented. They accused her of being a collaborator with the ousted 
government of Kabbah and were set to burn the house, an all-too-frequent 
ritual in those days. But some of her secondary school students were on the 
scene and told the rebels, she recalls: “She’s our teacher. We will not allow 
you to burn her house.” Then one of the rebels apparently recognized her 
and told the others to move on.
37 King interview.
38 Sally Kamara, in an interview with the author, February 10, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
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Another category of individuals who resisted the AFRC were individual 
lawyers who boldly stepped up to defend detainees at a time when their bar 
association was quiet. Yet another category had elements of both individual 
and organizational resistance: people whose organization was so small 
and so weakly f inanced that it could offer little or no help in support of 
their activism. Many journalists fell into this category at the time. They 
worked out of one or two rooms with minimal equipment – often with no 
computers or phones. Their newspaper could not provide much, if anything, 
in the way of protection, legal fees, or material support other than a meager 
salary. In essence, when they wrote critical articles about the junta, they 
were exposing themselves as individuals to potential retribution; and in 
numerous cases the junta went after them, individually, arresting, torturing, 
and in a few cases, killing them.
The AFRC, through its illegitimacy and brutality, pushed many Sierra 
Leoneans into the category of noncooperation. Whether out of protest 
or fear, the widespread noncooperation by Sierra Leoneans in daily life 
under the junta deprived the junta of any claims to legitimacy. The brutal 
suppression of basic rights and violence against citizens, bravely reported 
by the few independent newspapers that kept publishing, sometimes 
clandestinely, relayed that illegitimacy to the international community. 
This noncooperation, mixed with reports of brutality, served to open the 
door to the international intervention that eventually drove the rebels out.
While some of those who stayed in Freetown and other parts of the country 
had a record of activism against the NPRC, it is impossible to dissect how 
much of their motives for noncooperation in daily life, especially in work, 
was a protest against the AFRC and how much of it was out of concern for 
their safety if they went to work or the chance of being labeled a collaborator 
with the junta when the exiled government returned. In a larger sense, it 
didn’t matter what the motives were: ultimately, the mass of the population 
did not cooperate with the regime; the country was not functioning in most 
of the normal ways a country functions. Abdul Tejan-Cole, an attorney 
who later headed the country’s anticorruption commission, suggests that 
the mass resistance was individual noncooperation on a collective scale.
I  still have some huge questions about how organized it was, how 
centralized the whole thing was. I don’t subscribe to the theory that 
people sat back because [Radio Democracy] told them what not to do 
… We had instructions [from Radio Democracy] that people had been 
asked to do [something] that people simply ignored. People sat back 
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and looked at the situation; did what they thought was right. People 
were sick and tired of so many years of war and suffering and they 
just said: the only way that my situation can improve is … sit back and 
say “No.”39
Organizational Nonviolent Resistance: Lessons from Gandhi 
and King
When teachers and other members of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress 
went on a nationwide protest strike shortly after the arrival of the AFRC 
junta, they were joining a rich tradition of nonviolent resistance that in-
cludes Martin Luther King, Jr.’s campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s against 
racism in the United States and Mohandas Gandhi’s famous salt march 
against the colonial British in India in 1930.
Gandhi had practiced his developing philosophy of nonviolence while liv-
ing in South Africa. At the time he returned to India under British rule, the 
British had long established a monopoly on the production and sale of salt 
and derived important income from taxing it. His tactic was to violate the 
British laws against Indians producing salt and urging Indians nationwide 
to do the same. In social movement terms, Gandhi “framed” his appeal for 
action, nonviolent resistance, around the unpopular tax on an item that 
was important to people living in a tropical country, especially given the 
poverty of the masses.
This was more than a gesture toward cheaper salt: it was a bold defiance 
of British law and part of a campaign to free India from British rule. As he 
prepared to march to the sea, he said: “This f ight is no public show; it is the 
f inal struggle … I do ask you to return here only as dead men or winners of 
swarj, a term he used to mean “political independence … The simple act of 
standing up to the authorities dispelled the sense of inferiority that colonial 
rule both fostered and required” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 66, 85, 108). On 
March 12, 1930 Gandhi started a 240-mile walk to coast of the Arabian Sea 
to a point near the small coastal community of Dandi. It was a place where 
the watery saline mud was especially suited for boiling to create salt from 
the residue. Along the way he encouraged local British-appointed officials to 
resign their posts in protest; and he advised villagers to boycott ceremonies 
conducted by off icials who did not resign. He reached the coastal area 
39 Abdul Tejan-Cole, in an interview with the author, February 24, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
mass noncooPeRation HelPs defeat a Violent Junta 125
April 6, symbolically reaching into the water and pulling up a chunk of 
saline mud as the f irst step in producing salt.
The Salt March gave the world the idea of mass nonviolence in politics. 
It was also a living sermon to the country, which was heard by many 
and changed many. That sermon speaks to us just as loudly in the new 
millennium. The revolution that Gandhi sought to achieve was not 
merely political. It was also social. The independence he fought for was 
not only national but also personal. The Salt March was primarily about 
empowerment; it told people that they were stronger than they thought 
and that their oppressors were weaker than they imagined (Weber 2002).
The salt march put the British on the spot. If they arrested Gandhi and 
others who began making salt – as thousands did – they would create more 
martyrs for the national movement and conf irm Gandhi’s claims about 
their oppressive intent. But if they did nothing, they would look weak with 
regard to enforcing their laws, inviting further protest. Gandhi sought to 
provoke the British into action by announcing he would lead a raid on the 
Dharasana salt production in Gujarat that was part of the British monopoly 
on salt production. Before the salt factory protest, however, thousands 
were arrested, including Gandhi. The protest proceeded without him. 
At the Salt Works, some 2,500 demonstrators gathered as police savagely 
beat unarmed volunteers with steel tipped rods; at least forty-two people 
were injured. “The watching crowds gasped, or sometimes cheered as the 
volunteers crumpled before the police without even raising their arms 
to ward off the blows… The volunteers who were hit simply reeled over 
on the ground – without making a cry or an effort to defend themselves,” 
according to United Press International correspondent Webb Miller, who 
was there (Miller 1930).
One of the aims of such protests, as nonviolence methods guru Gene 
Sharp writes (Sharp 2005, 549), is to deny oppressive authorities the “pil-
lars of support” which oppressive authorities rely on to rule. One of those 
pillars is “moral” authority, according to Sharp. The violence the British 
government used against unarmed protestors at the Dharasana salt works 
robbed the British of any pretense of moral authority in their dealings with 
Indian subjects.
While Gandhi and King (and others) who advocated using nonviolence 
tactics pointed to the moral force of nonviolence, Sharp also emphasizes po-
litical tactics and strategies involved. He identif ies the “pillars” a repressive 
regime depends on to continue in power as including, in part, “moral and 
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religious leaders supplying authority (legitimacy), labor groups and business 
and investment groups supplying economic resources.” Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2011, 44) in their global study of nonviolent resistance campaigns 
from 1900 to 2006, make a similar point when they stress the importance 
of “sustained pressure derived from mass mobilization that withdraws 
the regime’s economic, political, social, and even military support from 
domestic populations and third parties. Leverage is achieved when the 
adversary’s most important supporting organizations and institutions are 
systematically pulled away through mass noncooperation.” As important 
and essential as individual resistance is in any social/resistance movement, 
organized resistance is also critical, and Sharp argues (2005, 35), likely to 
have more impact:
While individual acts may at times not have much impact, the def iance 
of organizations and institutions – for example, trade unions, business 
organizations, religious organizations, the bureaucracy, neighborhoods, 
villages, cities, regions, and the like – can be pivotal. Through these 
bodies people can collectively offer disobedience and noncooperation. 
Organizations and intuitions such as these, which supply the necessary 
sources of power to the opponent group, are called “pillars of support.”
Teachers and Labor Strike
Only a day after the coup, The Sierra Leone Labour Congress, Sierra Leone 
Teachers Union and other trade organizations “encouraged their workers 
to stay at home and despite pleas and threats from the AFRC, the workers 
refused to yield” (Alie 2006, 179). The strike by the labor unions, especially 
the teachers, was a deliberate, nonviolent organizational tactic to weaken 
the regime by refusing to cooperate in the kind of day-to-day economic and 
social – educational, in this case – life of the society.
It was a clear message to the junta: you are not welcome; we will not 
cooperate; step down and let the democratic government return. As one 
labor off icial recounted the resistance: “We’re going to use what we have. 
What we have is to work. When we work we generate wealth. And if we 
don’t work, wealth will not be generated. And that will [lead] to destruction 
of government.”40 This was not a nationwide strike for benefits; this was a 
nationwide resistance to an illegitimate regime. In a country such as Sierra 
40 Max Conteh, in an interview with the author, February 6, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
At the time of the interview, he was director of education for the Sierra Leone Labour Congress.
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Leone, one of the poorest in the world, going on strike was a major sacrif ice. 
The question was: how would members survive; how members would feed 
their families. Many people left the country; many others received money 
from their relatives abroad. “The foreign exchange bureaus were packed.”41 
But for many who could not leave or did not have supportive relatives 
abroad, local culture was a safety net of sorts and an important “weapon” 
of resistance. Labour Congress off icial Max Conteh explained:
Because of our culture and our traditional values we are highly dependent 
to each other. [We have] strong family ties. During that period, those who 
have [helped] those who did not have. That is our traditional value. I share 
with my relations. Even under normal circumstance, that is the way we 
live. And that will also ensure that people don’t starve.42
The most powerful part of the Labour Congress at the time was the Sierra 
Leone Teachers Union (SLTU). Industry is limited in Sierra Leone. Schools 
are in all parts of the country. Education is a top priority for most families 
in Sierra Leone and across Africa. 43 Families, especially mothers, will make 
sacrif ices to insure their children get the chance to go to school. Competi-
tion at the higher level and at the university level is especially stiff. “The 
Sierra Leone Teachers Union was one of the f irst national associations to 
condemn the coup and declared a teachers strike until democracy was 
restored” (Global Nonviolent Action Database 2011).
Alpha Timbo was secretary general of the SLTU through much of the 
1990s and also general secretary of the Labour Congress in the mid-1990s. 
As such, he was someone both the NPRC and AFRC courted then tried to 
intimidate; both efforts failed. He had organized strikes under President 
Momoh, demanding more and timely pay. “They tried to co-opt me.” When 
the NPRC took power, they offered him a government job which “I declined; 
I would never serve a military government.” When the NPRC set up an 
advisory committee on the constitution that made a national tour, the 
41 Gordon Interview.
42 Conteh interview.
43 One of the saddest things I saw in Sierra Leone was the destruction of a small private, 
wood-walled school near our apartment in Hill Station in Freetown. The Lutheran church in 
Ghana owned the land the school was allowed to build on but wanted the land back. After 
negotiations stalled, they bulldozed the school on a weekend. The publicity was so great that after 
the teachers walked to the nearby home of President Ernest Bai Koroma and complained, the 
president visited the site and ordered the church to build a replacement school. The incident is 
just a small example of the political as well as the social importance of education in the country.
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Teachers Union sent people to all the same meetings to argue against it. “We 
said we do not need a new constitution; let’s just f ix a date for elections.” 
When the Union held meetings with the theme of “No new constitution; 
NPRC must go” the police started showing up to try to intimidate people. 
Timbo tried a new strategy: hold multiple meetings at the different sites at 
the same time because police couldn’t be at all of them at the same time, at 
least not in numbers. Occasionally two police would show up, outnumbered 
by 100 or so at the meeting and were beaten by the attendees. “I never called 
for them to be beaten – except for one or two occasions.” When the AFRC 
overthrew the elected Kabbah government, Timbo was in no mood to back 
down, even after they offered him a position, which he refused.
My refusal led to the American Federation of Teachers taking my family 
[for protection] Because of the atrocities committed, and I was here, 
I refused to leave the country. I was arrested several times, over 20-30 
times. We stopped work [for teachers], so I was under extreme pressure 
every day. I had to go to State House to talk about how these schools 
would reopen. I told the teachers I would not call them back to work 
[until democracy was restored]. I told them anytime you hear my voice 
on the radio calling them to work I was under duress. We refused taking 
salaries from them [AFRC]. When the new government came [the elected 
government of Kabbah] they paid us part of the back salary.44
Journalists Wage Nonviolent “War” against the Military Junta
Critical reporting by independent Sierra Leone journalists made the abuses 
of the junta not just a local issue but an international one and helped keep 
international pressure on the AFRC to step down. The journalists took 
great risks to report the news. Some were threatened, detained, tortured, 
and a few killed during the AFRC occupation in 1997-98. Others were 
targeted and killed in January 1999 when elements of the AFRC returned 
in a f inal spasm of violence. The reporting was an important element in 
the nonviolent resistance against the junta. Olu Gordon, an independent 
journalist, argued that journalists helped lead the unarmed struggle against 
the AFRC junta. “The struggle of the independent press against the AFRC 
junta was in essence a struggle of civil society against the state … Only the 
press was in a position to articulate those interests on a consistent and 
daily basis” (Gordon 2004, 181, 191). The news they published was not simply 
44 Alpha Timbo, in an interview with the author, February 6, 2009, in Freetown Sierra Leone.
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a matter of propaganda; numerous journalists interviewed explained the 
steps they took to try to investigate before publishing. Journalists were a 
particular target of the junta, which wavered between an apparent desire 
for credibility by allowing a semblance of freedom of the press, and the 
even stronger desire for control and to punish anyone publishing critical 
news about them.
Drawn to activism by their profession
One of the targeted journalists was Jonathan Leigh who was working as a 
stringer for the independent Democrat newspaper at the time. His articles 
brought him such unsought notoriety that he had to wear a disguise when 
he went to a scene to report. As we were walking along one of Freetown’s 
typical over-crowded sidewalks on the way to my interview with him in a 
small café near his tiny, second floor newspaper off ice, I asked him why he 
had taken such chances to report the news during the AFRC occupation. 
He stopped, looked at me as if it was a dumb question: “I’m a journalist.”45
Leigh’s response nudged me to think more deeply about similar responses 
from activists I had interviewed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kenya. Though 
I had probably considered the idea before, it was now becoming more obvi-
ous that a whole range of professionals were drawn into human rights, 
pro-democracy activism not by any decision to be an “activist.” Rather, they 
were drawn into the role of activist, sometimes reluctantly, because of their 
profession. “This is our work,” said Phillip Neville, owner and founder of 
the Standard Times newspaper based in Freetown, who was beaten by the 
AFRC for his paper’s reporting. But like most other journalists interviewed, 
Neville also said he is an ardent supporter of democratic rule. “We stood 
f irm because of democracy. We had not wanted democracy to be inter-
rupted because we suffered for democracy to come into this country.” Like 
a number of others, he paid a high price for his dedication. “I was seriously 
beaten up [by the AFRC]. They took everything from me; and they burnt 
down my house.” He credits God for having survived.
Other examples of people drawn into an activist role through their 
profession were the attorneys who felt obliged to defend detainees who 
came to them for help. I met such attorneys in all three countries. In the 
broader concept of social movement developed in this book, this category 
45 Jonathan Leigh, in an interview with the author, February 13, 2009, in Freetown Sierra 
Leone.
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of sometimes reluctant activists – professionals drawn to activism because 
of their work, not through membership in a protest organization – plays an 
important part in the resistance. Yet such professionals are left out of most 
studies because they do not belong to a recognized resistance organization.
Mustapha Sesay, for example, was a journalist during the time of the 
AFRC. He nearly lost his life during the extreme violence by the rebels 
in January 1999. Asked why he continued his work under such dangerous 
conditions he said: “We are journalists. Besides, our nation was in crisis … 
And we also wanted to set a precedent. If the AFRC had succeeded we may 
have had two or three more coups after that. But it was because of the kind 
of resistance they had from the general public and the media – the journal-
ists who stood up against them – that the military system has become so 
unpopular in Sierra Leone.”46
As we settled into a booth at the café near his off ice, Leigh, in his typical 
journalistic approach, went straight to the point about his work and its 
dangers. When students organized a protest march August 18, 1997 that 
was violently broken up by police with several deaths reported, he donned 
a cap and dark glasses to hide his identity as he approached the march to 
report. “Police were looking for prominent anti-junta journalists. You don’t 
go very close to them [AFRC]. You keep your face down. I was scared, but 
I wanted to see what was going on.” Leigh was arrested in October 1997 
shortly after publishing his reports on a member of the junta being involved 
in the looting of a shop at night. According to his reporting, he said, “The 
‘boys’ working under him [the senior junta off icial] walked into the shop 
one night and stole items.”
I was arrested in the afternoon around 5. I was stripped of all my belong-
ings, blindfolded, and taken to [the house of the off icer of the junta he 
wrote about]. I was beaten with rif le butts [by the off icer] I sustained 
injuries on my head. [He was then taken to a military camp at Hill Station 
in Freetown.] We were treated very badly. One evening the soldiers came 
around and started to beat up everybody … We were there for some two 
weeks … I was given twelve lashes seriously with a stick. The place where 
we used to sleep was more like a dungeon. It was water-logged, moldy 
ground.47
46 Mustapha Sesay, in an interview with the author, February 11, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
47 Leigh interview.
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When Leigh was released he immediately left for his own safety to Gambia. 
He credits international media watchdog groups including the Commit-
tee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Sans Frontiéres (Reporters Without 
Borders), and the International Federation of Journalists with helping 
win the release of prominent local journalists who the AFRC detained. 
Leigh is convinced the independent reporting during the AFRC brutal 
regime helped bring about their demise by broadcasting the abuses of the 
regime. Ironically, Leigh was later detained by the restored, elected Kabbah 
government in 1999 for reporting the alleged excesses of a public off icial in 
“carrying out his duties.” He was “invited” to military headquarters. “I was 
locked up for three days.” He was not mistreated, he said. Later, he charges, 
some government security off icials “planted arms in the off ice.” As a result, 
he was again detained, this time for 18 days by the police. Then the state 
dropped the charges.
The reports [about the AFRC] had a lot of impact in restoration of de-
mocracy. If the papers had been all [pro]-junta at the time, it wouldn’t 
have been easy for [West African troops to intervene and chase the AFRC 
out of Freetown].The papers reported the bad things they were doing: 
the harassments, the looting. Those outside came to know they have to 
do something to restore democracy by what they were getting from the 
newspapers.48
Another journalist at the time, Abdul Dimoh Kposowa was writing for 
the Standard Times, hiding from the regime in a downtown apartment, 
now converted into a modest hotel, the site he chose for my interview 
with him. Occasionally he stopped talking as a hotel employee passed 
nearby, perhaps a habit developed during his time as an underground 
journalist. Kposowa shows me the scars still visible on the palm of one 
hand, a result of torture by the AFRC. “Every journalist was a target” 
except those who were pro-junta. When he was located and arrested 
after writing articles critical of the AFRC, they used a razor blade to tear 
off some of the skin on his palm and his feet. He was held temporarily 
in a large, steel shipping container, a common practice by the AFRC, 
then held for two weeks in the Pademba Road prison in Freetown before 
being released.
48 Leigh interview.
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Underground Resistance by Journalists
When the junta got tough on journalists, some of the journalists got clever. 
They changed their main off ice to “ghost” off ices, continuing operations in 
hiding. AFRC security personnel would show up and f ind the off ice open 
– but empty. Nearby, blending in with the street crowds, a secretary or mes-
senger would keep an eye on the off ice from a distance. If a friend showed 
up they would be guided to the real location where the paper continued 
being put together. When the AFRC-RUF junta began going after vendors 
of the papers, the vendors got clever, too, slipping the independent papers 
between the covers of pro-junta publications. Six journalists, including 
Jonathan Leigh, were arrested and tortured.49 The Sierra Leone Association 
of Journalists resisted AFRC “guidelines” and refused to support registration 
for newspapers. “Daring, courageous and ingenious though the independ-
ent media was in resistance to the AFRC-RUF, it survived because it was 
a part of a lager coalition opposed to the regime.” Even lack of material 
resources worked at times to the advantage of the resistance, providing a 
reverse twist on the resource mobilization theory as playing an important 
role in the success of social movements. Most of the press houses “lacked 
computers or phones and had to outsource their basic production of its 
copy.”50 “This resource disadvantage enabled journalists to operate in a 
clandestine manner; to be on the move and to escape being caught. It often 
became impossible to pin down exactly where the newspapers were being 
published since their stated off ices were just addresses in their imprints” 
(Gordon 2004, 188-91)
A Journalist with a “Revolutionary Fervor” for Democracy
Early in my stay in Freetown I heard about a veteran journalist who was 
active in all three periods of resistance I was studying, from Siaka Stevens 
days through the AFRC period: Olu Richie Awoonor Gordon, better known 
as simply Olu Gordon. His penname, according to a colleague, Frank 
Kposowa, was “Gatsby.” He was still an active journalist.51 His off ice was 
on the second f loor of a large home on a busy intersection not far from 
the city stadium where I trained with other runners from time to time. 
Gordon sat in an over-crowded, dimly lit off ice with windows facing the 
49 Gordon interview.
50 Gordon attributes this observation to a pamphlet by journalist Umaru Fofana (1999).
51 At the time of the interview he was editor of Peep magazine. 
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street, smoking as he talked. At f irst we just chatted, but he plunged rapidly 
into an account of the resistance of ordinary people in Sierra Leone to past 
repressive regimes. I realized that this was going to be much more than 
a get-acquainted encounter: this was the interview. I asked him to start 
over so I could tape the full interview. He ended up talking for nearly three 
hours, interrupted a few times by people who stopped by the off ice. At one 
point we watched together out the window as a school marching band led 
a hearse in a funeral parade. Later, across the busy intersection, a f low of 
uniformed primary school girls streamed out onto the street from their 
classrooms as their morning session ended.
Some of the journalists active during the AFRC-RUF occupation in 
1997 and 1998 such as Paul Kamara and Olu Gordon were among the most 
consistent opponents of authoritarian rule in the country – and among the 
most courageous. Kamara’s confrontation with the NPRC is described in a 
separate chapter. Gordon was a popular young faculty member at Fourah 
Bay College during the early 1980s when students were challenging the 
government; in 1985 he was expelled along with two other faculty members, 
Cleo Hanciles and Jimmy Kandeh.
We were branded as being radical but I don’t think we were doing any-
thing particularly illegal. We just happened to be close to the students. 
And we had a suspect political background. We’d been with The Tablet 
[an independent newspaper that challenged some of the policies of then 
President Siaka Stevens]. We’d been student radicals ourselves.52
Gordon was present at the two national conferences that pushed for the 
NPRC departure and for democratic elections. He criticized the AFRC and 
also the reinstalled Kabbah government which detained him brief ly in 
2005 for an article about corruption charges against a minister who was 
close to the president (Reporters without Borders, 2005). While continu-
ing to write critical articles about the junta, he was also involved in the 
planning for the student demonstration against the junta August 18, 
1997 that was brutally put down by junta security forces. By that time, 
police were watching the newspaper where he worked, at Kamara’s For 
Di People. But, in another example of the importance of minor actors and 
individual resistance, Gordon’s cousin, a local businessman, volunteered 
his house as a meeting place. His cousin said:  “Any way I can help I will.” 
It became a kind of war room for planning the peaceful student protest. 
52 Gordon interview.
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The day before the demonstration, we planned “assembly points, the 
banners, the posters …” in his cousin’s house. Police later suspected his 
cousin and killed him, Gordon said. “It was really the determination of 
the ordinary people to get rid of the military regime that really sustained 
what we did.”
Gordon was Secretary General of the Sierra Leone Association of Jour-
nalists (SLAJ) during the AFRC period. Two days after the coup, SLAJ 
issued a statement calling for the restoration of democracy. “They were 
arresting journalists [frequently].” At one point it fell to him to deliver 
a letter of protest to the junta leader over the arrest of journalist Kelvin 
Lewis.
I tried to get someone to do it; they wouldn’t do it. I had to go do it myself. 
It was scary because these guys were totally mad. A lot of them were on 
drugs half the time. You never knew what they were going to do. It was 
the longest walk from the [AFRC headquarters] gate to the mail room 
and back that I’ve ever taken. I was petrified. When I look back at some 
of the things I’ve done, I really think we were stupid. [laughs heartily]. 
I wouldn’t do them now. At the time we just took chances – we did what 
had to be done. And it had to be done.53
When Gordon died in 2011, there were many tributes published, including 
one which recounted an article he wrote in 1997 in For Di People soon after 
the AFRC called the RUF rebels to join them in the junta. Apparently to 
terrorize the population, the rebel soldiers caught and dismembered an 
alleged looter in Freetown. Gordon condemned the act, writing: “They have 
done this to put fear into us. Well, it won’t work. We will not fear them … 
The very symbol they have used to put fear into us is what we would use 
to mobilize people against them … They will go … ” The tribute noted that 
Gordon did not use a pseudonym on the article. “He signed it boldly, ‘By 
Olu Gordon’ … [T]hat was the essence of Olu Gordon, a relatively quiet man 
with a revolutionary fervor that appears to make him almost inviolable” 
(Hanciles 2011).
53 Gordon interview
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Radio Democracy: Psychological Warfare against the “Foot” of 
State
Evidence on the nonviolent resistance by civilians in Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Kenya to regime repression provides new insights on the theoretically 
murky question of how repression affects resistance – and how resistance 
affects repression. The cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, in particular, where 
repression was more severe than in Kenya, provide valuable information 
about what kind of resistance is possible under such conditions; what shape 
such resistance takes; and what kind of impact it may have. As horrific as the 
repression was under the AFRC in Sierra Leone during 1997-98, and under 
Samuel Doe in the 1980s in Liberia, it could have been worse. But in each 
of the three countries examined in this book, there was the naïve hope on 
the part of the regime rulers that they could gain international respect and 
credibility by adhering to at least the semblance of basic democratic and 
human rights principles. Yet in all three, the regimes were not consistent 
in this direction, periodically detaining, torturing, and killing perceived 
and actual civilian opponents.
In Sierra Leone, the AFRC-RUF repression did preclude most open 
demonstrations, although there were two notable ones, analyzed below. 
One additional form of resistance, a clandestine radio station, functioned 
outside the usual resistance-repression framework since the broadcasting 
took place outside the physical reach of the junta. It reflects the ability of a 
resistance movement to adapt its tactics according to the level of repression 
and how they are used against a regime. Had the broadcast station been 
located in Freetown or some other place under junta control, it could have 
been detected and destroyed.
Radio Democracy, as 98.1 FM became known,54 was established in July 
1997 by the ousted SLPP government of Kabbah, with financial support from 
the British and US governments. It was secretly located at the Nigerian-
guarded international airport at Lungi, across the wide bay from Freetown. 
It provided what in social movement terms is referred to as “cognitive libera-
tion,” a feeling that there is a way to change an unjust situation.55 Even if 
people recognize a situation as unjust, they may be reluctant to do anything 
about it. “In the absence of strong interpersonal links to others, people are 
likely to feel powerless to change conditions even if they perceived present 
54 98.1 continues today as an independent radio station based in Freetown.
55 The concept is developed, among other places, in McAdam (1999, 48-51)
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conditions as favorable to such efforts.” Such links provide the “information 
and perspective that others afford …” (McAdam, 1999, 48, 50).
A “Ray of Hope”
In any developing society, there are always interpersonal links, but the re-
pression of the junta made them more diff icult, especially since society was 
divided between opponents and supporters of the junta. Radio Democracy, 
however, provided indirect personal links to a broad invisible network of 
listeners; the broadcasts provided the “information and perspective” of 
others cited by McAdam. The broadcasts, a mix of propaganda against the 
regime, news, satire, and practical information on availability and location 
of market items, gave sympathetic listeners encouragement to not cooperate 
with the junta and to hang in there because the exiled government would 
return. “If someone is drowning and sees a thread, he will grab that thread 
hoping it will save him. People had lost hope … Radio Democracy was 
giving hope, that light, that ray of hope to people that all is not lost yet.”56 
For Sally Kamara, who was active in the Women’s Forum that had opposed 
the NPRC, listening to Radio Democracy reinforced her desire to outlast the 
AFRC ordeal. “When I heard it I was lifted.” She recalled that the broadcasts 
encouraged her to “stand f irm; that you should not give up. It would soon 
be f ine. The democratically elected government would soon be restored.”57
Julius Spencer, one of three people who ran the station with Hannah 
Foullah and Alie Bangura for the exiled government of President Kabbah, 
suggests the project accomplished two main tasks that helped drive out the 
rebels and bring back the democratic government:
1 It supported the nonviolent resistance movement against the junta. 
“It served as a rallying point for the resistance. Without the radio sta-
tion, I don’t think the resistance could have lasted long … The general 
public – their spirits were kept up and they retained the hope that the 
government would be restored.”
2 The nonviolent resistance of the junta, in turn, attracted international 
support and encouraged the military intervention that eventually 
ousted the rebels. “If the Sierra Leone population had cooperated with 
the junta there would not have been any real moral obligation on the 
part of the international community, including ECOMOG, to try to 
restore the government. The main reason that happened is because it 
56 Lewis interview.
57 Sally Kamara interview.
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was quite clear the junta did not have any popular support.” At the same 
time, the broadcasts “provided encouragement for the ECOMOG [West 
African] troops who by the time we arrived [July 1997] were becoming 
dispirited because of the kind of things that were being said about them 
on the radio, on television [by the junta].”58
Listening to Radio Democracy became a daily event for many Sierra Leone-
ans, but it was also dangerous. Several interviewees recounted a story of a 
woman in Freetown being shot when rebels found her listening to the station. 
Whether the story is accurate or not, the fact that it was spreading around 
made people cautious.59 “People had to hide to listen to Radio Democracy 
because if you are caught, you are as good as dead. Funnily, the military boys 
listened to Radio Democracy. I remember when we were locked up that night 
[at a military base]; one of them had his radio tuned to Radio Democracy.”60
Opponents of the exiled SLPP government saw Radio Democracy in a dif-
ferent light: It was “Enemy No. 1,” charged Paolo Bangura who served briefly 
in the AFRC cabinet. He argued that the station took advantage of the split in 
the AFRC between the remnants of the Sierra Leone Army and the RUF rebels 
to “create panic and mayhem” among civilians. “They [Radio Democracy] had 
moles at every level. They were really alarmists, urging people to stay home from 
work – warning them to stay home” or be considered collaborators.61 Spencer 
does not deny that Radio Democracy broadcast warnings to those who cooper-
ated with the junta. The government-supported station was intent on “instilling 
some fear in the ordinary people so they would not cooperate with the junta … 
simply by letting them know the government [in exile] was going to come back 
… and anybody who cooperates with the junta was going to be seen as having 
collaborated.” After the Kabbah government returned there were a number of 
revenge killings against suspected collaborators, but Radio Democracy urged 
citizens to not engage in that, Spencer said. Bangura also charged that some 
broadcasts pinpointed rebel activity and that subsequently Nigerians bombed 
those areas causing civilian deaths. Spencer did not deny this:
That’s possible; that’s possible. Civilians were killed on all sides. There 
were more civilians killed by missiles f ired by the junta themselves. 
58 Spencer interview.
59 Alie (2006, 182) writes that “many Sierra Leoneans caught listening to the radio lost their 
lives” but mentions no sources to support the statement.
60 Lewis interview. He was detained as an independent journalist and tortured at a military 
barracks.
61 Bangura interview.
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Basically what the radio station was doing was giving information. Also, 
in a way, trying to destabilize the junta. That was part of the strategy, to 
try to destabilize them. So we’d talk about things that they were doing. 
And when we got the information we would immediately put it out.
Invisible Networks Supporting Social Movements in Repressive 
Settings
Most social movement literature stresses “public” challenges to authorities. 
But in repressive settings, public challenges can be suicidal. This book 
argues that a more flexible approach to social movement theory is necessary 
to describe what happens in dangerous circumstances. In Kenya, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone, non-public networks of activists supported social move-
ments when the state was too repressive for open ones. In the case of Radio 
Democracy, Journalist Kelvin Lewis identif ied a complex but secretive 
network of people in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 
which gathered news for Radio Democracy.62
This [MRD] was just a group opposed to the junta and the rebels, a group 
which professed to f ight for the return of democracy; guys who didn’t 
support the soldiers. You had students, you had police off icers who had 
run away; you had soldiers who had joined the other side; you had civil-
ians … There was an organization; there was a leader … These guys would 
scout around during the day and then in the evening they would wait for 
the call from Ali Bangura [who] would call, ask them what is the news.63
Three citizens in Freetown – two businessmen and a member of the govern-
ment’s security team – developed networks of informants and reported 
to Bangura.64 The broadcasts were a mix of propaganda, psychological 
62 In an interview, Spencer said he invented the name of the group. Hannah Foullah added that 
the network included various organizations, including a youth movement. Gberie (2005, 108) 
calls the MRD a “nationwide resistance … which incorporated almost all the pressure groups 
and civil organisations plus the [armed] Kamajor and the northern-based [armed] Kapras, a 
very anti-RUF group. The latter two groups came together to form a stronger, more diversif ied 
[Civil Defense Force] force to oppose the AFRC.”
63 Lewis interview.
64 Spencer identif ied the three; a local journalist identif ied several other Sierra Leoneans in 
Freetown who were key informants in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The 
author decided not to identify any of these individuals because he did not interview them to 
obtain their permission. 
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warfare, and news. Sometimes informants provided negative reports against 
individuals as part of a personal vendetta. “We were not in a position to 
cross check or verify anything that we put out.”65 In the effort to destabilize 
the regime, Radio Democracy broadcasters announced when the top AFRC 
off icials were meeting and where, sometimes causing those at the meeting 
to run away for fear of possible bombing by the Nigerian forces. AFRC forces 
searched in vain for the station but never found it.
A Nonviolent Woman “Warrior”
Hannah Foullah was a key player in the nonviolent part of the resistance to 
the AFRC. She was studying history and sociology at Fourah Bay College in 
Freetown when the rebels seized the city in May 1997. When she fled with 
a relative to Guinea she met Julius Spencer and Ali Bangura who wanted 
to set up a clandestine radio station to support resistance to the AFRC and 
help destabilize the regime. Hannah had read about Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and also followed African politics. “I just felt this is an opportunity I have 
to serve my own country. I decided Ok let me take it up. They said it would 
just take two weeks. Two weeks ended up being 9 months [laughing].”66
The “station” was set up in a tent protected by sandbags a few meters 
from the airstrip at the international airport in Lungi, across the bay from 
Freetown where the AFRC was based. But the rebels had troops in the 
area and, the third day after the radio team arrived, rebels bombarded the 
airport which was being defended by Nigerian troops under direction of 
ECOMOG. “I was so scared. This battle went on for … days.” On another 
occasion a snake slipped into their broadcast tent. “They had to dismantle 
all the sandbags and everything and eventually killed the snake. For a long 
time I didn’t want to go in there but you had to do the work. We used to eat 
the rations the soldiers were eating: eh, it was terrible.”
Their contacts were impressive. Hannah said they even had the number 
of the AFRC commander, Johnny Paul Koroma. “We would call him and 
say we wanted to talk to him and say: “Don’t you know that people don’t 
want you [laughing].” They broadcast over the same wavelength as the 
state radio. “So it meant that people put their radio on the frequency 99.9 
[the state radio channel] they would get 98.1. So that was really brilliant. 
65 Spencer interview.
66 Hannah Foullah, in an interview with the author, December 10, 2008, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone.
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I really enjoyed that [laughing].” When the AFRC jammed the broadcasts, 
they increased the power of the signal and continued with the programs. 
Hannah particularly appreciated the broadcasts by Ali Bangura who used 
humor and ridicule against the junta members. A decade after her months as 
a nonviolent warrior for restoration of democracy and human rights enough 
people recalled her contributions to the resistance to suggest I interview 
her. I f inally located her where she was working in a bank. I asked her what 
she thought of her work as a wartime radio broadcaster.
It helped people in terms of their, how do you say, resilience. I think it 
would have been very easy to just back down, you know. But because we 
were on air it strengthened the resolve of the people to continue resisting 
the Junta. Otherwise it would have been very diff icult because they didn’t 
have food; schools were not in session, a lot of bad things were happening. 
So it was diff icult.
Dangerous Marches
Students had played a key role in the resistance to President Siaka Stevens, 
especially during the 1977 demonstrations which began at Fourah Bay Col-
lege and spread across the country. They had challenged Steven’s handpicked 
successor President Momoh in the late 1980s and up to the time of the NPRC 
coup in 1992. Once again they surfaced as a contentious force on August 
18, 1997, when they and others staged one of the few overt demonstrations 
against the AFRC regime in a dangerous “march for democracy.”67 The 
march had two purposes:
First was to tell the military: You know what? We don’t believe in “jun-
taism.” You guys shouldn’t come and destroy the democratic process. 
And secondly, the demonstration was to send a clear signal that Sierra 
Leoneans were resolved it needed the support of the international com-
munity to ensure that democracy was restored.68
67 Amnesty International 1997.
68 Abdulai Bayraytay, in an interview with the author, April 28, 2009, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
Bayraytay in that year was secretary general of the National Union of Sierra Leonean Students 
but was out of the country when the march took place. 
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Journalist Lewis, reporting for the Voice of America, was spotted and ar-
rested the day of the march.69 He was beaten with a machete then locked 
overnight in a freight container at the military headquarters before being 
released the next day. His colleague Jonathan Leigh, wearing a disguise of 
cap and dark glasses to escape detection by police, managed to report on 
the march.70 The AFRC had warned the students not to proceed with the 
march, which also involved trade unionists and market women; the junta 
forces broke up the march with live ammunition and tear gas.71 At least 
six students were killed, many others injured, and more than 120 people, 
mostly students, were arrested on August 18 and 19.72 The AFRC accused 
students of being armed, a charge denied by then Student Union President 
Maclean Thomas: “We have never used AK-47 rifles to demonstrate against 
the junta because we believe in the ideals of Martin Luther King Jr. by using 
nonviolent means for our voices to be heard by the whole world” (Global 
Nonviolent Action Database, 2011).
Marching on the Rebel Leader’s Home: “We Shall Overcome”
Nigerian and other ECOMOG West African troops drove the AFRC junta 
out of Freetown in early February 1998. President Kabbah returned from 
exile in Guinea March 10. In 1999 in an attempt to end the war with Foday 
Sankoh’s RUF, he invited Sankoh to join his government, awarding him a 
position more or less equivalent to vice president. But in May 2000, there 
were rumors that Sankoh was planning a coup. The same week that the final 
ECOMOG troops left Sierra Leone, the RUF kidnapped some 500 UN troops 
and began advancing toward Freetown.73 This prompted two large marches 
on the home of RUF leader Sankoh who was still living in Freetown. The first 
march, led by women, was peaceful; the second, led mostly by men, was not.
The f irst march, held on May 6, 2000, was organized by the Women’s 
Forum. Still energized from their campaign against the NPRC, the women 
were well organized. Some women planned to strip as a traditional protest, 
69 Lewis interview.
70 Leigh interview. 
71 Early in my stay in Sierra Leone, Amy Challe, then an employee of the United States embassy, 
told me she had participated in the march. It was not until later that I came to appreciate how 
dangerous a march it had been.
72 Amnesty International 1997.
73 Joe A.D. Alie, in an interview with the author, May 5, 2009, in his off ice as Head of the 
Department of History and African Studies at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
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something Kenyan mothers did in a protest to free political prisoners, but 
others, including Shirley Gbujama, who had chaired the two national 
conferences during the NPRC period, counseled against that. She asked 
the women to not be confrontational. Convincing women to participate 
was not easy. Sankoh’s home was guarded by ECOMOG forces, and Sankoh 
and his rebels at the house were also well armed. A senior police off icer had 
told Gbujama that Sankoh’s forces planned to shoot anyone who went to his 
home in Freetown. Gbujama estimated there were some 500 women “from 
all over,” including market women, political leaders and teachers. She and 
a smaller group of women went ahead of the main group.
We came up singing “We Shall Overcome” [she sang it on my balcony 
during the interview]. If we had come in confrontation they would have 
killed us. We had a loud speaker. Marie Bob-Kandeh [a market women 
organizer] read a statement asking him to get his people to lay down 
their arms.74
Sankoh responded by shouting insults out the window and “threatened 
bloodshed. His men were giving signs of amputation and cutting throats,” 
Gbujama recalled, not empty gestures given the RUF record of having done 
that. But no shots were f ired. Things were quite different two days later 
during a march on his house organized by the Civil Society Movement, 
with participation from the Labour Congress. The march was massive, 
comprising a range of civil society, including men and women, boys and 
girls, political leaders and others. “The groups were peaceful – singing and 
chanting, but the RUF was uneasy; they felt irritated.”75 But then things 
turned deadly: shots were f ired. “That led to commotion and 21 people of the 
civil society group lost their lives on that day. Civil society was unarmed.”76 
When the women had approached the house two days earlier, ECOMOG 
troops stayed in place between the women and Sankoh’s house; when shots 
were f ired on the second march, the only ECOMOG force, a tank, was driven 
away down a hill.77
74 Gbujama interview. 
75 Nana Pratt, in an interview with the author, February 6, 2009, in Freetown Sierra Leone. 
Dr. Pratt was a lecturer at Fourah Bay College and a member of the Mano River Union Women 
Peace Network (MARWOPNET), which sought a negotiated end to the war. 
76 Ayesha Kamara, in an interview with the author, January 28, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. Historian Alie puts the number of killed at the site at “about twenty” (Alie 2006, 200).
77 Tejan Kassim, a Labour Congress off icial at the time, in an interview with the author, April 
17, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
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In the morning we collected some of the dead. It was not a sight to see: 
young people [dead]. Women were killed also, women and men. All of 
them were unarmed. There was a girl 21 years old; she had just plaited 
her hair: beautiful girl. She was shot twice; one in the head, one in the 
chest. She died holding Foday Sankoh’s gate. We found her holding that 
gate in the morning, dead, the next morning, about 7 o’clock when we 
went to collect the dead. She came from around Mountain Court East 
[in Freetown].78
In the confusion, Sankoh managed to escape. He was caught in Freetown 
ten days later (Alie 2006, 201) He was arrested and in March 2003 indicted, 
along with three of his top commanders, by a UN-sponsored Special Court 
in Freetown on crimes including “murder, sexual slavery and rape, forced 
conscription of children and attacks on UN peacekeepers.”79 He died in 
custody four months later of a stroke. In June 2002, he said in one of his 
last court hearings: “I’m a god. I’m the inner god. I’m the leader of Sierra 
Leone.”80
Final Orgy of Violence: “We Thought We Would All Be Dead”
If one wanted to assess just how much violence it takes to stop nonviolent 
resistance, the return of the rebels to Freetown January 6, 1999 in an orgy of 
violence that halted all nonviolent resistance would be an example. For more 
than two weeks, the violence that engulfed the capital was overwhelming, 
as Human Rights Watch (1999) reported:
Civilians were gunned down within their houses, rounded up and mas-
sacred on the streets, thrown from the upper f loors of buildings, used 
as human shields, and burned alive in cars and houses. They had their 
limbs hacked off with machetes, eyes gouged out with knives, hands 
smashed with hammers, and bodies burned with boiling water. Women 
and girls were systematically sexually abused, and children and young 
people abducted by the hundreds … While there was some targeting of 
particular groups, such as Nigerians, police off icers, journalists, and 
78 Kassim interview.
79 United Nations news release, July 30, 2003.
80 Associated Press, July 30, 2003. Another news release on his death is by the United Nations, 
July 30. 2003. 
144 RiPPles of HoPe
church workers, the vast majority of atrocities were committed by rebels 
who chose their victims apparently at random.
Human Rights Watch (1999) also reported that the senior government pa-
thologist registered burials of 7,335 corpses from the January invasion. The 
attackers used massive human shields to inf iltrate the city and hide from 
Nigerian counterattacks. Keen (2005, 1) said the attackers “killed around 
6,000 people, raping women and girls, before retreating with thousands of 
boys and girls they had captured. Contrary to most accounts, Keen argued 
that “the majority of attackers were associated with the Sierra Leonean 
army, in particular the faction linked to the May 1997 junta but unable to 
f ind a place in the reconstituted army under Kabbah.”
Voice of America journalist Kelvin Lewis was one of the independent 
journalists targeted by the attackers. “A lot of journalists were killed … They 
were definitely targeted. Myself I was targeted. They came for me; they asked 
for me. My house was one of those torched. I was in the house with my whole 
family. We had to leap over two walls to escape.” The family escaped execution 
when one of the boys among them recognized a young attacker with whom 
he had gone to school; the boy told his fellow attackers to leave them alone.81
In less than two weeks “nearly 100,000 people were driven from their 
homes.” many found refuge in the National Stadium, but Human Rights 
Watch (1999) reported that the attackers massacred people gathered for 
safety in some mosques and other public sites. Within three weeks the Ni-
gerians had driven the rebels out of Freetown at a loss of some 700 Nigerian 
soldiers. “Overall [in the war] Nigerian losses in Sierra Leone are reckoned 
to have been over 1,000 killed and several thousand wounded, which is to 
say that more Nigerian troops died f ighting the RUF than did soldiers of the 
Sierra Leone Army, which often collaborated with the rebels throughout 
the conflict” (Gberie 2005, 130-32).
International Interventions: A Nigerian Dictator Helps Restore 
Democracy
The war continued after Kabbah returned March 10, 1998, and the junta 
had been driven out of Freetown. Kabbah initiated treason trials of sixty 
people who were members of the junta or “junta collaborators.” Almost 
all who had not been executed were freed by rebels in their brief return 
81 Lewis interview.
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to Freetown in January 1999. Twenty-one soldiers, including one woman, 
were convicted of treason and killed by f iring squad October 19, 1998 at a 
public execution on a beach in Freetown. Amnesty International (1998) 
condemned the executions as “deplorable.” The Amnesty statement noted: 
“The court martial allowed no right of appeal against conviction or sentence 
to a higher jurisdiction, in violation of international standards for a fair 
trial.”
International reactions to the AFRC coup in May 1997 had been swift 
and unif ied. “By early July 1997 the new military government had become 
completely isolated by the international community” (Clapham 1997, 907). 
The Commonwealth suspended Sierra Leone. The Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) called upon its members to “abstain from 
transacting any business” with Sierra Leone. The United Nations followed 
with a British-sponsored resolution of sanctions against the country. The 
embargos were aimed at stopping the flow of business and weapons that 
could be used to prop up the junta. Nigerian troops, dispatched under the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) extended the embargo to rice as 
well, however, leaving people scrambling to f ind food and depending more 
on locally grown crops.
Nigerian troops initially arrived in Sierra Leone prior to the AFRC coup 
under a bilateral agreement to help implement the earlier peace accord 
with rebels. But when the rebels seized power in May 1997, Nigerian head 
of state General Sani Abacha “vowed to overturn the coup and reinstate 
his friend Kabbah.” This put the head of a “brutal and obdurate military 
regime” in the position of defending a democratic regime.82 During their 
time in Sierra Leone, ECOMOG troops, essentially the Nigerians, bombed 
and strafed civilian areas of Freetown and other parts of the country in an 
attempt to drive out the junta military, causing many civilian casualties 
(Gberie 2005, 112-13).
After the f inal orgy of violence by the Sierra Leone Army and the RUF in 
January 1999, a peace treaty was signed in Lomé, Togo July 7, 1999 between 
Kabbah and the RUF. But hostilities still continued. In December 1999, the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone troops began arriving from India, 
Kenya, Jordan, Zambia, and Bangladesh. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops 
left by May 2000. The same week RUF forces took hostage some 500 UN 
troops upcountry, killing several in the process. A small British force arrived 
82 Spencer interview. Spencer added: “[Abacha] had met President Kabbah at some conference. 
Somehow they struck some kind of friendship and because of that he was willing to support the 
government to be restored … The move to drive the AFRC out was mainly Nigerian”.
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to help the UN mission troops. The captured UN troops were released in 
July with the intervention of Charles Taylor of Liberia. In August 2000, a 
small group of AFRC soldiers kidnapped some British soldiers but they were 
rescued by British troops (Alie 2006, 200). The war was off icially declared 
over by Kabbah January 18, 2002. Kabbah was reelected in May 2002.
Implications of the Noncooperation with a Military Junta
I’m not sure the AFRC would have been removed simply through noncooperation. 
But the noncooperation inspired other actions that resulted in their being removed.
Julius Spencer83
The immediate and widespread noncooperation campaign against the 
AFRC rendered the country ungovernable and provided the international 
community an open door for economic and military intervention. Had 
the population danced in the streets and welcomed the junta the way so 
many people did in 1992 when an earlier military group seized power, there 
would have been little reason for intervention from the outside. The mas-
sive noncooperation was unprecedented in the country’s history, despite 
years of repressive regimes. The 1997 coup came less than a year after the 
democratic election of a president, an election which followed years of 
autocratic, single-party rule then four years of military rule. People were 
not necessarily united behind President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, but they 
were generally united against another military junta.
Civilians expressed this sentiment in a variety of nonviolent ways: teach-
ers and labor went on an extended strike which shut down schools across 
the country; civil servants and many other employees stopped going to 
work; many shops and businesses, including most banks, closed. Thousands 
of others emigrated, most to Guinea where the government was in exile. A 
clandestine propaganda/news radio station (Radio Democracy) of the exiled 
government became a popular link that encouraged people to persevere. 
Some independent journalists continued writing critical articles as the 
junta wavered between seeking legitimacy with the semblance of a free 
press and cracking down on dissent.
In terms of social movement theories, this was an example of how it 
is important to broaden the typical (Western-origin) concept of what a 
83 Spencer interview.
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movement is. For example, while the severe repression usually discouraged 
overt demonstrations – there were a few, and they met with violence – 
there was widespread individual resistance. To overlook such resistance 
for not f itting neatly into the limited parameters of a movement would be 
to miss a key part of the resistance that led to the eventual ouster of the 
junta. Individual actions as well as organizational resistance played a role. 
Attorney Abdul Tejan-Cole noted it this way: “Everybody realized that 
something was not in their best interest. And everybody individually knew 
what they had to do, which ended up collectively being the right thing.”84
In one of the poorest countries in the world, the line between organiza-
tional activism and individual activism merits attention. When an organiza-
tion is so small and underfunded it may not be able to offer an activist any 
protection, training, materials, or other support. This study considers such 
activists as individual and not organizational and would include journalists 
from the typically small newspapers in Freetown. It would also include 
attorneys who courageously stepped forward to represent clients detained 
by the junta. Such attorneys, acting at a time when their bar association was 
generally quiet, were acting as individuals. The masses of individuals who 
stayed home, surviving on shared food or meager incomes from continuing 
petty market sales or remittances from family abroad, were also acting 
as individuals. But the sum of their resistance was a collective resistance 
that stripped the junta of claims of good governance and legitimacy. With 
regard to women, the war and resistance and responsibilities “gave women 
conf idence in themselves. That has had a positive effect on our women 
nationwide … the war helped liberate women. Future government should 
be aware: women are stronger.’85
There were linkages and coordination among individuals and organiza-
tions involved in the resistance. Some were open such as the meetings 
and statements by such organizations as the Sierra Leone Association of 
Journalists, the Labour Congress, and the Teachers Union. Other connec-
tions were not visible. Instead they took the form of clandestine meetings 
and conversations, the passing of coded messages. Radio Democracy played 
an important role in linking together those in the resistance, encouraging 
them, informing them, and also warning them to not cooperate with the 
junta or be labeled collaborators.
Thus the resistance that took place is an example of both a social move-
ment and a nonviolent resistance movement; in fact they were both. The 
84 Tejan-Cole interview.
85 Shellac Davies interview.
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academic divisions between the two concepts are unnecessary in such 
cases. This case study also deepens our understanding of the social move-
ment concept of “opportunity.” For the most part, the resistance that took 
place occurred with no perceivable “opportunity” or external, exogenous 
conditions that would naturally encourage a movement. Thus the study 
supports f indings elsewhere that repression can stimulate resistance. The 
case of the AFRC also supports the argument that such resistance is possible 
in a very poor society with very limited material resources. Above all, the 
resistance movement against the AFRC is an example of the importance of 
agency, of individuals and members of organizations taking actions despite 
several “structural” barriers (namely the repression). At its extreme, as in 
January 1999, the repression shut down the resistance. But at most other 
times, the nonviolent resistance continued in one form or another.
Part two
Liberia
Figure 5  Saxophone player in a public event in Monrovia, Liberia, 2006
Photo by Betty Press
Figure 6  Coffee house in the northern city of Ganta, Liberia, 2006
Photo by Betty Press
5 Nonviolent Resistance in Abeyance1
Courageous Dissent
Baccus Matthews was hard to f ind. Nearly three decades after he led a 
mass protest against the government in 1979 that panicked the regime and 
showed its weakness, a weakness preyed upon in a successful military coup 
the next year, Matthews had become almost invisible. “I think he lives over 
there,” said one interviewee, pointing toward some old, modest apartment 
buildings in downtown Monrovia, the capital. No one seemed to have his 
phone number. Then during one of my interviews in the city, a young man 
came into the office to f ix the air conditioner. I asked his name. “Matthews,” 
he said. I told him I was looking for Baccus Matthews. “That’s my uncle.” he 
replied and gave me his number. It was important to f ind Baccus Matthews. 
He had showed how one person can nearly topple a government. It took 
some more research, some more theorizing, and some reconceptualizing 
of traditional social movement theory to get a clear f ix on his contribution 
to a key social movement and to regime change in Liberia.
This chapter examines two periods of nonviolent resistance in Liberia: 
(1) the 1970s when social movements functioned openly; (2) the years 
Samuel Doe was head of state (1980-90), when there was often an abey-
ance of open social movements due to the extreme repression but some 
nonviolent resistance continued in various forms.2 The current chapter 
begins with some background on resistance in Liberia in earlier years, 
especially by journalists. Later there were many brave individuals who 
resisted the Doe regime, often as part of their profession, such as Ken-
neth Best, editor of the independent Daily Observer and a small number of 
lawyers who challenged the regime’s pretense at legality. From time to time 
there were mass demonstrations, usually put down with violence. Under 
Doe, especially in his later years in off ice, there was little in the way of 
organizational resistance because of the risks. Statements by a few daring 
members of the clergy were the exceptions. Because of the repression, the 
traditional concept of an organized social movement with members and 
1 As noted in the theory chapter, a resistance in abeyance in this study refers to resistance 
limited in scope because of repression, when it is too dangerous to have a central or formal 
organization or organizations. Later, when it is safer, the resistance may resume more openly 
and in a more organized fashion.
2 The second of two chapters on Liberia focuses on the Taylor presidency period (1997-2003) 
when a social movement was able to mount a campaign of nonviolent resistance.
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mass demonstrations usually was not possible. It was simply too danger-
ous. In a period of abeyance, waiting for safer times, activists and others 
determined to push for democracy and human rights, managed to engage 
in some nonviolent resistance. It involved a variety of tactics, individuals, 
small groups, and on occasion mass participation, which f its the broader 
model of a social movement as presented in the theory chapter of this book.
The so-called “Rice Riots” of 1979 that Matthews organized against a 
government plan to raise the price of rice, a staple in Liberia, were the 
culmination of a decade of testing the waters of “democracy” by a non-
violent social movement. They were led by two organizations: Matthew’s 
Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), and the Movement for Justice in Africa 
(MOJA). They served as a model for later nonviolent social movements in 
Liberia (Weah 2013). During the 1970s they and others pushed the envelope 
on pluralism after more than 100 years of concentrated power in the hands 
of black emigrants from the US, most of whom were former slaves.3 The 
regime Matthews challenged with his protest in 1979 evoked such a pan-
icked reaction from the government that from then on it was just a matter 
of time before someone would take advantage of this weakness and seize 
power, as elements of the military did about one year later.
The military government, the f irst to be led by an indigenous Liberian, 
raised hopes of inclusion. “There was an ecstatic rejoicing of many tribal 
people that a new order had arrived in which there would be a dramatic and 
immediate reversal of fortunes between the discredited Americo-Liberians 
and the oppressed tribal people. This was followed by a sober reawakening” 
(Liebenow 1987, 191). The new regime of Samuel Doe did not broaden partici-
pation, relying instead on his ethnic minority, the Krahn. In a presidential 
election in 1985 described variously as “controversial” (Dunn 2009, 146), 
and “thoroughly fraudulent” (Ellis 2012, 63) that was full of irregularities, 
Doe predictably won, edging out four opponents with 50.9 percent of the 
vote (Libenow 1987, 296). This was followed shortly by an unsuccessful 
military coup, after which the regime unleashed such barbaric repression 
that it stif led the formation of any cohesive, nonviolent social movement. 
During this abeyance in social movements in Liberia from late 1985 to 1990, 
when Doe was assassinated in a civil war, some individual activists and 
small groups bravely continued their resistance despite the dangers that 
included detention in horrible conditions, torture, execution, and burning 
3 Liberian political scientist D. Elwood Dunn (2013) prefers not to use the term “slaves” but 
“black American emigrants,” because not all new world blacks were former slaves and because 
he considers the term slaves to be pejorative. 
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of newspaper offices. Some lawyers, academics, journalists, clergy, students, 
and others, nevertheless, continued to challenge the regime.
A History of Authoritarianism and Resistance
From 1822-67, more than 11,000 black Americans emigrated to what became 
Liberia: of that some 4,500 were born free; the rest had been emancipated 
(Liebenow, 19) on condition that they emigrate to Africa (Moran 2006, 2). 
They were funded by the American Colonization Society, former masters, 
and state legislatures. The reasons behind the funding were often far from 
altruistic.
Slave owners saw repatriation as a means of removing unwelcome ex-
amples of independent, self-supporting free blacks from the view of their 
slaves. Some white abolitionists who felt slavery as an institution was 
immoral were nevertheless uncomfortable with the prospect of actually 
living in a multiracial society (Moran 2006, 2).
The American blacks were joined by 1860 by nearly six thousand Africans 
freed by the US Navy from slave ships. With f inancial backing and sup-
port from the US Navy in “resisting tribal and European threats to the 
life of the colony,” the emigrants soon developed a hierarchical system 
among themselves and a dominant political and economic position with 
regard to the indigenous population (Libenow 1987, 20-21, 19).4 “Like Sierra 
Leone, Liberia began its existence both as a haven created by humanitarian 
interests for black men unwanted in a white country and as a means for 
the introduction of Christian civilization to the aboriginal African … In the 
case of Liberia, however, the direction of the American Colonization Society 
seems to have assumed the eventual establishment of local self-government 
patterned after American models” (July 2004, 86, 90). This didn’t happen, 
however, resulting in a paradox from the beginning (Liebenow 1987, 1, 5-6): 
“Till the bitter end … the central political core of the Americo-Liberian elite 
attempted to hold tight to the reins of power and to reap a disproportionate 
share of the benefits of economic growth.” The emigrants’ world along the 
coast was in many ways cut off from the interior and its population right 
up to the 1980 coup, as Dunn notes (2013):
4 The so-called Americo-Liberians who were born free in the United States formed the “upper 
echelons” of the system (Libenow 1987, 19).
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Liberia was born an enclave state in context of the world of the 19th 
century. The state was initially for black settlers, opening only gradually 
to assimilated indigenous people. The enclave state began expansion 
into the hinterland at start of the 20th century … The struggle was then 
initiated regarding how to blend two world views and two (or perhaps 
three) cultures [African, Islamic, and Western]. That struggle is with us 
today in 2013.
Against this authoritarian, hierarchical rule, there is evidence of a long 
history of nonviolent resistance, especially among journalists who sparred 
with the various one-party regimes to try to establish and maintain some 
degree of freedom of the press. In the early 1900s, governments passed a 
series of restrictions on press freedom, including “sweeping restrictions 
on free expression in 1916” (Burrowes 2004, 154, 158). But independent 
journalists challenged the government with published dissent, including 
by the Rev. James Emmanuel Padmore, editor of the Bensenville Whip; J.I.A. 
Weeks, of the Crozierville Observer; and the outspoken Albert Porte (1906-
86). “Despite having been sued, threatened, and detained without trial on 
countless occasions by off icials in various administrations, Porte remained 
active” in his resistance to authoritarian regimes through his publications 
in various newspapers (119). In hard economic periods when newspapers 
were sometimes unable to continue printing, Porte resorted to distribut-
ing pamphlets challenging the governments on various points, including 
expansion of power by the executive branch. During the rule of President 
William V.S. Tubman (1944-71) journalists and others “began to experience 
very serious reversals, in the form of persistent and unrelenting assaults on 
press freedom, freedom of speech and even political pluralism” (Best 1997, 
49). In 1944 Porte was convicted of sedition “after he criticized the terms of 
payment negotiated with an American iron mining company” (Burrowes 
2004, 271). At the same time, “as the storm of the cold war gathered,” the 
United States drew closer to Liberia “in support of its policy of containing 
communism (Dunn 2009, 187).
Tubman’s successor, William R. Tolbert (1971-80) “immediately began 
liberalizing the political atmosphere” (Best 1997, 52). But Tolbert was 
ambivalent about his stated intentions to pursue reform. He reacted to the 
growing criticism of his regime in this new political atmosphere. In 1975, 
for example, when the four editors of The Revelation, a monthly publication 
by university students, criticized some of his policies, he had them arrested 
and heavily f ined. From that point on, there was “not a single independent 
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newspaper left in the country” (Best 1997, 53).5 Nevertheless, Porte continued 
his critical writings. In one of his pamphlets, “Thoughts on Change,” Porte 
(1977) wrote of the Tolbert administration: “The rule by decree method as-
sumes the ‘papa knows best’ attitude and however dramatic the results may 
be, is in contrast to the somewhat slower, f irmer participatory democratic 
process.”6 He also wrote in “Explaining Why” (1976):
I am not afraid. I think it is better to be open, frank, and speak the truth 
as I see it rather than be flattering, deceitful and underhanded. I believe 
with every f iber of my being that the pen is more powerful than the 
sword, that God stands by truth and that the truth crushed to earth 
shall rise again.
When Porte took on the Tolbert regime in the mid-1970s, he was taken to 
court on libel charges by Stephen Allen Tolbert (President Tolbert’s brother), 
whom Porte had charged with corruption. When Porte was heavily f ined, 
a “spontaneous outpouring of public support for the defendant [Porte] led 
to the creation of what was arguably the f irst real Liberian civil society 
organization, Citizens of Liberia in Defense of Albert Porte (COLIDAP)” 
(Pham 2006, 79). It was more than a protest on behalf of Porte, as Dunn 
and Holsoe (1985, 141-2) note. The protest “was transformed before long 
into a veritable public outcry against the excesses of a government off icial 
with presidential connections.” For his part, President Tolbert faced the 
challenge of balancing an expansion of political participation with main-
taining stability; a complicated balance Huntington (1968) warns requires 
a combination of order and development of a viable political party system. 
“Hence minimizing the likelihood of political instability resulting from the 
expansion of political consciousness and involvement requires the creation 
of modern political institutions, i.e., political parties, early in the process 
of modernization” (399).
5 Elwood Dunn (2013) notes, however, that there were a number of other publications at 
the time, including at the University of Liberia the University Spokesman, and The Revelation, 
produced by PAL.
6 I read these documents in the Albert Porte Memorial Library, Paynesville, Liberia, near 
Monrovia which has a collection of his writings. In a brief meeting in July 2006 with his widow, 
Bertha Porte, in her home on the outskirts of Monrovia, she sat on her bed in a checked red and 
white dress, her white hair pulled back in a bun. Of her husband’s courageous publishing career 
she said: “I encouraged him.” 
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Cultural Restraints on Resistance?
In Liberia, as in Sierra Leone and Kenya, one might ask why it took the larger 
“civil society” (a term that generally came into use in Liberia during the 
study period) so long to rebel or resist. Focusing on Liberia, Yoder (2003, 4) 
suggests that the culture of Liberians argued against democracy and human 
rights. In addition to the obvious fear of reprisals from authoritarian rulers, 
“Liberian political culture places an excessively high emphasis on order and 
stability while tolerance, accountability, and innovation are afforded too 
little importance. This imbalance has been a key contributor to Liberia’s lack 
of progress toward a liberal and democratic society.” Yoder adds that “[e]ven 
the pamphleteer Albert Porte, perhaps Liberia’s most persistent political 
critic aff irmed the concept of the big man who provides justice and order. 
Porte did not envision a society without privilege or big people. He just 
wanted the privileged and powerful to be upright and generous” (45-6), an 
argument that seems contrary to Porte’s own writings.7 Sawyer, Wesseh, 
and Avjavo (2000, 11) observed: “The Liberian state evolved as a patrimonial 
state dominated by the settler oligarchy for about a century and a half.” 
They add that the culture has been marked by “[v]alues of social tolerance, 
commitment to dialogue, and a predisposition to handle disputes through 
peaceful means – including striking compromises and reaching consensus.”
A quite different interpretation of Liberia’s history is offered by Liberian po-
litical scientist Elwood Dunn (2013), who argues strongly against the prevailing 
black colonialism version of Liberian history in favor of what he terms “more 
than a century of struggle for political and cultural unification in Liberia 
… Even in darkness there are moments when some light breaks through. 
Liberia remains an experiment in black self-government.” And responding 
to arguments that the Liberian culture limits dissent, anthropologist Mary 
Moran (2006, 35, 155) argues that Liberians have a long record of dissent.
Unfortunately, the obsession with secret hierarchies on the part of 
anthropologists and the insistence on patrimonialism, old and “neo,” by 
the political scientists combine to leave us with a view of this region of 
Africa as hopelessly unsuitable for “democracy” or any system emphasiz-
ing broad participation and protection of individual rights … To limit 
the discussion to “big men” and “small boys” in patron-client relations 
is to fail to account for generations who have dedicated their lives (and 
sometimes lost them) in the cause of progressive change.
7 See Porte’s statement in 1977 quoted above.
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Emergence of Civic Resistance
Tolbert arrived in office promising reform but soon wavered between reform 
and repression. “What he graciously conceded one day, he ruthlessly took 
away the next” (Libenow 1987, 170). This angered the old guard as well 
as the budding reformists. “The more concessions Tolbert made to those 
who called for political reform, the more he became estranged from the 
conservatives in his own party (Ellis 1999, 50). The 1970s was “a period of 
national consciousness; expectations among Liberia’s rural and urban poor 
were raised.”8 In this mixed political atmosphere, two main civic groups 
emerged that would provide some of the country’s future political leaders 
and human rights advocates: PAL, formed in the United States among the 
Liberian diaspora in 1975 by G. Baccus Matthews; and MOJA, formed in 1973 
and led by Togba Nah Tipoteh, and several other early members including, 
H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr. and Amos Sawyer. Noting the growth of move-
ments in the 1970s, Sawyer said,
I never really saw my own work purely as human rights work … Ours was a 
democracy advocacy approach, but based in education. We held seminars, 
workshops, conferences, and that sort of thing, to educate people and at 
the same time to provide some kind of platform for advocacy for change. 
I think it [the political activism] was a broad movement. So these were 
examples not just of a handful of people screaming from a street corner, 
but widespread movements [emphasis added].9
These advocates for change served as models for a younger generation of 
activists.10 The two groups PAL and MOJA attracted some of the brightest 
and later most influential individuals in Liberian politics and proved to be 
a training ground of sorts for the next decade of political activism. Dunn 
and Holsoe (1985, 168) describe MOJA, for example, as “the f irst organ-
ized political movement of the Left” in context of the Soviet/American 
Cold War struggle in Liberia. They add: “Dr. Tipoteh played a major role in 
developing widespread awareness of the real potential for change. Working 
8 Aaron Weah, in an e-mail to the author, December 4, 2013. Weah was a civil society activ-
ist, working for the International Center for Transitional Justice in Liberia at the time of this 
communication.
9 Amos Sawyer, in an interview with the author, June 26, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
10 Tiawan Gongloe, in an interview with the author, Monrovia, Liberia, June 19, 2006. Gongloe, 
who was active under both the Doe and Taylor regimes, described as “role models” leaders of 
the two groups, including Tipoteh, Sawyer, Fahnbulleh, Matthews, and Dew Mayson.
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through student, labor and other organizations, he used to full advantage 
the Tolbert government’s declaration of interest in “knowing the mind of 
the people.”11 MOJA formed as an antiapartheid movement by students 
and faculty at the University of Liberia but soon developed an anticolonial 
tone that questioned Liberia’s honoring the early settlers from the United 
States over the indigenous (Moran, 2006, 107-8).
We became the shock force – the real example of the shock force of the 
intelligentsia – student leaders who were then raising questions, working 
with workers, and in the process we had increasing numbers of people, 
including professors, who then wanted to be seen as dealing with these 
issues rather than sitting on the sidelines.12
For the most part their resistance to the persistent authoritarian rule that 
occurred, despite Tolbert’s promises for reform, was non-confrontational, 
choosing instead to use education, training programs, and discussions, but 
always with an emphasis on democracy. Tipoteh (born Roberts) explained 
his motives as trying “to raise awareness as to the role of justice in making 
people aware of their rights so that they will then use peaceful means to 
improve their relative power position.”13 Sawyer, later to be named one of 
the interim presidents of Liberia between the Doe and Sawyer regimes, 
offered an important explanation of the role of MOJA and other civic groups 
that were resisting more than a century of authoritarian rule. His explana-
tion parallels this book’s argument for an expanded concept of what is 
included in a social movement.
You had, for example, the formation of independent unions breaking away 
from the government-sponsored unions … Workers became an independ-
ent union. Many shop stewards decided to speak on their own. You had in 
the Chamber of Commerce the formation of the Liberian Business Caucus 
that was raising questions … You had a number of women’s groups [form-
ing] … The Liberian Council of churches: very, very active. [Episcopal] 
Bishop [George] Browne, [United Methodist] Bishop Kulah. [Catholic] 
Bishop Francis: these people brought huge congregations with them.14
11 Togba na Tipoteh was chair of MOJA from 1973-80; minister of planning under Samuel Doe 
1980-81. Dunn and Holsoe note he had refrained from giving an account of his sixteen months 
in the People’s Redemption Council government of Doe. 
12 Conmany Wesseh, in an interview with the author, June 24, 2006,in Monrovia, Liberia. 
13 Togba Na Tipoteh, in an interview with the author, June 22, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
14 Sawyer interview.
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Sawyer’s points are worth emphasizing here because in the current three-
country study, similar phenomenon was found in both Kenya and Sierra 
Leone: (1) A “movement” of resistance occurred in Liberia in the 1970s, 
though it did not resemble the popular notion of a social movement. (2) 
The movement involved a broader range of organizations and individuals 
than are normally recognized in social movement studies. Yet the elements 
were interconnected through social and professional ties, united in focus 
(regime reform as a minimum) and using a variety of tactics to protest in 
noninstitutional as well as institutional channels. (3) Some key activists 
in the movement did not see themselves as activists. Instead they saw 
themselves as just doing their job, as in the case of the outspoken clergy. 
MOJA and PAL were anything but benign discussion groups, however, 
they were led by politically ambitious individuals and included some 
Marxists. Their demands for democracy and inclusion posed a threat in 
the eyes of the government. “They set the stage for the coup.”15 Weah (2013) 
goes further on this point: “MOJA and Pal may have adopted a nonviolent 
approach in their activism but … the military coup of Samuel Doe was a 
direct outgrowth of the activism of the 1970s.”16 Activists in PAL, the more 
radical of these two civic groups of the 1970s, called for Tolbert’s resignation 
(Moran 2006, 108).
The political activists of MOJA and PAL continued to apply pressure on the 
government, with PAL formally launching itself as an opposition party, 
the Progressive People’s Party (PPP), while MOJA, seeking to politicize 
the army, established a night school known as the Barracks Union, of 
which Amos Sawyer was the principal. Tolbert responded by banning 
the PPP and detaining a number of militants whom he threatened to 
execute (Ellis 1999, 52).17
15 Arthur Kulah, then a bishop of the United Methodist Church in Monrovia, in an interview 
with the author, July 7, 2006. Kulah wrote a book about his experiences (1999): Liberia Will Rise 
Again: Reflections on the Liberian Civil Crisis.
16 Aaron Weah (2013) adds that co-optation of some members of MOJA and PAL into govern-
ment in the 1980s opened up space for new political actors, primarily University of Liberia 
student activists.
17 Ellis points out that one of the leaders of the Liberian student movement in the United 
States at this time was Charles Taylor who headed back home to be “at the heart of things.” In 
1989 he launched a civil war in Liberia.
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Rice Riots (1979): Opening the Door for the 1980 Coup
When I f inally located Matthews and he showed up for an interview in 
the restaurant of the Royal Hotel, in Monrovia, he looked intently around 
the large room then sat down with his back to the wall. My instincts as a 
former journalist told me this was not someone who would appreciate my 
pulling out a tape recorder, so I opted to take careful notes. “We did the 
unthinkable at the time” in holding a mass, public demonstration in 1979, he 
said. In organizing the mass demonstration against the planned government 
increase in the price of rice from $22 to $30 for a large sack,18 PAL founder 
Matthews was using a nonviolent tactic he said was aimed at breaking a 
“history of silence” in Liberia on the part of the indigenous and to help 
achieve a greater political voice for those shut out of the political system. 
Tolbert claimed no one opposed the price hike and challenged Matthews 
to f ind twenty-f ive people who opposed it. “He [Tolbert] lived in this little 
cocoon.” When Matthews showed up with twenty-f ive people, including 
dock workers, students, and market women who opposed the price hike, 
Tolbert ended up “in a shouting match.” One older market lady said the 
president never thought of anything good to help the people. Matthews 
told the president he was planning a demonstration April 14, 1979. He and 
the other demonstrators were well aware that a public protest was “was 
extremely dangerous.” The president warned he would block it with force. 
With no independent newspaper to carry news of the planned protest, PAL 
members turned to distributing pamphlets. On the day of the protest, “when 
the government started shooting, it became a riot.”19
Police opened f ire on civilians.20 On the third day of the protests, the 
regime announced there would be no increase and instead a slight decrease 
in the price of a large bag of rice from twenty-two dollars to twenty dol-
lars. Matthews had gone into hiding to avoid arrest as the regime began 
searching for him and demonstrators house by house. He surrendered and 
18 An eightdollar increase in the price of a bag of rice might not seem cause for risking one’s life 
to demonstrate, but at the time, the “average monthly income of urban Liberians was roughly 
$80” (Libenow 1987, 171).
19 Baccus Matthews, in an interview with the author July 13, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
Matthews died fourteen months later after a brief illness. This may have been his last interview 
and perhaps the f irst in a long time.
20 John Stewart, in an interview with the author, July 14, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. Stewart, 
a student leader at the time, recalled the government estimated thirty deaths, but Stewart (who 
was not present at the time) and Matthews, later estimated that up to 100 people were killed. 
An independent report (Berkeley 1986, 14) put the casualties at forty.
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was detained for two months then released.21 The fact that the govern-
ment responded with violence was a mark of its insecurity, and perhaps its 
inexperience with protest of this sort, even when confronting a nonviolent 
social movement. The fact that the army, made up mostly of indigenous 
Liberians, was reluctant to f ire on the demonstrators showed the vulner-
ability of the regime to a coup by the military (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 76-8).22 
The police were led mostly by Americo-Liberians, though the rank and f ile 
was largely indigenous, but the police were better paid than the army.23 
The protest was also an example of how a small organization can play an 
important role in a nonviolent social movement. It showed “that even a 
loosely organized but determined opposition could capitalize upon events 
to challenge the regime” (Libenow 1987, 172). The protest also drew in a 
range of civilians including University students who were not discouraged 
by the violence. “Students have always been in the forefront as groups in 
social transformation in this country.”24
Students have been the voice, the conscience of society since the ’70s. But 
this is due largely to the fact that political institutions in the country have 
been generally weak and effectively succeeding in creating a vacuum 
into which students stepped unwillingly – I would say unwillingly, in 
articulating and advocating the interests and concerns of the people. 
[The violence] more or less inspired or galvanized the students. It was not 
just students who were out on the streets; ordinary people: thousands, 
thousands … There hadn’t been a demonstration like that [the Rice Riots] 
before in the history of the country. 25
21 Matthews said he was released in what he called “a deal.” In exchange for a public statement 
of support for the president, the government admitted no wrongdoing but promised some 
reforms. Matthews was named minister of foreign affairs under the military regime that seized 
power a year later.
22 This observation by Dunn and Tarr is cited in Moran 2006, 108). In social movement theories 
of “opportunity” and some democratization theories (e.g., O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) this 
reluctance by the army would signal a split in the hierarchy that provided an “opening” of 
“opportunity” for activists. There was a split, but it was the military who took advantage of it in 
a coup the next year.
23 Stewart interview. (Stewart is a nephew of activist pamphleteer Albert Port and cousin of 
Kenneth Best, an independent journalist whose articles frequently challenged the Doe regime.) 
Stewart, a student leader at the University of Liberia at the time, was arrested four times. Dunn 
(2013) notes the police director at the time, Varney Dempster, was indigenous.
24 Gongloe interview. He later became Liberia’s solicitor general in the government of Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, elected in 2005.
25 Stewart interview.
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Short-Lived Hopes for Human Rights and Democracy
Almost exactly one year after the Rice Riots, on April 12, 1980, army Master 
Sergeant Samuel Doe and a group of his military colleagues seized power, 
assassinating President Tolbert at his Executive Mansion. Doe’s ascension to 
power marked the f irst time Liberia had been led by an indigenous person 
and not an Americo-Liberian descendent, also known as “settlers.”
The settlers reserved all privileges – political, social, and economic – for 
themselves and their children. The native man was condemned to remain 
at the bottom of the social ladder, regardless of all the efforts he made 
for personal advancement. He was segregated against, considered as 
a heathen, and made to be ashamed of his primitive background. His 
rebellion against these and other ill-treatments was suppressed ruth-
lessly, leaving a scar of anger and hatred in his heart and mind” (Justice 
and Peace Commission, 1994, 17).26
Doe’s assumption of power raised hopes of the indigenous majority that 
their voices would at last be heard by government. “There were grievances 
about imbalance in education, lack of balance in development, concentra-
tion of wealth in the hands of a few; and Monrovia being the only place 
that had anything else. The rest of the country was left in ruins.”27 Another 
activist from the 1970s noted that there was little excuse for the poverty that 
gripped most Liberians. “Liberia is rich in resources for a small population; 
we have iron ore, we have diamonds … we have rubber, we have timber; 
uranium. We should not be poor. You know why? Bad governance. Also, it 
is related to the East West conflict, domination of the national economy 
by foreign interests.”28
Hopes for an inclusive, democratic government were soon dashed. Doe 
not only turned increasingly to his ethnic Krahn, he initiated a regime of 
repression. More than 200 were estimated to be killed in the f irst few days 
of his rule; thirteen senior ousted off icials of the previous regime were 
executed on a public beach as thousands watched and cheered. “Within the 
space of about two weeks, Liberia’s new rulers had established a reputation 
26 Elwood Dunn (2013) challenges the objectivity of this historical assessment. “There is a Na-
tional History Project underway led by trained Liberian historians to undertake an inclusive and 
comprehensive history of the Liberian people. It may challenge the prevailing historiography.”
27 Wesseh interview. Wesseh was a student leader at the time.
28 Stewart interview. 
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for lawlessness and brutality … The People’s Redemption Council (PRC) 
soon “suspended the constitution, dissolved the executive and legislative 
branches of government, and eliminated the writ of habeas corpus. Martial 
law was declared. Political activity was banned.” More than f ifty perceived 
rivals, mostly military personnel were executed (Berkeley 1986, 14-6). Nev-
ertheless, on May 7, 1980, less than a month after the coup, thousands of 
students protested at the Executive Mansion. “We said in that statement 
that the military has done the nation well by the coup and it is time for the 
military to prepare its exit – back to the barracks.”29
Lacking technical and managerial skills, the new military government of 
Samuel Doe allotted four cabinet portfolios to the PAL/PPP, including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was given to its leader, Baccus Mathews, 
organizer of the 1979 Rice Riots. MOJA members received three posts (Pham 
2006, 80). Sawyer was named chair of the National Constitution Drafting 
Commission, formed in April 1981 by the government and disbanded in 
November 1983 (Dunn and Holsoe 1985, 155). Other civic leaders were co-
opted by the Doe regime as participants (Pham 2006, 80). Many of them 
joined the leaders who lived luxuriously. But many of these technocrats and 
liberal politicians were moved aside as Doe increasingly turned to his own 
ethnic group to govern, disappointing native Liberians who had hoped that 
this f irst native president would bring into government many who had been 
shut out by the Americo-Liberian hold on power of all the previous regimes.
Compared to at least the appearance of an opening for political dissent 
under the Tolbert administration, the Doe regime had a very low tolerance 
of demonstrations or criticism. The repression that characterized not just 
the start but the whole of Doe’s regime blocked the successful functioning 
of a vital, nonviolent social movement. There was an abeyance in social 
movement activity: low-level resistance, not centrally or even formally 
organized for fear of reprisals. “There was nobody who spoke up for us, 
Nobody! Everybody was scared. There was nothing. All the organizations 
had been banned including the Bar Association throughout the 80’s and 
the 90’s. The Bar association was inactive and scared.”30 John Stewart, a 
former student leader in the late 1970s, was arrested in 1984 on charges of 
distributing antigovernment literature. “There was a lot of repression all 
through the 80s.” Like many other activists in the mid-1980s, he was tortured 
and held in unlit cells so crowded prisoners slept in rotation, otherwise 
standing for long periods:
29 Wesseh interview.
30 Kenneth Best, in an interview with the author, June 17, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
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You know the standard fare, or rite of passage in the post stockade was 
whipping, 25 lashes on the bare back, strapped to a table and the soldiers 
call it – excuse my language – f… Mary. They would lie you stretched 
across the bench, like this and both of your arms would come under and 
they were handcuffed, the arms, and when they lash you, only your lower 
body can move, so it induces movement that resembles a person having 
sexual intercourse, so they say well, that man f… Mary. And they will spill 
water on your back and sprinkle sand, so that the whip can cut harder … 
the sand will cling to your back so when they lash you, the sand can cut 
to make it more painful.31
Resistance in Abeyance: Courage, Commitment, Danger
This kind of repression blocked formation of open social movements with 
formal organizations under both Doe and Taylor. “There was nothing like 
an organized movement.’32 Yet some nonviolent resistance continued in 
the mid-1980s despite the risks and threats from the regime. Indigenous 
Liberians had “the notion that … now was time for all the indigenous people 
to enjoy the fruits of the country. When Doe suggested the 5 percent Krahn 
were going to replace the settler group, the rest of the people said that is not 
going to happen. This was the cause of the internal dissent.”33 The low-level, 
nonviolent resistance involved teachers, university students, a few members 
of the clergy, and a handful of lawyers operating individually while their 
bar association remained quiet. “Human rights activists [were] very strong 
about their convictions; they lasted a while; then got squashed or fed up 
with the system … People knew them; they go down in history; others came, 
got frustrated.”34 At times they were supported by mass demonstrations, 
either spontaneous or planned. For example, in 1982 when Doe banned all 
student activities, six leaders of the Liberian National Student Union were 
arrested for defying the order. They were condemned by a military court 
to die but Doe released them only fourteen hours before the scheduled 
execution, apparently in response to widespread public criticism of the 
regime’s treatment of the student leaders. A wide range of Liberian civilians 
31 Stewart interview.
32 Alaric Tokpa, in an interview with the author, June 13, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
33 Elwood Dunn, in a telephone interview in the United States with the author, June 22, 2006.
34 Father Thomas Delany, in a telephone interview in the US with the author, May 2005. Father 
Delany was working for the Catholic Church in Monrovia, Liberia.
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from professionals to market women made public statements against the 
planned execution. When Doe finally released them, thousands of Liberians 
poured onto the streets in celebration. “When people act collectively locally, 
it scares people in power.”35
If you talk about the period of the Rice Riots, the initiative that was seized 
by the students through the early ’80s, the religious leaders, journalists, 
you may not see perhaps an umbrella organization [saying] this was a 
pro-democracy thing – but these were people interacting and working 
very closely in many places, sometimes on similar issues, sometimes on 
the same issue.36
Shooting Books
Because of the repression, however, “there was not a lot of political activity.” 
Yet elements of the resistance movement continued, despite the risks. A 
handful of attorneys bravely challenged the regime in court on human 
rights issues and rule of law. “Because the military was very, very repres-
sive, a lot of activism had to go underground.” University students wrote 
statements critical of Doe’s People’s Redemption Council (PRC), which 
students called “People Repeating Corruption,” distributing the statements 
clandestinely on foot, leaving them in public places.37 When Sawyer and 
George Klay Kieh, Jr. of the faculty of the University of Liberia were detained 
for allegedly conspiring to overthrow the government, students boycotted 
classes and held several demonstrations on the campus exhibiting not only 
courage, but creativity and even humor, as Ezekiel Pajibo, president of the 
Liberian National Student Union at the time recalled. The students refused 
to leave campus and held a three-day vigil to protest the arrests.
We were really partying, that’s true [he laughs]. And on the third day, 
we did this coff in business. We did an eff igy of Doe and we were going 
to bury the PRC government. A woman [on campus] taught the student 
demonstrators how to shout in Krahn [the f irst language of Doe]. The 
students were in shouting distance of the Executive Mansion. [Doe sent 
troops to the campus.] They raped women; they beat up the students 
who were living on campus; and I believe a couple of people may have 
35 Gongloe interview.
36 Sawyer interview
37 Stewart interview
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died but we have no way of authenticating that. They shot at everything. 
In fact they even shot at books in the library and the computers. They 
said it was the books in the library that were giving [students] a foreign 
ideology [that inspired the resistance].38
The violence forced some student leaders to take their nonviolent resistance 
campaigns underground. The Daily Observer was burnt down. There was no 
free press in the country. “So one had to find a way to critique the government.” 
In December 1984 Pajibo and some others were charged with publishing an 
anti-regime pamphlet “Revolutionary Action Committee” or “React.” (When 
I asked if Pajibo had published it, he turned to another former activist, Aloy-
sius Toe, who at that moment was in the nongovernment office where Pajibo 
worked. “Have we ever acknowledged publishing that,” he asked? Then Pajibo 
confirmed they had published it.) “We were following in the footsteps of the 
historic pamphleteer Albert Porte.” They were sent to the infamous Bella 
Yella prison, deep in the interior forests.39 Prisoners were jammed as many 
as thirty to a small room, making it diff icult to breath. They were forced 
to work from 5 a.m. to 5 p.m. on farms often owned by military personnel. 
“There were public floggings daily.” After six months he was transferred to a 
prison in Monrovia and released later in 1985 before the presidential elections 
and after some international pressure from the United States for releasing 
political prisoners.40 Organizational activism was minimal at best. Direct 
political confrontation was too dangerous. So instead, activists encouraged 
a strategy aimed at weakening the economy, the soft side of the Doe regime.
They could carry you [away] anytime and kill you. Sometimes in the 
morning you get up, you see somebody’s head in the street. They killed 
somebody and the head is in the street and everybody sees it. We had no 
direct human rights institution that was pursuing a democratic process. 
[But] there were boycotts. Teachers refused to go to work. Then students 
went on a rampage because teachers refused to go to work. Students got 
into the streets … to demonstrate because they wanted teachers to go 
38 Ezekiel Pajibo, in an interview with the author, July 12, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
39 Another student leader imprisoned there told anthropologist Mary Moran (2006, 153) that 
the repression of the Doe regime led some opposition politicians to abdicate their role to the 
student movement. “We [students] were too young, immature, and secondly, it was kind of 
dangerous … So it kind of forced us to grow many years before our time.”
40 Pajibo interview.
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back to work. These were the methods that were used to undermine the 
economy of the state that brought about the civil conflict. 41
Professional Duty: Pathway to Resistance
Another part of the resistance came from independent journalists of whom 
Kenneth Best, owner and editor of the Daily Observer was the most promi-
nent. The Daily Observer was closed several times in the 1980s for printing 
photos (often by photographer Sando Moore) or news of poor conditions in 
the country, including bad roads upcountry and late pay for teachers. On a 
visit to the US, where he f inally moved in 1990, a man approached Best who 
was familiar with his newspaper: “How did you manage to survive Samuel 
Doe, the man asked? And I said to him for that you have to ask the good 
Lord.” Best summarized his form of nonviolent resistance to authoritarian 
rule under Doe – doing his job as a professional journalist. It was the kind 
of explanation for activism that reoccurred frequently in my interviews: 
people were drawn into activism by way of their commitment to their 
profession, not by membership in a human rights advocacy organization.
Under Doe there was hardly any human rights advocacy because half the 
time most of the civil organizations were banned. Politics as well. The 
press was primarily, under Doe, the only activist organization because 
a few of us, a few of the papers, had to do what we had to do – cover the 
wrongs of society, cover the news, good or bad. And that’s why we were 
constantly at loggerheads with the government. My paper was closed 
down f ive times under Doe. I went to jail three times. My wife and my 
secretary and female reporter and female advertising lady went to jail for 
four days. So there was no human rights advocacy. The only thing that 
I remember is that we always had a crowd at the off ice to see what was 
happening but nobody stood up for us, even the other newspapers.42
One of the few members of the clergy to speak out against Doe was Bishop 
Arthur F. Kulah of the United Methodist Church of Liberia. In April 1981 
at a public ceremony he made a statement aimed directly at Doe’s regime: 
41 Dempster Brown, in an interview with the author, July 13, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. Brown, 
a human rights attorney, argued that the weakening economy and protests against it helped 
open the way for the civil war that began under Taylor.
42 Best interview.
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“The guns that you have used to liberate us should not be used to enslave 
us.”43 Statements such as this put him at risk; the regime quickly put out 
word that they intended to arrest him. He went into hiding for a couple of 
months, moving from house to house to sleep. He fled to the Ivory Coast 
for several months then returned to Liberia. In the absence of a prominent, 
central social movement organization, church leaders were “the conscience 
of the nation” during the resistance, according to Liberian political scientist 
Dr. Elwood Dunn. “Churches were organized; they tried to do what they 
could; but it was very diff icult.”44
Aaron Weah (2013) argues that few church leaders brought much to the 
resistance process in the 1980s, citing the Most Reverend Michael Kpakala 
Francis, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Monrovia, as a “notable excep-
tion.” Archbishop Francis made courageous pronouncements against the 
violence both under Doe and Taylor. Almost all those interviewed in Liberia 
volunteered that Archbishop Francis was a key moral force against the Doe and 
Taylor excesses toward Liberian civil society. “Whenever I got arrested, Bishop 
Francis would speak in church. He was courageous and bold.”45 Archbishop 
Francis based his opposition to the violence of both Doe and Taylor on a 
spiritual platform and bravely spoke out against both. “Archbishop Francis 
really stood up to Taylor and Doe,” said Father Delany, of the Catholic Church in 
Liberia.46 During Doe’s reign, for example, according to a Catholic report: “The 
government viciously attacked the Archbishop; his life [was] threated but he 
was undaunted and addressed himself to all the needs of the day.” He focused 
especially on “the rights of people” (Catholic Church of Monrovia, 2001, 11).
American Ambivalence over Repression in Liberia
In contrast to the push for democracy by the US ambassador to Kenya, Smith 
Hempstone (1989-1993), the policy regarding Liberia by the US, the closest 
country to Liberia due to the role of black emigrants from the US, most of 
whom were former slaves and to earlier US protection of them in the 1800s, 
was one of ambivalence. There were at times public condemnations by the 
US of the excesses of Doe, but there were also periods of support, including 
43 Bishop Arthur F. Kulah, in an interview with the author, July 7, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
44 Elwood Dunn, in a telephone interview with the author in the US, May 22, 2006.
45 Hassan Bility, in a telephone interview in the US with the author, May 2, 2008. Bility, an 
independent journalist, was also courageous.
46 Delany interview.
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the “possible complicity” in an assassination attempt on Doe and in the 
attempted coup against Doe November 12, 1985. The US early on pressured 
Doe to return Liberia to civilian rule and he agreed. But when he reneged, 
it began a “deterioration of relationship” between Liberia and the US. This 
ambivalence included acceptance of the controversial election of 1985 
which Doe allegedly won as a civilian. The administration of US President 
Ronald Reagan (1981-89), as part of his Cold War strategy against the Soviet 
Union, offered “support for developing world clients states such as Liberia” 
(Dunn 2009, 144, 147, 152). This left Doe largely unhampered in his domestic 
repression, largely unhampered by any consistent pressure for reform from 
Liberia’s main ally abroad. The US supported Doe’s election “victory” in 1985 
“on the grounds that even a rigged election was better than no election at 
all. This effectively shut off the last possibility of evicting Doe from power 
by constitutional means, or at least by peaceful ones” (Ellis 1999, 63).
After the election, Thomas Quiwonkpa, “the acknowledged leader of the 
seventeen soldiers who murdered President Tolbert” in April 1980 and later 
commanding general of the army under Doe and his longtime friend, at-
tempted a coup November 12, 1985. During the few hours that Quiwonkpa 
and his soldiers were in charge, there were mass celebrations in Monrovia. 
“Liberians poured out of their homes by the thousand, chanting songs of praise 
and gratitude” (Berkeley 1986, 20). Doe, tipped off by the United States Embassy 
of the coup, was able to rally troops to regain control (Ellis 1999, 59). The Doe 
regime unleashed an orgy of violence after putting down the coup. Hundreds 
of soldiers and civilians were killed by Doe’s forces and many deaths, including 
that of Quiwonkpa, involved dismemberment and mutilation (Berkeley, 49).
The increased repression after the coup further dampened what little 
open criticism was forthcoming from civil society.
From ’87 on you didn’t really have a civil society that was vocal, that was 
expressive, you know, that was organized. People spoke out as individuals, 
but not many people really spoke up. In conversations with people views 
were expressed. Most people really and truly did not really advocate – and 
quite frankly, even when you were talking with conscionable people, 
many times they would be afraid of statements that you would make. 
There was a fear in Liberia. The regime was repressive; and it could be 
brutal. And so there was real fear.47
47 Etweda Cooper, in an interview with the author, June 19, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. Cooper 
was later active in the push by Liberian women for peace.
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Still, some advocates for change sought ways to keep the dialogue for reform 
alive, sometimes in unconventional ways. For example, some of them would 
gather almost daily at a small restaurant called The Corner (since burned 
down) on Old Road in Sinkor, a section of Monrovia, to talk about the issues 
of the day. This included business people, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and 
even some government off icials. People spoke freely and expressed their 
opinions and concerns. But there were informal rules for such a gathering.
One of the conditions for coming in there was if you were a government 
off icial, you could never bring your walkie-talkie into the place. If you 
had a security [bodyguard] your security could not come into the place, 
into The Corner … because we were trying to protect the confidentiality 
of the gathering … We discussed all issues … The food was not good. So 
basically we went there for the conversations, the discussions.48
Civil War Stirs More Regime Repression – and Resistance
On December 24, 1989, forces led by Charles Taylor launched what became 
a civil war, entering Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire into Nimba County.49 By July 
1990, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) had reached Monrovia. 
During the intervening six months from the f irst invasion, the Doe regime 
cracked down even harder on internal dissent, focusing much of their efforts 
on what remained of an independent press. That is the period when the 
Daily Observer was set on f ire. “The independent media were targeted and 
destroyed. By July 1990, there was not a single independent media house 
in Monrovia.”50 With Taylor’s troops threatening to seize the capital if Doe 
did not step down, the Press Union of Liberia, student groups, labor unions, 
the teachers association, transport union and women’s groups and others 
joined in a mass march to Parliament in a desperate attempt to get Doe to 
resign. It was “a mixture of everyone; professionals, people from low income, 
from lower parts of town; from everywhere. It was a concerted effort.” The 
regime warned it would stop the demonstration with force. On the day of 
the march “heavily-armed road blocks were set up,” Gabriel Williams, a 
48 Etweda Cooper interview.
49 As with the war in Sierra Leone, it is beyond the scope of this book to examine in any detail 
the war in Liberia. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia: Final Report (2009), among 
other works, gives an overview of the war and its devastating impact on the population.
50 Gabriel Williams, in an interview with the author, June 11, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
Williams was a leader in the Press Union of Liberia at the time.
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leader in the independent Press Union of Liberia, recalled. As the crowds 
approached the Executive Mansion, chanting insultingly for Doe to “come 
down,” resign, soldiers f ired in the air then at the demonstrators, pursuing 
them as they fled in all directions:
People were getting hurt; people were getting killed. I started running. 
People were falling over each other … When those guys took control of 
the city, they began to do a search and cordon [off neighborhoods] … 
That day was the beginning of the complete breakdown of law and order. 
There was no more normalcy since that day. The country just descended 
into absolute chaos.51
Doe hung on to power in a state of siege. Taylor’s NPFL forces arrived in 
Monrovia in July 1990. Taylor took control of most of the city and his forces 
were even f iring on the Executive Mansion itself. But West African troops 
(ECOMOG)52 arrived in Monrovia on August 24 and prevented his f inal 
capture of power and the presidency. Taylor, “enraged by ECOMOG for 
denying him the military victory which had been within his grasp” was 
forced to retreat from the city; by then his forces held control of most of 
the country. Doe was murdered September 10, 1990 in Monrovia by a rival 
rebel faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), 
led by Prince Johnson. After a series of interim governments, Charles Taylor 
would be elected president in 1997 and rule until forced to resign in 2003. 
Despite the repressive nature of his administration, advocates for human 
rights and democracy continued their efforts.
Implications of Peaceful Resistance in Abeyance
Liberia offers insights into how a resistance in abeyance survives, waiting 
for better times to remerge more fully and more openly. Liberia has a long 
history of nonviolent resistance, particularly by journalists. In the 1970s, 
several civil society organizations formed to take advantage of what ap-
peared to be a more liberal administration. Key f igures in the resistance 
51 Williams interview. Williams detailed his experiences during the war in his book published 
in 2002, Liberia: The Heart of Darkness: Accounts of Liberia’s Civil War and Its Destabilizing Effects 
in West Africa.
52 ECOMOG was the armed Economic Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West 
African States, which included Nigerian and other troops.
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in the 1980s and beyond built on these historical precedents and identif ied 
as their models the leaders of political reform groups launched in the 1970s. 
The Tolbert regime of the 1970s proved erratic: encouraging reform while 
also cracking down on challenges to its authority. The Rice Riots of 1979, 
a mass public demonstration against intended government hikes in the 
price of rice, was met with violence. Hesitancy of the army to fully engage 
in the repressive government response to the demonstrators exposed the 
weakness of the Tolbert regime. A year later a military coup led to the 
assumption of power by Samuel Doe, the f irst indigenous head of state 
after continuous rule by descendants of American slaves and other black 
emigrants.
While the regime of Samuel Doe initially raised hopes that the indigenous 
population would at last have a voice in governance, his reliance on his eth-
nic Krahn and his repressive response to criticism left advocates for change 
at risk. Repression under the Doe rule prevented formation of an open and 
organized, nonviolent social movement but it did not stop advocates for 
reform and later for regime change from attempting to make their voices 
heard. The resistance was in abeyance but it was neither silent nor invisible. 
It would reemerge more broadly in the 1990s as conditions permitted.
The candles of nonviolent resistance in Liberia never quite blew out 
during the violently repressive decade of the 1980s under Samuel Doe. A 
full-scale resistance movement was not possible: it was simply too danger-
ous. During the last decade of the Cold War, the West – including Liberia’s 
closest ally in the West, the United States – was focused on supporting 
allies against Communism, not democracy and human rights in Liberia and 
Africa in general. But a low-scale resistance in abeyance continued despite 
arrests, torture, and death of some advocates. It took the form of critical 
reporting, statements by clergy, legal challenges to the regime, and defense 
of politically targeted detainees. It involved occasional strikes and mass 
demonstrations, but it also included spontaneous gatherings in opposition 
to the repression against those charged with standing up for freedom. It 
involved both individual activists – those acting on their own or without 
signif icant support from any organization – and organizational activism 
such as that of the Catholic and United Methodist Churches.
There was no central resistance organization bringing together the sparse 
strands of nonviolent resistance. Instead, the various strands often operated 
separately and in abeyance, though at times they came together quickly for 
a public demonstration. Usually the resistance took place at a much reduced 
level than under a more tolerant regime as people waited for the day when 
more open and organized, nonviolent resistance would be possible. Those 
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active in this low-level, decentralized and at times clandestine resistance 
were linked through professional ties or friendships, or both. They were 
courageous and highly committed. They used the local media when it was 
available (some media houses were destroyed); they stayed in touch with 
international human rights organizations which sounded the alarm when 
one of the activists was detained by the regime.
Contrary to some social movement literature, the resistance operated 
essentially without structural “opportunities” for advancing. On the con-
trary, the repression at times was horrif ic even barbaric; the risk to those 
challenging the regime in any way was big. Still some resistance continued. 
But in order to detect such resistance in abeyance, it is necessary to use the 
broader concept of a social movement this book presents, broader than is 
generally seen in the relevant literature. The concept of a movement used 
in this study includes individual as well as organizational activism. It also 
includes professionals drawn to the resistance by way of their commitment 
to their jobs, not necessarily as members of a human rights organization. 
The focus is on resistance, not just organizations that resist. This perspective 
is more outward looking, more dynamic than the usual inward concentra-
tion on the mechanics of a movement. This broader concept also pays close 
attention to small groups. The study intentionally notes the courage and 
commitment of participants and includes ample examples of their words 
and actions.
Figure 7  Kofi Woods, human rights activist, Monrovia, Liberia, 2006
Photo by Betty Press
Figure 8  Elizabeth Sele Mulbah, peace activist, Monrovia, Liberia, 2006
Photo by Betty Press
6 Peaceful Resistance during a Civil War
Following the murder of Liberian President Samuel Doe in 1990 and up to 
2003 when President Charles Taylor (1997-2003) resigned, two nonviolent 
social movements emerged with roots of resistance from the 1980s, 1970s, 
and earlier. One movement sought to expose abuses by Taylor and eventu-
ally to force him out of power. The other, a peace movement led by women, 
aimed at bringing an end to the civil war began in 1994. In the f inal year of 
the conflict, 2003, women staged mass demonstrations to protest for peace.
Activists in these movements included, among many others: a reader of 
Gandhi, Thoreau, and Martin Luther King; a priest who demanded peace 
and justice; a journalist whose articles led to his detention in a f looded, 
underground cell; a lawyer tortured for demanding the rule of law; and 
mothers who flew to peace talks or stood in long vigils in rain and sun to 
press for an end to a brutal civil war. Some activists had survived the 1980s 
and were active again; many more were new to resistance.
After a decade of repression under Samuel Doe (1980-90), the civil war 
starting in December 1989 took more than two hundred thousand Liberian 
lives by 1997; it also pushed some six hundred thousand into other countries 
as refugees, and left some eight hundred thousand internally displaced out 
of a pre-war population of only 2.5 million. Many fled to Monrovia (Moran 
2006, 120). The election of rebel leader Charles Taylor in 1997 f inally brought 
temporary peace. But by 1999, civil war erupted again as another rebel 
group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), based 
in Guinea, threatened to seize power.
Civil society was still fairly weak during Doe’s years, and the resist-
ance operated in abeyance, at low levels, held down by repression. The 
resistance movements of the 1990s had an important advantage: Amos 
Sawyer. Chosen as interim president from 1990-94, Sawyer, an academic 
with political ambition, was supportive of civil society. During his tenure as 
head of state, advocacy groups had a chance to establish themselves.1 This 
period laid a foundation for the resistance that would later openly challenge 
President Taylor. Taylor was elected president in 1997 after a series of interim 
governments. Despite Taylor’s repression, more selective than wholesale, 
a nonviolent social movement emerged to seek reform but later to seek his 
1 Ruth Perry, appointed head of state in mid-1996, serving until Taylor took power, similarly 
provided an opportunity for civil society groups to grow. A coalition government including 
representatives of the main f ighting forces was in power from 1994 to 1996. 
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removal. Taylor resigned in 2003 as rival rebels were approaching the city 
and as he faced an international indictment for crimes against humanity in 
Sierra Leone, which he had used as a resource base for his war in Liberia.2 
After an interim presidency led by Gyude Bryant, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was 
elected the f irst female president and took off ice in January 2006.
This chapter examines how these two movements managed to survive dur-
ing a civil war and under a repressive ruler. It also examines something the 
social movement literature often fails to highlight: how movements start. 
The movements were quite different. One sought peace, using centralized 
organizations and a public leadership to pressure the regime nonviolently, 
primarily through lobbying, marches, and vigils. The other movement 
sought to expose Taylor’s human rights abuses and to remove him from 
power. “We were trying to make sure he stepped down. So we said [to the 
international community]: Don’t support the man.”3 Taylor could agree 
with the women about the need for peace; after all, peace would enable him 
to stay in power; he could blame other rebel leaders for the continuing war. 
Taylor could not agree with activists seeking to remove him from power. 
In his eyes, these activists were enemies and he responded with selective 
threats, detention, and torture. During Taylor’s regime, the resistance plan-
ning against him generally took place in private. “Most of the meetings were 
secret, informal, or on the phone. We’d meet at social gatherings.”4 But as 
the abuses and war continued, the resistance, building on the experience of 
the early 1990s when the civilian interim governments were not repressive, 
activists began emerging more openly toward the later Taylor period.
There was an increasing use of alliances and formal organizations to 
coordinate public events. Though seemingly fragmented, the multiple 
sources of this resistance were linked through professional and/or social ties 
and could coordinate a mass demonstration on occasion. This nonviolent 
resistance ranged from legal challenges by individual lawyers, independent 
journalistic reporting, and statements by outspoken clergy. The resistance 
involved individual activists – a phenomenon practically ignored in the so-
cial movement literature, as well as organizational activism. Human rights 
lawyers, for example, often not supported by their national bar association 
2 Dunn (2013) notes that Taylor was also under “intense pressure” to resign from US President 
George Bush.
3 Brown interview. 
4 Hassan Bility, in a telephone interview with the author, June 22, 2008, in the United States.
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as an organization, acted individually, though often collaborating with a 
few other attorneys to represent politically targeted detainees.
It is important to note that the activism that took place did so in an inter-
national spotlight. Various human rights groups and some diplomats were in 
regular contact with the activists in Liberia. When a prominent activist was 
detained, these organizations abroad and some embassies would quickly 
issue protests and demand their release. Liberians in the diaspora also 
played a role in the pressure on Taylor, publicizing abuses abroad, staying 
in touch with family and friends and activists in Liberia, encouraging them, 
and sometimes helping support them. It is beyond the scope of this study 
to focus on the details of what these international organizations and the 
diaspora did with regard to advancing Liberian human rights, democracy, 
and peace, as important as this was. Further, this study does not claim 
that domestic resistance alone led to the resignation of Taylor in 2003. The 
international indictment and approaching rebel force combined to force 
him out. This study does contend that without the domestic nonviolent 
resistance and the solidarity of activists in Monrovia, especially during 
the Taylor regime, stripping him of much of his legitimacy and his pretense 
at the rule of law, Taylor’s demise likely would not have come when it did.
One Country, Two Presidents
A small hole in the thick window glass behind the desk of Liberia’s interim 
president, Amos Sawyer, caught my attention during my interview with 
him as a journalist. I had started the interview in the cavernous off ice of 
the president sitting on the front row of chairs set up at some distance from 
Sawyer’s desk. Because I was doing a radio interview, I pulled my chair 
around to his side of the desk so I could use my handheld microphone. It 
was then that I noticed the hole. Sawyer explained it was from a bullet f ired 
from across the street by rebel forces led by Charles Taylor in 1990. Taylor 
had come that close to seizing power from President Samuel Doe before a 
West African military force intervened.
Sawyer’s tenure as interim President of Liberia (1990-94) provided a rare 
opening for civil society. He demonstrated a “commitment to press freedom” 
which led to a proliferation of newspapers, as well as human rights and other 
NGOs. But some journalists who challenged the actions of the occupying 
West African troops ran into trouble. “There were instances where reporters 
were detained and news organs threatened for publishing articles that were 
considered to be anti-ECOMOG.” When Taylor arrived in power as part of 
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a subsequent interim coalition government comprised of rebel leaders, he 
and other leaders tried to curb dissent. It was too late: the genie was out of 
the bottle. People were not ready to settle back and be compliant. “People 
in Monrovia were used to this kind of freedom of expression, freedom of 
movement,” said Etweda Cooper, who became a key f igure in the initial 
women’s peace campaign in the early 1990s.5
After Taylor had nearly seized power in 1990, he withdrew his forces 
from Monrovia, the capital, but continued the civil war. His rebels took 
control of most of the Liberian countryside and Taylor claimed he was the 
legitimate president. Liberia was a divided country with Taylor in charge 
of everything but Monrovia. Monrovia became an isolated zone of relative 
peace crowded with internal “refugees” f leeing f ighting in the civil war. It 
was in Monrovia that almost all of the nonviolent resistance to Taylor took 
place during his tenure as president. There would be times, however, when 
the war swept into the city, causing massive destruction and deaths. The 
war resumed in 1999 when LURD6 began challenging Taylor. The f ighting 
continued until Taylor resigned in 2003. At that time he was also under 
indictment from a Special Court set up by the United Nations and Sierra 
Leone for his role in aiding rebels in Sierra Leone in exchange for diamonds 
to pay for his own war.
Having interviewed one of the two men identifying himself as president of 
Liberia, Amos Sawyer, I wanted to meet the other man, Charles Taylor, who 
claimed to be “President of Greater Liberia,” essentially everything outside 
of Monrovia. I contacted his spokesman, Thomas Woewiyu, who was also 
his minister of defense and in Monrovia at the time. We arranged to meet 
at a restaurant and he agreed to drive me to Gbarnga, several hours north of 
the capital. We took a taxi to the edge of the city and passed easily through 
a military checkpoint manned by West African troops. Once across we were 
in Greater Liberia which was under control of Taylor’s rebels. Woewiyu was 
met by a driver of an SUV and we headed north.
In a civil war, roadblocks can be used by the controlling ethnic group to 
punish members of a targeted ethnic group on the other side of a conflict, 
as they were in Rwanda by Hutus killing minority Tutsi in 1994. We had to 
pass through a number of roadblocks manned by young men and boys who 
“wielded the power of life and death.” They were often “dressed in bizarre 
5 Etweda Cooper interview.
6 A split in LURD led to the formation of a separate rebel group, the Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia (MODEL) which also attacked Taylor’s forces.
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costumes and wearing traditional war regalia” and sometimes used to stop 
and kill not only those from rival ethnic groups but civilians of the same 
ethnic group as those manning the roadblock who they suspected of sup-
porting the enemy, or others in “settling of scores” (Ellis 1999, 116-7). In our 
case, Woewiyu f irst identif ied himself to the armed groups of young boys 
and men as the minister of defense for Taylor. When this had little effect, 
he distributed cigarettes to the f ighters which, fortunately, was enough to 
get us through the barriers.
In a modest off ice building in Gbargna, Taylor, dressed in a full length 
traditional West African gown, stepped from behind a small table to greet 
me and thank me for “risking [my] life” to come to the appointment. After 
answering my questions, including allegations (which he denied) of training 
child soldiers, something my editors cautioned me not to ask him about, he 
sat back, smiled, and said: “George Washington had his chance.” Clearly he 
thought it was his chance to be recognized as president of Liberia. Eventu-
ally, he was. He was elected despite his deserved reputation as a ruthless 
rebel commander whose forces no doubt had killed many relatives of the 
voters. The logic of why Liberians would elect such a man may be captured 
in a statement by someone who did vote for him but later realized his 
mistake after Taylor’s violence in off ice became clear. “You know, we were 
just hoping that Taylor had been f ighting for so long to be president, you 
know, that if we just gave it to him, he would be a good person. But we were 
wrong: elections can’t make you a good person” (quoted in Moran 2006, 123).
Resisting a Tyrant, Peacefully
As President, Taylor became very repressive against his opponents. One 
piece of evidence of this repression came from an unexpected source, the 
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI announced that Charles 
Taylor’s son, whom the elder Taylor had put in charge of internal security 
in Liberia, had been sentenced to ninety-seven years in prison for crimes 
of torture.
Between 1999 and 2003, in his role as commander of that unit, [Taylor’s 
son] and his associates committed numerous and varied forms of torture, 
including burning victims with molten plastic, lit cigarettes, scalding 
water, candle wax and an iron; severely beating victims with f irearms; 
cutting and stabbing victims; and shocking victims with an electric 
device. (FBI 2009)
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But against such repression, a nonviolent resistance movement took place. 
Hassan Bility, one of the independent journalists targeted by the Taylor 
regime for his reporting, called the resistance an example of “micro-social 
movements.” At times the resistance took the form of mass protests, either 
organized or spontaneous. Bility, who survived detention in an under-
ground, watery cell for his independent reporting, noted that only a small 
number of activists were “people who woke up in the morning [and said]: 
I want to be a human rights activist.”7 Many others were drawn into the 
nonviolent resistance by way of their roles as lawyers, clergy, journalists, 
mothers, and academics. Scholar Amos Sawyer and his professional col-
league Conmany Wesseh, jointly ran a think tank while Taylor was presi-
dent, producing reports contradicting some of the unsubstantiated claims 
by the Taylor regime. They were attacked in their off ice and nearly killed 
by thugs, undoubtedly hired by Taylor, who saw the two scholars as part of 
the resistance movement even though they did not f it the usual description 
of activists. “People were not moving all the time with mass action, expecting 
bullets to hit their breast, but in various ways there was resistance every step 
of the way,” Sawyer said.8
Moral Basis for Resistance
In 1991, the Catholic Church in Monrovia, under the leadership of Arch-
bishop Michael Kpakala Francis, started a nationwide monitoring system, 
the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), to document abuses during the 
civil war. Father Francis based his opposition to the violence of both Doe 
and Taylor on a spiritual platform. He spoke out boldly to denounce their 
abuses. Father Francis saw a link between a strong civil society and respect 
for human rights on the one hand, and peace, democracy and the rule of law 
on the other. His condemnation of violence focused on the civil war that 
began in December 1989. During a packed service in his church in 1992, he 
spoke out forcefully against Operation Octopus, a rebel offensive in 1992 
that was slamming Monrovia, eventually leaving some three thousand 
dead, including f ive American nuns, and eight thousand wounded by the 
time West African troops demanded a ceasef ire on November 7 (Hubband 
1998, 213):
7 Bility interview.
8 Sawyer interview; emphasis added.
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Archbishop Francis used a large straw fan to cool himself. He had wiped 
away the sweat. Then he wiped away the tears. “We are prisoners,” he 
yelled. “They [the rebels] are destroyers, not builders. They have done 
nothing for their country. We prayed for these wicked people – liars, who 
kill us and murdered the sisters.”
The Catholic Church monitoring system operated through dioceses in vari-
ous parts of the country. Their sources included “[prison] escapees, market 
women – ordinary people,” said Kofi Woods, former student president at the 
University of Liberia in 1987, winner of the Reebok Human Rights award, 
and the f irst director of the JPC. From 1991-95 the JPC was most active 
in information gathering in the Monrovia area; when the roads were re-
opened after Taylor’s election in 1997, their network operated more easily 
countrywide. The central JPC off ice in Monrovia was located in a building 
with the Catholic charity CARITAS so it was easy for informants to come 
and go without drawing unnecessary attention to themselves. This initiative 
was the start of a social movement, “We had to build a movement,” he 
said, referring to the need not only to work with local lawyers, journalists, 
and others, but to build ties to international human rights organizations 
including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyer’s 
Committee for Human Rights. The strategy was a 3-D strategy: document 
abuses; disseminate the information; defend the victims of the regime:
Somebody, somewhere has to start it [a resistance movement] … some 
group of people however few have to start it … So it is not the majority 
who comes on board immediately; it is the few who believe in it, who 
have a passion for it that starts [a movement]. [JPC helped create] a new 
wave of awareness in society … and those who were creating this new 
awareness were seen as a threat to the establishment, to the warlords, 
to the factions.9
The JPC became much more than a reporting initiative, it was an advocacy 
and defense initiative that stood boldly for human rights, focusing especially 
on abuses by the police and other security personnel and seeking to help 
the victims. The JPC developed a pact with the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) 
because the Taylor regime was arresting independent journalists. “We would 
9 Kof i Woods, in an interview with the author, June 13, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. Woods 
later became a member of the cabinet in the administration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in charge 
of labor.
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mobilize a team of lawyers immediately,” said Woods. As a result, along with 
international condemnation, the campaign against the journalists diminished, 
Woods claimed.10 The JPC focused on abuses by police, among other issues:
We [defended] people that were hunted for political reasons … We helped 
to free journalists that had been detained for reporting certain stories. 
We went to the aid of those who were brutalized. In some instances we 
assisted some of them to go to hospitals to treat their wounds. And we 
sought the release of political detainees and prisoners.11
In 1992, JPC launched its own radio station, Radio Veritas, which aired a 
program called Front Line that broadcast live testimonies from victims of 
the war and related atrocities. “In our own little way, we were trying to 
expose some of the excesses of government and trying to insure that the 
rights of people are expected,” said Rennie Ledgerhood, station manager at 
the time. In 1996, in the midst of the civil war and before Taylor was elected, 
the station was burned down but the Catholic Church rebuilt it. Once in 
off ice, President Taylor was not happy with the broadcasts, including one 
interview with by then self-exiled senate leader Charles Brumskine. After 
the interview aired one morning on Radio Veritas, Taylor’s minister of 
justice called in the station journalists and ordered them not to air it again. 
The station agreed not to rebroadcast the interview. “Every other day they 
[Taylor off icials] were calling me, threatening me to shut the station down; 
threatening to revoke the license; threatening to issue f ines,” said Ledger-
hood. The government was also unhappy with the JPC reports aired about 
abuses countrywide. But Taylor was not anxious to confront the Catholic 
Church and was still trying to gain international respect. “The church 
has a great force, both internationally and locally.”12 In 2000, the regime 
briefly shut the station down but reopened it after a barrage of domestic 
and international complaints. The station agreed to let go John Stewart, a 
human rights activists from the 1970s who was then broadcasting Voices 
from the Front Line, as well as a popular, non-JPC program Topical Issues.
Woods, who grew up poor with a single mother who was often ill, credits 
her for his own passion about how people are treated. He continued his own 
10 Woods interview.
11 Frances Johnson-Morris, in an interview with the author, June 22, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
She was head of the JPC 2004-2005 and later minister of justice in the administration of Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf. In 1997 she was chief justice of the Supreme Court.
12 Rennie Ledgerhood, in an interview with the author, June 16, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
Peaceful Resistance duRing a ciVil waR 183
activism with various organizations after his tenure as director of the JPC, 
helping organize what he calls “stay homes:” civil disobedience in protest of 
abuses by Taylor. His activism made him a target of the regime, leading him 
to make frequent changes in where he slept at night, welcomed by friends 
and supporters despite the risks they took in doing so.
I lived in communities where ordinary people protected me without 
weapons. They said to me that we are protecting you because you are 
advocating for us … I always believe that good will transform evil but good 
will not transform evil by retreating from evil. We must confront evil. 
It is only by confronting evil that we offer society a moral alternative.13
Human Rights Activism – “Delivering Body Blows to Taylor”
Taylor’s repression stimulated a growing resistance. “I think they intensi-
f ied human rights advocacy by their repression because – the more they 
became repressive, the more people became resilient.”14 By some accounts 
of Liberians interviewed, repression under President Taylor was as bad as 
or worse than under Doe. Human rights attorney Dempster Brown, one of 
those who challenged Taylor on legal grounds, said bluntly: “He was worse 
than Doe.” An example of the violent and unpredictable behavior of some 
of Taylor’s forces during his presidency adds credence to the comparisons. 
Noweh Flomo sold peanuts in a market in Monrovia. She was outside her 
home one day in July 1998, the year after Taylor’s election. Some Taylor 
security personnel came to her house to see her niece who was staying with 
her. They arrived in a pickup with music blaring and lights on. Noweh told 
them the war was over and it was no longer time to act like rebels. “They took 
her into her home, raped her and slit her throat,” recalled Etweda Cooper, 
then running the secretariat for the Liberia Women’s Initiative (LWI), a 
peace movement. But what happened next showed the strength of the 
human rights activists even at a time of severe repression. Cooper called a 
press conference to denounce the murder and was herself ordered to report 
to the police, which she did, f lanked by six lawyers including well-known 
human rights lawyer Tiawan Gongloe and several attorneys from the female 
lawyers association. Police were apparently intimidated by this show of 
solidarity by known activists and all but one of them quickly found an 
13 Woods interview.
14 Gongloe interview.
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excuse to leave the police station. She was read her rights, something the 
female lawyers had never seen done for a woman in years. Cooper added:
Then you had everybody calling: you had the human rights groups calling; 
you had the international human rights calling. The National Endow-
ment for Democracy called. You had the women who decided they were 
going to demonstrate the next day. It was on Focus on Africa on the BBC 
because the women had called the BBC. There were members in Taylor’s 
government who went to talk to him. Several ambassadors and human 
rights agencies called Taylor. At about 9 [p.m.] I was freed.15
Liberians had awakened to their power of claiming their rights. Some of 
them had been in the Liberian diaspora and had returned to Monrovia from 
the United States, accustomed to the freedoms of America. As the number 
of advocacy organizations grew, people began coordinating their efforts 
and cooperating. “They were even coming together as networks.” When 
someone in civil society was arrested for speaking out against abuses, the 
local newspapers published it; people talked openly about it. Various tactics 
were used to curb repressive acts by the rebel coalition regime. On one oc-
casion, people had been asked to wear black for a day; on another occasion, 
civil servants were asked to stay home for a day.16 Taylor responded to this 
growing activism. But when Taylor began targeting opponents, human 
rights groups began targeting Taylor.
As soon as he got into off ice, [Taylor] started targeting the human rights 
groups. He didn’t like the human rights groups [or] the press. People dis-
appeared during Mr. Taylor’s time. A lot of people disappeared; sometimes 
we’d f ind the bodies after two or three months. So – starting around 
2000, Mr. Taylor became the target of the human rights groups because 
he was very brutal. We insisted that he should be removed from off ice.17
International Support for Advocacy
Though there was no one central organization opposing Taylor, there were 
several opposition groups in civil society that were well organized, including 
15 Cooper interview.
16 Cooper interview.
17 Brown interview. 
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the Coalition of Human Rights Defenders. “We were highly organized and 
the leadership was focused on the rule of law and dignity for man.”18 The 
coalition was formed by local activists with help from other countries 
including Canada and Senegal. The National Human Rights Center and more 
than two dozen other organizations became a part of the coalition, which 
began working closely with international human rights groups such as 
Amnesty International. At one point the coalition staged a march to protest 
human rights abuses, defying a threat by Taylor not to do it. Dempster 
Brown, a leader in the human rights struggle, was one of those arrested. 
Quick response by human rights groups abroad and by Archbishop Francis, 
who called Taylor, led to Brown’s release. On another occasion, Brown went 
to Taylor’s minister of justice to demand the release of 125 persons jailed 
without trial. They got into a shouting match. “You do not have the legal 
right to put people in jail without trial,” Brown insisted. He was not detained.
Given the high level of repression during the early Taylor regime years, 
however, there was not the more classical social movement with a for-
mal organizations; that was too dangerous. Instead, the movement was 
multicentered; that is, there were various points of resistance including 
some organizations but also an informal network of human rights lawyers, 
independent journalists, a handful of outspoken clergy, and others. When 
a principal activist in this loose social movement was arrested, it trigged a 
response by other parts of the movement, as in the case of Brown’s arrest. 
When Bility would get arrested, a group of human rights lawyers would 
descend on the police who were holding him, as human rights attorney 
Frances Johnson-Morris, an activist attorney at the time, explained. “We 
were asking and calling upon government to release him [Bility] and draw-
ing the attention of government to his bad treatment and the torture. There 
was this overwhelming solidarity. Not just with the JPC but with the other 
human rights organizations.”19
According to Liberian political scientist Elwood Dunn: “Human rights 
activism was delivering body blows to Taylor’s political machine as their 
activities delegitimized the regime on a daily basis.”20 The National Bar As-
sociation also challenged Taylor in 2001. The bar association in Liberia had 
been banned and was “inactive and scared” in the 1980s under Doe.21 Under 
Taylor, “a few members of the bar [were] outspoken but as an organization 
18 Brown interview.
19 Johnson-Morris interview. 
20 Elwood Dunn, in an e-mail to the author, 2006.
21 Best interview.
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it has not been in the forefront of radical or social transformation.”22 There 
were exceptions. In 2001, Councilor Emmanuel Wureh, an associate justice 
of the Supreme Court, was arrested under a sweeping legislative contempt 
ruling. The bar association temporarily froze the courts with a boycott. Two 
leaders of the bar, Marcus Jones and Ismael Campbell, were imprisoned for 
opposing the legislative ruling. Taylor promised to release the two if they 
apologized. “They told the American Ambassador [who visited them in 
prison] that they would never apologize to Mr. Taylor. They prefer to die 
in jail. So Mr. Taylor could not penetrate the National Bar Association.”23 
They were released in two months when the legislative ruling against them 
expired.
The number of human rights organizations mushroomed in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. But despite what appeared outwardly as a mass movement 
for human rights, the number of activists willing to risk the dangers of open 
advocacy against the regime was relatively small, according to activists 
interviewed. Many of these organizations were just after donor funds; 
the actual number of committed human rights organizations was “very 
small,” according to international human rights award winner Aloysius 
Toe.24 Human rights organizations were in close contact with international 
organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights 
Watch, and Amnesty International. “The various international human 
rights groups would then link up – buttress the work of local human rights 
groups by issuing statements, by extending their advocacy internationally 
and giving voice to advocacy on the ground.”25 Taylor tried to cloak his 
administration in a robe of legality as he continued to seek international 
support and legitimacy from Liberians themselves. Without this goal, Taylor 
might have been even more brutal against the human rights defenders.
Ripples of Hope: Activists Inspire Others
Leaders of the anti-Taylor nonviolent social movement sometimes found 
themselves the focus of unexpected public support in the form of sponta-
neous demonstrations. Tiawan Gongloe was a courageous human rights 
22 Gongloe interview.
23 Brown interview.
24 Aloysius Toe, in an interview with the author, June 24, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. Toe, like 
fellow Liberian activist Kof i Woods, was a winner of the Reebok Human Rights award.
25 Gongloe interview. 
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supporter as a human rights attorney. In 2003, Gongloe received the highest 
human rights award from Human Rights Watch. Binaifer Nowrojee, then 
counsel with the Africa division of HRW, said at the time: “During the dark-
est days of Liberia’s civil conflicts, Tiawan Gongloe was a beacon of hope. 
Without Mr. Gongloe’s courageous intervention, many political detainees, 
journalists, and other victims of abuse would have languished in prison or 
worse” (Human Rights Watch 2003). In 2002, Gongloe was arrested for a 
speech he gave during a visit to Guinea in which he advocated for human 
rights. He was taken to Monrovia police station and tortured through the 
night with severe beatings and candle wax poured on his body. Word quickly 
spread what was happening and a mass gathering occurred outside the 
police station then later at a hospital where he was taken the next day.
To my surprise thousands of people turned out to f ight the dreadful 
special police force of Taylor called the Special Operation Mission and 
came to the police station and advocated for my release. Many persons 
were arrested as a result of that but they remained def iant until I was 
released and taken to the hospital. Thousands of people turned out to 
visit me at the hospital.26
Toe, another human rights attorney, also gave hope to others and inspired 
some to join in resistance of one form or another. His resistance exemplif ies 
the complex interweaving of individual and organizational activism in 
Liberia under Doe as well as the range of tactics, target audiences, and 
motives of key activists. “We had to use personal strategies and tactics 
at times. At other times it was organizational.” As we parted after a long 
interview at his home outside of Monrovia, Toe, answered my last question 
about what motivated him to take the risks he had. “Gandhi and Martin 
Luther King,” he said quickly, adding: “I can’t be silent in the face of evil.”27 
In a separate interview (McConnell 2008), he said he was also inspired by 
Henry David Thoreau. He elaborated on his motivation: “I can’t really say 
how brave I am but there comes a time when everybody falls silent and 
then a voice that I refer to as God [picks me] up and says, ‘It is by you that 
others are being kept alive.’ I take courage from that.”
26 Gongloe interview. 
27 Toe interview.
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Array of Tactics in the Resistance
During the dangerous Taylor years he was anything but silent, showing 
how one individual can help create some of the ripples of hope that Robert 
Kennedy spoke of in 1966. Toe operated at times as a courageous individual 
and at times as an organizational activist in collaboration with other human 
rights groups such as the National Human Rights Center of Liberia and the 
Liberia Coalition of Human Rights Defenders, both comprised of member 
groups. His activism included helping build popular understanding of 
human rights. “He started over 100 human rights clubs [and] called at-
tention to human rights abuses and promoted human rights education in 
Liberian schools. He also organized a network of 245 volunteers in rural 
communities to monitor and report human rights abuses. In 2001, he led 
non-violent protests against the politically motivated murders of Liberian 
activists” (Malek 2005). In 2002, Taylor, who Toe described as “very, very, 
very arrogant,” began arresting “dissident collaborators.” Rebels in LURD 
were pressing Monrovia. Taylor began arresting Mandingos, an ethnic 
group he suspected supported LURD rebels against him. Taylor was trying 
to argue that it was for the good of the country to make the arrests. Toe 
responded with challenges to the regime at several levels and with a variety 
of tactics.28
1 Local level. He f iled writs of habeas corpus on behalf of some of those 
arrested and he issued press statements against the arrests.
2 National level. When Taylor said the cases would be handled by mili-
tary courts, Toe went to the military courts and f iled more writs of 
habeas corpus. He had seven attorneys helping him in this campaign, 
including Dempster Brown and Beyan Howard. During the resistance 
to Taylor, it became fairly typical that a number of attorneys would 
show up to challenge arrests of activists. They were usually acting as 
individuals without the support of the National Bar Association which 
was only periodically active as an organization in defense of human 
rights.
3 International level. Toe f iled complaints in Banjul, Gambia, with the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. He also docu-
mented some of the arrests and passed the information to Amnesty 
International, with whom he was working on a project at the time, and 
to other international human rights organizations.
28 Toe interview.
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4 Mass action: When the courts didn’t respond, he organized a prayer 
breakfast. He invited President Taylor and diplomats: Only the US 
charge d’affairs came. He invited some 150 religious organizations: only 
the Muslims came. No United Nations or other international off icials 
came.
5 March. He organized a peaceful protest march to Taylor’s Executive 
Mansion to present a petition to the president. Instead, the government 
sought his arrest. “Nineteen well-armed state security came to my 
home.” Like numerous other activists engaged in dangerous tactics 
challenging the regime at various times, Toe wasn’t sleeping in his home 
and thus escaped arrest, though his wife was at home and was taken 
into custody. She was released the next day upon the intervention of 
John Blaney, US ambassador to Liberia (2002-2005). Taylor responded 
to the planned march by putting Monrovia on a war footing, with 
helicopters overhead. “Every street had soldiers with AK47s and RPGs.” 
Taylor charged that human rights activists were inf iltrating rebels 
into the city. Taylor was looking for Toe. “I went underground for eight 
days. I refused to go into exile. Either Taylor killed you or he sent you 
into exile. I said even if I get killed, this is the price some must pay” to 
advance the rights of others. Then he took what he described as “the 
ultimate gamble”: he turned himself in. He was charged with treason 
and imprisoned. At this point it was clear that Taylor was not just after 
Toe: he was determined to halt all resistance to his continued rule and 
plans for reelection.
In the illegitimate governing process adopted by the Liberian Govern-
ment, student leaders, journalists, politicians, human rights advocates 
and lawyers have fallen victim. It appears that the time has come for 
religious leaders, [to speak out]. History has proven people’s power in 
the Philippines, Romania, Indonesia Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and many 
other places. In union [we are] strong; success is sure; we cannot fail” 
(Gongloe 2002).
After eight months in prison, as rebels closed in on Monrovia and shelling 
was occurring, prison personnel f led and the prisoners broke open the 
gates and fled, too, in June 2003. Toe smuggled himself out of Liberia by 
boat to neighboring Côte D’Ivoire. He stayed there four months, returning 
in August 2003 after Taylor resigned.
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Courage and Commitment: Intangible “Resources” in the 
Struggle for Human Rights
The usual concept in social movement theories of material “resources” as 
key to a movement does not apply very well to repressive settings such 
as Liberia was in this period. The country is one of the poorest in Africa, 
located on the poorest continent in the world. Although some of the activists 
were well educated and came from various professions such as academics, 
law, journalism, the clergy, the organizations through which many of them 
carried out their advocacy for human rights and democracy were modest 
at best. A few organizations attracted international grants, especially in 
the later part of the study period. But often locally based organizations 
had little in the way of resources to offer their activist members, including 
clerical, f inancial, security or other assistance.
What the Liberian resistance did have, however, they used well: courage; 
ideas; ideals; a commitment to freedoms such as the rule of law; a sense 
of human rights (such as the right to due process in court, the right to 
publish and speak, and the right to assemble); and in the case of some of 
the politician activists, the ambition for political power. The focus of the 
human rights movement was on the absence of rule of law and the physi-
cal abuses by the Taylor regime. Challenges to the regime often met with 
arrests, sometimes torture, and death. The defenders of human rights did 
not have weapons, but they had these ideas that were powerful enough to 
build momentum and to gain both domestic and international support. It 
was really a battle of ideas vs. a tyrant. “We didn’t have arms, but we were 
using our pens.”29
An example of this courage and commitment was journalist Hassan 
Bility. Taylor’s persistent persecution of Bility was triggered by his persistent 
reporting from 2000 to 2002 in the Analyst newspaper and interviews with 
the BBC about Taylor’s human rights abuses, including Taylor’s connections 
to Sierra Leone. Bility was arrested seven times and held from one day to 
six months, altogether in thirteen different prisons as Taylor tried to hide 
his whereabouts. At one point he was held for more than two weeks in an 
underground cell partially f illed with water. During the night he was taken 
out and subjected to torture by electric shocks all over his body. In the cell 
he tried to sleep on a metal beam above the water. “If you slept, you rolled 
into the water. My feet were swollen; I had to crawl on my knees. They tied 
your hands behind your back so the two elbows touched each other … 
29 Brown interview.
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for hours. The rope would cut into your flesh.” When Bility was arrested, 
sympathetic guards would smuggle out his communications to friends such 
as lawyer Aloysius Toe, who in turn would forward it to the international 
human rights groups. This probably saved his life and almost certainly 
played a factor in his release.30
The example of activists such as Bility sheds light on this concept of 
“resources” as well as motivational issues for activists. The rational choice 
argument that people act out of self-interest31 would seem to falter in cases 
like his and that of some of the most ardent activists elsewhere, including 
the other sub-Saharan African countries highlighted in this study. Some 
Kenyan attorneys freely admitted it was in their self-interest as professionals 
to see rule of law restored. But why would a lawyer or a journalist risk 
possible torture or even death to publish an article or land additional legal 
clients?32 A pure dichotomy between self-interest and selfless interest does 
not satisfy. Bility argues that the concept of self-interest was involved but 
not in the way it is usually treated. “People do things out of self-interest. 
But the def inition of self-interest needs clarif ication …The reason I was in 
this [activism] was to see a better Liberia … I wanted people to have food 
and move freely. Seeing people happy was the motivation. The situation 
had become so hopeless that if I left, no one would expose things to the 
international community.”
Women’s Peace Movements
The women’s peace movement began in early 1994 when Mary Brownell 
formed the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI) which was the beginning 
of “a movement rather than simply an organization or a coalition of or-
ganizations” (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 17). It operated 
publicly, at some risk, with a central organization and was later joined by 
other key women’s peace organizations. It had an identif ied leadership 
and a membership who, especially in a later phase in 2003, the last year of 
the war, organized mass marches or vigils with women wearing white as 
a symbol of peace. The movement engaged Christians and Moslems, rich 
30 Bility interview.
31 See, among others, Mancur Olson (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the 
theory of Groups.
32 Some professionals and others took these risks while most did not, a behavior Olson (1965) 
explained as a “free rider” phenomenon. 
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and poor. They used a variety of tactics ranging from published statements 
and individual lobbying of rebel leaders and heads of state to, attending 
peace conferences, mass marches and “stay home” strikes. Though women 
were active in the peace campaign from 1994 to 2003, the year the war 
ended, much of the international attention has focused on the important 
and dramatic marches and vigil of the last few months of the war. Among 
the leaders of that f inal push for peace was Leymah Gbowee, who was 
interviewed for a f ilm on the campaign and in 2011 was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize along with Liberia’s (and Africa’s) f irst elected female president, 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. This section will examine highlights of the early peace 
movement as well as the dramatic campaign of 2003.
Women are usually depicted as victims of conflict, which they are. In the 
relevant literature “the majority of it tends to view women as victims rather 
than as active actors, largely as a result of patriarchal structures” (Karam 
2000, 2). But women in conflict states can also be agents for change, includ-
ing in a post-conflict society if they are part of the entire peace process. In 
Liberia, from 1994 to 2003, women found ways to involve themselves in the 
peace process despite the reluctance of the male negotiators to allow them 
to participate. The Liberian case stands out in three ways:
1 Women used their status as victims, and especially as mothers, to gain 
credibility in their peace campaigns and to help persuade the men to 
listen to them, which they did. The case of Liberia recalls past images of 
mothers of Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala, especially, who also used 
their status as mothers to insist on an end to conflict and a return of 
missing loved ones.
2 Liberian women peacemakers went beyond demanding an end to con-
flict: they employed creative tactics to engage informally in the peace 
process itself. United Nations resolutions call for such participation, 
especially in peace negotiations. But women have rarely succeeded 
in joining peace talks. “Off icial peace processes remain almost an 
exclusively male domain, and little has been done to encourage women’s 
equal participation” (Sorensen 1998, 28).33 In Liberia, the women were 
never allowed seats at the actual peace table, but they did manage to 
engage rebel negotiators in informal talks. And they rallied thousands 
33 Sorensen notes, however (12), that women have been creative in some countries to help 
bring about peace. In Columbia, women march to the front areas to seek peace; in the Balkans 
and the Caucasus women hid husbands and sons, lying to authorities about their whereabouts 
to keep them from being recruited into the f ighting; in the Philippines, women started “peace 
zones” to protect children from recruitment by militias and the army.
Peaceful Resistance duRing a ciVil waR 193
of Liberian women to mass demonstrations, marches, and educational 
campaigns focused on peace and human rights.
3 The case of the Liberian women peacemakers also stands out as an ef-
fective, nonviolent, political social movement in Africa, a region seldom 
studied through the lens of social movement theories. The women 
framed their message of peace in ways that attracted thousands of 
women, ranging from educated elites to illiterates. They formed alli-
ances with other organizations, both male and female, and they made 
effective use of the media, both domestic and international.
In early 1994, a small group of women launched a peace campaign aimed 
at bringing peace to Liberia after four years of devastating civil war. Mary 
Brownell and about a dozen other women organized the LWI to press 
the rebel leaders to come together to end the civil war that had begun in 
December 1989. They organized two mass meetings in Monrovia calling for 
elections, full disarmament and an end to the war. Reaction among rebel 
leaders was mixed; some of it was quite negative. “We were called all kinds 
of names. We were puppets of Sawyer [then interim president], we were 
called prostitutes, we were [described] as looking for jobs, husbands, and 
lovers … frustrated women … We had interests, we did not have positions. 
Our interest was peace: we were not looking for jobs.”34
The Catholic Church, led by Father Francis, was one of the biggest sup-
porters of the LWI. That, along with his denouncements of the violence, led 
to the Taylor rebel forces in April 1996 setting f ire to the main off ice of the 
church and its radio station, Radio Veritas, which had been broadcasting 
accounts of violence against civilians during the war. Tipped off that she, 
too, might be a target, Brownell, with the help of another rebel group led 
by Alhaji Kromah, went into hiding and later was evacuated by ECOMOG 
and flown to Freetown in neighboring Sierra Leone. When she returned she 
and the other women in LWI continued to press for peace until Taylor was 
elected president in 1997. On numerous occasions, members of various rebel 
groups, including Taylor’s, warned her of plots against her and urged her to 
avoid certain events. Like many women in this early peace social movement, 
Brownell credits her faith for her protection, including not having her house 
burned down as happened to the homes of many perceived enemies of the 
state. “God was always with me … He sent his angels and they spread their 
wings over my house.”35
34 Cooper interview.
35 Mary Brownell, in an interview with the author, June 20, 2006, in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
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Prayers were a key part of the work of the women involved in the 
peace campaigns. LWI actions, for example, included marches, petitions 
to rebel leaders, fasts, but also “prayer meetings held weekly in churches 
and mosques throughout the country.” Working in collaboration with the 
Interfaith Mediation Council, the Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Com-
mission, and the Council of Chiefs, women organized “stay home” days in 
1993, March 1995, and early 1996. “The stay-home days paralyzed Monrovia, 
closing markets, government buildings, transport and businesses, and were 
so successful they were called ‘the ghost town action.’” The actions were 
aimed at advancing peace talks but they also served to develop a sense 
of solidarity among the collaborating groups (African Women and Peace 
Support Group, 21, 18).
The main goal of the movement was ending the war. With some donations 
from local Liberian business interests, some of the women began travel-
ling to the series of peace conferences. They asked to be part of the peace 
delegations but were refused by the rebel leaders. Nevertheless, they made 
their presence known. “Even though they did not give us that [a seat at the 
peace talks], I tell you, every decision that they were making, they consulted 
us, the women.” They would win public commitments from the rebels then 
seek to hold them accountable. Later, when it became clear the rebel leaders 
were not moving toward peace, the women stepped up their activism. “We 
took to the air waves and we would blast them out: This is not what you 
promised us; you promised us to do better; you promised us that the war 
will come to an end, that you will stop f ighting and everything else.”36
Repeatedly they were refused a seat at the peace talks; it was even a 
challenge at f irst to be accredited as observers. However, they talked to 
delegates outside the formal sessions. “When they came out they wanted 
to meet with us. We did not side with anybody; we were just neutral.”37 A 
partial breakthrough came in 1995 at a summit meeting of the nine West 
African presidents and rebel faction leaders. The women’s groups had 
prepared a detailed paper documenting the suffering of civilians in the 
war. But spokesmen for the presidents refused them entry into the hall. 
Then Jerry Rawlings, president of Ghana, and presiding at the conference, 
broke with protocol and announced: “We have listened to the men, we have 
listened to all the factions, but we never listened to the civilians; we have 
never listened to our mothers, we have never listened to our sisters.” With 
that he welcomed Theresa Leigh-Sherman, an educator and a leader in the 
36 Brownell interview.
37 Brownell interview.
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movement, to the podium where she delivered a thirty-minute report, later 
recalling the impact. “The whole hall stood up and started clapping. The 
presidents, tears were in their eyes because they didn’t know our side, and 
that turned the issue of Liberia around. They saw a different perspective 
of the war. They saw how we were suffering” (African Women and Peace 
Support Group, 77).
“When Mother Calls”
One of the more dramatic methods employed by the Liberian women 
peacemakers came in 1995 when the vicious civil war was dragging on and 
rebel leaders were not making progress at peace talks. Liberian women 
peacemakers invited them to a private session in Monrovia designed as 
an icebreaker. The question was: would they show up? Setting aside other 
meetings they had for that day, representatives of all the rebel factions came 
to the women’s sensitivity training. They arrived dressed in suits, not battle 
fatigues. “When your mother calls you, you must show up,” said one of the 
rebel participants. Their arrival confirmed a tradition in many countries 
that gives special status to mothers, as peace campaigner Etweda Cooper 
noted. “In Africa when your mother comes to you, to speak to you – you 
must listen. It has to be.”38
The rebels sat down for what was intended as a one-day session that 
stretched into four days. ECOWAS stationed troops from its ceasef ire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to provide security at the building where 
the meeting took place, so the press was alerted to the sessions going on 
in secret inside. But as they exited the sessions, the women would say “no 
comment.” In the meetings the women asked rebel leaders to engage in a 
series of group confidence-building exercises, including putting pieces of 
cut paper together as a puzzle, which required everyone’s cooperation and 
rebel leaders talking with each other and relaxing with each other. “They 
said they appreciated the approach we took … [that] they gained much more 
in the four days of dialogue” than might be seen in immediate political 
results, said Elizabeth Sele Mulbah, one of those conducting the sessions.39 
The rebels recommended that international facilitators in the formal peace 
negotiations use similar sessions, she added.
There is no way to measure what effect the session had on the war. The 
next month rebel leaders did sign an agreement in Nigeria calling for a 
38 Cooper interview.
39 Elizabeth Sele Mulbah, in an interview with the author, June 21, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia.
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ceasef ire and an interim government comprised of rebel faction leaders. 
But f ighting soon broke out again, effulging Monrovia itself the following 
April, and the government comprised of representatives of the main fighting 
forces collapsed. At a second peace conference in Nigeria in 1996, Ruth Perry 
was appointed head of state in a third transitional government until Taylor 
was elected president in July 1997. The election of Taylor brought relative 
peace, but only temporarily. In 1999, LURD rebels began a series of attacks 
that continued until 2003 when Taylor stepped down.
The peace movement revived with several new groups joining the 
campaign. One of them the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network 
(MARWOPNET) was formed in 2000 to push for peace in various ways 
and to get the three presidents in the immediate region – Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea – to help negotiate peace. Women in Peace Building 
Network (WIPNET) was formed in March 2003, just months before Taylor 
stepped down in August. It was led by Leymah Gbowee. In 2011, when 
Gbowee received the Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee 
announced she had “mobilized and organized women across ethnic and 
religious dividing lines to bring an end to the long war in Liberia, and 
to ensure women’s participation in elections.”40 WIPNET also included 
hundreds of women from refugee camps near Monrovia. At one point, about 
1,000 women in WIPNET, dressed in white, marched on city hall for a rally. 
Women such as Cecelie Danweli, a WIPNET activist at the time, were drawn 
into the peace campaign by what they saw with their own eyes as a result 
of the war. “We saw these babies dying from hunger, at one of the schools at 
the outskirts of Monrovia; old men were dying from hunger.” She and others 
were convinced that the women had to keep attending the peace talks. “If 
we don’t … talk to the ‘boys’ [warlords] about what’s happening, we may 
not have a Liberia.”41 In April, the group organized women in a sit-in at the 
small Sinkor, airf ield across from a f ish market, prompting sit-ins/vigils 
in towns around the country (African Women and Peace Support Group, 
44-7.) The group of women in Monrovia was there from dawn to dusk, rain 
or shine, on a highway President Taylor passed by regularly between his 
off ice and his residence.
40 The same year, in awarding the Nobel Prize to President Johnson-Sirleaf, the committee 
cited her for “having contributed to securing peace in Liberia, to promoting economic and 
social development, and to strengthening the position of women.” The third winner that year, 
Tawakkul Karman, was cited for having “played a leading part in the struggle for women’s rights 
and for democracy and peace in Yemen.”
41 Cecelie Danweli, in an interview with the author, June 21, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
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People told us that … we must be crazy. In Liberia when it rains you see 
everybody running. We have this saying in Liberia that Liberians are 
afraid of rain. But who are these women, by the way, who gather under 
the rain, whether it is raining or not; they don’t run. We followed our 
emotions and our instinct and we just went about doing things.42
Women Seize Peace Talks Hall
In June 2003, rebel leaders agreed on a ceasef ire and a transitional govern-
ment without Taylor. But almost immediately he reneged on his promise to 
step down and the agreement fell apart with LURD launching three attacks 
on Monrovia so devastating that they were dubbed locally as World Wars I, 
II, and III. “People ran on carpets of shell casings and carried their wounded 
by wheelbarrow or on their backs, desperately trying to reach the makeshift 
clinics operated by international volunteers.” Meanwhile in July, delegates 
walked on clean carpets at the four-star La Palme Royal Beach Hotel where 
they were staying in Accra, Ghana for peace talks. “In the off-hours, you 
could observe these self-satisf ied negotiators lounging around the pool 
in crisp new shirts, having drinks … The warlords were on vacation, with 
the international community paying for it all” (Gbowee 2011, 158). Leymah 
Gbowee was in Accra with other Liberian peace campaign women lobbying 
delegates outside the conference hall. She felt broken, defeated. “How could 
I have been so stupid as to think a handful of women could stop a war? You 
fooled me, God … Suddenly I felt a rage greater than any I’d ever known” (160). 
She decided to organize the women into a spontaneous sit-in, blocking the 
doors of the conference hall with their bodies until they signed an agree-
ment. “Sit at this door and loop arms,” she instructed the women. “No one 
will come out of this place until a peace agreement is signed.” She passed a 
note to former Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar: 
“We are holding these delegates, especially the Liberians, hostage. They will 
feel the pain of what our people are feeling at home.” General Abubakar 
announced to the delegates: “the peace hall has been seized by General 
Leymah and her troops” (161). Part of the pain delegates felt was the need 
to go to the bathroom. The Ghanaian press and stringers for international 
media covered the unusual tactic. After about an hour the women, following 
a talk with General Abubakar, agreed to withdraw but only after insisting 
that the talks proceed with all delegates attending regularly.
42 Lindora Diawara-Howard, in an interview with the author, June 22, 2006, Monrovia, Liberia. 
Diawara-Howard was a WIPNET organizer.
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What we’ve done today is send out a signal to the world that we, the 
Liberian women in Ghana, at this conference, we are fed up with the war 
and we are doing this to tell the world we are tired of the killing of our 
people. We can do it again – and we will do it again!” (163).
The following month, August 2003, Taylor handed over power to his vice 
president and went into exile in Nigeria where he was later arrested for 
trying to leave the country without notice. Under indictment by the United 
Nations-backed Special Court of Sierra Leone, he was detained and eventu-
ally tried in The Hague, convicted, and sentenced to f ifty years. After an 
interim government headed by Guyde Bryant, who came under interna-
tional criticism on charges of off icial corruption, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was 
elected in November 2005. She was reelected in 2012.
Implications of Nonviolent Resistance during a Civil War
Theoretically, the two social movements mounted in Liberia between 1990 
and 2003, most the time during a civil war, show several important points: 
(1) how members of civil society in a repressive setting can mount a non-
violent resistance movement against a regime, and how such a movement 
starts; (2) how a movement seeking regime change can survive extreme 
repression by operating partially in secret (for planning) and partly openly 
with alliances and multiple organizations, not a central organization that 
could easily be shut down; (3) the importance of individual activism in 
repressive settings when key organizations (e.g., bar associations) are not 
supportive of members’ political activism; (4) how nonviolent resistance 
against a repressive regime can take place in a poor country with very 
limited material resources, where activists rely heavily on commitment to 
human rights and democracy as “resources”; (5) how women denied a place 
at peace talks can still have an impact.
There were contrasts in the way the two social movements operated 
which offer insights on social movements’ survival in repressive settings. 
The women’s campaign, which was not seeking regime change but peace, 
had a central organization (f irst just one; later several), and functioned 
publically with clearly identif ied leaders. Though occasionally threatened 
by rebels in the pre-Taylor regime period, they generally did not face extreme 
dangers because they were no direct threat to the power of President Taylor. 
The second movement, whose aim was regime change, operated without a 
centralized, formal leadership. That would have provided too easy a target 
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for Taylor. Instead the movement was a loosely linked collection of small 
groups, sometimes united in coalitions, and involving both individual and 
organizational activism. Even so, the leaders of the various elements of the 
movement were well known, and some of them were targeted for abuse by 
the regime. Activists were linked through professional or social relation-
ships, or both. They used a variety of tactics including legal challenges, 
strikes, critical publications, clerical criticism, and information gathering. 
Their reports and f indings were relayed to international organizations, 
including embassies and human rights groups which in turn put pressure 
on Taylor.
Liberian President Samuel Doe (1980-90) managed to thwart forma-
tion of an effective nonviolent social movement against his regime with 
extreme repression. President Charles Taylor (1997-2003) would have liked 
to do the same but things had changed by the time he was elected after 
leading a rebel force since late 1989. First, there was a relatively calm 
period of freedom of speech and association under the interim presidency 
of academic Amos Sawyer (1990-94). Many newspapers and human rights 
organizations formed during this period and Liberians (at least in Monro-
via) grew accustomed to exercising basic human rights. Second, this was 
also a period of major political transformation across sub-Saharan Africa 
from authoritarian regimes to many more democratic ones of varying 
quality. Finally the West, including the United States, was no longer playing 
the Cold War chess game in the region and was generally winding down 
automatic support for authoritarian regimes that had received aid simply 
because they were not communist. Third, when Taylor was elected, he 
sought – and needed – international recognition and support: Liberia is 
one of the poorest nations, and the rebel threat never fully went away. 
The civil war, which ended in 1997, restarted in 1999. Taylor tried to cloak 
his regime in a thin and all too transparent veil of legitimacy and rule of 
law and thus, to some extent, tried to tolerate those who would rip the 
veil down.
The peace campaign began in 1994 and was led by women. It continued 
until the end of the war, using a variety of tactics ranging from published 
statements and lobbying of delegates at peace talks to marches and sit-ins. 
There are lessons to learn from Liberia for women elsewhere who wish to 
move beyond their status of victims to that of actors in conflict states, in 
seeking to shape a return to peace and restoration of society along less 
patriarchal lines. The women’s peace campaign never drew the wrath 
Taylor levied on the anti-regime social movement which had two aims: 
(1) expose the human rights abuses of the regime; (2) push Taylor from 
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off ice. Whereas Taylor could accept a pro-peace campaign, he could not 
accept a regime-change campaign. Many of the activists of the anti-regime 
social movement were detained – some were tortured, some were killed. 
International notoriety kept some key activists alive and often resulted in 
their early release.
Were the movements effective? Liberia got rid of two authoritarian leaders 
in thirteen years: Doe in 1980 and Taylor in 2013, as Liberian human rights 
activist Pajibo noted. The resistance movements showed the courage, 
cunning, persistence, and commitment of its participants. However, this 
study does not argue that the movements brought peace or forced Taylor 
out of off ice. Peace came when Taylor resigned. He did so under pressure 
of rebel attacks by LURD that had reached the edge of Monrovia itself, and 
under an international indictment for supplying Sierra Leone rebels arms 
in exchange for diamonds to fund his own war in Liberia. But human rights 
and peace advocates had weakened his claims of legitimacy, exposed his 
repugnant abuses of power, and engaged the international community in 
the campaigns against him.
In the end Taylor may have lost because he forgot the story of the el-
ephant. At one of his last meetings with Taylor, one of his closest confidants, 
Thomas Woewiyu, reminded him of the elephant story:
In my tribe, the Bassa, they said you don’t show a child an elephant. You 
don’t have to tell him that’s an elephant because he knows right away. 
The thing that Taylor neglected to know was when he saw an elephant he 
thought maybe it was an ant. He didn’t know the power of the elephant, 
and that was his problem. I said to him, you know, Mr. President, the 
United States rules the world, and they rule everything in it. You try to 
exempt yourself and you don’t let that elephant recognize you, it will 
step on you.
Eventually President George W. Bush called for Taylor’s resignation. The 
LURD rebel force that had reached the edge of Monrovia was based in 
Guinea and aided by that government. LURD also had at least the “tacit 
support of Britain and the United States,” but in many ways was “no differ-
ent” than Taylor’s forces (Global Security).
The war ended in 2003, the same year Liberia ratif ied the UN Convention 
on the International Criminal Court. Among President Johnson-Sirleaf’s 
early appointments in 2005 were some of the leaders of the human rights 
campaigns, including Tiawan Gongloe and Kof i Woods. Aloysius Toe 
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continued his human rights advocacy as did numerous other former ac-
tivists against Taylor. President Johnson-Sirleaf tackled the business of a 
country nearly broke, ridden by decades of ethnic strife and mistrust and 
with a crumbling infrastructure. The peace continued.
In the struggle between principled ideas and the force of the Doe and Tay-
lor regimes, activist attorney Gongloe said the regimes mistakenly thought 
they could silence the opposition with brutality but ended up helping create 
a movement against them. “I think they intensif ied human rights advocacy 
by their repression because the more they became repressive, the more 
people became resilient … Their despotism … brought human rights issues 
to the front … Pressmen were writing about abuses; journalists were being 
arrested and newspaper houses were being burned. People were going into 
exile. So human rights issues became a major issue of concern.”43 Liberian 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Leymah Gbowee said: “You can tell people of the 
need to struggle. But when the powerless start to see that they really can 
make a difference, nothing can quench the f ire.”44
43 Tiawan Gongloe interview.
44 Gbowee’s quote is included in an op-ed October 9, 2011 by Carol Mithers in the Los Angeles 
Times, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/oct/09/opinion/la-oe-mithers-gbowee-nobel-
peace-prize-20111009, accessed March 1, 2014.
Figure 9  Young street salesman, Monrovia, Liberia, 2006
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Figure 10  Village home, Liberia, 2006
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Part three
Kenya
Figure 11  Human rights activist Rumba Kinuthia, Nairobi, Kenya, 2002
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7 Individual Resistance against 
Repression
In a repressive setting, a social movement is not comprised solely of people 
who say they are part of a resistance organization; it also includes individu-
als and members of small, informal groups who are working for the same 
aim – regime reform or regime change.
Rumba Kinuthia is a tall man with a deep voice. He f irst granted me a 
ten-minute interview in Nairobi, Kenya, but it ended up taking nearly two 
hours. He recounted how in 1979 when the government barred two leading 
political activists from running for Parliament,1 he was president of the 
Students Organization of Nairobi University (SONU) and organized a mass 
student protest. Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi, who had succeeded 
Kenya’s f irst president, Jomo Kenyatta, when Kenyatta died the previous 
year, was nervous about suspected plots against him. As a result of the 
protest, the University was closed; Kinuthia was expelled and detained.
I was mistreated very badly for 38 days. I was denied food [at times] and 
kept in a water clogged cell. They would keep me in the water for about 
3 days, and then remove me and take me to a dry cell. And then I’d stay 
there for a few days, go for interrogation and then I’d be taken back [to 
the flooded cell. During the interrogations he was beaten with] whips 
and wooden planks and belts [He drew out his words with long, hissing 
s’s.]. I would be naked. Stark naked.2
Kinuthia is an example of both individual and later small organizational 
activism that is explored in the two chapters dealing with Kenya. He is also 
an example of a professional who is drawn into nonviolent resistance to a 
regime largely out of his commitment to principles of his profession and 
not as a member of a social movement organization. He began defending 
political dissidents as Moi, especially after an attempted coup by elements 
of the air force in 1982, became more paranoid and determined to wipe out 
any forms of resistance. His legal work was carried out as an individual; at 
the time, his professional organization, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), was 
not politically active. Rather than being cowed into submission, after being 
1 Kenyatta’s f irst vice president, Oginga Odinga, and George Anyonya.
2 Rumba Kinuthia, in an interview with the author, August 21, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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tortured, he continued defending political dissidents. In 1990 he helped 
organize an illegal (in the view of the government) political opposition 
rally at Kamkunji grounds in Nairobi and was again arrested, tortured, and 
detained for three years. Still not subdued, he continued his activism and 
in 1997 ran unsuccessfully for Parliament.3 When the interview was over, 
he stood up from behind his desk in his law off ice and said he enjoyed the 
conversation. How could he have “enjoyed” telling me about his torture? 
I got the impression it was the f irst time he and many other interviewees 
had ever been asked such detailed questions about their experiences in 
the resistance.
Where did activists such as these get their resilience, such courage? Who 
were these individuals who stood up to a repressive regime and lived to 
tell their stories? How were they part of a nonviolent social movement 
that helped bring political change to Kenya? David S. Meyer (2002, 20) 
reminded scholars to not lose track of the dangers activists sometimes face, 
to remember the people, and not get totally absorbed in abstract theory. 
I tried to keep this idea in mind as I made my way back and forth across 
Nairobi, the capital, tracking down former activists, gathering accounts of 
what they did.
The period I chose to focus on was from the 1980s to 20024 when the 
ruling party for the first time finally lost in a democratic election. Slowly, the 
outlines of a political resistance social movement began to emerge, one that 
grew later into a culture of resistance with open and widespread challenges 
to the regime.5 It was sketchy at f irst: there was no unifying account of the 
various people who had resisted the repression. And the resistance was not 
the type usually described as a social movement. Instead, it involved both 
individual and organizational activism, including individual attorneys, 
writers, academics, clerics, opposition politicians, and others who chal-
lenged the regime and its legitimacy using a variety of nonviolent tactics.
When it was too dangerous for open, organized resistance, activists 
often operated as individuals, staying loosely connected through informal 
3 Kinuthia claims he was rigged out in favor of a government-supported candidate.
4 Though there were earlier legal challenges, including by Kinuthia and others, the legal chal-
lenge to torture by Kenyan attorney Gibson Kamau Kuria in 1987 that led to his own detention, 
stirred negative publicity in the US press and may have been an important factor in the state’s 
reduction (but not cessation) of torture of political dissidents.
5 As previously noted, I def ine a “culture of resistance” as one in which public challenges to 
the abuse of power by a regime becomes a norm for activists and for a visible segment of the 
general public.
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professional and social ties in a pre-cell phone era. After the regime gave 
in to growing domestic demands to allow multiparty elections starting in 
1992, the resistance shifted from one primarily of individuals and small 
groups to larger open groups, including opposition political parties and 
various civil society organizations.
This chapter focuses mostly on individual activism in Kenya primarily from 
1987-91, when this kind of resistance was most evident, building on earlier 
examples. I def ine individual activism as activism by persons who take 
part in a resistance without the support (e.g., f inancial, material, protec-
tion) of an organization. This can also include an activist who is a member 
of an organization too weak to provide such support. The second of two 
chapters on Kenya focuses mostly on resistance by small, informal groups, 
starting around 1991 and on mass demonstrations and other forms of public 
resistance that grew into a culture of resistance during the 1990s, helping 
bring a change of regime in 2002 when the ruling party was defeated in an 
election for the f irst time.6
During this f irst phase (1987-91), there never was a main resistance 
organization, but there was organization without organizations. The non-
violent resistance was fragmented, and diverse throughout this period. 
Yet like small streams coming together to form strong currents that, as 
Robert Kennedy (1966) once said, can “sweep down the mightiest walls of 
oppression,” such fragmented currents of resistance helped erode the pillars 
of power of the authoritarian regime. In a repressive setting, if one follows 
the energy in the resistance and the purpose of the activists, expanding the 
focus from primarily formal organizations and how they fit into the political 
process, one discovers a much broader range of participants in the resistance 
than most social movement studies detect. Initially the resistance in Kenya 
involved primarily individual activists unsupported by organizations, a 
phenomenon generally not included in social movement literature.
This broader range of activists in a repressive setting may include profes-
sionals drawn into the resistance not as members of a social movement or-
ganization but as individuals carrying out their professional commitments, 
as happened in Kenya as well as Liberia and Sierra Leone: e.g., attorneys 
responding to requests for defense from detained political activists and 
independent writers operating self-f inanced publications that issue strong 
critiques of the regime. This and other kinds of individual activism formed 
6 There is some overlap between the two periods with a few organizations speaking out in 
the late 1980s and some individual activism after 1991.
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an integral part in the early resistance in Kenya to the repressive regime 
of Daniel arap Moi, Kinuthia explained. “These were individual initiatives. 
There was no organized group. Because as you know, at that point, even 
holding a meeting, for people who were marked like us, was a very risky 
affair. So these were things which were being done by small groups of 
individuals.”7
The resistance in Kenya later included human rights organizations and 
the f irst, clandestine stirrings of opposition political parties whose activ-
ists organized two illegal mass rallies in 1990 and 1991. In late 1991, after 
nearly f ive years of growing domestic and some international pressure, Moi 
reluctantly agreed to accept multiparty elections starting in 1992. Most of 
the nearly 70 people interviewed credit acceptance of multiparty politics 
to f irst domestic resistance and next international pressures. There was a 
broad consensus that the domestic nonviolent resistance was what attracted 
international pressures on the regime. One of the president’s closest aides 
during the most repressive periods of the regime, Bethel Kiplagat, also 
credits domestic pressure f irst then international pressure with bringing 
about the change.
Kiplagat shared this observation in an interview. He greets his visitor 
on the ground floor of his off ice in Nairobi, then bounds up the stairs two 
at a time, to his off ice, closes the door, blocks his calls, then settles in and 
offers an insider view of the Moi regime. From 1983 to 1991, years of high 
levels of abuse of human rights, Kiplagat, a member of President Moi’s ethnic 
grouping, the Kalenjin, served as permanent secretary in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. He observed:
If there is no internal pressure, it is very diff icult for the West to put 
too much pressure. So the idea of having civil society, groups of people, 
a freer press, developing in a country is very helpful for changes. If you 
don’t have that, it’s very hard for foreigners to come in and start saying, 
you change; you must do this. They will in the end, but it takes longer.8
The two Kenya chapters explore activism in Kenya through several theo-
retical arguments that this book develops. In addition to the ones listed in 
the chapter on new theoretical perspectives, two minor theories are also 
introduced in this chapter: activism that depends on a chain of events in 
most acts of resistance; and the nearly invisible role of minor actors. Both 
7 Kinuthia interview.
8 Bethel Kiplagat, in an interview with the author, October 7, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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elements add to an argument that often social movements are unpredictable 
because of the unpredictability of the chain of events, which can break 
at any point, and the unpredictable role of minor actors which is often a 
spontaneous role.
Professionalism: an Overlooked Entry Path to Activism
An important contribution to nonviolent social movements comes from 
professionals drawn into an activist role through their profession, even 
when their own professional organization is not part of a resistance move-
ment and offers little or nothing in the way of support or protection. Some 
activists self-identify as such and wade into the resistance. Others may have 
the same commitment toward human rights and democracy but are drawn 
into the resistance by way of their profession, out of a commitment to the 
ideals of their profession. Attorneys and journalists were two examples 
of this in Kenya, something especially clear during the period of 1987-91 
when individual activism was at the forefront of the nonviolent resistance.
Human rights attorney Gibson Kamau Kuria is an example of an attorney 
drawn into activism through his legal work. His most prominent interven-
tion came in 1987 when three detainees subjected to torture retained him. 
“Gibson at times was purely a lawyer … not an opponent of the government. 
For him it was really a legal thing,” said Kenyan human rights attorney 
Maina Kiai.9 Kenyan attorney Martha Koome, who also took up cases of 
political detainees acknowledged: “There was no strategy that I thought 
about myself; I just got involved in the normal course of my work as an 
advocate.”10 One of the leading attorney activists for human rights, Paul 
Muite, noted that it was natural for some attorneys to wage legal battles 
against the regime to help strengthen the concept of rule of law which 
their profession required.11 Because such activists may not be members of 
a resistance organization, their contributions to a social movement under 
repressive conditions may easily be overlooked. In the case of Kenyan at-
torneys taking part in the nonviolent resistance in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
9 Maina Kia, in a telephone interview with the author, September 9, 2003 in the United 
States. Kia, a former employee of Amnesty International, had started the nongovernment Kenya 
Human Rights Commission. Under the Kibaki government he was appointed in 2003 to head 
the government’s human rights commission, a job which frequently put him at odds with the 
new administration.
10 Martha Koome, in an interview with the author, October 29, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya
11 Paul Muite, in an interview with the author, July 23, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. 
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they operated in contact with each other but without organizational support 
from their professional body, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), until it took 
an activist role starting in 1991 when Muite became its chair.
Resistance despite Repression, Few “Opportunities,” Limited 
Material Resources
As noted in the chapter on theoretical perspectives, most of the nonviolent 
resistance that took place in the three countries studied took place without 
major, perceived political opportunities or favorable structural conditions in 
society. Numerous studies have shown that resistance can take place under 
repression and some argue that repression actually stimulates more resistance. 
This study concurs with such findings. It differs from the preponderance of 
social movement literature in the past several decades, however, which have 
argued strongly for the presence of structural opportunities or openings in 
order for a social movement to progress. In Kenya the repression was severe at 
times, especially in the 1980s. But even by 1997, five years after the regime had 
permitted a switch to multiparty elections, government security personnel 
fired live bullets on demonstrators at a public rally in Nairobi, killing several. 
During the early phase of resistance in Kenya, the kinds of “opportunities” 
identified in main stream literature were of  little use to the movement. Though 
one could argue that increased international interest and donor pressure 
(inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pressure) provided activists with 
external opportunities, it was primarily internal, self-created opportunities 
by activists themselves that lay behind most of the domestic resistance.
Much of the social movement literature is structural, that is, it focuses 
on conditions in society beyond the control of activists. It argues that when 
those conditions or “opportunities” are favorable, movements are more 
likely to be able to proceed. Although later research has shown this is not 
always the case, often structural opportunities do seem to enhance move-
ments’ ability to proceed. This study highlights activism in three countries 
where there were seldom obvious “opportunities.”
The chapter now turns to exploring these theoretical themes in more depth 
through a study of the events and of the activists, primarily in the 1980s and 
early 1990s with some historical notes: (a) early resistance: the colonial era; 
post-colonial political murders; activism in the 1970s; (b) individual activism, 
starting mostly in the 1980s by attorneys, independent journalists, and oth-
ers, including the “chess game” of tactics between attorneys and the regime.
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Early Resistance
Kenya’s history of resistance dates back at least to the early 1900s with 
the struggle of the coastal Giriama against colonial British rule. Another 
example: some two thousand Kamba farmers in 1938 marched from their 
dry farming area to the capital, Nairobi, in protest of British policies to 
restrict the number of cattle allowed on their land. The governor agreed to 
their demands. From 1952 to 1956, in what Miller and Yeager (1994) describe 
as a “Kikuyu revolt,” an estimated sixteen thousand Mau Mau f ighters, 
motivated by loss of land in the central highlands dating back some 30 years, 
attacked police posts and isolated farms. The British responded by round-
ing up an estimated one hundred thousand Kenyans in detention camps; 
another one million were forced into stockade villages and thousands of 
homes and small villages were destroyed (24-5).12 Lonsdale, in a foreword 
to anthropologist Greet Kershaw’s book Mau Mau From Below (1997, xvi) 
writes that the Mau Mau involved “tens of thousands of Kikuyu people [who] 
felt impelled for reasons which remain hotly disputed, to organize and bind 
together their loyalties in order to undertake possible civil disobedience 
and even political murder.”
Kenya became independent in 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as the f irst presi-
dent. Although he promised a democratic, African socialist state, within 
a few years he had become “authoritarian” (Ochieng’ 1989, 94). Several 
prominent political f igures were murdered with suspicion focusing on the 
Kenyatta regime.13 Even so, there was some resistance to the government 
in Parliament itself where a group of parliamentarians dubbed “the seven 
bearded sisters” did their best to oppose the majority.14
12 It was not until 2013 that the British government acknowledged responsibility for the deaths 
of “many thousands of Mau Mau members” as well as the “torture and other forms of ill treatment 
at the hands of the colonial administration.” The government agreed to pay 5,228 claimants a 
total of £19.9 million and to help pay for a monument in Nairobi in memory of “the victims of 
torture and ill-treatment during the colonial era.” The British foreign secretary, William Hague, 
also identif ied the Mau Mau insurgency period as 1952-63 and claimed “the Mau Mau themselves 
were responsible for the deaths of over two thousand people including 200 casualties among 
the British regiments and police (Hague 2013).
13 These included Pio da Gama Pinto, a Goan, in 1965; popular labor leader and cabinet minister 
Tom Mboya, a Luo who was gunned down in Nairobi in 1969; and popular assistant minister 
and leader of the National Youth Service J.M. Kariuki, a Kikuyu, in 1975.
14 The seven “Bearded Sisters” included: Abuya Abuya, Onyano Midika, Moshengu wa Mwa-
chof i, James Orengo, Lawrence Sifuna, Dr. Chibule wa Tsuma, and Koigi wa Wamwere. One 
account (Schmidt and Kibara 2002, 10) includes George Anyona instead of Abuya Abuya.
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In 1978, President Kenyatta died in off ice and was succeeded by his vice 
president, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin. Moi stated in September 1978 that 
all Kenyans were answerable to him and he was answerable only to God.15 
Moi released political prisoners the same year but soon began cracking 
down on dissenters. Among academics in the opposition at the time were 
Katama Mkanga, Mukaru Ng’ang’a, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, Micere Mugo, 
Atieno Odhiambo, Shadrack Gutto, Willy Mutunga, and Gibson Kamau 
Kuria, many of whom were inspired by a Marxist philosophy (Ogot 1995, 
197-8).16 Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Anyona attempted to form an 
opposition political party but the government registrar of societies refused. 
Shortly after that, in June 1982, Parliament quickly passed a constitutional 
amendment making Kenya an one-party state de jure; it already was one de 
facto. Less than two months later, on August 1, 1982, elements of the air force 
attempted a coup d’état. “The coup attempt transformed Kenya’s political 
scene” leaving Moi “[s]everely shaken” (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 31). It was 
in the 1980s that he began cracking down hard on suspected opponents to 
the regime, including those suspected of being in one of the underground 
organizations, especially Mwakenya.
Hiding in a Charcoal Truck to Run for Parliament
Some stories are worth telling because they show a larger point. The fol-
lowing account illustrates several points: (1) the stubborn and courageous 
determination of some Kenyans to resist an increasingly authoritarian 
regime in the 1980s; (2) the equally stubborn and dangerous determina-
tion of the regime to prevent such challenges; (3) the regime’s charade of 
legitimacy of such state institutions as the courts and elections. The human 
rights attorney involved, Mirugi Kariuki, symbolizes dramatic accounts 
that marked pivotal points in the resistance.
He was one of the independent-minded politicians who still wanted to 
win a seat in Parliament as a member of the sole party, the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) but found it to be nearly impossible. Kariuki 
nevertheless vied in a by-election in 1982 for a seat vacated when dissident 
15 Kenya historian Macharia Munene called the author’s attention to this quote which he said 
appeared in in the Sunday Nation, September 17, 1978, pages 1 and 3.
16 In 1980, after student riots at the University of Nairobi following a banning of outside 
speakers, the government seized the passports of twelve lecturers who were considered critical 
of the government, including Micere Mugo, Ooko Ombaka, Michael Chege, Mukaru Ng’ang’a, 
Okoth Ogendo, Atieno Odhiambo, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Shadrack Gutto (Ogot 1995, 199).
indiVidual Resistance against RePRession 213
politician Koigi Wamwere was detained in the aftermath of the attempted 
coup that year. Kariuki faced obstacles set by a government wary of his 
previous defense of a Kenyan friend suspected of possessing antigovern-
ment literature. President Moi even warned him publicly that he should not 
run for Parliament. But Moi, even at that early date, was intent on keeping 
the outward trappings of legitimacy of state institutions and elections. So 
rather than simply bar Kariuki from running, they put roadblocks in his 
way, literally.
I said that that my f irst priority will be to f ight for the human rights of 
the detained persons. And I’ll be calling on the government to release 
all political detainees. So that was my agenda in the by-election. So Moi 
talks about it and he said he’s warning me, if I repeat it now, I’ll face the 
consequences. This is in an Uhuru Park [the main one in Nairobi] meeting. 
He’s addressing the whole nation and calling me names.17
In those days, a would-be candidate had to do two things to run: (a) obtain 
a clearance paper from the government; (2) present the nomination paper 
later, in person, by a deadline. When Kariuki was handed his clearance 
paper, he noticed it was not signed by the president. When he questioned 
this, he was given a signed one but only after being warned that he should 
not criticize the government. A friend of his in the national Special Branch 
(security) off ice warned him of plans to detain him. Alerted, he was able to 
climb over a wall of his home compound when agents arrived to arrest him.
He still wanted to present his nomination papers. But the day they were 
due, police had blocked access roads to the off ice. His friends hid him in a 
charcoal truck and approached the barricades. “I was under a tent with the 
bags of charcoal. So they said, they told police – because there was a police 
dragnet there, we couldn’t pass through – they said, ‘Oh, we’re just delivering 
charcoal, here at the blood donor [off ice].’ They allowed; they didn’t suspect 
anything.” The truck was backed up to another part of the building and 
he snuck out, passed through several doors, and, to the bewilderment of 
election off icials, suddenly burst in the back door of the election off ice and 
slapped his nomination papers on the table. The intelligence officer who had 
tipped him off about a pending arrest was in the room and told the election 
off icer that since Kariuki had personally presented his papers the off ice 
had to register him as a candidate. So he ran, but he lost to a nephew of the 
president in what Kariuki claims was almost certainly a rigged election.
17 Mirugi Kariuki, in an interview with the author, August 12, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Growing Resistance
Others in the early 1980s tried a variety of resistance tactics, some openly, 
others covertly, “Throughout the 1980s, various groups opposed the one-
party rule using different strategies. This included academics from the 
University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University; an attempted coup by junior 
Air Force off icers [1982]; and underground movements such as Mwakenya, 
Umoja, Kenya Patriotic Front, Kenya Revolutionary Movement and the 
December Twelve Movement” (Ogot 1995, 197,199). Maina wa Kinyatti, a 
former historian at Kenyatta University was imprisoned under harsh condi-
tions from 1982-88, accused of being part of the underground opposition. 
“There was a lot of fear, nobody could say anything. We went underground 
because of that.” In an interview with the author he described his motivation 
as based on “patriotism; love for our country.”18 After the attempted coup in 
August 1982, Moi cracked down even more severely on suspected dissidents, 
especially from 1986 to 1988 with numerous detentions and torture, forcing 
the opposition almost entirely underground.
In 1988, another part of the resistance social movement emerged out of 
a professional commitment to ethical reporting. The resistance involved 
a magazine expose of government fraud and a journalist, Bedan Mbugua, 
who soon became a rallying point for growing popular dissatisfaction with 
the regime. In an election in 1988 Moi ordered a system of open voting 
known as queuing where voters stand in public lines at the polling stations 
behind the candidate of their choice. Even though the candidates were all 
from the ruling KANU party, some candidates were more popular with the 
people than others. Mbugua, as editor of the magazine Beyond, published 
by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), exposed government 
fraud in the voting. It was likely not the f irst time there was a fraudulent 
election. “What made this rigging different was that ordinary voters had 
seen with their own eyes how candidates with short lines, if favored by the 
government, won over candidates with longer lines in polling place after 
polling place,” Mbugua recalled.19
The magazine sold out quickly as Kenyans not used to seeing government 
fraud so boldly exposed rushed to grab even the additional copies printed 
before the government banned the sale later the day of publication. “Many 
18 Maina wa Kinyatti, in a telephone interview with the author in the United States, March 
2004.
19 Bidan Mbugua, in an interview with the author, August 13, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. People 
lined up to vote behind the representative of their preferred candidate.
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were being arrested for carrying the Beyond magazine. So it was a big, big – 
the magazine created a very big crisis in the country. And with that reaction, 
it’s like the tide [of resistance to the regime] that you could not stop was 
born.” Mbugua was arrested, but then he was brought to the president’s office 
where he was offered a deal by two presidential aides. He would be freed if 
he wrote a public apology saying that it was the NCCK and the Church of 
the Province of Kenya (CPK)20 that pushed him to write the expose.
There is a certain stubbornness about many of the human rights activists 
interviewed for this book: they stand up for freedom despite the dangers. 
They refused to be intimidated and even to turn down good treatment if 
they give up their principles. Mbugua refused the offer:
I said I was very happy to be invited to State House because not many 
Kenyans go to State House. And secondly, I said I was very patriotic, but 
patriotism, which is deep love for your country, also impelled one to speak 
about – to speak truth about the same country. I was not pushed to write 
by the NCCK and CPK. I was the Editor-in-Chief. I made the decision. 
They had never seen anything like that.21
He was quickly judged in a Moi court and imprisoned.22 The head of the 
NCCK made a statement that it was Mbugua, not the NCCK that was respon-
sible for the expose. Mbugua says the statement was probably written to 
prevent the government from banning the NCCK as a legal organization. But 
the day Mbugua was tried, a huge crowd gathered outside the courthouse 
in his support. It was another crack in the wall of fear surrounding many 
Kenyans at the time to stand up against the regime.
Freedom Corner: Early Cracks in the Wall of Fear
In downtown Nairobi, Uhuru (Kiswahili for “freedom”) Park is a busy 
place most hours of the day. It is located directly across from the tall 
government building where much of the torture of political detainees 
took place in the 1980s. People hurry through the park on their way to 
20 Bishop David Gitari of CPK had begun criticizing the regime in some of his sermons.
21 Mbugua interview.
22 In 2013 Kenya’s High Court (equivalent to a federal court in the US) awarded Mbugua and 
Gitobu Imanyara (see below) compensation for unlawful imprisonment in the late 1980s in 
connection with their human rights work (Standard newspaper, Nairobi, Kenya, by Wahome 
Thuku 2013).
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work, or relax on the grass during lunchtime, or play with their children 
on a weekend. But the park would not be there today except for the 
protest of Kenya’s Nobel Peace Prize winner (2004), environmentalist 
Dr. Wangari Maathai. With some organizational support, she initiated 
a peaceful protest to block a plan by President Moi to build a six story 
statue of himself and a sixty-two-story off ice building for his ruling 
party. When she wrote the president an open, published letter in 1989 
calling for a halt in his plans to usurp much of the park for his party 
headquarters and his statute, she was writing as the chairman of the 
National Council of Women, and coordinator of the Green Belt Movement 
which had organized women around the country to plant trees and do 
other environmental projects.23 The association of architects, a private 
organization, took out a full page ad in a local newspaper criticizing the 
planned construction. But essentially, it quickly became a one-woman 
contest of wills that got very personal and helped break the public fear 
of speaking out against the regime.
The most signif icant impact of that action was the empowerment it gave 
to ordinary people who had come to believe that the ruling party was 
immovable; it could not be touched; it was like a rock; it had so entrenched 
itself. It was like a wall that could not come down. So it [her save-the-park 
campaign] gave people courage and they said: “Ahhh! It can be done!” It 
proved that this apparently immovable rock can be cracked. It has been 
cracked by this woman.24
“This woman,” as President Moi would refer to her in public statements, 
should, he said, stay out of politics and had no basis for challenging the 
authority of the state. He even insulted her publicly by referring to her 
negatively as a divorced woman. The implied threats to her safety were 
meant to silence her. But in her political activism, she was always her most 
determined in the face of such pressure. “My best safety net [is]: I don’t see 
fear.” Instead, she responded to the threats with a light but serious touch.
I told them, essentially: Don’t come talking to me about my womanhood 
because I’m not interested in your manhood … I think the most important 
23 The Council expressed support by mail but did not demonstrate publicly; Green Belt Move-
ment kept its environmental focus.
24 Wangari Maathai, in an interview with the author, September 23, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. 
She died in 2011.
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thing, and which has never really been recorded, or suff iciently studied, 
was that it’s very much part of my nature that I don’t give up; and that is 
probably the scientist in me. I wrote letters to our environmental network 
throughout the world.
She continued writing polite letters to the government – and to donors 
who must have wondered why a country they were loaning to had to 
spend a large amount of money on a party headquarters and a statue of 
the president. Eventually donors balked and Moi halted his plans. Maathai’s 
contribution to the social movement against the Moi regime was a public 
challenge that exposed vulnerability to pressure that had rarely been seen 
in Kenya at the time. Her protest in 1989 came only about two years after the 
public exposure of torture of political dissidents but more than two years 
before Moi accepted multiparty elections. Shortly after her challenge there 
were renewed attempts to form opposition political parties, a campaign 
culminating with two illegal rallies, in 1990 and 1991; and in late 1991 came 
Moi’s acceptance of multiparty elections.
Dr. Maathai’s successful resistance of the regime’s plans to take over a 
city park for its party headquarters was followed by more political activism 
by women. In 1992, a small group of mothers approached her with an idea 
of a nonviolent protest to try to win the freedom of their sons who were 
political detainees. She also joined other politicians in organizing what 
became one of the new political opposition parties as the resistance moved 
from a period that highlighted individual activism to one in the early 1990s 
of small group and organizational activism.
Individual Activism (1): Urban Legal “Guerrillas”
In Kenya, contrary to what one might expect, it was individual activism, 
not organizational activism that played a leading role in challenging the 
Moi regime in the 1980s and into the early 1990s. This was a period when 
most activist organizations either had not formed or were not yet willing 
to join the open opposition to a regime that was torturing dissidents. It was 
during the early 1980s, and more so from 1987-91, that a small number of 
Kenyan attorneys, began defending accused dissidents, acting as individu-
als. Attorney Gibson Kamau Kuria, one of the “urban legal guerrillas,” had 
a very small legal off ice, but sued the government in 1987 to stop torture 
of suspected political dissidents.
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“We were called urban legal guerrillas because we spent all our time 
strategizing on how to expose the atrocities in the government,” human 
rights attorney G.B.M. Kariuki recalled.25 These “urban guerrillas” included 
Paul Muite, Gitobu Imanyara, James Orengo, Kuria, Kiraitu Murungi, Mirugi 
Kariuki, Pheroze Nowrojee, John Khaminwa, Martha Karua, Kathurima 
M’Inoti and Rumba Kinuthia.26 They are considered individual activists 
because they were part of a legal resistance at a time when their professional 
organization, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), was not politically active and 
not providing any support to their activism
Independent activists include individuals who were part of small or 
weak organizations that were unable to provide any signif icant support. In 
Kenya, this also included independent owners and writers of self-f inanced 
(and barely sustainable) critical publications such as Society magazine 
run by Pius and Lloyce Nyamora and Nairobi Law Monthly, run by Gitobu 
Imanyara, and Finance, run by Njehu Gatabaki. It included individuals 
who were members of an organization that opposed their activism. In 
Kenya, this included activism by Reverend Timothy Njoya.27 Such activists 
in Kenya (and similar ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone) played an integral 
role in the nonviolent social movement in Kenya against the Moi regime, 
providing additional voices for reform, rallying public support for regime 
change, and helping undermine the credibility of the Moi regime. Like the 
individual lawyers, these other individual voices helped build a culture of 
resistance.
Typically studies of social movements, human rights, and democra-
tization focus on organizations and the factors that hurt or hinder their 
operation and expansion. Individual activism is rarely mentioned, if at all. 
Yet much of the critical nonviolent resistance in Kenya occurred because 
individual activists, attorneys and others challenged the regime. These 
challenges grew increasingly sophisticated as attorneys engaged in a kind of 
chess game of tactics against a regime intent on pretending there was rule 
of law in Kenya but even more intent on not allowing the law to interfere 
with their hold on power. This individual resistance chipped away steadily 
at the claims of legitimacy of the regime, showing them to be in violation 
25 G.B.M. Kariuki, in an interview with the author, October 11, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
26 These activist attorneys are listed in an order based on the frequency with which they were 
identif ied by interviewees (not just attorneys) as prominent activists. There were other human 
rights attorneys during this period.
27 Rev. Njoya was openly opposed by key off icials in his Presbyterian church who did not 
support his activism. He did, however, have the support of lower level off icials in his church, 
and he was widely popular in Kenya among those dissatisf ied with the regime.
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even of their own laws and certainly in violation of basic human rights 
standards such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.28
Organization without Organizations
In repressive settings where formal resistance organizations provide too 
tempting of a target for the regime, where it is too dangerous to organize 
resistance openly, activists tend to operate informally. In Kenya, individual 
activists had no formal organization; instead they had organization without 
organizations. By word of mouth, secret meetings, land telephones, activists 
stayed in touch to share information, and develop legal resistance strategies 
and help each other in emergencies the best they could in a pre-cell phone 
era. Though their own professional legal organization was not taking a politi-
cal supporting role for activist attorneys, those attorneys collaborated when 
necessary. “If something outrageous happened in the courts, then 15 lawyers, 
20 lawyers would sign a statement.”29 Some Kenyan activist attorneys in 
this period gathered regularly at the downtown off ice of attorney Japheth 
Shamalla. Activism in this kind of environment, with government spies 
and harsh punishment of suspected opponents to the regime, took courage.
It was in his off ice that the politicians met. It was his telephone that 
everybody used; it was his fax that we were faxing New York before 
I bought my own fax, and other statements. It was really a “war room.” 
And whenever one [of the lawyers] failed to come in the evening, frantic 
calls [were made] to f ind out [about them] because they could have been 
picked up [by police.] 30
“We were representing one another,” said Khaminwa, an activist attorney 
in the early 1980s and onward. “I used litigation” to challenge state power. 
“I was also part of the activism pushing for multiparty and democratization.” 
His individual activism landed him in detention in 1982-83, starting shortly 
before the attempted coup in 1982. The night of his arrest, he recalled: “I was 
28 Kenya became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1976. 
29 Martha Koome interview.
30 Martha Karua, in an interview with the author, August 15, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. The 
off ice belonged to Japheth Shamalla, according to Karua. 
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searched, stripped naked. It was a bad exercise; it was something I was not 
expecting.”
He pauses, gazes out the window at the busy street below, full of com-
muters walking along the sidewalks or heading home in crowded minibus 
taxis known as matatus. The evening of my interview with him, he was 
wearing a blue and green pullover sweater. He had just f inished another full 
day of legal work, two decades after his own detention. As he continued to 
talk, he climbed with some diff iculty up on the top of his desk and reached 
up to lock a high window as he prepared to go home. “The President [Moi] 
was given power like a chief. From the outset he was not democratic at 
all.” Khaminwa put on his jacket over his sweater. It was dark outside now. 
The church singers on the sidewalk below had f inished their recruitment 
exercise. The streets were no longer crowded but were considered unsafe 
for walking at night. He had a taxi waiting below for him to take him to his 
home in Karen outside the city. “We kept on doing it [challenging the govern-
ment’s arbitrary use of power through court cases]. We were not scared.”31 
A number of other Kenyan human rights attorneys active in the next phase 
of activism (1987-91) identif ied Khaminwa and attorneys including Pheroze 
Nowrojee and Willy Mutunga as role models for their own activism.
Unpredictability of Social Movements: Minor Actors; Chains of 
Events
The government of Kenya had long used torture as a means of political 
control. But in 1987, a year after a major crackdown had begun on sus-
pected political dissidents, including those associated with underground 
opposition,32 three political detainees who had been tortured in detention 
became part of an open resistance to the government by launching a legal 
challenge to the government while still in prison. They were helped by 
minor actors to make their challenge. The sequence of events helps il-
lustrate not only courage and ideals of the detainees, but two minor theories 
developed in this study: the role of minor actors and the related concept of 
chain of events. These in turn, shed some light on an argument of this study 
that social movements often are not predictable. They are unpredictable 
because the chain of events involved in a movement is not something one 
can map out or predict. There is too much spontaneity, too many unplanned 
31 John Khaminwa, in one of two interviews with the author, August 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
32 Amnesty International, “Kenya: Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials” (1987).
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actions, to generate much in the way of prediction as to where a movement 
is heading or what impact it will have. There is considerable uncertainty 
about even the survival of a nonviolent resistance movement. Extreme 
repression can bring it to a halt; or drive it underground. But even when 
this happens, some resistance may continue in the open as it did in Kenya. 
As for the theory of the importance of minor actors, examples below show 
how unexpected help enables key actors to survive and sometimes to have 
an impact, including the three political detainees. In other cases, minor 
actors helped Kenyans avoid arrest, at least for a while.
Under most traditional studies of social movements, the actions of po-
litical detainees against a regime, if recorded at all, likely would be noted 
as brave individual acts. They were individual acts; and their bravery is 
beyond question. But equally important, their resistance was an element 
in the social movement that eventually helped bring political change to 
Kenya. The prisoner activists were part of the movement in several ways: 
they pursued the same aim as others in the movement: human rights and 
democracy; they openly challenged the legitimacy of the regime; and 
they had been part of earlier resistance efforts, both legal and political. 
In all aspects, their contribution to the social movement against the Moi 
regime was just as valid as the participation of a Kenyan in one of the mass 
demonstrations for change or as a member in one of the organizations that, 
especially starting in the early 1990s, formed part of the resistance. In 1987, 
even from within prison, they were part of the nonviolent resistance/social 
movement in Kenya.
The chain of events that led to a reduction of torture for all detainees be-
gan with the three managing to resist under torture admitting to unfounded 
charges. Kiplagat, one of Moi’s close aides during this period, confirmed in 
an interview the regime’s treatment of such detainees:
During that period [1980s] there were people who were not very comfort-
able [with the regime] from the University [of Nairobi]. They may, or may 
not have set up this organization called Mwakenya. They were taken to 
court; some of them were tortured. And they made confession. Whether 
they were involved or not involved is something we have to [question]. 
And many … were locked up for f ive years, six years.33
The three detainees had previously attracted government attention as 
critics of Kenya’s human rights. Mirugi Kariuki and Wanyiri Kihoro had 
33 Kiplagat interview.
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helped defend accused dissidents in the early 1980s; both later became 
opposition members of Parliament. Mukaru Ng’ang’a was an historian at 
the University of Nairobi and later leader of the Kenya National Democratic 
Alliance and a presidential candidate in 1992. With the help of minor actors, 
they were able to get word to human rights lawyer Kuria that they wanted to 
challenge their confinement and treatment and the kangaroo trials which 
often lasted only a few minutes at dawn without lawyers. The closest I came 
to seeing them as prisoners was one day in Nairobi when they were brought 
to the courthouse in a government car with curtains hiding a view of the 
occupants. Later I interviewed both Kihoro and Kariuki. Kihoro explained 
why he resisted torture instead of confessing to trumped-up charges as 
others before him had:
I did not want eventually to feel that I had cooperated in any way with 
those who had tortured me. I thought it was incumbent upon me to 
continue in that mood of history of resisting, and resisting in a way that 
I’m also trying to stand up with my people and to open up my country, for 
greater debate locally and internationally. My case was very important in 
opening up Kenya to international scrutiny by donors and human rights 
groups [about] what was happening – especially torture.34
Kihoro, held for three years, was tortured during the initial seventy-four 
days in detention from July 29 to October 10, 1986, including being beaten 
with clubs. On three occasions, for a total of twenty-four days, he was 
confined in a cell f looded ankle-deep with water. This hideous treatment 
is something Kenyans point out was also practiced by the British. The British 
high commissioner obtained evidence of the treatment after Kihoro was 
taken to a hospital: “His [Kihoro’s] feet had started to rot.”
There was a trap door in the roof, apparently, through which they lowered 
the food. And the cell, for 28 days or more was several centimeters, several 
inches deep in water, so that he could either stand in the water or if he 
wanted to go to sleep he could sit in the water and get his backside wet 
and lean against the wall because he couldn’t have any beddings; that 
would have been absolutely saturated.35
34 Wanyiri Kihoro, in an interview with the author, June 28, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
35 Malcolm Harper, in an interview with the author, July 2, 2002 London. At the time of the 
interview, Harper was director of the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom of 
indiVidual Resistance against RePRession 223
A sympathetic guard (a minor actor in the drama of Kihoro’s resistance) 
arranged a secret meeting between Kihoro and his wife in the parking lot 
of Nyayo House, the tall, downtown government building where the torture 
was taking place. In that meeting Kihoro asked his wife, Wanjiru, to contact 
attorney Kuria.36 The attorney f iled suit against the regime and was himself 
detained, though not tortured. Kuria’s law partner, Kiraitu Murungi, then 
ref iled the same challenge and was not detained. Knowing he might be 
detained, Kuria had briefed Washington Post Nairobi-based reporter Blaine 
Hardin, whose paper timed the story to coincide with a visit by Moi to 
President Reagan (Hardin 1987). The headline beneath a photo of the two 
of them at the White House read: “Police Torture is charged in Kenya.” 
Moi apparently was furious at the report and perhaps at the embarrassing 
timing of it. With the help of the same sympathetic guard, Wanjiru Kihoro, 
through an exchange of notes with her husband, convinced him to start 
writing a diary – in prison – describing the torture. Wanjiru, who later 
became an active member of the Kenyan diaspora opposition in the UK 
recalls encouraging her husband to record the details.
I felt that if he had recorded what he was going through it would be like, 
very cathartic; it would get the thing out and he’d be able to withstand 
whatever else would come. And that’s how he started writing. He didn’t 
sit back and remember, he was writing every – I have the documents at 
home; I have the letters – diary … And when I sent them to Amnesty, 
Amnesty [researcher Martin Hill] said this is the f irst very complete 
information we have of what is going on.37
After the international publicity, the use of torture by the regime became 
much less frequent. Hill, speaking as a former researcher on Kenya, said one 
of the impacts of Amnesty’s 1987 report (“Kenya: Torture, Political Detention 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. He personally intervened to try to win the release of Kihoro, 
whose wife approached him in London for help.
36 The other two detainees, Ng’ang’a and Kariuki, managed to get word to Kuria as well. Kuria 
represented all three until he, himself, was detained because of that representation.
37 Wanjiru Kihoro, in an interview with the author in London. A number of former political 
prisoners in Kenya have had their stories published, including: Wanyiri Kihoro, Never say Die, 
1998, published by East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi, Kenya; Maina wa Kinyattĩ’, 
Kenya: A Prison Notebook, published by Vita Books, London, and by Mau Mau Research Center, 
Jamaica, N.Y.; and Koigi wa Wamere, The People’s Representative and the Tyrants, 1992, published 
by New Concept typesetters, Nairobi, Kenya.
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and Unfair Trials”) was to debunk the argument of the Moi regime that they 
were facing a dangerous, terroristic underground movement, Mwakenya.
It [the report] points out that the Kenyan government was not facing 
a serious armed opposition. It pointed out that their reaction to it was 
disproportionate and involved serious human rights abuses and these 
ridiculous summary trials of which there have been 70 or 80 … The repres-
sion and the search for victims and the torture [was] reduced after that. 
But it didn’t go away.38
The “minor actor” in this case, the prison guard who played a key part in this 
chain of events, was not the only example in which someone sympathetic 
to the efforts of human rights activists helped protect them in Kenya, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. The unanticipated role of minor actors adds to the un-
predictability of social movements in general, but especially in repressive 
settings where key activists might have been blocked or even killed without 
the help of a minor actor. Other examples in Kenya include these:
– A taxi driver warned attorney Martha Karua that he had been hired 
by someone working in the president’s off ice along with a second taxi 
driver to carry policemen to follow her and, when the opportunity 
presented itself, to block her car. “The moment people want to arrest 
you, not in the normal manner, but to isolate you, they could have 
taken me elsewhere. They could have hijacked me, gone and brutalized 
me,” Karua recalled. Instead, alerted, she drove to an upscale hotel in 
downtown Nairobi, parked, and went inside. When hotel security saw 
the policemen going from car to car to locate hers, they called the police 
and the two plainclothesmen were arrested. They were later freed when 
they provided the name of the person at the president’s off ice who had 
assigned them to track Karua.39
– Rumba Kinuthia was tipped off by an armed government security 
off icial about his pending arrest by the Criminal Investigation Depart-
ment (CID) at a Nairobi restaurant the day of an illegal political rally he 
helped plan (Saba Saba, July 7, 1990). “He took me through a back door, 
and sent somebody to drive my car round [to the back]. They stormed 
in soon after I left,” Kinuthia recounted.40
38 Martin Hill interview with the author, July 2002, London. Torture continued on some 
political dissidents but mostly on common criminals.
39 Karua interview.
40 Kinuthia interview. Saba Saba is Kiswahili for seven, seven seventh month, seventh day.
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– Raila Odinga, later a presidential candidate, was smuggled into neigh-
boring Uganda by a Catholic priest and a nun to escape a police dragnet 
in 1991 shortly before a second illegal rally he had helped plan was held 
that year at Kamkunji grounds in Nairobi.41
Chess Game of Tactics
Starting in the late 1980s, human rights attorneys engaged in a chess game of 
tactics with the Moi regime, transforming the court room into a stage for the 
political opposition. This was another important step forward in the social 
movement that resisted the regime. Arguments challenging the legitimacy 
of the regime had been confined mostly to a few independent publications, 
always under threat of being closed down. Now those arguments reached 
a broader audience through the mainline newspapers that covered court 
proceedings. The government would catch on to a new activist legal tactic 
and try to counter it, but the attorneys responded with new tactics. Pheroze 
Nowrojee, a serene Kenyan of the Parsi faith with a Gandhi-like appearance, 
was a human rights attorney to whom some younger activist attorneys in 
those years turned to for advice. He explained one of the strategies:
You seek to win [court cases], but by def inition, winning is not allowed 
[before corrupt judges]. Therefore the trial has to be used to make the 
maximum gains. And you show the oppression, you unravel the oppres-
sion, the means of oppression; you unravel its illegality. The more we 
lost cases in the courts, the more converts we had gained [through the 
publicity]. So we were the gainers: if we won, we won with a royal f lush; 
if we lost we still lost with two fours, two sevens.42
The Moi regime sometimes made false charges against the attorneys in 
an attempt to block this kind of resistance. In March 1991, the State issued 
an injunction against Paul Muite aimed at preventing him from acting 
as chairman of LSK. The injunction had been sought by attorneys, led by 
Mutula Kilonzo, Moi’s lawyer, who were unhappy with Muite’s election and 
following his strong pro-reform speech as the new chair. LSK vice chair Willy 
Mutunga chaired the f irst LSK council meeting which gave full support to 
41 Raila Odinga, in an interview with the author, October 30, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
42 Pheroze Nowrojee, in an interview with the author, August 3, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Muite.43 Muite explained how the government made a countermove against 
activists’ tactic of bringing cases to court despite the almost certainty of 
losing. The government would try to intimidate the defense attorneys or 
order them to submit their statements directly to the judge in order to 
circumvent access to the statements by reporters. Activist attorneys then 
tried a new tactic: walking out of the courtroom. This left the defendants to 
speak on their own behalf, giving reporters fresh material to write about. 
Attorneys also began focusing on pretrial documents. Instead of f iling brief 
statements of the charges prior to the trials, the attorneys began submitting 
lengthy explanations on which the charges were based. Reporters would 
then print the detailed charges as part of their normal court coverage. The 
flurry of f ilings and trials sometimes put the spotlight directly on the police 
and others who were part of the state repression at the time. In one case, 
Muite found himself interrogating a senior police off icial in court instead 
of the other way around.
I was cross examining a Special Branch off icer, a very tall guy. He was 
seated not far from me. He didn’t like the cross examination. So he’d take 
a minute or two, very arrogantly staring at me [then] say: “I’m not going 
to answer that question.” And I would say to the judge: “The question is 
proper, legitimate. Can you tell the witness – I was quite f irm – we are 
not in the Nyao House chamber of tortures; we are in a court of law. That 
[the torture chambers] is his domain, but this is not his domain.” And 
the Magistrate was terrif ied [Muite laughs, telling the story]. He would 
order the witness to answer the question. The witness proceeded to tell 
me: “One of these days you will come to where I am; I’ll have you; you 
will see” [Muite laughs].44
As it turned out, the day when the tables were turned was not long in com-
ing. In November 1991 Muite was arrested in connection with the “illegal” 
political opposition rally at Kamkunji in Nairobi. Muite came face to face 
with the same Special Branch off icial whom he had interrogated in court. 
Now it was Muite’s turn to be interrogated. He was held ten days in prison, 
but not tortured.
43 Mutunga, an early human rights activist, served as vice chair from 1991-93 and as chair from 
1993-95. He also served as head of the private Kenya Human Rights Commission. In 2011 he was 
named chief justice of Kenya’s highest court by President Mwai Kibaki.
44 Muite interview.
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It can be very intimidating. It’s just that the situation had slightly changed. 
Perhaps sometimes when you are very high prof ile [as Muite was] and 
everybody knows they have arrested you, then they sort of hold back. But 
you can see them [the police] you can see their hands shaking when they 
are trying to restrain themselves from hitting you, particularly when you 
sort of answer them f irmly.45
Individual Activism (2): Resistance by Writers, Clergy and Others
In a repressive setting, independent writers and others in addition to 
attorneys can play an important role in a social movement. Their activ-
ism may come not as members or participants in a self-identif ied social 
movement organization but in simply carrying out their own professional 
commitment as journalists, editors or publishers. Just as some attorneys 
and others in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Liberia were drawn into an activist 
role because of these commitments and not because of membership in a 
resistance organization, so too were some independent writers. In social 
movement parlance, writers can help “frame” the message of activists simply 
by reporting what was happening in terms of repression. In Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, this was seen mostly in the courageous professional work of 
some journalists; in Kenya a few independent writers established several 
publications with the express purpose of highlighting human rights abuses 
and lack of democratic rule.
Weapons of Words
In the late 1980s, attorney Gitobu Imanyara launched Nairobi Law Monthly 
and Pius Nyamora and his wife Lloyce launched Society magazine. The 
intent of these independent publications was to provide a public forum for 
critical commentary about the regime.46 Both were small, family run and 
self-f inanced publications with a skeleton staff. Their tiny publishing f irms 
were unable to provide any signif icant support for their activism except 
in providing a platform for written dissent. By that criterion, one could 
identify the editors and writers as individual activists. This kind of entry 
path to a resistance movement via one’s profession, and individual activism 
45 Muite interview.
46 Finance magazine in Nairobi also published many critical articles about the Moi regime 
during this period.
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in general, is often overlooked in the literature on social movements. These 
editors in Kenya soon drew the wrath of the Moi regime and eventually were 
arrested. But by that time they and their publications had become popular 
at home and were known abroad, which probably accounts for their being 
held only for a relatively short time. Lloyce Nyamora was handled roughly, 
including being kicked and held incommunicado until she and her husband 
were released on bail. They left the country in 1994, returning years later.
As with the case of attorney Paul Muite, it is hard to over-estimate the role 
Imanyara played in opening up the political system in Kenya.47 Imanyara 
became one of the key sources of energy in the nonviolent resistance. He 
recruited an impressive array of contributors to his Nairobi Law Monthly, 
whose articles def iantly challenged the legitimacy of the Moi regime and 
its pretense at a just legal system.
The mainstream media was sort of subdued in its reporting because of 
the consequences of challenging the single party regime. Nairobi Law 
Monthly was the primary forum and weapon and tool for the movement 
for human rights in this country for … about f ive years: ’87 to about ’92.48
This angered the regime. Imanyara was attacked on the street by thugs 
apparently sent by the government. He was arrested in 1990 and 1991. 
Yet each time he continued his activism, adding to a widening culture of 
resistance in Kenya that further expanded after multiparty elections began 
in 1992, involving mass demonstrations and widespread public criticism 
of the regime. “The more they punished Gitobu Imanyara, the more the 
resistance grew … Gitobu, for me, was very, very, very courageous [and] a 
glaring example of somebody who was acting as an individual. He suffered 
a lot for it.”49
At one point Imanyara was ill when in police custody and taken to a hospital 
where he was chained to a bed during treatment. Imanyara’s resistance was 
a key part of the fragmented social movement against Moi, especially in the 
47 Muite and Imanyara were the f irst and second most frequently mentioned human rights 
activists named by Kenyan activists and others interviewed for this study.
48 David Makali, in an interview with the author, September 18, 2002 in Nairobi, Kenya. At 
the time Makali, a Kenyan, was a media studies specialist. Nairobi Law Monthly sold between 
twenty-f ive thousand to seventy-f ive thousand copies per edition, depending on how politi-
cally hot their cover story was, he said. Makali described Nairobi Law Monthly and Society as 
“institutions” because of their popular support including donations.
49 Willy Mutunga, in an interview with the author, September 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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period highlighted by individual activism. He helped frame a message of 
the regime as legally illegitimate; and he provided a forum for critics, which 
added to a growing culture of resistance. Local attorneys staged a three-day 
strike in protest against the confinement of Imanyara and attorney John 
Khaminwa. International donors and human rights organizations took 
note of Imanyara’s valiant challenges, putting pressure on the government 
to release him. This international pressure on Moi would grow in the early 
1990s, especially from the United States, whose ambassador, Hempstone, 
became a vocal advocate for human rights and multiparty elections. Donors 
temporarily froze new funding in 1992 following a major political opposi-
tion rally and growing domestic unrest. They again froze new funding in 
1997 when the regime killed some people demonstrating for constitutional 
reform before the elections that year.50
Pius Nyamora later identif ied what he saw as some of the links in the 
chain of resistance that was growing around that time: Individual activists 
> foreign media > local media, including activist writers and vendors > 
local non-government organizations > international NGOs > international 
pressure on the regime. “It began with individuals.” Later “ordinary people 
provided the crowds at rallies, not fearing death [or perhaps overcoming 
fear]. “They formed the crowds.”51
“God’s Kingdom Grows with Opposition”
Further resistance to Moi’s rule came from four church leaders who were 
increasingly openly criticizing the regime for its human rights abuses. The 
four activist clerics, known as “the quartet” were: Bishops Henry Okullu, 
David Gitari, and Alexander Muge of the Anglican Church of the Province 
of Kenya; and Rev. Dr. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East 
Africa (PCEA). The f irst three spoke with institutional backing; Rev. Njoya’s 
activism was opposed by the Kenyan leaders of his church, though he had 
popularity among the members and the public. He acted essentially as an 
individual. Bishop Muge died in early 1990 in a car accident which many 
Kenyans believed was an intentional government-supported plan to silence 
50 Funding freezes are analyzed in the second Kenya chapter.
51 Pius Nyamora, in a telephone interview with the author, December 17, 2002 in the United 
States. Kenyan historian Macharia Munene (2013) attributes the folding of Society less to repres-
sive activities by Moi and more to loss of customers “when it appeared to lose objectivity and 
became excessively partisan in the politics of 1992.”
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a bold critic from Moi’s own ethnic group. “I still consider the death of 
Bishop Muge a great mystery,” wrote Bishop Okullu (1997, 120-1).52 Rev. Njoya 
was several times beaten by police. Rev. Gitari once escaped a mob sent 
to his house with, he contends, intent on killing him. “We became the 
spokesmen of the people because it so dangerous for an individual to attack 
the government because they could easily be detained without trial”, said 
Gitari in an interview.53 Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, an academic activist at the 
time (later elected to Parliament), who worked closely with Bishop Okullu, 
credits the bishop’s explicit Easter Sermon in 1990 on political reform with 
helping lay the inspirational groundwork for the important opposition rally 
later that year.54
After attorneys Muite, Imanyara, James Orengo, Kuria, and Mutunga, 
Kenyans interviewed for this book ranked Dr. Rev. Timothy Njoya as a 
key f igure in the resistance to the Moi regime. He spoke out bluntly for 
multiparty elections as early as January 1, 1990, two years before that reform 
was reluctantly accepted by the regime after growing domestic and inter-
national pressure. I tracked him down in a suburb of Nairobi some years 
after his courageous activism. Like most of the activists interviewed, he had 
been a brave individual, a nonconformist at a time when conformity was 
safer. He was overseeing the slow construction of a religious rock garden, a 
project of his as an outside artist. “I’ve been here, doing this creativity” he 
said when we met again.55
Rev. Njoya took me on a tour of the small area which already had a 
pyramid of stone big enough to have a narrow walking path through the 
base. His son said his father wants him to build an even bigger pyramid. It 
represents the “ascension and descension” of Jesus. Another sculpture signi-
f ies the wheat and tares parable. “God’s kingdom grows with opposition,” 
he said. After the brief tour of the sculptures, we sat on some of the rocks. 
52 Shortly before his death, Bishop Muge def ied the threat by a member of Parliament and 
Minister of Labour Peter Okondo that he would be killed if he set foot in a particular district 
(West Pokot) where he nevertheless went. Throup and Hornsby (1998, 200) argue that this raises 
suspicion of government involvement in the death.
53 Archbishop David Gitari (retired), interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, November 7, 
2002.
54 Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, in an interview with the author August 2, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. 
The 1990 and 1991 opposition rallies will be discussed in the second Kenya chapter.
55 Dr. Reverend Timothy Njoya, in an interview with the author, July 29, 2002, Ngong Town, 
near Nairobi, Kenya. I had interviewed him in 1990 after a political rally, as a correspondent for 
The Christian Science Monitor. I was assigned to Nairobi from 1987-95, covering East and West 
Africa, based in Nairobi.
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Around his neck Rev. Njoya wears a cross made of two nails. “Everybody 
has opposition within each other,” he says. Nearby workers are chiseling 
rocks. The tape recorder picked up the high-pitched, rhythmic tap-tap-
tap as yet another stone was carved into its place in this slowly growing 
religious testament to the nontraditional, stereotype-breaking concepts of 
the now-retired activist.
His strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s had been to try to “eliminate 
fear” of the regime, he said. He had spoken out boldly for democracy shortly 
after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. In 1997, as police broke up an op-
position rally, he was attacked by police and is convinced that the intent 
was to kill him. His church hierarchy not only offered no support for his 
activism, they eventually banished him to a rural church for it. “Yes, to quiet 
me down,” Njoya explained. But it didn’t work: he kept on speaking out for 
democracy and human rights against the government, especially from the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s.
Implications of Individual Activism
Individual activism is a missing element in most of the social movement 
literature. Yet it can play an important role in challenging an oppressive 
regime nonviolently, as it did in Kenya between 1987 and 1991. At a time 
when few Kenyan organizations were willing to publicly oppose the human 
rights abuses by the regime, some individual attorneys and independent 
journalists, and others did take a public stand.56 It was dangerous: the 
regime had already rounded up suspected dissidents and tortured many 
of them. Nevertheless, individual activists, many of them drawn to the 
resistance by way of their own profession, courageously resisted through a 
variety of tactics including legal challenges and critical publications. They 
played a chess game of tactics in the courtroom as they maneuvered to 
bring to public attention the regimes excesses.
These individual activists lacked the support, f inancial or otherwise, 
of organizations. Human rights attorneys, for example, did not have the 
backing of their bar association until an activist was elected chair of the 
56 During this period, a few organizations did speak out. For example, the International 
Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section) issued critical statements in international forums against 
the regime’s abuses. The National Christian Council of Churches (NCCK) made some critical 
statements during this period. The Catholic Church joined the Law Society of Kenya’s appeal 
by LSK chair Muite for repeal of detention laws. 
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organization in 1991. Several independent writers ran self-f inanced publica-
tions that lacked organizational strength. But individual activists were 
able to attract international attention. That came too late for some to avoid 
being victims of torture by the state, but the challenges to their treatment 
helped reduce the use of torture as a policy of the regime. Altogether, these 
early challenges of the repressive Moi regime helped break a wall of fear 
that had kept most Kenyans silent. This in turn helped open the way for 
organizational resistance in the early 1990s that grew into a culture of 
resistance.
One might ask: how can individual activists be part of a social movement? 
As noted in the theory chapter, the def inition of a “social movement” of-
fered in this book is: a process of challenges to targeted authorities that may 
involve individual as well as organizational activism, and at times mass public 
support, and is aimed at either regime reform or regime change. But beyond a 
definitional issue is the fact that while they operated as individuals without 
organizational support, they were in touch with other activists, planning 
their part in the overall resistance. They were frequently in contact with 
each other, especially during times when some among them were targeted 
by the regime. In the relatively small world of Nairobi, where most of the 
resistance took place, they were known to each other. They sometimes 
worked as small, informal groups such as the times when they gathered 
in a war room to map out strategies and keep an eye out for the safety of 
their fellow activists. At the same time, these individual activists were an 
example of a social movement in abeyance, operating on a limited scale, 
waiting for safer times to emerge more openly and in a more organized 
fashion. During a period when it was considered too dangerous for most 
organizations to self-identify as being directly opposed to the regime, these 
individual activists helped keep the light of nonviolent resistance lit.
8 Establishing a Culture of Resistance
Monica Wamwere, a stout upcountry woman with little formal education, 
whose smile revealed her mostly missing front teeth, stood amidst the small 
group of elderly mothers in a park in downtown Nairobi. As the Kenyan 
police, armed with helmets, shields, clubs, and tear gas circled the mothers, 
she began leading them in a traditional Kikuyu song. Young male support-
ers, sitting on the ground in a larger circle around the mothers, locked arms 
in an attempt to provide a human shield against the impending attack.
It was March 1992. In the face of mounting domestic resistance and 
international pressures, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi had reluctantly 
agreed the previous December to scrap the one-party system and hold 
multiparty elections in late 1992.1 Opposition political parties were form-
ing. But across the street from the protesting mothers, in the basement of a 
tall government building called Nyayo House, some of their sons and others 
had been tortured for advocating reform. They were still in prison. Recently 
rumors had spread that they might be executed as some others had been 
who had opposed the regime. Three mothers decided they must protest to 
try to save their sons’ lives.2 They met upcountry in Nakuru to plan their 
strategy. At f irst they had considered demonstrating outside the prison at 
the edge of Nairobi, but they settled instead on a more daring and visible 
plan: a hunger strike in Uhuru Park in the heart of the city.
In social movement terms, they were making a very public challenge of 
authorities in a noninstitutional way, framing their message as an appeal 
for justice and using one of the most potent forces in the world: mothers. 
Across Africa and in many other parts of the world, it was considered taboo 
to strike a mother, protesting or not. They were not an organization; they had 
only their own funds (at f irst). They were not skilled at mounting a protest. 
Driven by a passion to save their sons, they were using their own bodies 
to challenge a regime that had shown little respect for the law, torturing 
1 Moi surprised delegates and even some of his close aides with his announcement at a 
national meeting of his party, the Kenya National African Union (KANU). “The power stems 
from the people,” Moi told delegates in the modern Kasarani Arena in Nairobi. Just days before, 
donors had imposed a freeze on new aid. But Moi’s decision also followed growing domestic 
resistance and two major rallies for multiparty which police had violently repressed (Press 1991).
2 Milcah Wanjiku Kinuthia, Rumba Kinuthia’s mother, in an interview with the author, 
October 12, 2002 in Nairobi, Kenya. She said the original three were the mothers of political 
prisoners Koigi Wamwere, Mirugi Kariuki, and Kinuthia.
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and sometimes executing suspected enemies. They were determined and 
unafraid.
What can I be afraid of when my son had been locked up? I decided to go 
there because I felt my son would be hanged. I went looking for Koigi’s 
mother and the other mothers and that is when we came out with the plan 
to come to Nairobi. We went and told Mr. [Amos] Wako [then attorney 
general] that we were camped at Freedom Corner and we wanted to f ind 
out why our sons had been arrested.3
The previous chapter examined primarily individual, nonviolent resistance 
to the repressive regime of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s, 
especially from 1987 to 1992. This chapter examines a somewhat overlapping 
period of nonviolent activism by small groups 1990-92; and a period of mostly 
organizational activism 1992-2002, the year the ruling party lost power for 
the f irst time. It also looks at mass demonstrations from 1990 onward. In a 
model developed in this book, each of these elements combined to establish 
in Kenya (and in Sierra Leone and Liberia), a culture of resistance. This study 
defines a culture of resistance as one in which public challenges to the abuse 
of power by a regime becomes a norm for activists and a visible segment of 
the general public. A culture of resistance can be blocked by overwhelming 
force as it was in Liberia under Samuel Doe (1980-90). But massive repression 
risks driving a nonviolent resistance underground. Doe was killed in a civil 
war. There had been at least some underground resistance in Kenya in the 
early 1980s, though the extent remains unclear. In Sierra Leone some people 
went to Libya for training in revolution, but only a few took up arms and 
initiated the civil war in that country.
The specif ic critical events highlighted in this chapter that added signifi-
cantly to the resistance include (1) the daring protest by mothers of political 
prisoners demanding release of their sons; (2) two groundbreaking, illegal 
(in the eyes of the regime) political rallies, one in 1990 and the other in 1991, 
that changed the political landscape of Kenya and were key steps leading to 
adoption of multiparty elections in late 1991; and (3) mass demonstrations 
for reform in 1997, an election year.
It is worth repeating here key arguments of this study. The dominant 
attention in social movement studies is on organizations, often large 
3 Milcah Wanjiku Kinuthia interview. Freedom Corner, as it was later designated in honor 
of the mothers strike, is within Uhuru Park at the junction of Uhuru Highway and Kenyatta 
Avenue.
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organizations. But this misses important contributions of individuals and 
small groups. Their contributions can help keep a social movement going 
until it is safe enough for organizations to take the lead, as happened in 
Kenya in the early 1990s after multiparty elections were allowed. To help 
capture a broader sense of a social movement, especially in repressive set-
tings, the analytical spotlight needs broadening to include a more complete 
range of participants. The focus should be more on the various sources of 
resistance – individual, group, organizational, and mass participation – and 
less on structure (formal or informal) such as membership or participation 
in a self-identif ied resistance organization, something Tilly emphasizes 
(e.g., 2008). Some key activists in Kenya, Liberia, and Sierra Leone never 
identif ied with a social movement organization yet played a critical role in 
the resistance. At times an independent publication run by a few individuals 
can become an important element in a resistance movement as was the case 
in Sierra Leone in the early 1980s and in both Liberia and Kenya. At other 
times opposition political parties may take the lead in a resistance as they 
did in Kenya in the early 1990s. This study also notes an entry path into the 
nonviolent resistance via commitment to one’s profession (e.g., law, journal-
ism, clerical) and not membership in a resistance organization. One could 
argue that there were several social movements in Kenya, starting at least in 
the 1980s and continuing to 2002. But with no obvious gap in the resistance 
during this period, the author has chosen to discuss the resistance in terms 
of a single social movement with cycles of activism that developed into a 
culture of resistance, each overlapping phase of resistance building on the 
previous: individual, small group, organizational, and mass participation.
Small groups played an important part of the process of resistance in Kenya 
and took center stage in the resistance in Kenya in the early 1990s, including 
the protest by the mothers. Because it represents a transitional protest 
from individuals to small group protest (it was both), their 1992 protest is 
presented out of chronological order, followed by an analysis of the two 
attempted mass rallies in 1990 and 1991 that are examples of small group 
initiatives that also involved mass participation.
Mothers’ Strike
The mothers’ strike illustrates how a few dedicated activists can attract 
supporters and sympathy and make a larger impression on the public than 
their numbers would suggest possible. The dozen or so mothers alone might 
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have had an impact by themselves. But in the f irst few days of their outdoor 
protest, sleeping overnight in the park, they began attracting considerable 
supporters in addition to coverage by the local and international press, 
including this author who was a journalist at the time based in Kenya.
The mothers strike quickly became a focus of the nonviolent resistance 
in early 1992, just as opposition political parties were forming. Earlier the 
mothers had approached environmentalist and political activist Wangari 
Maathai for advice. She had stood up to the Moi regime over a plan to build a 
sixty-two-story building for the ruling party and a six-story statue of Moi in 
Uhuru Park. The mothers met several times in Dr. Maathai’s home in Nairobi 
planning how to proceed. They met with the Attorney General Amos Wako 
to inform him that they would be waiting in the park until the prisoners 
were released. They ignored his advice to go home and await a government 
decision on their appeal. As night approached the f irst day of the protest, 
the mothers lit candles, one for each of the approximately f ifty political 
prisoners whose release they were seeking. An Asian woman loaned the 
mothers an open-sided canopy, the kind used in garden dinner parties. As 
night approached, a group of men led by Ngonya wa Gakonya, then leader 
of a religious group known as the Tent of the Living God, arrived to provide 
protection. At f irst members of the public came just out of curiosity, but by 
the second or third day, other Kenyans came to tell their story of how they, 
too, had been tortured. The crowds grew.
Once we went there we opened a f lood … We provided a forum that so 
many people needed but didn’t have. So by the second day people started 
coming to visit, to look, to see: “Look at this bunch of crazy women who 
are sleeping outside!” and to hear our story. By the 3rd day some people 
started telling their story.4
The police were now closing their circle tighter and preparing to attack. 
I had been reporting on the strike but was also responsible for covering 
the news across East and West Africa and could not remain on-site with 
the mothers as much as my wife, Betty, could. Betty Press, a professional 
photographer, was documenting the mothers and the police that day as she 
had every day since they began their protest. I was in our nearby apartment 
in Nairobi writing another story when a foreign journalist called and said 
she had some film from Betty who had asked her to keep it safe in case police 
attempted to destroy f ilm at the site of the protest. The journalist said the 
4 Wangari Maathai, in an interview with the author, September 23, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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police were closing in on the mothers. I ran to our car and drove as quickly 
as I could to the site, parked on the grass and threaded my way through the 
now-tightening circle of armed police to stand with the mothers and Betty. 
I found myself standing next to Dr. Maathai and only a few feet from one of 
the mothers, Monica Wamere, who started to sing as the police got closer.
Then the police attacked. Some later reports claimed police beat the 
women: I saw no evidence of this f irsthand, though I couldn’t see everyone. 
The police did attack the would-be protectors who had formed a ring around 
the mothers who themselves sat in the shade of the canopy. The protectors 
quickly f led for safety toward the mothers, piling under the roof of the 
canopy and falling in a pile on and round the mothers. I found myself buried 
under their bodies with just my head protruding, feeling the crush of their 
weight. Just then a Kenyan policeman tossed a tear gas canister toward 
the women under the canopy. The canister hit my head, bounced off, and 
exploded, sending a cloud of gas through the area. It actually helped: the 
supporters f led the gas, freeing those of us underneath. Betty meanwhile 
had sidestepped the cloud of teargas and managed to keep photographing. 
Some of the mothers stripped at least partially as a cultural protest some-
times used in Africa. “That is a curse, a way of cursing those people – the 
president and the people who had imprisoned our sons unfairly,” one of 
the mothers said.5
The police won the day, but the mothers achieved their goal, eventually. 
The police took the mothers to their upcountry homes but they immediately 
returned to Nairobi and started a year-long protest in the basement of the 
nearby All Saints Cathedral with the support of the clergy there. By the end 
of the year, all but one of some f ifty political prisoners had been freed.6 
The regime had been caught off guard by a protest by mothers and shown 
itself weak enough to be cajoled by domestic and international criticism 
into a political action they had not planned. The regime showed signs of 
nervousness but had not backed off the use of force to break up the protest. 
Nor had the regime fully renounced torture. Margaret Wangui, the sister 
of Rumba Kinuthia, who acted as a liaison between the mothers and their 
supporters in the city, was detained for more than two months and tortured 
for her part in the mothers’ protest.
5 Margaret Wangui Kinuthia, in an interview with the author, October 12, 2002, in Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
6 Unfortunately, according to a human rights group established in conjunction with the 
mothers’ protest, Release Political Prisoners, the number of detained prisoners reached ap-
proximately that number again within a year.
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They continued beating me and asking me whether I had been feeding the 
mothers … whether we wanted to overthrow the government. I stayed one 
day [in a water-flooded cell]. I could not sleep or sit down. They beat me 
with small sticks … I never knew where I was because I was blindfolded 
[during interrogations].7
The mother’s strike was the f irst time Kenyans had seen such a direct and 
public protest of ordinary people that was not put down immediately against 
a regime many feared. It was “a real milestone” that helped to further break 
a wall of silence with regard to public protest.8 The two earlier public rallies 
that preceded the regime’s acceptance of multiparty elections had been 
broken up almost immediately with force. But, the rallies and the mothers’ 
protest showed how small group resistance can play an important role in 
rousing public awareness in a social movement when it is too dangerous to 
have a central organization.
Small Group Strategic Choices and Tactics: “Exciting the Masses”
Ultimately it doesn’t matter what power the government has. If you can 
succeed in exciting the masses, the masses rise up against the govern-
ment; the government has to give way. It cannot imprison everybody; it 
cannot kill everybody. We came very close to it in 1990-91.9
Activist Kenyan attorney Paul Muite was speaking of the two public rallies 
of 1990 and 1991 which the government broke up with force. “You can say 
the government saw the people were uprising and they were prepared to 
escalate the uprising,” Muite added, offering that, and not donor suspension 
of new aid shortly after the second rally, as an explanation for why Moi 
gave into mounting calls for switching to multiparty elections. Muite also 
referred to calls for strikes by the operators of the mini taxies in Kenya and 
efforts to achieve strikes by cash crop growers and civil servants as part 
of a civil disobedience campaign whose aim was not human rights but 
“pluralism.” The nonviolent resistance movement in Kenya gained further 
7 Margaret Wangui interview.
8 Binaifer Nowrojee, in a telephone interview with the author, June 5, 2002, in the United 
States. At the time, Nowrojee was legal counsel for the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch.
9 Paul Muite, in an interview with the author, July 13, 2003, in Nairobi, Kenya. Muite, a human 
rights attorney, was later elected to Parliament.
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momentum in the 1990s as small groups began to form that took the lead 
from individual activists. Opposition political parties and other organiza-
tions soon followed, supported by an increasing mass participation in public 
rallies and demonstrations. The model put forward in this book leading 
to a culture of resistance involves three somewhat overlapping phases: 
individual activism, organizational activism, and mass public support. In 
the 1990s, individual activism was replaced by organizational activism as 
opponents to the Moi regime won concessions that reduced the fear though 
not the danger of resistance.
Breaking the “Wall of Fear:” Saba Saba Rally 1990
The Kamkunji site for the f irst planned opposition rally in July 1990 
that would shake the status quo is an open space at the edge of Nairobi 
central business district, partially ringed by small shops. On the eve of 
independence in the early 1960s, Kamkunji was the political meeting 
ground for African anticolonialists. It has symbolic political value beyond 
its geographic location. Over the years important political speeches had 
been given there. On a busy street nearby, men push and pull overloaded 
wooden handcarts piled with vegetables or other goods purchased nearby 
and being delivered to stores or homes, some at the top of hills that leave 
the laborers covered in sweat and straining to reach their desitinations. 
Matatu minibus taxis stream by jammed with passengers who can afford 
the relatively cheap fares, while rivers of workers pass by on foot walking 
to or from their tin-shack homes in Kibera and similar slums, where toilets 
and fresh water are scarce. The wealthier speed by in comfortable cars on 
their way to their modest, multistoried apartment buildings in complexes 
sprouting outward for miles from the city center, or to expensive houses 
with guarded gates.
As I witnessed Kenya’s growing political resistance to authoritarian rule, 
I sometimes wondered how much of it was driven by a sense of human 
rights, a longing for democracy and justice, and an end to the torture of 
politically marked dissidents and how much of it was driven by a desire of 
those out of power to get into power. Or was the nonviolent resistance more 
basically driven by a hunger for food, jobs, and a sense of dignity among 
the poor? One day, riding with an educated Kenyan friend who directed a 
research organization, I asked him as we stopped outside his small but solid, 
two story home near downtown Nairobi, what was his primary concern as 
a Kenyan. His answer came quickly: “Putting food on our table.”
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It was against tough economic conditions, with economies slipping 
all across Africa in the late 1980s, that a small group of Kenyan activists 
challenged the government’s legitimacy, using the courts to seek an end to 
illegal detentions and mistreatment of prisoners, and to widen the sense of 
freedom of press and expression. But individual activists can only achieve 
so much. It takes more organized efforts to carry a resistance further. In 
1990, plans were underway to move to the next step in the pressure for the 
regime to adopt multiparty elections which activists hoped would open 
the system and lead to a change of regime. The momentum came almost 
exclusively from Kenyans who were not members of the president’s ethnic 
grouping, the Kalenjin. There was some Luo and other participation in the 
resistance, but the leaders were mostly Kikuyus, an ethnic group which 
had lost power when vice president Moi became President upon the death 
in off ice of Kenya’s f irst president, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978.
Businessman Kenneth Matiba, a former Moi cabinet member, and 
Charles Rubia, a former mayor of Nairobi, who had a falling out with the 
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, both Kikuyu, gave a 
press conference in May 1990 announcing plans for a public rally on July 
7. The announcement was well covered by the Kenyan and international 
press. In an interview, Rubia laughed as he recalled that the stated purpose 
was “to discuss development of the country and the economy. The strategy 
was we would have eight public rallies, one in every province. We would 
start with Nairobi.” The two men held a second press conference soon after 
the f irst one, laying out in detail the issues they hoped would become the 
basis of a public debate on governance. Rubia said he hoped to avoid a mere 
personal attack on Moi. But everyone knew the real reason for the planned 
rallies was to open up the political system to competition.
I felt, having been expelled from that party, I couldn’t just keep quiet. 
Not just myself. There were many people who felt the same thing. And 
I thought perhaps if Kenya assumed a multiparty political situation, 
then there would be more political parties formed, and I, for one, would 
perhaps f ind a “home.” It’s like if somebody kicks you out of his house, 
you’ll come later on … to think of building your own house. That in a 
nutshell was the main reason I felt, as a duty to myself as a Kenyan, to 
campaign for a multiparty situation.10
10 Charles Rubia, in an interview with the author, October 8, 2002, at the Nairobi Club, Nairobi, 
Kenya. Rubia added that he actually applied for a license for the rally but was turned down.
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There was no organization behind the planned rally, only a small group of 
activists working together, including Raila Odinga. “In those days there were 
no proper structures for organizing protests. Mr. Matiba had contact with 
matatu operators which he said he would mobilize and I would organize the 
fans, my link there, so that we take them to Kamkunji.”11 The announce-
ment by Matiba and Rubia of the planned rally sent a fresh burst of hope 
through the country for those hungry for change. “Everybody begins to 
gather courage, mainly because there was an example set when nobody else 
could wait and this is when Matiba became critical in people’s minds.”12
The Moi regime knew the real purpose of the rally and didn’t like it. The 
president quickly warned that the rally would be unlicensed, illegal, and 
halted by force. The regime broke up the rally with force, attacking the large 
crowds that had showed up even though Rubia called off the rally, which 
had not been licensed, just before he and Matiba were arrested. Forced to 
sleep on the concrete f loor of their cells, conditions that contributed to 
health problems of both Matiba and Rubia, they learned from sympathetic 
guards that there had been several days of demonstrations and clashes with 
police in various parts of the country following the aborted rally. Though the 
rally had been blocked, it had sent a signal through the country that change 
was needed and people were willing to stand up for it. In social movement 
parlance, this is both relative deprivation (realizing there is a problem) and 
cognitive liberation (seeing a way out of the problem). Despite the dangers, 
many people had come to the intended rally in Nairobi and many others 
had protested in various other parts of the country.
“Over a few weeks, Matiba and Rubia effectively transformed the long-
repressed underground movement for multi-party democracy into a mass 
movement which for the f irst time threatened the government’s control” 
(Throup and Hornsby 1998, 61-2.) Moving beyond what individual activists 
could accomplish, a small group of activists, supported by mass popular 
participation, had broken the wall of fear, though Kenyans were always 
aware of the dangers of protesting. The rally and the repressive response by 
the regime had attracted widespread domestic and international attention. 
Kenyan historian Munene (2013) notes, “Thereafter, the public lost fear of 
government. With the fear factor broken, the number of activists increased 
as the initiative for political action shifted from Moi to his opponents. 
11 Raila Odinga, in an interview with the author, October 30, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
12 Macharia Munene, in an interview with the author, September 9, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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The government pays attention when the activists attract mass following. As 
long as they are not attracting international concern, they can be ignored.13
Widening the Resistance: Kamkunji Rally 1991
A single photograph from the second major attempted rally on November 
16, 1991 captures the spirit of protest better than the brief, soon-forgotten 
words by activist leaders who ducked police barricades and got to the site. 
The photo shows several opposition politicians14 riding in a small pickup 
truck racing through downtown Nairobi with police in hot pursuit. One of 
them, Martin Shikuku, is sitting on the roof f lashing the then-popular sign 
for multiparty, a two-f ingered ‘V.’ As the van sped through working-class 
neighborhoods, shots were f ired at the pickup, according to Shikuku. The 
photo was broadcast domestically and internationally. It was a stunning, 
bold, in-your-face challenge to the Moi regime, and a cold reminder that 
change was probably inevitable without massive use of force to stop it. 
Large crowds of Kenyans had shown up at the rally despite warnings from 
President Moi and despite a huge presence of riot police clubbing and 
chasing those who came. Some who showed up said they were no longer 
afraid of the regime; some who escaped tear gas then returned to the site a 
second time. The Kamkunji rally drew considerable international attention, 
especially when police moved in to violently suppress it.15
This marked a turning point in the nonviolent resistance in Kenya. For 
the second time in two years, the public had been invited to physically 
express their discontent with the Moi regime, a dangerous proposal at the 
time. For the second time, large crowds of Kenyans had responded, this time 
not to a call from two former Kikuyu members of government seeking a 
way to open up and get back into politics, but from a broader representation 
of Kenyans from different ethnic backgrounds. This posed a much greater 
threat to the Moi regime, signaling that it was not just the largest ethnic 
group against him but a potentially strong coalition of Kenyans from various 
ethnic groups. Given that political voting in Kenya was largely ethnic based, 
the coalition of organizers was a much broader challenge to the legitimacy 
13 Macharia Munene, in a personal e-mail to the author, November 18, 2013.
14 They included, Martin Shikuku, James Orengo, Masinde Muliro, and Philip Gachoka.
15 Being more cautious than some of my fellow international reporters at the time who ended 
up injured by the police, I interviewed Kenyans near the rally site until a truckload of police 
ran toward me and a correspondent for Voice of America, forcing us to jump in my car and f lee 
along the median strip to get our stories out to our editors.
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of the Moi regime. Later that month, international donors meeting in Paris 
froze new funding to Kenya pending economic reforms. Days later Moi 
accepted multiparty elections, leading to the impression that it was the 
donor freeze that pushed him over the line. This study, however, argues 
that it was the growing domestic unrest, not the aid freeze, which led him 
to make the decision to allow multiparty voting, an argument with which 
an academic study of donors to Kenya agrees (Brown 2000).
A social movement whose supporters f ind little in the way of political 
“opportunities,” or external advantages encouraging a movement can 
still move forward if enough people are willing to risk the dangers in an 
authoritarian setting. The f irst rally, Saba Saba, had been a bold attempt 
to push the regime into accepting multiparty politics, but the base from 
which that challenge came was narrow enough that the regime could afford 
to suppress the supporters who showed up for the planned event and not 
make any concessions. The tactics behind the Kamkunji rally were different. 
This time opponents created the outlines of a rival political party, calling it 
the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). By limiting its charter 
members to a maximum of nine, they were technically in compliance with 
the law at the time that organizations with ten or more members had to 
have a government-approved license. There was no way a group of rival 
politicians could get a license for an organization.16
The fact that the individual politicians who stepped forward as members 
of FORD were of an older generation did not mean that younger political 
opponents of the regime were hesitant. It was intentional, according to one 
of the members, Shikuku. “We were old enough to die. We didn’t want kids 
around who still have got hope of living; we had already brought people 
in this world and we were ready to die.”17 Behind this united front were 
younger political activists eager to f ind their place in government. “We were 
the Young Turks behind the movement,” said Raila Odinga. He mentioned 
others, including James Orengo, Paul Muite, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o.18 Raila 
Odinga said he had met with Allan W. Eastham in the United States Embassy 
who had encouraged formation of some kind of united front which would 
16 The original members of FORD included: Oginga Odinga (Raila’s father), Martin Shikuku, 
Masinde Muliro, Philip Gachoka, George Nthenge, and Ahmed Salim Bamahriz. The formation 
of the group was announced at a press conference July 4, 1991 which was widely covered by both 
the local and international press.
17 Martin Shikuku, in an interview with the author, October 3, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
18 Raila Odinga interview.
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make it easier to garner international support.19 A former US diplomat at 
the embassy in Nairobi later recalled:
We [the US Embassy] were encouraging the opposition, if it wanted to 
make a difference, to present some sort of a united front. It was not so 
much to attract US support, although the context was twofold: First, to 
overcome Moi’s biggest advantage, the ability to divide the opposition 
and prevail. Second, to convince the world outside Kenya that they [the 
opposition] were serious. The problem was that the opposition [was] 
divided as Kenya was, by ethnicity.20
In organizational terms, the establishment of FORD represented a further 
shift from individual activism to small group activism. Its members repre-
sented a broad range of political resistance to the regime from various parts 
of the country. It was the rebirth of institutionalization of political pluralism 
in Kenya. In the model introduced in this book of a culture of resistance, 
it represented the second phase, organizational activism, after individual 
activism, and it was connected to the third phase, mass public support. The 
number of Kenyans participating in the rally, like the number of Kenyans 
who stepped forward as members of FORD, was relatively small. A social 
movement rarely involves most people in any cause but it can focus public 
attention on an issue; its strength lies in the potential to rally a signif icant 
portion of the general public to that issue.
What Quantitative Studies Miss
In their quantitative and archival study of political transformation in thirty-
one African countries from 1985-94, Bratton and van de Walle provide 
important information on regime change. Among other insights, they 
concluded that political protests were important markers in the process. 
But such studies from afar cannot be expected to detect the importance 
of non-events, or attempted protests, nor the signif icance of any single 
protest. For Kenya, if one were to do a count of major protests, as many social 
movement studies do around the world, the count, assuming attempted 
19 At the time, the ambassadors from the United States and Germany were both showing 
support for the opposition and political pluralism.
20 Allan W. Eastham, Jr., in a personal e-mail to the author, June 24, 2013. Eastham was political 
counselor at the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya 1988-92.
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events were included, would be only two between 1990 and 1991. But the two 
attempted rallies, both violently suppressed by police, marked a political 
ground shift in Kenya from individual activism to small group activism 
– and the f irst indications that a mass support for change was welling up 
with no certainty of how far it would go. A quantitative analysis of Kenya 
at the time would have missed the groundswell of support for multiparty 
elections which many Kenyans hoped would bring a better economy, more 
jobs, and dignity for the individual. That support was f irst evident at the 
Saba Saba rally July 7, 1990, the day a wall of fear was cracked in Kenya, and 
then at the November 16, 1991 rally, both at Kamkunji grounds in Nairobi. 
After the aborted rally of 1990 there were riots across parts of Kenya. After 
the 1991 rally, there were further demonstrations in various cities, indicating 
a broad opposition to the regime.
Organizational Resistance
The nonviolent social movement in Kenya continued but in a different form 
as a culture of resistance grew. Individual activism had gained important 
ground in focusing attention to a domestic and international audience on 
the excesses of the regime. The torture of dissidents had not stopped, but 
it had been sharply reduced. Small group activism had gained some initial 
mass public and international support in the form of illegal rallies. Now the 
regime had reluctantly agreed to allow multiparty elections. This opened 
the way for political opposition parties to take the lead in organizational 
resistance to the regime. In this phase of nonviolent resistance to the con-
tinuing authoritarian regime of Moi, it took on the form of more classical 
social movements with organized public rallies, growth of nongovernment 
organizations advocating for improved human rights, and widespread pub-
lic commentary critical of the president. Many of the individual activists 
from the earlier phases of resistance joined the opposition parties; some 
were elected to Parliament; others assumed leadership positions in an NGO.
Ethnic Divisions
Despite the hope of a united opposition with the formation of FORD, the 
group very quickly split. The euphoria of a possible united front quickly 
dissolved as the group divided into a number of political parties formed 
primarily along ethnic lines. Activist Paul Muite notes that ethnic politics 
“has terribly hurt and slowed down democratization. It is the most tragic 
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issue, not just in Kenya, but I would say in Africa. Also in human rights. 
It’s the most divisive issue.”21 Ethnic politics, a feature of African politics, 
proved divisive in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections when Kenyans 
mostly backed a candidate of their own ethnic group. It was not until the 
2002 election when rivals came together under a united platform that they 
defeated the ruling party for the f irst time. Moi exploited this feature of 
Kenyan political life to help bolster his argument that a multiparty system 
would cause ethnic tensions. His regime fanned ethnic fears and rivalries 
around the issue of land which led to a series of deadly ethnic clashes from 
November 1991 to 1993 and again in 1997 in a coastal region. The coastal 
clashes were aimed at forcing Luo to move out of the area. Moi hoped to 
clear rival ethnic groups from areas he wanted to win electorally, according 
to Muite. “He [Moi] started it [ethnic clashes] even before elections, as a way 
of resisting the mounting pressure for multi-partyism for election purposes. 
He wanted to kick out the non-Kalenjin [primarily the Kikuyu] from Rift 
Valley so that they don’t vote against the government.”22
Cycles of Activism
In Kenya there were peaks and valleys in activism. Tarrow (1998) writes of 
a cycle of activism. Though his analysis does not preclude multiple cycles, it 
primary theorizes about a rise and a fall with activists eventually growing 
tired or disillusioned. In Kenya there were multiple risings and fallings with 
the decline in activism coming between election years of 1997 and 2002. 
The multiparty reform had not been accompanied by other constitutional 
reforms that would diminish the power of the president who had the power 
to appoint off icials from top to bottom in Kenya. Nor was there a change 
in the repressive laws the president used to attempt to control freedom of 
speech and assembly. Looking back, some activists said they should have 
pushed for greater reforms. Underneath the drive for multiparty politics 
there was little push by leading opposition f igures for a reduction in the 
power of the presidency. The silence of leading presidential candidates on 
this issue showed their real intent: to win with such powers intact.23
21 Muite interview.
22 Muite interview.
23 It was not until 2010 that a constitution was f inally adopted by public referendum that 
reduced presidential powers by establishing a system of shared governance of locally elected 
off icials.
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New Tactic: National Citizen’s Convention
It was against this background that another attempt was made by civil 
society for a new constitution. This required open, organized activism, 
wider alliances that activists hoped would transcend ethnic rivalries. 
The new drive for constitutional change began taking shape as the 1997 
election drew closer. The focus: a national convention to push for reforms 
before the election so that the winner would not carry on with the same 
authoritarian powers. There were public meetings to choose delegates to 
the convention. Movement leaders framed their message in a way designed 
for mass appeal: the rallying cry was “no reforms, no elections.” A National 
Convention Planning Committee was organized during 1996 to prepare for 
a National Convention Assembly (NCA) in April 1997 in Limuru, outside of 
Nairobi. The plan was to develop “a new constitutional order … a transitional 
constitution to democracy … and that was considered treason,” according 
to one of the organizers.24 The convention, unlike the politics of the day, 
was not designed for elitists. It drew on people across the country, rich and 
poor, urban and rural, to generate new ideas: students, teachers, farmers, 
laborers, minibus taxi fare collectors (touts), and roadside craftsmen ( jua 
kali) as well as politicians. There were grassroots preparatory meetings.25 
At the convention, the assembly elected a National Convention Executive 
Committee (NCEC).
“Foot Soldiers” for Freedom
A generational gap soon developed amongst the delegates at the National 
Convention. “The politicians during the first National Convention Assembly 
were asking for minimum reforms … to facilitate a smooth election. But we 
[the youth activists at the convention] were telling them there is no way we 
can have a free and fair election without comprehensively overhauling the 
24 Davinder Lamba, in an interview with the author, September 28, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Lamba, a public policy analyst with two master’s degrees and one of the organizers of the 
national convention, is a Sikh, and was unaff iliated with any political party. He mentioned that 
the years of activism had a physical and emotional toll on the families of activists, including his 
own.
25 Some Kenyan observers characterized the preparatory meetings/assemblies as elitist-run 
and accomplishing little, while defenders such as Lamba argue they were a grass roots exercise 
in developing a participatory sense of democracy that was new to Kenya.
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constitution of the Republic.”26 Young delegates at the National Convention, 
many of them former university student activists, began pushing for public 
demonstrations in 1997 instead of just resolutions. At the same time, they 
began to acknowledge that in many cases they were being “used” by the older 
politicians and activists at rallies, serving as organizers and bodyguards 
instead of speakers.27 They were, in effect the “foot soldiers” in Kenya’s 
struggle for greater human rights and democracy. The younger generation 
(under thirty), while admiring the courage of the better known veteran 
activists, including Willy Mutunga, felt they were not getting a chance to 
develop their own voice in the struggle for political reform. Some of them 
would later go into nongovernment organizations working on justice issues 
or run for Parliament themselves, with limited success, usually due to lack 
of funds. The table below shows the difference in the activities of the two 
generations with regard to public demonstrations.
Table 1  Veteran Activists v. “Foot Soldiers” in Kenya’s Political Demonstrations
veteran activists/politicians youth activists: “foot soldiers”
middle class or above often poor
lawyers; politicians; clergy students; former students; unemployed
sometimes had bodyguards at unprotected; sometimes served as 
bodyguards for
dangerous protests veteran activists/politicians
legal representation if arrested minimal or no legal support
planned protests carried out the plans; recruited participants
highly publicized in media mostly ignored by media
more conservative demands more radical demands
source: Press (2012, 7), based on interviews conducted by the author in kenya, 2002; plus archival 
materials
Growing Support for Mass Public Demonstrations
At the National Convention in 1997 the younger generation of activists 
managed to help persuade delegates to endorse and carry out a series of 
monthly public demonstrations starting in May 1997 and ending in October. 
26 Njoroge Waithera, in an interview with the author, November 7, 2002, at the NCEC off ice 
in Nairobi, Kenya.
27 Ndung’u Wainaina, in an interview with the author, December 15, 2005. At the time, 
Wainaina was program manager for NCEC.
estaBlisHing a cultuRe of Resistance 249
To the delight of veteran activist Mutunga, the middle class began coming to 
the demonstrations, a contrast to the f irst two big opposition rallies in 1990 
and 1991. This was an important expansion of the mass public support for 
the nonviolent social movement against the Moi regime, a point Mutunga 
made in both his book (1999) on the middle-class connection to the push 
for a new constitution, and in an interview.
[I]f you’re going to get anywhere in this country you’ve got to convince the 
professionals. The middle class as a social group is so important … And in 
’97 we were almost getting there because the accountants would come to 
the mass action, they park their little cars very far, they take off their ties 
and they march with everybody. There were certain issues that we were 
pushing forward: issues of power rationing, issues of water, a decayed 
infrastructure; we’re getting punctures [from bad roads] and what not.28
The expansion of the resistance to include members of the middle class 
was further evidence of the growth of a culture of resistance in Kenya. 
Activists who had been elected to Parliament or taken up leadership posi-
tions in NGOs had been unable to wring substantive reforms out of the 
administration since its reluctant agreement to adopt multiparty elections 
starting in 1992. Opposition rallies were drawing huge crowds, sometimes 
interrupted by police. Now the middle class, an educated and vocal group 
were beginning to risk the ever-present threats of force by the regime at 
unsanctioned public rallies. A younger generation of activists was pushing 
for more demonstrations and starting to map out other strategies for expan-
sion of rights. It was possible that all these sources of energy, like small 
streams would coalesce into a river that could further erode the regime’s 
pillars of power, though an outright violent revolt seemed not to be in the 
cards. As the demonstrations began in May, the regime appeared uncertain 
of how to respond but it soon made its intentions clear.
The f irst demonstration in 1997, aimed at forcing the Moi regime to agree 
to constitutional reforms before the election late that year, was May 31. 
Demonstrators were met with only a mild (by Kenyan standards) response 
by police using teargas. Once the regime realized that the protests had the 
potential of growing as they continued, it responded with excessive force for 
the second demonstration, July 7, the familiar Saba Saba date that evoked 
memories of the 1990 initial mass rally. Hundreds of police and paramilitary 
28 Willy Mutunga interview. Mutunga is one of the few scholars to recognize the important 
role of the youth activists in the reform process.
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personnel were sent into the intended rally sites of Kamkunji grounds, 
Uhuru Park, and around the downtown business district. Some of the same 
veteran activists from earlier protests, James Orengo, Martin Shikuku, and 
Paul Muite, managed to get to one of the demonstration sites. Police showed 
no mercy, charging into the crowds “in a mad frenzy,” using “unprecedented 
violence.” At least fourteen people were killed (Peters 2001, 42). Police even 
chased people into the supposed sanctuary of the All Saints Cathedral, 
where the mothers in 1992 had stayed during their year-long vigil to win 
release of political prisoners. Among others attacked in the cathedral was 
human rights activist Rev. Timothy Njoya. He credits the fact that he was 
not killed to several courageous journalists who spontaneously shielded 
him from police blows with their own bodies.29
Still, the demonstrations continued – and grew beyond the planned 
monthly protests – with a boldness that could only have stunned the re-
gime and given new hope to Kenyans eager for regime change, nearly two 
thirds of whom had voted against the president. Kenyans were still living 
under the control of an authoritarian regime; the economy was slipping, 
and legitimate protests were being met with violence. Release Political 
Prisoners (RPP), a human rights group that grew out of the mothers’ vigil, 
staged a demonstration. Large crowds gathered twice at All Saints Cathedral 
to reclaim its sacred role as sanctuary and to pray for those killed in the 
demonstrations. Other demonstrations were held elsewhere in the country 
during July and August, and later in the year. “The defiance reflected by 
the mass action had conf irmed the growing culture of resistance in the 
country” (Mutunga 1999, 189).
Counter Tactics by the Regime: the Chess Game Continues
Resistance in a repressive setting is triggered by the repression itself. The 
response by an authoritarian regime, if not overwhelming enough to crush 
it, can lead to a new round of resistance/repression/resistance and so on 
until one side gives in or gives up. When individual activism was at the 
forefront of the resistance, the regime played a chess game of tactics, with 
each side learning from the other how best to proceed. This is what Dodd 
(1994) refers to as “institutional learning.” It is a game both sides played well 
in Kenya. Some organizers of the National Convention were hoping it could 
transform itself into a “sovereign” national convention with the authority 
29 Weekly Review, July 11, 1997, 5
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to form a new government as had occurred in several West African nations, 
including Benin. In the face of international condemnation of the renewed 
regime violence, a determined segment of the public who did not back down 
and in the face of another funding freeze, this time by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Moi regime made its next move with cunning.30
What happened next shows (1) the strength of a nonviolent resistance 
to force a determined regime to make compromises; (2) how a regime can 
temporarily demobilize a resistance movement with partial concessions; 
and (3) how a regime can skillfully use rivalries within a resistance move-
ment to split it and avoid further concessions.
Moi signaled a willingness to adopt some reform legislation prior to the 
upcoming election. He asked the clergy to withdraw from the reformist 
movement and mediate between them and the government. Religious 
leaders welcomed the chance to get back into a neutral role and withdrew 
from the National Convention structure. Once they had, the president 
ignored them. Most of the members of Parliament who were part of the 
National Convention quickly abandoned the convention and returned 
to Parliament with an eye to the upcoming elections and their record as 
politicians able to bring real reform. Moi backed the establishment of an 
Inter-Party Parliament Group (IPPG) to negotiate the reform laws. Donors 
who had been supportive of the Convention process quickly pulled back 
and expressed support for compromise in Parliament. Ironically, given his 
history of detention in years of struggle against the regime, the negotiations 
were headed by former activist and now member of Parliament, George 
Anyonya.
Moi had successfully neutralized a growing civil society drive for a new 
constitution, removed the clergy from their supportive role of reform, 
and quieted rebellious members of Parliament with the reward of some 
incremental reforms, and pleased international donors – all in one swift 
countermove that essentially left him with his powers intact. Looking 
back, one of the key, nonelected activists who helped organize the national 
convention, academic Kivutha Kibwana said:31 “We invested so much 
power [in] civil society. We were leaders by default. And we developed a 
following. And then there was rivalry.” The rivalry was essentially between 
elected politician/activists and unelected activists, a rivalry Moi exploited 
30 The temporary suspension came with criticism from the IMF about personnel and other 
bureaucratic issues which caused one writer to complain that while Rome was burning, the 
IMF was merely examining the strings on the f iddle (Weekly Review, August 8, 1997).
31 Kivutha Kibwana, in an interview with the author, July 22, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.
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skillfully.32 Member of Parliament Kiraitu Murungi, who participated in the 
NCEC at f irst, later wrote (2000, 78-9): “I felt that academics leading NCEC 
were getting carried away from political realities. The MPS were worried 
that the stand-off between NCEC and KANU hardliners would increase the 
political temperatures and drive the country into civil war.”
In Parliament, KANU and opposition MPs negotiated a series of legisla-
tive reforms lowering barriers against freedom of speech and assembly 
which easily passed. Assessments differ on the importance of those reforms. 
“IPPG was a regression. Although there were some positive things that 
came out, we got a fraction of what we could have gotten. So we put back 
the reforms by f ive years.”33 MP Murungi (2000, 81) noted that the reforms 
had “little impact on the elections, but they definitely opened some political 
space.” In the election of 1997, opposition parties nearly won a majority 
in Parliament. President Moi was reelected against a divided opposition 
and amidst some charges of voter fraud. Others were stronger in their 
criticism, calling the abandonment of the national convention process 
by activist members of Parliament a “betrayal” of the reform movement.34 
Public disillusionment with elected off icials led to the further discussions 
on constitutional reforms as the Ufungamano Initiative, named after the 
meeting site in Nairobi, guided by religious bodies. “[Moi’s] control of the 
judiciary hadn’t changed; his control over the Army hadn’t changed; his 
control over Parliament hadn’t changed. And so what was different from 
a one-party state, except a lot of people speaking, which he learned how 
to live with.”35
The sedition law banning what the government could interpret loosely as 
liable criticism against the government was abolished, but the law against 
incitement remained and “replaced the law of sedition in terms of being a 
convenient tool for harassment.” The Public Order act was amended to allow, 
in theory, public demonstrations but police continued to treat police ap-
proval as a privilege and not a right and often stalled on issuing permits. The 
Preservation of Public Security Act was annulled, ending detention without 
trial. “That one has been observed.” The Chiefs act which essentially gave 
the local chiefs appointed by the president the power to compel donations 
for public projects and to require labor on those projects was dropped. The 
32 Macharia Munene in an e-mail to the author, November 18, 2013.
33 Lamba interview. 
34 Pheroze Nowrojee, in an interview with the author, August 3, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Nowrojee, an activist attorney, was highly regarded as a model for many of the younger activist 
attorneys in the late 1980s and 1990s.
35 Nowrojee interview.
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law limiting licensing of new radio or television stations was amended, but 
the government continued to stall on issuing them.36
All in all it was a “very, very, very, very false reform. It was part of the tricks 
that KANU [the ruling party] really had used to get the pressure that was 
building from mass action off its back. In reality, things did not radically 
change the way they were because the laws that had been used for this 
repression continued in place, and they continued being invoked.37
Further Growth of a Culture of Resistance: A “Psychological 
Revolution”
As stated earlier, this study def ines a culture of resistance as one in which 
public challenges to the abuse of power by a regime becomes a norm for 
activists and a visible segment of the general public. The resistance had 
begun through “individual courage … I think some of these people who 
took up positions, irrespective of what happened to them, were very coura-
geous people, I think they were very principled people.”38 Their example 
in the 1980s and early 1990s inspired other acts of resistance. Small groups 
had joined the resistance, including the mothers in their protest against 
political detentions, and the political f igures who organized the two ral-
lies in 1990 and 1991. The 1997 mass demonstrations in the face of threats 
and violence from the regime was another sign of a growing culture of 
resistance, especially as it began to involve the middle class. And with the 
easing of restrictions in 1997 on freedom of assembly, leaders of opposition 
parties, especially James Orengo and later Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki, 
took full advantage of the concessions, holding political rallies across the 
country, often massively attended despite a police presence and occasional 
interference. The regime’s reluctant acceptance of multiparty elections in 
late 1991, and the partial concessions in 1997 on speech and assembly “add 
up to a point where they become irreversible … [part of an] historic buildup 
of changes that occurred in the last 10 years [1992-2002].”39
36 Kathurima M’Inoti, in an interview with the author, July 18, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. At the 
time, M’Inoti was the junior law partner in the f irm of Kuria and Murungi.
37 M’Inoti interview.
38 Munene interview.
39 Munene interview.
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Democratization did make halting progress through the 1990s, however, 
as Moi’s grip on power started to slip and political momentum gradually 
shifted to the opposition. With a narrow parliamentary majority after 
the 1997 elections, KANU could no longer legislate as Moi pleased. More 
important, a new generation of politicians, in alliance with a cohort of 
the old guard, began to assert its independence and openly defy Moi … 
The tide was beginning to turn (Barkan 2004).
There were other signs of a growth in the culture of resistance. In the 1992 
election, for example, there were f ive thousand Kenyans monitoring the 
election (Barkan 1998); for the 2002 election there were nearly twenty-eight 
thousand (Barkan 2004). Some tactics from the early 1990s became less 
potent as they became more commonplace under a more relaxed political 
environment. “You f ind that demonstrating as a tactic has been watered 
down. I  mean everyone is holding processions in Nairobi nowadays, 
including church people, holding processions, urging people to attend 
their crusades.”40 There was a proliferation of nongovernment advocacy 
organizations (NGOs) in the 1990s: “professional associations … civil society 
organizations like the church – and basically groups of organized citizens 
and committed individuals using established and credible organizations.”41 
Rural residents were also beginning to exercise more freedom:
People are opening their mouth now. Even when you have development 
meetings, the Chief will call the chairman of the ruling party, the chair-
man of the main opposition parties. So there is also an acceptance, 
I think, largely, in many parts of the country, of multi-party system. 
And people can express opinions freely.42
The occasional dramatic legal challenge to the regime was now a thing of the 
past: law suits against the government became common. Public criticism 
of the regime also grew commonplace, including television comedy acts, 
newspaper cartoons, and open discussions. When the author f irst reported 
on political events in Kenya in the late 1980s, informants would call but not 
40 Muthoni Kamau, in an interview with the author, December 21, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya.
41 Mutuma Ruteere, in an interview with the author, August 21, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. At the 
time Ruteere was a researcher for the Kenya Human Rights Commission, a private organization.
42 Ruteere interview. Ruteere had carried out research on human rights in several rural 
areas of Kenya for the Kenya Human Rights Commission. According to Ruteere, by 2002 there 
were approximately f ifteen small human rights groups in rural parts of Kenya. But it was still 
dangerous as police would sometimes try to block their work.
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give their name over phone lines they thought might be tapped. Kenyans as 
a rule seldom spoke in public against a regime that was known for having 
many undercover spies. After the rallies of 1990 and 1991, especially after 
1997, many Kenyans spoke their minds freely. Examples of resistance as a 
norm includes these culled from the Nation daily newspaper in 2002.
– (Sept. 27) “The High Court yesterday confronted a tidal wave of protest 
by issuing an order stopping public debate on the judicial reforms 
proposed in the Constitutional review report.”
– (Oct. 4) “The President was jeered and at a political rally in his own 
territory, Eldoret. Crowds along the road waved the two-f inger multi 
party salute as Moi’s choice for President to succeed him in the 2002 
election, Uhuru Kenyatta, drove by.”
– (Oct. 10) “Most of Kenya’s 3,000 lawyers held prayers and demonstrated 
in the streets, shunning the courts for one day to protest Judiciary 
attempts to block the work of a constitutional review team.”
Shortly before the 2002 election in which the ruling party candidate for 
president was defeated for the f irst time, a former individual activist at-
torney said: “There’s [been] a psychological revolution of the people.”43
International Resistance against Kenya
Domestic protests can win international support that helps add pressure on 
a repressive regime to adopt reforms. That much is clear. What isn’t clear is 
under what circumstances that support is forthcoming. Cliff Bob (2005, 4-6) 
argues that international support from developed countries is not so much 
a product of “top-down” assistance as it is a “marketing” process involving 
efforts by insurgents to attract support and choices by NGOs abroad to 
choose causes that f it their own criterion. Domestic activists in the country 
of repression have to take the initiative to “raise international awareness” 
about their cause. The current study concurs with this argument. Kenyan 
activists, especially during the period of primarily individual activism, as-
siduously courted international support by relaying details of the oppression 
43 Kiraitu Murungi in an interview with the author, July 18, 2002. Murungi was the law partner 
of Gibson Kamau Kuria who, after Kuria was detained in 1987 for f iling a legal challenge to 
detention and torture, courageously ref iled the same challenge. But after accepting a key post 
in the Kibaki government after 2002, Murungi became, in the eyes of some former activists, an 
obstruction to reform rather than an advocate.
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under the Moi government. It was such reporting that enabled Amnesty 
International to document its important report in 1987 about torture in 
Kenya. It was because various other human rights organizations in the 
West were kept informed by activists that they were able to provide quick 
and public condemnations of the Moi regime that no doubt helped win the 
release of some well-known activists who were detained.
The dynamics of support are different, however, when it comes to 
bilateral assistance programs being used as leverage for human rights and 
democracy. For one thing, even repressive regimes can lobby for support, 
as Kenya’s did. Such aid usually falls within the parameters of political 
expediency and changes in global politics. Until the end of the Cold war, 
symbolically f ixed in the minds of many by the tearing down of the Berlin 
in 1989, there was little Western support for nationalist movements or 
domestic human rights campaigns in Africa. South Africa became an excep-
tion despite the reluctance of President Ronald Reagan to apply sanctions 
on the white regime to dismantle the apartheid system and to allow blacks 
to vote. The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 after nearly twenty-seven 
years in prison stirred hopes across the continent that change was possible.
In Kenya it was the Americans and the Germans, especially – not the Brit-
ish – who pushed for multiparty elections and an improvement in human 
rights. The British played down the human rights issue because Kenya was 
already pro-Western at a time when the West was playing a political chess 
game in Africa for allies against the Soviet Union. “It [Kenya] was a friendly 
country. You had instability in Ethiopia, you had instability in Somalia, you 
had instability in Sudan, you had … the [Idi] Amin years in Uganda and 
the post-Amin instability. Kenya was seen as a haven. And [British – and 
other Western] business and other interests wanted to keep it that way.”44
The Kenyan government also wanted to keep things that way. As a former 
British foreign service off icial from that period noted, Kenya used a “well 
organized lobby in London” to make their case for a single party regime 
to avoid what Moi often referred to as the risk of ethnic political splits 
that could tear the country apart. There was also a “sort of built in Kenya 
lobby of former colonial f igures” within the British government. As a result, 
Britain tended to send pro-Kenyan diplomats to Nairobi to represent the 
44 Malcolm Harper, in an interview with the author, July 2, 2002, in London. From 1968 to 1971, 
Harper was the f ield director for Oxfam in East Africa. 
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government.45 But democracy was far from a buzz word in the halls of the 
US State Department in the 1980s with regard to Africa.
I would argue that the US didn’t have any problem with the single party 
states. There were single party states that were their friends and single 
party states that weren’t. But that was based on whether these folks were 
lined up with the US or the Socialist Bloc. So this [the start of multiparty 
elections in Kenya] was not a gift from the donors by any stretch of the 
imagination and that point needs to be emphasized.46
A “Rogue” US Ambassador Supports Kenyan Human Rights
The US, like Britain, was a player in the same political chess game of the Cold 
War. As a former journalist covering East and West Africa for The Christian 
Science Monitor from 1987-95, I had trouble getting any US ambassador in 
the region to go on record in support of democratic governance before the 
early 1990s. I  literally chased one ambassador in West Africa down the 
hall as he strode rapidly away from my questions without uttering a single 
word in favor of democracy. Fortunately, there was at least one exception: 
Ambassador Smith Hempstone in Kenya. Hempstone, a former journalist 
who had reported on Kenya pre-independence and author of two history 
books on the region, arrived in Kenya as a “conservative cold war warrior. 
Over time, as he accumulated experience with the repressive and rapacious 
practices of that government, Smith went in the other direction.”47 The 
start of Hempstone’s shift apparently came when the popular minister 
of foreign affairs, Robert Ouko, was murdered and his body burned in 
1990 shortly before Ouko was to report to the president about government 
corruption he had detected. The murder also came after Ouko had received 
45 Christopher T. Hart, in a personal e-mail to the author, 2002. From 1985-90 Hart was head 
of Africa research section of the Foreign and Commonwealth Off ice; he also served in Nairobi 
1974-76. Hart added that President Moi in the eyes of the diplomatic community was “underrated. 
He was very, very, energetic; gets up early, works very, very hard; very assiduous in visiting all 
around Kenya.”
46 US House of Representatives International Relations Committee staffer, who requested 
anonymity, in an interview with the author, May 21, 2002, in Washington.
47 Allan W. Eastham, Jr. interview.
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special attention from US off icials as part of the delegation of President 
Moi’s off icial visit to the White House.48
“I suppose the scales f irst fell from my eyes when Ouko was so cruelly 
murdered,” Hempstone wrote in his book about his time in Kenya: Rogue Am-
bassador: An African Memoir (1997, 167). He began meeting with opposition 
activists, shared a meal with them in a local restaurant, and offered refugee 
protection in the US Embassy for attorney Kuria when the government was 
seeking to arrest him. The US Embassy, as noted previously, encouraged 
opposition f igures to form some kind of united front which would make it 
easier to support them.49 Hempstone and the German ambassador, Bernard 
Mutzelburg, whom Hempstone called “a courageous f ighter for freedom” 
(95) worked together to support an expansion of democracy, sometimes 
pressing their points jointly in meetings with Kenyan off icials. At one point 
Hempstone called the international and local press to accompany him to 
a very public and somewhat confrontational meeting with the Kenyan 
attorney general to complain about lack of human rights. Despite the public 
denouncement of Hempstone by the Moi regime, “I think he had an effect” 
in helping push the Moi regime toward reforms.50 The State Department, 
particularly the Africa Bureau, was “lukewarm” and somewhat reluctant 
regarding Hempstone’s statements for human rights and democracy.
We were still in the Cold War and the uncertain transition out of it, and 
of course there was also the f irst Gulf War; and Kenya was our best friend 
in East Africa, with a [military] access agreement in force. We kept asking 
them [the Kenyan government] big favors and they were very helpful. 
So what we did on human rights and with opposition f igures was not 
explicitly blessed by Washington, nor was it prohibited.51
A speech Hempstone gave in May 1990 to the Rotary Club in Nairobi nearly 
got him recalled to Washington. He said in part: “A strong political tide is 
f lowing in our Congress, which controls the purse strings, to concentrate 
our economic assistance on those of the world’s nations that nourish 
democratic institutions, defend human rights, and practice multiparty 
politics” (Hempstone 1997, 91). Unbeknownst to him, the same day two 
48 The Moi regime refused to release a report by Scotland Yard that pointed to two top aides 
as the “principal suspects” (Weekly Review, November 29, 1991). 
49 Allan W. Eastham interview. Two Kenyan activists received similar advice from a British 
politician (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 76).
50 Hart interview.
51 Allan W. Eastham interview.
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former members of a Moi cabinet who had been expelled from the ruling 
party, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, held a press conference in Nairobi 
also calling for multiparty elections. Both the Moi regime and the US State 
Department were angry with the American ambassador. Hempstone found 
himself on thin ice and was nearly recalled to Washington.52
From Regime Reform to Regime Change: Who gets the Credit?
Activists had won important concessions in 1992 and 1997 but they were 
not successful in achieving regime change until rival candidates came 
together in a united slate in 2002. Political science professor and member of 
Kenya’s Parliament Peter Anyang’ Nyang’o worked hard behind the scenes 
to achieve that unity. The unity agreement f inally came in the form of 
the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) with Moi’s former Vice 
President Mwai Kibaki as the winning presidential candidate. Kibaki easily 
beat Moi’s handpicked KANU candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s 
f irst president, Jomo Kenyatta. Looking back, one could ask, who gets the 
credit for the regime reforms and ultimately for the regime change: domestic 
activists? International actors? Both?
Did the US and other international pressures on the Moi regime cause 
the president to reverse himself and accept, in a speech to his party in early 
December 1991, multiparty elections? Most analyses conclude, given the 
time of the decision shortly after donors froze new funds that the answer 
is yes. This study, however, after an examination of the domestic buildup of 
pressure for change starting in the mid-1980s, including the two politically 
ground shifting attempts at national opposition rallies, argues that it was 
primarily domestic pressure that tipped the scales. The funding freeze 
alone would not likely have pushed him to make the decision; it probably 
influenced the timing of his decision.
The funding freeze came at a meeting of World Bank and bilateral 
donors in Paris in late November 1991. A World Bank off icial at the Paris 
meeting recalled that human rights and other political abuses were not 
discussed at the meeting, which focused on economic issues.53 Donors were 
52 Allan W. Eastham interview. At the time of Hempstone’s death in 2006, then-Secretary of 
State Lawrence S. Eagleburger described him as “a man of real courage” and said that “to have 
pulled him out or to have disciplined him would almost certainly have created real problems 
politically at home” (Bernstein, Washington Post, November 20, 2006).
53 Stephen O’Brian, in an e-mail to the author, 2002. At the time of the freeze, O’Brian was 
head of the World Bank delegation in Kenya.
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inconsistent before and after this freeze, sometimes increasing funding at 
times of serious human rights abuses; sometimes reducing it; sometimes 
praising Moi and at other times criticizing him. An examination of donor 
funding compared with the record of human rights abuses from 1987 to 
2002 shows an inconsistent relationship. It also shows that Moi was in no 
apparent hurry to restore aid, either in 1991 or in 1997 when the IMF froze 
new funds at a time when the regime was killing some unarmed protestors 
in public demonstrations for constitutional reform. If the president had felt 
so crucially vulnerable to funding shifts, he might have moved quicker to 
meet the demands behind the two freezes – but he did not (Press 2006, 124-5, 
182). Donors took too much credit with regard to the adoption in Kenya of 
multiparty elections and gave too little heed to the mounting domestic 
pressure. A former British diplomat familiar with Kenya noted: “The role 
of external donors has been grotesquely exaggerated. Donors claim great 
credit from their aid: Everyone is so vain.”54 A study of donors concluded, 
“In the case of Kenya, the reform movement was mainly domestically driven, 
with donors lending their support after a critical mass had already been 
achieved and actually discouraging more fundamental political reform” 
(Brown 2000).
Domestic pressure had been growing since the 1980s as a range of activ-
ists using different tactics and strategies challenged the power of the regime 
and called for a multiparty system. Moi could afford to ignore the activism 
by individual or even organizational activists who were mostly “elitist” 
middle and upper-class, well-to-do people; he could not afford to ignore 
protests where the elitists began mobilizing mass demonstrations – nor 
could the international community.”55 The rallies in 1990 and ’91 were the 
culmination at that time of this pressure with major potential consequences 
which the Moi administration recognized. One of the most prominent 
activists at the time, attorney Paul Muite, offered this analysis of why the 
Moi regime adopted multiparty elections.
Human Rights Watch, donors, agitation by lawyers, critical statements 
by the churches; they were all there. But the last straw that made the 
government give in was the def iance, f irst in July 1990 and November of 
1991 … [T]hat sent the message to the government that her own people are 
54 A former British diplomat, who requested not to be named, in an interview with the author, 
November 18, 2002, in London. 
55 Munene interview. Historian Munene argued that it was the “convergence” of domestic 
mass demonstrations and international actions that pushed Moi to make the reform.
estaBlisHing a cultuRe of Resistance 261
prepared to rise up and defy the government. It was when, in July of 1990, 
despite the detention of people like Matiba, people went to Kamkunji 
[site of the rally]; that frightened the government. The government saw 
there was going to be chaos, general chaos across the entire [country]. 
So here were people jumping out into the streets who were prepared to 
be killed. That is what frightened the government. And we repeated the 
same in 1991. So it is that defiance. That is what does the trick in the end.56
The view from within the administration is a harder one to assess. Moi 
had a tendency to criticize outside pressure from groups such as Amnesty 
International then quietly respond to at least some demands for human 
rights improvements. He verbally and publicly clashed with US Ambassador 
Hempstone on numerous occasions. One of President Moi’s close aides 
during the buildup of pressure for change said, “I f ind it very diff icult to see 
which one [was more signif icant: domestic or international pressure].” He 
cited the activism of “marginalized” politicians including Oginga Odinga, 
son Raila Odinga, Kenneth Matiba and the vocal criticism from Bishops 
representing at least their own dioceses – and the mass demonstrations. 
This provided a handle for the international community to grasp and ap-
ply pressure for reform. “You see if there is no internal pressure, it is very 
diff icult for the West now to put too much pressure.”57
Implications of a Culture of Resistance
This study offers a model for the growth of a culture of resistance involving 
three primary and sometimes overlapping elements: individual activism, 
organizational activism, and mass popular support. Kenya had all three 
phases. The nonviolent social movement in Kenya, whose visible roots 
can be traced back at least into the 1980s (and earlier in historical studies) 
had grown from mostly individual activism (1987-91) to small group (1991-
92) then organizational activism from 1992 onward. After the adoption 
of multiparty elections and formation of opposition parties, the focus of 
the resistance shifted to these parties. Some former individual activists 
became leaders in opposition parties, running for president or winning 
56 Muite interview.
57 Bethuel Kiplagat, in an interview with the author, October 7, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Kiplagat served as Moi’s permanent secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation from 1983 to 1991. 
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parliamentary seats. Others moved into leadership in advocacy NGOs or 
returned to their professional careers.
The organizational phase of activism drew mass support, most visibly 
in rallies across the country. In a repressive setting it is not surprising that 
there may be no formal organization or central organization. While most 
studies of social movements try to identify organizations that scholars 
can focus on to measure and analyze their growth, their use of exogenous 
opportunities, and their eventual decline, the broader model of a social 
movement presented in this book enables the scholar to detect a more 
flexible range of strands of a movement. At times there was a predominant 
strand; at other times not. Though the strands may have appeared isolated 
when viewed separately, they were usually connections between them as 
activists shared information and sometimes jointly planned acts of resist-
ance. Muhula (2005, 326) notes in his study of social movements in Kenya: 
“Social movements are not permanent entities with structured leadership 
like the rest of civil society. They might even appear transitory in nature.”58
In his famous poem “The Second Coming,” W.B. Yeats (1920) penned the 
oft-quoted line: “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;” In Kenya, even 
after it became safer to organize openly, there was no “centre” or central 
organization that emerged as politically ambitious politicians split the 
nonviolent resistance along ethnic lines. There were peaks and valleys in 
the resistance. The drive for a wider campaign for constitutional reform, for 
example, only peaked in election years and even then without the support of 
leading opposition presidential candidates.59 Without a center, a resistance 
risks failing to achieve its goal, in this case regime change. It took until 2002 
to replace the regime and then only because of the temporary unity among 
rival candidates. But support for the rival candidates had grown as popular 
resistance against the regime grew into a culture of resistance.
Though this study of Kenya focuses on the period 1987-2002, it is essential 
to add that the election of Mwai Kibaki in 2002 brought mixed changes. 
There was an important easing of restrictions on freedom of speech and 
assembly. Corruption remained a major problem. Some human rights abuses 
persisted. Several human rights/democracy activists from the resistance 
58 Muhula identif ies three social movements in Kenya 1988-2002: the formation of FORD, 
which quickly split into ethnic groups; the formation of the NCEC, which was undermined by 
Moi’s counter-tactics; and the brief coalition of parties that agreed to support Kibaki but quickly 
dissolved after the election.
59 This was not resistance movement in abeyance; it was the ebb and f low of interest and 
critical events.
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years accepted appointments to the cabinet, where their actions brought 
strong criticism from some former activists. Two human rights investigators 
were murdered in 2009, spreading fear among the human rights community. 
In the disputed presidential election in 2007, opposition candidate Raila 
Odinga, who was well ahead at one point, lost to Kibaki, who was hur-
riedly sworn in for a second term. After the results were announced, the 
country was torn apart by violence. A group of local and international 
mediators forged a shared governance plan in which Kibaki and Odinga 
both ruled until the 2013 election which Odinga lost to Uhuru Kenyatta. The 
International Criminal Court indicted several Kenyans for crimes against 
humanity for their alleged involvement in fomenting the postelection 
violence, among them Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who nevertheless 
were elected president and deputy president in 2013. Meanwhile, in 2010 a 
new constitution had been adopted that f inally reduced the concentrated 
powers of the president and brought new hopes to Kenyans of a more stable, 
democratic future.
Figure 12  Slum and downtown skyline, Nairobi, Kenya, 2006
Photo by Betty Press
Figure 13  Police attack mothers and supporters protesting for release of political 
prisoners, Nairobi, Kenya, 1992
Photo by Betty Press
 Conclusion
Implications for the Study of Social Movements and 
Nonviolent Resistance
We started this exploration of people standing up for human rights and 
democratic freedoms with a statement made by Robert F. Kennedy in 1966 
in Cape Town, South Africa, during apartheid, and it is worth repeating:
Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, 
or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and 
crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring, 
those ripples build a current which can sweep down the mightiest walls 
of oppression and resistance.1
Just two years before Kennedy spoke in South Africa, Nelson Mandela had 
been imprisoned in a small cell on nearby Robben Island off the coast of 
Cape Town. He was freed after almost twenty-seven years then led four 
years of tough negotiations with the South African white government. He 
was elected president in 1994 when blacks could vote for the f irst time. His 
sense of reconciliation and leadership helped avert a civil war. By the time 
of Mandela’s death in 2013, South Africans were no longer separated by 
color and the laws of apartheid. But the realities of economic disparities 
between the races, as well as high levels of unemployment and crime meant 
millions were still living in hardship. Mass political activism had helped 
bend the course of history in South Africa toward good, but for many, the 
goal of justice remained distant.
In the three sub-Saharan Africa countries studied in this book – Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Kenya – the goal of justice remains distant for many 
today in terms of poverty, education, and health. Human rights abuses 
continue. But the progress in all three countries has been impressive in 
those same categories. The accomplishment of ordinary people in all three 
countries in helping overcome the tyranny and abuses of past regimes is 
now a matter of record. The resistance was mostly nonviolent despite the 
violence against them. Gandhi, a main proponent of nonviolence observed 
1 Robert F. Kennedy, “A Tiny Ripple of Hope” (Day of Aff irmation address at Cape Town Uni-
versity, Cape Town, South Africa, June 6, 1966), American Rhetoric. http://www.americanrhetoric.
com/ speeches/rfkcapetown.com/.
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that tyrants eventually fall. “When I despair, I remember that all through 
history the ways of truth and love have always won. There have been tyrants, 
and murderers, and for a time they can seem invincible, but in the end they 
always fall. Think of it – always” (Gandhi 2010).
But that statement does not explain how tyrants fall. This study of three 
sub-Saharan African countries has argued that nonviolent resistance can 
take different forms than what one normally pictures when thinking 
of social movements. In Sierra Leone at one point a small independent 
newspaper, The Tablet, became the focus of opposition; in Kenya, op-
position political parties took the lead in the resistance after an earlier 
period of mostly individual activism. In Liberia, where repression was 
more intense than in those two countries, resistance took a variety of 
forms. There were few if any obvious “opportunities” for resistance: the 
repression was intense much of the time. At times elements of resistance 
operated in abeyance, at low levels, until they managed to emerge more 
openly.
This book has shown how ordinary people can rise up courageously 
against tyrants and challenge them. Most of the events highlighted in 
this book – the repression and the nonviolent responses – were known 
to residents of the countries, though the full panoply of activism over 
a decade or two had not been collected or examined in the way this 
book does. The contributions of many of the individuals had not been 
woven together into visible patterns. An advance reader of the Sierra 
Leone chapters, political author Lans Gberie, wrote: “The cacophony 
of voices, which could have cluttered the text, feels fresh and original, 
because they are drawn from many sources, some expected, some not. 
They add up to a very convincing account of the political history and 
social activism of the country for the past few decades” (Gberie 2013). 
Liberian scholar T. Debey Sayndee, director of the Kof i Annan Institute 
for Conflict Transformation at the University of Liberia observed that the 
section on Liberia “highlights deep-rooted issues that any serious person 
seeking to engage the Liberian society can take clues from. It brings out 
hidden reasons for the way the society operates” (Sayndee 2013). Kenyan, 
historian Macharia Munene wrote that the nonviolent resistance there 
started “with uncoordinated individuals each trying to right perceived 
wrongs in different places within a given polity … then develops into a 
Culture of Resistance to the Culture of Repression [emphasis in original] 
which in turn attracts additional attention and support both locally and 
internationally … The argument, using Kenya, is very persuasive” (Munene 
2013).
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Activism and Structural Conditions
The focus has been on people, not on conditions; on domestic resistance, 
not international pressures and interventions. This focus is intentional. 
The study does not make the claim that activism led to the regime changes 
that came in all three countries. Rather, the argument is that without the 
domestic resistance it is unlikely that changes would have come when 
they did. Domestic opposition to a regime opens the door to the kind of 
international pressures and, in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia, to 
international military intervention which pushed the tyrants aside. The 
example of Sierra Leoneans welcoming the National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC), a military junta, in 1992 is illustrative. With people literally 
dancing in the street at their arrival, the international community had 
no reason to intervene. But the massive noncooperation that greeted the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup in 1997 sent a different 
signal to West African troops (and eventually the British) that the regime 
had to go. It was defeated by these forces. In all three countries, interna-
tional diplomatic pressures played a role. In Kenya, for example the US and 
Germany, especially, were quite clear about their opposition to the Moi 
regime. Donors cut off aid more than once in Kenya, though this study has 
argued it was primarily the growing domestic unrest and resistance that 
pushed Moi to accept multiparty elections.
External conditions (usually referred to in the social movement literature 
in terms of “structure” and “opportunity’) were important. For one thing, 
repression was the condition which sparked the nonviolent resistance. 
Poverty may have pushed some to join the resistance though it likely held 
many others back who were focused on making a living, on keeping what-
ever job they might have risked by openly confronting the regime. The book 
argues, however, against a deterministic interpretation of events in all three 
countries, against the notion that conditions primarily determined what 
happened politically. This has been a detailed account of how individuals, 
small groups, informal and formal organizations, and mass demonstrations, 
became part of what eventually amounted to a culture of resistance in all 
three countries. In the process they defied the main structural limitations, 
the repression, and the danger of opposing regimes that at times were 
ruthless and vindictive. Some in the resistance stayed in the shadows of 
anonymity, though perhaps participating in a demonstration, spontane-
ous or planned; others helped organize such demonstrations; a smaller 
number stepped directly into the regime spotlight and openly challenged 
the repression in various ways.
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Uncertainties
This study does not argue that the presence of a social movement, in abey-
ance or in full operation, will lead to a particular outcome or result. The 
author makes no predictions based on the f indings of this study other than, 
as mentioned above, to argue that without the resistance that took place, 
change of regimes would likely not have come when they did. In other cases 
regime change may not occur. In these three cases, change did come. People 
stood up for freedom, often at great risk. Activists sometimes were saved or 
helped by the spontaneous assistance of minor actors, making prediction 
of their activism uncertain. Taxi drivers, jail keepers, and others warned 
activists of pending arrests, helping them survive harsh confinement or to 
seek legal defense (as in Kenya).
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005) 
found that nonviolent resistance is much more successful in obtaining regime 
change than violent campaigns and that a country is much more likely to 
remain a democracy if the campaign for change was nonviolent (see the theory 
chapter for details). But the nature and behavior of the new governments 
achieved with the help of nonviolent resistance is never a certainty. Another 
uncertainty is what role activists will play once a regime change occurs.
Some former activists later accepted government posts once there was a 
transition. In Liberia, several courageous human rights attorneys took cabinet 
posts under Africa’s f irst elected female president. In Sierra Leone when 
I interviewed her, Zainab Bangura, who helped lead a women’s movement for 
peace and democracy in the mid-1990s, was minister of foreign affairs. Hindolo 
Trye was minister of tourism; and another former key Tablet newspaper con-
tributor, I.B. Kargbo was minister of information and communication, both in 
an APC government, the same party they had opposed in their activist days.
In all three countries, some former activists have been criticized for their 
performances in the new governments; in a few cases they have been blamed 
for corruption and even for obstructing moves toward greater human rights 
and other reforms. Activists seen as heroes at one point in their country’s 
struggles for human rights are not always seen that way later. In Kenya, for 
example, attorney Martha Karua, one of the most fearless advocates for 
human rights and democracy, later became a senior government off icial 
when her ethnic group won the presidency. She was criticized for vouching 
for the authenticity of the 2007 presidential election, widely condemned as 
flawed. She ran unsuccessfully for president in 2013. Kenyan attorney Kiraitu 
Murungi, once a human rights advocate, was seen by some of his former 
fellow activists as an obstructionist after he joined the Kibaki government.
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Arguments Supported
Six arguments were introduced in the chapter on theoretical perspectives. 
The evidence presented to support them contributes to the literature on 
social movements, democratization, and our understanding of how non-
violent movements operate in repressive settings.
1 Individual activism, a much understudied part of social 
movements, can play a significant part in nonviolent 
resistance.
The literature is practically silent on the contributions of activists acting as 
individuals and not members of an organization. But in all three countries, to 
varying degrees, individual activists played an important role in building a 
nonviolent resistance at a time when organized resistance was not prevalent. 
The term “individual activism” is defined herein as activism unsupported 
by an organization. In some cases, the activists’ organizations opposed 
their resistance; in other cases the “organization” they belonged to was so 
weak it offered little or no support. In Sierra Leone, during a period of high 
repression under the military junta the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), some independent journalists went underground with their skeletal 
staff and continued publishing clandestinely. In Kenya, for example, before 
most organizations joined in the open resistance to Moi’s regime, individual 
writers, lawyers, mothers, and others challenged the regime openly, drawing 
both domestic and international attention to the abuses of the regime. 
Another source of resistance in all three countries was the individuals drawn 
into the resistance not as members of an organization but as people commit-
ted to the principles of their profession, including independent journalists, 
attorneys, and some academics. In such cases they were generally operating 
as individuals, not representatives of their profession.
2 During periods of high repression, nonviolent social 
movements may lack a formal structure but continue in 
abeyance, informally, at a lower level of resistance, waiting for 
safer times to emerge more openly and formally.
This happened in all three countries at times. In Sierra Leone, a university 
student protest in 1977 against the president that spread to a nationwide 
student strike was thwarted from becoming a full social movement by 
regime repression and co-optation, and by lack of planning and alliance 
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building on the part of the students. Resistance continued in abeyance, in 
the form of an independent newspaper, The Tablet, organized by earlier 
activists and in the 1980s with more university student demonstrations. 
The resistance in abeyance set a model for the open social movements that 
did emerge in the mid-1990s. By the time the AFRC seized power in the late 
1990s, a culture of resistance had been developed but resistance efforts were 
forced to operate in abeyance because it was too dangerous to mount an 
organized, open resistance. There was mass, informal noncooperation that 
closed schools, many businesses, and slowed government bureaucracy to 
a crawl. A clandestine radio station encouraged the noncooperation that 
continued until the junta was ousted by international military interven-
tion. In Liberia, the extreme violence of the Samuel Doe regime blocked 
formation of a full social movement. But some journalists, lawyers, clergy, 
and others kept a low level of resistance alive in the 1980s that blossomed 
in the 1990s into two social movements, one against the regime, and one 
led by women who campaigned for an end to the civil war. In Kenya, in the 
late 1980s when the regime was torturing political dissidents, the individual 
attorneys and other activists informally mounted a social movement in 
abeyance, one that grew bolder and bigger in the 1990s in the push for 
multiparty elections.
3 Nonviolent resistance can take place even under severe 
repression, and without favorable conditions or “political 
opportunities,” and with only limited material resources.
As shown, most of the openings or opportunities often cited in the literature 
– external conditions that could encourage a movement’s advance – were 
not present. Instead activists and supporters often faced a wall of repression: 
armed police attacks; detentions; torture; execution. This study concurs 
with more recent studies which argue that repression can stimulate resist-
ance; it provides fresh evidence of this. With regard to material resources, 
the resistance studied took place in countries still developing and under 
circumstances of poverty for the majority. Many of the activist leaders 
were elites, educated and with a profession. Many who joined in resist-
ance demonstrations were poor, though some in the middle class also took 
part. In a pre-cell phone era, some activists had access to off ices and fax 
machines, but often material support for the resistance was meager. As 
shown through interviews, however, many activists were motivated by 
ideas, including a stubborn commitment to justice and human rights, while 
others were motived by hopes of personal gain.
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4 Nonviolent social movements in repressive settings involve 
a broader and more complex array of participants than is 
generally recognized.
In addition to the large organizations and mass demonstrations that usually 
feature in most social movement studies, the three case studies showed the 
important role individual activists and small, informal groups can play in 
building a nonviolent resistance movement. This includes persons drawn 
into the resistance by way of their commitment to their profession (e.g., 
attorneys; independent journalists). In Sierra Leone, it was a small group 
of students who planned the demonstration against Stevens. In Liberia and 
Kenya, small, informal groups of attorneys helped each other in the defense 
of accused political activists. A group of Kenyan mothers challenged the 
illegal detention of activists.
5 From modest starting points, nonviolent activism can grow 
into a “culture of resistance” unless blocked by extreme 
repression.
Building on an historic record of nonviolent resistance, activism in all three 
countries led to the establishment of a culture of resistance. The study de-
fined the development of a culture of resistance as a process in which public 
challenges to the abuse of power by a regime become a norm for activists 
and for a visible segment of the general public. The student demonstrations 
in Sierra Leone in 1977 and the 1980s broke the silence that had engulfed 
much of society during the repression of the Stevens years. The women-led 
push against a military junta in the mid-1990s involved a broader-based, 
public resistance that grew further into the mass noncooperation against 
a second junta in the last half of the 1990s. In Liberia, resistance in the 
1970s, followed by some courageous examples in the 1980s under severe 
repression, grew into a culture of resistance in the 1990s. An example was 
the dramatic marches by women for peace. Kenya’s wall of fear began to 
crack in the late 1980s when individual, and some organized, resistance 
took place against the regime. It cracked further in the early 1990s with 
two non-licensed major rallies by political opposition f igures. It openly 
flourished after that and included mass demonstrations, an active media 
and open criticism of the regime.
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6 There is a need for a universal model of social movements, one 
that can work in the democratic West as well as in repressive 
settings.
This study suggests a new model for social movements to help bridge this gap, 
recognizing social movements as a process of challenges to targeted authori-
ties that may involve individual as well as organizational activism, and at times 
mass public support, aimed at either regime reform or regime change. Though 
emerging primarily from the democratic West, social movement theory has 
been applied increasing to repressive settings elsewhere, especially in Latin 
America and more gradually in Africa. For reasons noted above, social move-
ments in dangerous conditions are obliged to adopt more flexible approaches 
than those in less harsh settings. There is another important difference: 
social movements in democratic settings usually seek regime reform; in 
repressive setting they may seek regime change. This makes activists targets 
of the regime. Often activists cannot be open and formally organized or they 
risk being blocked or crushed by the regime. Yet another difference: they do 
not always have “opportunities” favorable to them, or signif icant material 
resources. A broader, more flexible concept of a social movement is needed 
to apply to both repressive and non-repressive settings. The model presented 
in this book involves individual, organizational, and mass activism, allowing 
for goals of regime reform or regime change. The model does not limit social 
movements to the usual characteristics often cited in the literature of being 
“sustained, organized, and public.” The model recognizes that repression 
sometimes makes these goals impractical and dangerous.
Longtime Kenya resident Harold Miller, an advocate for peace, cautions 
about trying to see African societies through the lens of Western theories.2
I f ind the Western need for a clear theoretical framework that makes 
sense within the world of Western academia not fully satisfying … Per-
haps the closest approximation to a continually (sub-Saharan) recognized 
ideological concept is Ubuntu,3 which … more recently associated with 
South Africa in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
established by Mandela, chaired by [Archbishop Desmond] Tutu.
2 Harold Miller, in an e-mail to the author, November 25, 2013.
3 There are many interpretations of the term, including the concept of “living harmoniously 
in community,” in I Am Because We Are: African Wisdom in Image and Proverb, by photographer 
Betty Press with proverbs compiled by Annetta Miller (2011, 1).
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Miller does see more “commonalities” than differences among people. He is 
discouraged that some Kenyans (and the same concern was recognized in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia) “deploy the term or concept ‘human rights’ largely 
[for] opportunist ends.” This study does not disagree with his concern. Some 
activists clearly sought political benef it. But many others did not. They 
stood up for greater freedom, for human rights, including the right to be 
treated with dignity and to be able to live safely and make one’s living in a 
dignif ied way. Those who stepped forward as part of the resistance did so 
at risk, sometimes grave, personal risk. The results anticipated or not, are a 
heightened awareness of human rights and other democratic freedoms and 
greater sensitivity of attempts by governments to abuse them. A lingering 
question is whether a society anywhere that once experiences that spirit and 
awareness will mobilize to protect those rights if they are threatened anew. 
This author remains optimistic that they will. Once a culture of resistance 
has been established in a society, it is not likely to disappear again, at least 
not without a struggle.
In our journey we have seen fresh evidence of the power of the human spirit.
Figure 14  Family in their street sales stall, Nairobi, Kenya, 1991
Photo by Betty Press
Figure 15  Hope for the future: sign board with image of Africa’s first elected female 
President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Monrovia, Liberia, 2006
Photo by Betty Press
 Appendix
Methodology
After completing initial interviews in Kenya, I  looked for two other 
countries with even more repressive regimes to see if signif icant and 
contemporary nonviolent resistance had occurred there as well. Both 
Liberia and Sierra Leone had experienced more repressive regimes and 
civil wars. Usually the f ighting was away from the capitals, where most of 
the resistance took place. Instead of looking for great variance, the study 
uses “sequential case selection,” as methodologist Charles Ragin (2004) of 
the University of Arizona describes. “The key is that in much qualitative 
work, case selection is often sequential, based on what has been learned 
so far. The goal is to solve puzzles through careful [sequential] case selec-
tion,” looking for similar cases to see if what happened in one country 
may have happened in others. The historic analysis included establishing 
timelines for key events. In Sierra Leone, most interviewees pointed to 
the precedent-setting student demonstrations against the government 
in 1977. In Liberia most analysts suggested the logical starting point for 
the study was the demonstrations in 1979 against government plans to 
make a major hike in the price of rice, a staple food there. In Kenya, overt, 
nonviolent resistance emerged prominently in 1987 with legal challenges to 
political detention. The interviews with activists and other knowledgeable 
observers were supplemented by archival research specif ic to the three 
countries and by an extensive literature review of social movements and 
nonviolent resistance.
Structural Issues
The study is an intentional look at the role activists played in the nonviolent 
resistance that occurred in all three countries and the repression of the 
regimes aimed at stopping them. This is a clear “agency” approach which 
some scholars might argue provides only a limited view of the forces at 
work during the repressive periods studied. The study does not argue that 
structural factors within the three countries or that international actions 
were not important; they were, and often they are noted. The reforms in 
the 1990s, for example, were part of a sweeping wave of democratic reforms 
that occurred in many parts of Africa in the post-Cold War period when 
the West was no longer in competition with the Communist bloc for allies. 
Human rights became a popular and internationally supported theme 
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in Africa from developed nations on both sides of the Atlantic. But this 
study argues, on the basis of deep research, that it was domestic resistance 
that in most cases started the move toward reform. International help and 
pressures followed and may well have tipped the scales in some cases. But 
without the activism on the ground, changes would not likely have come 
as soon as they did.
Quantitative studies based on available data sets or constructed ones 
based on economic and political features of societies in developing nations 
such as these can yield informative correlations. But this qualitative study 
yields insights not available through such studies. The details and motiva-
tions, fears and tactics and emotions of former activists, their relationships 
with each other, the hardships they faced and suffered, become clear 
through this kind of qualitative study and involve interviews.
Interviews
The book is based in large part on interviews with some 170 individuals 
(mostly activists but also people knowledgeable about the activism in the 
three countries) and with political analysts familiar with those countries. 
Key activists were located using a “snowball” method: asking early and 
well-known activists to name others. Building a list of prospective inter-
viewees was not the problem. Finding people was the challenge. Despite the 
relatively confined geographical area where most activists still lived – the 
capital cities – activists from as long as twenty to thirty years ago were not 
always easy to trace. Eventually I was able to track down almost all persons 
I sought to interview.
Interviewees in all three countries recalled events and their activism 
with amazing detail, which I cross-checked by way of multiple interviews 
covering similar time periods and events and by matching the interviews 
with the historical record. On only a few occasions did someone get a date 
wrong. Fitting the various narratives together in a way that had not been 
done before in any of the three countries yielded a rich volume of evidence 
for theoretical interpretation.
I  used a semi-structured interview method, preparing questions 
but remaining ready to divert temporarily from my questions when an 
unexpected comment indicated a new and fruitful path. At such points, 
just listening instead of rushing on with preconceived questions often 
unearthed very relevant information that would otherwise have been 
missed. At some reasonable point, I would return to my planned questions. 
All interviews were conducted by the author. All but a few interviews were 
conducted in person in one of the three countries; a few were conducted 
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in London or Washington, and a few by telephone. I have also used some 
comments sent to me by e-mail. Interviews typically lasted from one to 
two hours, sometimes longer. It was not unusual for a scheduled interview 
to be extended at the request of the interviewee. One Kenyan who had 
been tortured for his activism interrupted his legal work of the day to 
grant me “ten minutes,” but he ended up allowing me more than an hour. 
In many cases it seemed the interview was the f irst opportunity the 
former activists had been given to detail their nonviolent resistance.
Whenever possible, I requested that the interview be conducted with no 
one else in the room. At times I politely asked others to leave. It is the au-
thor’s conviction, based on years of journalistic reporting, that interviewees 
are more likely to speak candidly when they are not speaking in front of an 
“audience” of even one other person. One of the keys to successful inter-
views was being patient, not rushed, out of respect and because personal 
narratives generally are not quick, yet can yield rich material. Sometimes 
I  learned nothing new in terms of events since I soon become familiar 
with the key events of the study period. But I learned something about 
the individual, their motivation, and their own views of what happened. 
Also, in a general way, especially in African cultures I am familiar with, it 
is considered impolite to push aside comments others are making to get 
to your preconceived questions. Often some of the best material emerged 
slowly toward the end of a long interview after some level of trust had been 
established.
In all but a very few cases, the individuals granted permission to be 
quoted by name; two of the exceptions were government off icials, one in 
Britain and one in the US. In almost all cases, the interviews were taped 
with their written consent for later publication. The activists had been 
public, often at risk, and they had no need to hide their identity. Knowing 
their names may be used strengthens the chances of credibility since their 
words might be seen by fellow activists and others from the study period. 
And in many cases it also gives them credit for their courage.
Accuracy of Interviews and other Findings
Because this book covers several decades of political history in each country, 
to verify my f indings, I sent the chapters to experts to review in advance, 
including a historian in each country, plus political analysts and other 
scholars. It is encouraging that these experts all welcomed the analyses as 
unique and accurate except for minor suggested corrections which I have 
made. Some added additional nuances of interpretation which I  have 
included. By cross-checking between multiple interviewees and archival 
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material, I was able to arrive at narratives that made sense. Occasionally 
there was a discrepancy between the memories of activists regarding an 
event. The differences, when they appeared, seldom involved historical 
facts, but generally interpretations of them. Where the differences were 
signif icant, I have provided the conflicting versions.
The research used a form of “triangulation” to assess the credibility of 
information, drawing from (1) a wide range of interviews; (2) an extensive 
literature review (human rights reports and other documents, including ten 
years of the Nairobi-based Weekly Review, considered to be one of the most 
reliable and consistent sources of political news during much of the study 
period); and (3) my own assessment as the information gathering continued. 
In Kenya, the f irst country examined, I had the advantage of working as a 
foreign correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor based in Nairobi 
for eight years covering East and West African countries.
Limits of the Interviews
The “snowball” method of locating interviewees has its limitations. For 
example, men generally named other men as good contacts. I made in-
tentional efforts to f ind women activists. Only the best-known male or 
female activists tend to be the ones named by others. But I also intentionally 
followed up on some names suggested by only a few persons, and I tried to 
f ind interviewees from a range of backgrounds.
Another limitation in the methodology is that most of the interviews 
were with urban-based activists. While it is true that most of the resistance 
I was able to document occurred in the three capital cities, undoubtedly 
there are many other instances yet to be unearthed and analyzed in smaller 
cities and rural areas. It is possible that some of the resistance in those 
other areas may have been even more dangerous than in the urban areas 
due to the presence of either rebels, army personnel, or both. There was 
a degree of protection for known (mostly urban) activists in the form of 
appeals from international organizations and perhaps embassies in the 
case of their arrest or detention. Lesser-known activists did not have this 
benef it, though numerous well-known activists suffered at the hands of 
the regimes.
Most of the interviews were conducted in the three countries. This 
meant that most of those who were active in the resistance in the important 
diaspora were not contacted. It should also be noted that only a portion of 
the activities of activists are recorded in this book. Future researchers can 
f ind plenty of unused material for additional analyses. Kenyan historian 
Macharia Munene (2013), who reviewed the Kenya chapters and approved 
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their accuracy (with slight changes made that he suggested) noted this: 
“There is a danger of being absorbed so much in some ‘activists’ that other 
players are ignored while glorifying the select.” That is true. Many people 
interviewed for this project do not appear in these pages or the book would 
be too long. And I am convinced there also are many other activists and 
others whom I never came across and who played a role in nonviolent efforts 
to bring about change in the countries studied. Even if I don’t know their 
contributions, they do.
Finally, the book is not intended as a complete period history of the 
three countries studied. For example, the book does not include a detailed 
analysis of the civil wars that occurred during the study periods in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. Nor does it include details of the ethnic conflicts that 
occurred in Kenya during the study period.
Availability of Interview Transcriptions
The author made transcripts of almost all the interviews, a slow process 
but one that helps bring out details that might otherwise be overlooked 
in simply listening to the taped recordings and making notes. Weaving 
excerpts from the transcripts into a narrative was like working on giant 
puzzles. For the benefit of future scholars, interviews with Kenyans who 
gave permission for publication of their remarks have been posted on the 
Library of Congress as part of their Africa collection at: http://www.loc.gov/
rr/amed/afs/kenyanhumanrightsinterviews.html. The author plans to do 
the same thing at some point for the Sierra Leone and Liberia interviews 
if there is continued interest on the part of the Library of Congress. In the 
meantime, I have listed in this Appendix the names of my interviewees 
except for the few who requested anonymity. Most of them were still alive at 
the time of this writing and can be located by other scholars who may arrive 
at different interpretations of events based on accounts of these activists 
and others. In other words, the conclusions in this study are falsif iable; 
they can be challenged.
Interviews
Those interviewed by the author for this book included (mostly) activists 
who were operating during the study periods, and others familiar with their 
resistance and/or the countries. NGO refers to nongovernment organiza-
tion. For activists, Profession indicates their profession at the time of their 
activism; for others it reflects their profession at the time of the interview.
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Sierra Leone
Name Profession
anonymous lebanese businessman
Bah, ibrahim journalist
Bah, sheikh mohammed moslem imam
Bangura, alimamy Pallo academic
Bangura, Zainab insurance
Bassie, gibril ngo
Bayraytay, abdulai university student leader
Bob-kandeh, marie market sales
conteh, max labor union
davies, Beresford academic
davies, shellac ngo
ellis, stephen academic
foday-musa, gibril university student leader
fofanah, alusine member of Parliament
foray, John journalist
foray, Pios journalist
foullah, Hanna bank employee
fyle, c. magbaily historian
gbujama, shirley educator
gordon, olu journalist
grant, emmanuel member of Parliament
Hull, tom former us ambassador to sierra leone
Humper, Rt. Rev. Joseph clergy
James, ambrose ngo
Johnbull, Patrick clergy
Jusu-sheriff, yasmin human rights attorney
kabba, alie university student leader
kamara, ayesha ngo
kamara, Paul journalist
kamara, sallieu journalist
kandeh, Jimmy university student activist
kargbo, ibrahim university student activist
karim-sei, ibrahim journalist
kassim, tejan labor union organizer
king, Jamesina human rights attorney
kposowa, abdul dimoh high school activist; journalist
kposowa, frank journalist
leigh, Jonathan journalist
lewis, kelvin journalist
mambu, charles ngo
minah, festus teachers union organizer
momoh, Hindowa university student activist
munchi, kiki s. (Harris) former us embassy official
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Name Profession
neville, Philip journalist
Pratt, nana ngo
samu, marian university student activist
sesay, mustapha, journalist
sheriff, Brima ngo
smythe, amy ngo
spencer, Julius journalist; kabbah cabinet
tejan-cole, abdul attorney
thomas, abator ngo
thorlu-gbla, abdul university student activist
timbo, alpha union organizer
totangi, kalilu university student activist
touray, a. marie market women leader
trye, Hindolo university student activist; journalist
wai, abdulai university student activist
Liberia
Name Profession Activism period*
doe/taylor
anonymous liberian attorney
anonymous western diplomat
Best, kenneth newspaper publisher doe
Bility, Hassan journalist taylor
Bowier, emmanuel doe cabinet
Brown, dempster attorney taylor
Brownell, mary n. educator taylor
Butty, James journalist doe
cee, esther seton attorney taylor
cooper, etweda activist taylor
danweli, cecelie ngo taylor
delaney, thomas clergy
draper, Richmond commercial
dunn, elwood political scientist
gongloe, tiawan attorney taylor
guannu, Joseph saye historian
Howard-diawara, lindora sociologist; ngo taylor
Jallah, Rev. tolbert thomas clergy
Johnson-morris, frances attorney taylor
karku, sampson student leader taylor
karnley, father andrew 
Jagaye
clergy taylor
konneh, sheikh kafumba f. moslem leader taylor
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Name Profession Activism period*
korto, Joseph educator
kulah, Bishop (Ret.) arthur f. clergy doe
Rennie, ledgerhood radio journalist taylor
matthews, Baccus politician *
moore, sando photojournalist doe, taylor
mulbah, elizabeth nursing taylor
Pajibo, ezekiel student doe
Parker, marie economist taylor
Porte, Bertha (mrs. albert 
Porte)
retired
Roberts, James educator
sainworla, frank radio journalist taylor
sawyer, amos politician/academic *doe, taylor
stewart, John student; journalist *doe, taylor
tikpor, monsignor father 
Robert
clergy doe, taylor
tipoteh, togba-nah politician/economist *
toe, J. aloysisus activist doe, taylor
toe, J. augustine attorney taylor
tokpa, alaric student; academic doe, taylor
Verdier, Jerome attorney
waines, david missionary
wesseh, conmany B. student; ngo *doe, taylor
williams, gabriel i.H. journalist doe
woewiyu, tom taylor cabinet
woods, kofi attorney doe, taylor
student means university student. the * indicates those who were active in reform-seeking civil 
society organizations in the 1970s leading up to the 1980 coup by doe. individuals shown may 
have been active in additional periods than those indicated.
Kenya
Rank* Name profession Phase 1 Phase 2 Interviewed
1987-’91 1991-2002
1 muite, Paul attorney i/o o √
2 imanyara, gitobu attorney i o unavailable
3 orengo, James attorney i o √
4 kuria, gibson attorney i i/o √
5 mutunga, willy attorney activist earlier o √
6 njoya, timothy clergy i/o i/o √
7 murungi, kiraitu attorney i o √
8 kariuki, mirugi attorney i o √
9 maathai, wangari biologist o o √
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Rank* Name profession Phase 1 Phase 2 Interviewed
1987-’91 1991-2002
10 nowrojee, Pheroze attorney i o √
11 kinyatti, maina wa academic activist earlier √ √
12 nyong’o, Peter a. academic i/o o √
13 mbugua, Bedan journalist o o √
14 khaminwa, John attorney i i √
15 odinga, Raila activist i o √
16 wamwere, koigi activist i i/o √
17 karua, martha attorney i o √
18 muge, alexander clergy o deceased
19 kibwana, kivutha academic i/o o √
20 oginga odinga politician i o deceased
21 kababere, njeri business i o √
22 matiba, kenneth business i o √
23 Rubia, charles business i o √
24 kariuki, g.B.m. attorney i o √
25 kiai, maina attorney o √
26 Buke, wafula youth activist i o √
27 gitari, david clergy o o √
28 lamba, davinder architect o √
29 nzeki, ndingi clergy o √
30 m’inoti, kathurima attorney i o √
Additional interviews of Kenyan activists and others
anonymous former British diplomat
anonymous us congressional staffer
Balala, sheikh moslem activist
duko, James human rights researcher
fisher, Hillary human rights researcher
Harper, malcolm former ngo official
Hart, christopher former British government researcher
Hill, martin human rights researcher
kamau, muthoni youth activist
kathangu, njeru attorney
kihoro, wanjiru diaspora ngo
kihoro, wanyiri attorney
kinuthia, margaret youth activist
kinuthia, milcah mother; housewife
kinuthia, Rumba attorney
kiplagat, Bethuel former moi senior official
koome, martha attorney
makali, david journalist
muthoni, kamau youth activist
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mugenda, abel academic
munene, macharia historian
mute, lawrence ngo
muthoga, lee attorney
ndegwa, stephen academic
nyamwamu, cyprien youth activist
o’Brien, stephen world Bank
ombati, kepta youth activist
ong’wen, James ngo
oyugi, edward psychologist
Ruteere, mutuma human rights researcher
shikuku, martin politician
shinn, david former us state department official
shitemi, simeon former moi government official
waithera, njoroge youth activist
wainaina, ndung’u youth activist
wanyande, Peter academic
west, tina former us embassy official
notes: *Rank reflects the frequency with which the top thirty kenyans were mentioned by other 
interviewees as key players in the nonviolent resistance during the study period, 1987-2002 
(Press 2006, 193). additional non-ranked interviews are included after that. Profession refers to 
their primary activity during the study period. Phase 1 was primarily individual activism; Phase 2 
was primarily organizational: i = individual activist; o = organizational activist. some were both. 
many individual activists later became organizational activists as more organizations, including 
opposition parties, started up. “unavailable:” after a brief initial interview, imanyara was not 
available despite repeated attempts to make an appointment, but with archival materials i was 
able to document his contributions to the resistance. deceased indicates activists who had died 
before the interviews were conducted.
Comparative Levels of Repression
State Repression in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Liberia: 1981-2003
(Lower scores = more repression/less respect for human rights)
Kenya S.L. Liberia
1981 6 8 5
1982 6 6 5
1983 6 6 6
1984 6 6 5
1985 5 7 2
1986 6 7 5
1987 5 6 5
1988 3 6 4
1989 4 6 3
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Kenya S.L. Liberia
1990 5 5 0*
1991 3 3 0*
1992 2 0 0*
1993 5 1 0*
1994 4 0 0*
1995 4 0 0*
1996 4 3 0
1997 4 0* 2
1998 2 0* 0
1999 1 0* 1
2000 2 0* 0
2001 3 4 1
2002 2 8 1
2003 3 5 1
total 91 87 46
source: cingranelli-Richards (ciRi) Human Rights data set. www.humanrightsdata.org which 
began in 1981
notes: the numbers measure Physical integrity, which includes torture, extrajudicial killing, politi-
cal imprisonment, and disappearance. “it ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four 
rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights.” the data is based primarily on analyses 
of the united states department of state annual country Reports on Human Rights Practices and 
on amnesty international’s annual reports. “if there are discrepancies between the two sources, 
coders are instructed to treat the amnesty international evaluation as authoritative … to remove 
a potential bias in favor of us allies” (ciRi 2008). * indicates “chaos” (civil war); no data available; 
coded in this article as 0, indicating no government respect for human rights given the atrocities 
that occurred. most nonviolent resistance examined in this book took place in the capitals, outside 
the war zones, though at times in both liberia and sierra leone, the conflict swept into the 
capitals. the coding shown is national, not limited to the capital.
Chronologies
To help readers keep key political and resistance events clear, a chronol-
ogy for each is provided below for the three case-study countries. In some 
cases, especially Sierra Leone where there were three distinct periods of 
resistance, inclusion of some details not in the previous chapters offers 
additional insights on the rich and multifaceted, nonviolent resistance 
that took place. The political chronology is drawn from the BBC timeline 
offered online for each country and is fully referenced in the bibliography. 
The resistance chronology is drawn from the author’s interviews and other 
research for this book.
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Sierra Leone
Political Chronology
1898 Hut tax “war” against colonial British administration.
1961 Sierra Leone becomes independent from Britain.
1968 Siaka Stevens returns to power as civilian president following a 
military coup.
1985 Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh becomes president follow-
ing retirement of Siaka Stevens.
1991 Start of civil war by Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
1991 New constitution provides for multiparty elections.
1992 President Momoh ousted in military coup by National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC); Captain Valentine Strasser 
becomes head of state.
1996 February. NPRC steps down after major civil society pressure. 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected president; signs peace accord with 
RUF rebels.
1997 May. President Kabbah ousted in a military coup by Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by Major Johnny 
Paul Koroma. Kabbah flees to Guinea.
1998 Nigerian-led West African intervention force drives rebels out of 
Freetown; President Kabbah returns from Guinea.
1999 January. Elements of army and rebels seize parts of Freetown 
in an orgy of violence before being driven out again. United 
Nations troops arrive to police peace agreement.
2000 British troops arrive.
2002 January. War declared over.
Resistance and Repression Chronology
Except where their names start the sentence, names of interviewees cited 
as sources are shown in parentheses.
Early resistance (examples)
– 1898 Hut tax “war” against colonial British administration
– 1947 mine workers strike
The Siaka Stevens years
– Students were active in the opposition, including in a 1968 demonstration. 
“Right from independence, whenever we have a repressive government 
in this country, one of the voices, one of the pressure groups that always 
comes out, that always speaks [is] the students” (Beresford Davis).
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– There was a “climate of fear” from 1980s onward (Julius Spencer).
– Resistance in the 1960s. Lawyers were the most vocal critics of govern-
ment until Siaka Stevens began repressing them: then “lawyers went 
into their shells” (Frank Kposowa). With few exceptions, the country’s 
bar association remained quiet throughout the rest of the Stevens 
era and even during the NPRC and AFRC military juntas. But some 
individual lawyers did challenge the government, including Charles 
Margai and others, for example, in the defense of those charged with 
treason and later executed under Stevens (Jamesina King).
– Churches in the 70s: “not vibrant” (Frank Kposowa)
1977 student demonstrations
– Stevens government and student politics. From the 1970s, the Stevens 
government got involved in student politics – a government/campus 
relationship that continues today (Brima Sherriff). Alie (2006, 98) notes 
there were government-paid student spies on campus in those years, 
which meant planning a demonstration had to be done in secret. The 
1977 demonstration surprised President Stevens just as he stood up to 
deliver a speech at a graduation ceremony.
– The 1977 demonstration lacked labor support. The demonstrations, 
which spread to secondary schools and colleges across the country, 
might have toppled the government with the help of labor, according 
to various interviewees.
– Students staged mass demonstrations at State House (the president’s 
off ice) during talks with student leaders.
1977 Parliamentary election violence: voting as resistance
In the wake of the 1977 student demonstrations, the shaken Stevens regime 
conceded to elections that year and lowered the voting age to eighteen.
But there was a highly rigged nomination process and the campaign was 
marred by government thuggery and other violence (Alie 2006, 86.)
University student demonstrations: 1980s-’90s
– There were more student strikes, either local or national, including one 
for multiparty elections and another over the quality of water (Abdul 
Kposowa). By the time Momoh came to power, students knew how to 
make f irebombs (Kalilu Totangi). In the face of student demonstra-
tions, labor unrest, and international pressures for democracy, the 
Momoh government accepted multiparty shortly after the civil war 
began.
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– 1980 – Campus strike against Organization of African Unity summit in 
Sierra Leone (The Tablet, Feb. 20, 1980, in Rashid 2004, 78).
– 1981 – students burn the off icial car of the Mayoress of Freetown, Dr. 
June Holst-Roness (Rashid, 2004, 78).
– 1984 – major demonstration: students and others reacted to ambiguity 
by Siaka Stevens about becoming a president for life: “Over 2,000 college 
students and urban youth took to the streets carrying placards which 
condemned the president’s plans for life presidency. The demonstrators 
stormed the City Hall and disrupted the ongoing APC party congress” 
(Rashid 2004, 80).
– 1985 – Fourah Bay College students protested expulsion of student 
leaders; burned Mercedes Benz car of the vice-principal, Cyril Foray 
(Hindowa Momoh). The demonstration spread to the city. “Cars were 
smashed, government buildings ransacked, and shops looted.” The 
University expelled forty-one students and three lecturers: Olu Gordon, 
Jimmy Kandeh and Cleo Hanciles. Kandeh later won a court ruling 
against his expulsion (Rashid 2004, 81, 89).
– 1990-91 – university students organize nationally; lobby Momoh 
directly.
– 1991 – students at Njala demonstrate peacefully at Taiama Junction (on 
road to Bo) for multiparty elections (Abdulai Wai & Marian Samu).
– 1991 – students at Fourah Bay march down from campus for multiparty; 
police beat and teargas students. Eight white American students used 
as a “shield” with their consent. Some students were jailed (Hindowa 
Momoh).
– 1997 (Aug 18) students march against the AFRC; met with violence.
Other resistance: 1980s
– 1981 labor strike without the help of students.
– 1981 “Ndogbowusi:” – A guerrilla movement formed in Pujehun District 
near Liberia “in the wake of the 1982 elections, to retaliate against what 
they perceived as “state-sponsored terrorism” (Alie 2006, 99).
– Mid to late 1980s: early indications of a gradual emergence of civil 
society. Kassim and King point to a real emergence in the mid-1990s 
in response to the excesses of the NPRC and their failure to bring peace.
RUF civil war begins: 1991 (mass killings and amputations)
– Hindowa Momoh argues that domestic pressures and frustration trig-
gered the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) civil war. He argues that 
the RUF was not specif ically a lumpen revolution as some scholars 
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have said (e.g., Ismail Rashid, 2004, 66-89). When you look at the RUF 
itself, it has a lot of intellectual backing. Rashid def ines lumpen youth 
as (71): “used in its crude Marxist sense to represent those strata of 
the society that cannot fully employ or sell its labour power because 
of capitalist transformation, restructuring or retrenchment.” In an 
endnote (87) he thanks Ibrahim Abdullah “for sharing his ideas/notes 
on his project on the Lumpen and unemployed in Freetown.” Rashid 
(2004) does not deny the links between the so-called lumpen youth 
of Freetown and “student radicals” who “helped reshape the role and 
agency of these youth” (86). Alie Kabba was elected unopposed as 
president of the student union at Fourah Bay College. This was, as 
Abdullah (2004, 56) points out, after a number of students, including 
Kabba, had gone to either Ghana or Libya (or both) for training and 
planning in revolutionary concepts. Abdullah adds that only three 
of these people decided to pursue actual revolution, including Foday 
Sankoh, who was not an intellectual. In March 1991, the RUF rebels 
invaded Sierra Leone.
NPRC coup 1992
– The f irst resistance to the NPRC began soon after they seized power, 
but the resistance grew much stronger in 1994 and 1995 after the junta 
had failed to end the war, had compiled a record of corruption and 
abuse of civilians, especially in Freetown, and was seen stalling in the 
promised transition to democracy rule.
– NPRC attacks prominent woman (Paul Kamara’s For Di People newspa-
per reported it).
– NPRC executes without trial head of police and some journalists.
– NPRC expels German Ambassador, Karl Prince; women, church leaders, 
and diplomatic community rally around him.
– Civilian politicians in NPRC and civil society: “Politicians had inf il-
trated” NPRC (Hindolo Trye). They were invited to join by the NPRC, 
which needed help running the government. But these civilian politi-
cians were, according to Trye, also seeking power for themselves. Trye 
adds that these civilian politicians also had “penetrated” civil society, 
again seeking power.
Early push for peace and NPRC divisions
– Youth march in 1994 for peace: As members of the Youth Federation 
for World Peace, women organized rallies, meetings, and a march that 
attracted a “couple of hundred” participants (Marian Samu).
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– Women marched in 1995 in Freetown, ending up at the national stadium.
– NPRC splits by 1994. There were divisions over governance issues. The 
aim stated early on by NPRC leader Strasser was to return the country 
to democracy. But they had moved away from that to “amassing wealth” 
(Brima Sheriff).
– Palace coup 1995: Bio replaces Strasser.
– There are several explanations for the coup. Bio accused Strasser of 
planning to delay the transition to democracy and Strasser late in the 
game decided to be a candidate for president himself. Bio and others 
in NPRC had already chosen another candidate (according to Julius 
Spencer); some former military cabinet ministers were upset with 
Strasser because he had sent them back to the barracks.
Resistance to NPRC
The NPRC failed to end the war or pay for it, instead collaborating with 
rebels to plunder resources in the f ield and raiding the treasury. Informa-
tion was coming out that the NPRC was draining the Ministry of Finance, 
supposedly to pay for the war; much of it was a matter of misappropriation, 
which prolonged the war, adding to demands for constitutional government. 
The war was having a widespread economic impact on society, including, for 
example, market women and families; teachers were not paid in war zones 
(Festus Minah).While Strasser’s own youth had appealed to youth early 
on, by 1994, student groups were criticizing the NPRC and some religious 
leaders began speaking out against continued NPRC rule (Brima Sheriff).
– Journalists mounted a steady resistance to the NPRC through independ-
ent reporting of their abuses.
– “All these groups shoot up. There was pressure [on the NPRC] from every 
corner.” Some told them to their face, others ‘spoke’ through graff iti on 
walls or at community meetings. When NPRC leaders went to a public 
forum, they would be confronted “diplomatically” (Abdul Kposowa).
Women’s resistance to NPRC
According to Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, women were politically active as far back 
as the 1940s. In 1952 the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement was formed. But 
during the repressive years of Siaka Stevens, women mostly retreated into 
social, educational, and development groups, only remerging to push for 
peace around 1994 and eventually for “elections before peace” to push the 
NPRC out of power.
– Background: Women felt left out of the World Conference on women, 
Nairobi, Kenya, July 1985 because it was mostly government officials that 
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attended (the official name was: “World Conference to Review and Ap-
praise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equal-
ity, Development and Peace”). Women in Sierra Leone began organizing 
for the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, September 
1995 (Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff). The organizing, lobbying, and participation 
of women led to their participation in the important Bitumani I and 
II political conferences in 1995 and 1996 on the NPRC role and war.
– Women’s Forum – According to Marian Samu, women meeting under 
Amy Smyth at the YWCA in 1993 formed a special group for peace, which 
“later developed into the Women’s Forum. Smythe says the Women’s 
Forum started in the 1994 after the women’s conference in Dakar, which 
was a preparatory meeting for the 1995 women’s conference in Beijing 
(Amy Smyth); it was most active 1994-’96 (Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff). It was 
a coalition of women’s organizations and the key movement of women 
during this period of a push for elections before peace. Dr. Nana Pratt 
spoke against the NPRC; Zainab Bangura and others came later, accord-
ing to Ibrahim Kargbo.
– SLANGO (Sierra Leone Association of Non-Government Organizations) 
started in 1994.
– Women staged a massive peace march “20,000-strong women’s peace 
rally” in Freetown in February 1995 (Bradbury 1995, 49, cited in Keen 
2005, 154).
– Sierra Leone Women” Movement for Peace formed (Jusu-Sheriff).
– Formation of Women for a Morally Enlightened Nation led by Zainab 
Bangura. Keen (2005, 156) says this group was “[p]articularly effective … 
They had reportedly threatened to expose corrupt politicians” f inancial 
links with the military unless the politicians backed the elections” 
(Africa Confidential, 29, March 1996, vol. 37, no. 7, cited in Keen 2005, 
156). Keen notes a point by Jusu-Sheriff that, in Keen’s words, “the 
women’s intervention might also have made a negotiated settlement a 
more respectable option, minimizing loss of face for both government 
and rebels” (156).
– Mid 1990s. Three key groups, among others, “came together” to oppose 
the NPRC: Civil Society Movement of Sierra Leone; SLANGO (Sierra 
Leone Association of Non-Government Organizations) and the Women’s 
Forum, according to Ayesha Kamara.
– Bitumani I, August 15-17, 1995. Women negotiated increased representa-
tion in the conference, more than was planned by the organizer, head of 
the Electoral Commission, James Jonah. The women lobbied nationwide 
on the issue. Delegates voted to hold elections before peace.
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– Bitumani II, February 12, 1996. Delegates vote to hold elections before 
peace.
– Head of state Maada Bio’s had attempted to “manipulate” the transition, 
to delay a return to democratic rule and prolong the military’s stay in 
power (Brima Sheriff). “Two days before the conference, the Interim 
National Electoral Commission off ices and the homes of Electoral 
Commission boss, James Jonah, and presidential candidate, Tejan Kab-
bah, were attacked with grenades and gunfire. Soldiers were widely 
suspected of being behind the attacks. Jonah, however, was determined 
to press on with the elections (Keen 2005, 156.)
– Women were again key players at Bitumani II. Not clear was how much 
doubt delegates had about proceeding to elections, but by most ac-
counts the speech by market woman Marie Touray on going ahead was 
dramatic and effective.
– International pressure: Julius Spencer notes that the will of the people 
was overwhelming at Bitumani II. The international community also 
played a role: “They were watching.” They also offered scholarships to 
the NPRC, many of whom accepted them, according to Spencer.
Voting in 1996: a form of resistance to NPRC in view of threats and gunfire.
One might not immediately consider the vote for a civilian president in 
1996 “resistance,” but Julius Spencer, who later became a cabinet minister 
in the government elected that year, describes it as resistance. “People went 
out to vote, even though there were threats of violence [by the regime]. On 
polling day, even with sounds of gunshots, people stood in line and insisted 
they were going to vote.”
– Election of Kabbah in February 1996.
– NPRC chairman Julius Maada Bio handed over power to the democrati-
cally elected president, Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah March 29, 1996.
– Kabbah government took power; fourteen months later he was ousted 
in a coup.
AFRC coup May 25, 1997: mass noncooperation by civilians
During their more than nine months in power, the civilian population in 
Freetown mounted an extraordinary nonviolent resistance campaign in 
which noncooperation was the key tactic. Driven by strong opposition to 
the junta and encouraged by both the unpredictable violence on the streets 
and fears of being labeled a collaborator later, much of the commercial and 
institutional life of the city shut down.
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– AFRC invites RUF rebels to join the military government. The RUF rebels 
quickly “took command” of the government (Charles Mambu and others).
– Sierra Leone Labour Congress denounces the rebels two days after the 
coup. They call on the regime to step down. Other immediate denuncia-
tions came from the National Union of Sierra Leonean Students (NUSS), 
Women’s Peace Movement, petty traders association, and the Sierra 
Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), and “university dons,” (Gordon 
2004, 187).
– Silent protest after rebels burn Treasury building in 1997. The destruc-
tion of records on seven state off icials came the day before they were to 
go on trial on charges of stealing state resources. “[T]housands of Sierra 
Leoneans gathered at the site of the burned Treasury in mute protest” 
(Gordon 2004, 187).
– Student demonstration August 18, 1997. Two students were killed (Jona-
than Leigh; Kelvin Lewis mentions one was killed.) Military helicopters 
flew over the city shooting live rounds at students; some 200 students 
were arrested and some female students were raped at military barracks 
(Brima Sheriff).
– Some civilians ate with rebels who were “family or friends” (Charles 
Mambu). It was a “matter of survival.” Rebels would locate food and 
other items and share it in the civilians’ compound. There were revenge 
killings of collaborators after the war, something few Sierra Leoneans 
mentioned but which are noted in international human rights reports. 
Charles Mambu said some AFRC fighters were recruited against their will.
– Clandestine opposition journalism. Signif icantly, a number of inde-
pendent newspapers began publishing from clandestine locations, 
continuing to expose junta abuses.
– Clandestine radio station. The Kabbah government in exile in Guinea 
set up a clandestine radio station that kept hope alive of their return. 
They used psychological tactics against the junta, using informants to 
report the junta’s moves and even plans.
Kabbah government returns in 1998; invites rebels into government
– Women in 2001 bravely march (peacefully) on rebel leader’s home 
amidst rumors of a coup. Rebel leader Foday Sankoh refuses to talk; 
he threatens the women, but does not open f ire.
– Second march on Sankoh’s home coup turns violent as rebels f ire on 
crowd, with estimates of about 27 killed.
– Abuses under Kabbah: delayed & unfair trials; mistreatment of prison-
ers (Brima Sheriff; also human rights reports).
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Rebels’ brief violent return: January 1999
The violence was so horrif ic and sudden that resistance was impossible. 
Estimates of the number of civilians killed range from six thousand to 
more than seven thousand with some one hundred thousand driven from 
their home. Nigerian troops at a cost of up to a thousand of their troops, 
pushed them back after several weeks. The war was off icial declared over 
in January 2002.
Liberia
Political Chronology
1847 Liberia declares independence.
1971 William R. Tolbert, Jr. becomes president; promises reforms.
1980 President Tolbert assassinated in military coup; Master Sergeant 
Samuel K. Doe becomes head of state.
1985 Doe wins disputed presidential election; coup attempt fails.
1989 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles G. 
Taylor, launches civil war.
1990 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sends 
peacekeeping troops; Doe is executed by a splinter group of the 
NPFL.
1990-97 Interim governments, including one of a coalition of rebel 
leaders.
1997 Charles G. Taylor elected president; disarmament brings tempo-
rary peace.
1999 Second civil war begins.
2003 Rebels advance to within ten kilometers of Monrovia; Taylor 
resigns facing international indictment on charges of war crimes 
of supporting rebels in Sierra Leone to help his own f ight in 
Liberia.
2005 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf elected president of Liberia – f irst woman 
elected as head of an African state.
2006 President Johnson-Sirleaf switches on a generator powering 
street lights in the capital, a city that had not had electricity in 
f ifteen years.
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Resistance Chronology
1970s Civil society groups push for political reforms. The Movement 
for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and the Progressive Alliance of 
Liberia (PAL) actively seek greater participation of Liberians 
in the political system; their leaders become role models for 
younger activists.
1979 “Rice Riots.” Led by Gabriel Baccus Matthews of PAL, with 
students and others protest an anticipated government hike in 
the price of rice. Tolbert uses force to halt the demonstrations. 
His reaction shows weakness of his administration, opening the 
door for the coup a year later.
1980s Some professionals and activists (journalists, clergy, and 
attorneys) push for greater democratic freedoms, but mass 
repression by Samuel Doe’s regime severely limits nonviolent 
resistance. Some activists distributing antigovernment literature 
are arrested; some are tortured. Six university student leaders 
condemned to die are released at the last minute after wide-
spread statements ranging from professionals to market women. 
Thousands demonstrate on the streets when they are freed.
University students demonstrate on campus after arrest of popular 
faculty members Amos Sawyer and George Clay Kieh, Jr. Doe 
targets independent newspapers, burning some of their off ices. 
Mass public march in 1990 to get Doe to resign as rebels draw near 
is put down with violence by the regime.
1991 Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC) created and 
provides nationwide, clandestine monitoring of human rights 
abuses, transmitting the f indings to international human rights 
organizations and Western governments. Archbishop Michael 
Kpakala Francis boldly condemns abuses by rebels, as he had 
abuses under Doe and did later under President Taylor.
1992 Catholic Church establishes its own radio station, Radio Veritas, 
which broadcasts live testimonies from victims of the war and 
related atrocities.
1994 Early phase of women’s peace movement. Women hold public 
meetings and attend some peace conferences, though they 
are never allowed in as delegates. Women lobby government 
off icials; issue public statements; stage marches and “stay home” 
strikes. Four-day “training” session in nonviolence for rebel 
leaders is sponsored by women’s peace activists.
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1990s During Taylor’s presidency: formation of numerous civil society 
organizations centered on human rights and rule of law. At-
torneys and others work closely with international human rights 
groups to report Taylor’s regime abuses. Activists in some NGOs 
stage various protests. Culture of resistance grows stronger.
1998 Rape and murder of a market woman in Monrovia by Taylor’s 
forces sparks united protest by female lawyers and others.
2003 Women stage mass marches and vigils and use other tactics to 
get Taylor and rebel leaders to stop the war. Taylor resigns.
Kenya
Political Chronology
1963 Kenya gains independence from Britain.
1964 Jomo Kenyatta becomes president.
1978 Vice President Daniel arap Moi becomes president upon the 
death of Kenyatta.
1982 Kenya declared a one-party state; coup attempt is unsuccessful.
1987 Opposition groups suppressed; international criticism voiced 
over arrests and abuses, including torture.
1988 Parliamentary elections held using controversial queue voting; 
widespread rigging reported.
1990 Popular Foreign Minister Robert Ouko murdered; Scotland Yard 
points f inger at two Moi off icials.
1991 Moi agrees to multiparty political system after mounting mass 
pressure and public rallies calling for this. The decision came 
shortly after a mass protest and donor freezing of new aid funds.
1992 Ethnic conflicts linked to the government’s attempt to control 
key electoral areas. Moi re-elected president amidst a divided 
opposition.
1997 Moi re-elected amidst continuing divisions among opposition. 
Some reforms passed by parliament.
1998 Bombing of US Embassy in Nairobi; more than 200 killed. A 
similar bombing hits the US Embassy in neighboring Tanzania; 
both bombings are linked to Al-Qaeda.
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2002 Mwai Kibaki wins election as president. Moi is ineligible to run 
again; his favored candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Keny-
atta, loses (but is elected in 2013). Kibaki is reelected in 2007 
in disputed vote counting which is followed by mass political 
violence, much of it ethnic related. Power-sharing government 
instituted with Kibaki and Raila Odinga, son of Kenya’s f irst vice 
president, Oginga Odinga.
Resistance Chronology
1970s Some published and oral dissent from academics and opposition 
members of Parliament.
1980s Formation of several underground opposition groups in an era of 
fear, including Mwakenya.
1987 Attorney Gibson Kamau Kuria sues the government to stop 
torture of political detainees.
1988 Bedan Mbugua, editor of National Council of Churches maga-
zine, Beyond, exposes government fraud in the 1988 elections.
1989 Conservationist/political activist Wangari Maathai challenges 
regime plans to build tall party headquarters and statue of Moi 
on only big city park. With the help of donor pressure she wins 
her case, showing Moi can be rebuffed.
Late 
1980s-
early 
1990s
Some attorneys, acting as individuals, without the support of 
their bar association, challenge the Moi regime’s human rights 
abuses and lack of rule of law. Several independent magazines 
challenge the regime, leading to arrests of the editors. Four 
clergy speak out for reform: Bishops Henry Okullu, David Gitari 
and Alexander Muge plus Rev. Dr. Timothy Njoya.
1990 First of two major non-approved opposition political rallies held: 
“Saba Saba,” July 7, in Nairobi. Police use violence to block it.
1991 Formation of the Forum for Restoration of Democracy in 
Kenya (FORD) by opposition politicians calling for multiparty 
elections.
1991 Second major non-approved opposition political rally held in 
Nairobi (“Kamkunji’) Nov 16, 1991, to press for multiparty elec-
tions. Police respond with force. Not long after that, and a donor 
freeze of new funds, Moi approves multiparty electoral system.
1992 Small group of mothers of political detainees stage public sit-in 
and partial hunger strike in a downtown park to win release of 
their politically detained sons. They are successful after one year 
of protest.
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1990s The mostly individual resistance gives way to mostly organi-
zational resistance as political opposition parties and activist 
NGOs form following adoption of multiparty politics.
1996-97 Nationwide advocacy network for reform established; holds 
national convention in 1997 near Nairobi. Youth delegates are 
very active at convention and push for demonstrations.
1997 Series of public demonstrations approved by National 
Convention Assembly. Regime uses extreme violence against 
demonstrators, who include members of the middle class. At 
least fourteen people are killed; many are clubbed.
Late 
1990s
Public criticism and even ridicule of President Moi and his 
regime becomes commonplace in magazines, newspapers, radio, 
television, public rallies as a culture of resistance begun in the 
late 1980s blossoms.
Abbreviations and Significant Terms
Sierra Leone
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (junta in power 
parts of 1996-97)
APC All People’s Congress (political party)
Bitumani I and II Two national conventions in 1995 and 1996 of a range 
of citizens who voted on whether to have presidential 
elections and end military rule before the civil war 
was over or wait until the war ended. The delegates 
in both conventions voted to have “elections before 
peace,” blaming military junta for prolonging the 
war to stay in power. (The sessions were held in the 
Bitumani hotel in Freetown.)
CDF/CDM Civil Defense Force/Civil Defense Movements: usually 
formed around a core group of traditional hunters, 
during the Sierra Leone civil war. In addition to the 
Kamajors in the Mende region of the South, there were 
“the Kapras and Gbetes among the Temne, the Donsos 
of Kono District and the Tamaboras of Koinadugu 
District.” The term “Kamajors” was widely applied to 
all such forces, though they specif ically were formed 
among the Mende (Keen 2005, 90)
CSMSL Civil Society Movement of Sierra Leone
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ECOMOG Economic Community (of West African States) 
Monitoring Group. The military force comprised 
of (mostly) Nigerian troops under the direction of 
ECOWAS that intervened in the civil wars in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
MARWOPNET Mano River Union Women Peace Network (women’s 
peace groups from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea)
MRD Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
NCCP National Coordinating Committee for Peace (coalition 
of some sixty professional, voluntary and religious 
organizations advocating for peace)
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council (military junta in 
power 1992-96)
OAU Organization of African Unity (later reorganized as 
African Union)
Radio Democracy A clandestine radio station operated inside Sierra 
Leone by the ousted government of Kabbah during the 
time the AFRC/RUF junta was in power in 1996 and 
1997. The aim was to encourage noncooperation with 
the junta, lift spirits of citizens, and put psychological 
pressure on the junta members by exposing their 
plans and actions through informants
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone rebel force)
SLA Sierra Leone Army
SLAJ Sierra Leone Association of Journalists
SLANGO Sierra Leone Association of Non-Government 
Organizations
SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party (political party)
SLTU Sierra Leone Teachers Union
SLWPM Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement
USIA United States Information Agency
WOMEN Women Organized for a More Enlightened Na-
tion (NGO formed in 1995 to promote peace and 
democracy)
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Liberia
COLIDAP Citizens of Liberia in Defense of Albert Porte. An early 
civil society organization in support of pamphleteer 
Albert Porte, a frequent critic of governments and 
advocate for reform
ECOMOG see listing under Sierra Leone
ECOWAS see listing under Sierra Leone
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Rebel 
group that broke off from Charles Taylor’s NPLF, 
headed by Prince Johnson, who later oversaw the 
torture and assassination of President Samuel Doe
JPC Justice and Peace Commission, an organization 
started by the Catholic Church in Liberia in the early 
1990s to support rule of law and human rights
LWI Liberia Women’s Initiative. Women’s peace advocacy 
group begun in the early 1990s
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy. 
Rebel group opposed to Charles Taylor
MARWOPNET see listing under Sierra Leone
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia. Rebel group 
opposed to Charles Taylor
MOJA Movement for Justice in Africa. A private organiza-
tion formed in the 1970s that advocated for political 
reforms
NPLF National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The rebel force led 
by Charles Taylor that invaded Liberia in December 
1989
PAL Progressive Alliance of Liberia. A private organiza-
tion formed in the 1970s that advocated for political 
reform. PAL founder Baccus Matthews organized the 
mass protests in 1979 against the government’s plan to 
raise the price of rice
PRC People’s Redemption Council. The name of the 
military regime headed by Samuel Doe which seized 
power in 1980
PUL Press Union of Liberia. Association of journalists in 
Liberia
WIPNET Women in Peace Building Network. Formed in 2003 to 
advocate for peace
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Kenya
CID Criminal Investigation Department (a government 
agency)
CPK Church of the Province of Kenya
FORD Forum for the Restoration of Kenya. Organization 
advocating for multiparty democracy
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPPG Inter-Party Parliament Group, formed in Parliament in 
1997 to propose reforms
KANU Kenya African National Union. The party of President 
Daniel arap Moi
LSK Law Society of Kenya
NARC National Alliance Rainbow Coalition, the unity group 
that backed one major presidential candidate in 2002 
against the KANU candidate of outgoing President 
Moi. The compromise candidate, Mwai Kibaki won 
the election
NCA National Convention Assembly in 1997 to advocate for 
constitutional reform
NCEC National Convention Executive Committee, formed at 
the NCA
NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya
RPP Release Political Prisoners, an NGO formed to advo-
cate for political rights
SONU Students Organization of Nairobi University
Figure 16  Looking to the future: young couple in Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2009
Photo by Betty Press
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